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ABSTRACT
This study charts the transition of Vest German public service 
broadcasting from its recent position of monopoly to its new status 
within a "dual system" of public service and commercial broadcasting. 
The political developments which have led to a dual system are 
analysed, and in this connection the conclusion of an inter- Land 
agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting in 1987 is discussed. 
Emphasis is also placed on the pronouncements of the Federal 
Constitutional Court in November 1986 and March 1987, which set new 
parameters for public service broadcasting, as exemplified in the 
constitutional obligation of Grundversorgung.
The reactions of public service broadcasters to commercial 
competition are examined by concentrating on recent TV reforms and 
attempts to expand into cable, satellite and sub-regional broadcasting. 
In both cases the underlying goal is to establish the extent to which 
public service broadcasters can respond to the commercial challenge by 
drawing on their own resources.
The study shows that public service broadcasting's response to 
commercial competition is inhibited by a complex procedure of Lander 
policy-making and by the politicisation of issues affecting the 
funding of public service broadcasting. It also contends that formal 
structures and programming reforms are an inadequate defence if there 
is decreasing political willingness to support the system. The extent 
of this support is measured by political willingness to guarantee 
adequate sources of funding. The preservation of public service 
broadcasting is therefore closely linked to decisions taken by those 
outside broadcasting. However, the study concludes that continued 
adherence to balanced programming will help ARD and ZDF to stand out 
from commercial channels, and that more attention to high quality 
entertainment will increase audience loyalty, so making it more 
difficult for party-political forces to dismantle the system wholesale.
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This study aims to chart the transition of West German public 
service broadcasting from its recent position of monopoly to its new 
status within a "dual" system of public service and commercial 
broadcasting. Of course, the introduction of commercial broadcasting 
in competition with public service broadcasting is not confined to 
West Germany alone. In the United Kingdom the public service British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has competed with the privately owned 
ITV stations since 1954. However, by examining recent developments in 
West Germany we can learn something about the route which public 
service broadcasting is taking in an increasingly deregulated and 
competitive environment. West Germany has been chosen as a case 
study, because it provides a perfect example of a broadcasting system 
which until quite recently was insulated from commercial competition, 
and exhibited only minor forms of commercial activity in the form of 
partial funding by advertising and the use of programmes produced by 
or bought from outside sources.
This introductory chapter outlines the key definitions and factors 
associated with the debate about the future of public service 
broadcasting in a broader context, drawing mainly on examples from 
West Germany and the United Kingdom. First, there will be an attempt 
to define public service broadcasting with reference to its past and 
the expectations and obligations it has traditionally been expected to
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fulfil. Second, there will be a discussion about recent changes in 
broadcasting which are affecting the traditional understanding of 
public service. This will focus on growing commercial tendencies 
which, accompanied by new developments in the field of cable and 
satellite broadcasting, allow a greater number of competing 
broadcasting outlets than had previously been possible.
Chapter 2 deals specifically with the history and structures of 
broadcasting in Germany. Initially, it was intended that a historical 
description of broadcasting in Germany would serve as a useful 
backdrop, but it soon became clear that the historical narrative was 
much more significant as a critical step towards the intended analysis 
of the transition of public service broadcasting in West Germany. For 
only by understanding events of the 1920s and 1930s can we fully 
comprehend broadcasting structures in today's West Germany. A 
description and analysis of contemporary broadcasting structures and 
legislation sets the scene for later discussion of the most recent 
developments in West German broadcasting.
Chapter 3 analyses the political developments which have led to a 
dual broadcasting system in West Germany. Attention is primarily 
focused on events dating from 1982, when a conservative coalition came 
to power in Bonn, instituting a technological policy of widespread 
cabling which has allowed the federal states, the Lander, to lay the 
legislative foundations of commercial broadcasting. A detailed 
analysis of Lander negotiations to establish a dual system by an 
inter-Land agreement is accompanied by an examination of the
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Constitutional Court’s role in setting new parameters for broadcasting 
within a dual system. However, attempts to introduce commercial 
broadcasting are not a recent development, and a short description of 
earlier attempts to break the public service monopoly underlines the 
historical continuity of the debate.
Having established the events which have led to a dual system, I 
shall look in Chapters 4 and 5 at how the West German public 
broadcasting organisations, ARD and ZDF, have reacted to the prospect 
of private competition. Chapter 4 considers changes to the profile of 
the main terrestrial television services, and the extent to which these 
have been influenced by the prospect of commercial competition. I 
decided to concentrate on television in this chapter because the 
terrestrial services of ARD and ZDF constitute the main weapon of the 
public broadcasters in the competitive battle with new commercial 
broadcasters. Chapter 5 examines the expansionary policies of public 
service broadcasting in the area of new technologies (cable and 
satellite broadcasting) and new services, specifically sub-regional 
radio. In both cases, the underlying goal is to establish the extent 
to which public service broadcasting can compete effectively with 
commercial broadcasting by drawing on its own creative resources.
Chapter 6 looks at the transition of public service broadcasting in 
terms of funding. Funding has always been a problematic issue, but 
the emergence of new commercial broadcasting stations has brought it 
to even greater prominence. Here, the problems of existing sources of 
funding, the licence fee and advertising, are examined in detail.
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There is also a consideration of alternative sources of funding and 
the extent to which these may offer a solution to existing problems.
In a sense Chapter 6 ties up previous chapters, because I have 
argued throughout that the absence of adequate funding inhibits 
internal reform and threatens not only the independence of public 
service broadcasting, but perhaps its very survival. Organisational 
structures and programming reforms are an inadequate means of 
ensuring future survival if there is decreasing political willingness 
to support the system, and the extent of this support is ultimately 
measured by political willingness to guarantee adequate sources of 
funding. The preservation of public service broadcasting is in fact 
dependent on those outside the broadcasting institutions rather than 
on any action taken by the broadcasters. Only as long as significant 
actors find their interests served by the public broadcasters, will 
the system remain secure regardless of whether it still manages to 
attract a significant proportion of the audience.
No single research method was adopted for the study, largely 
because of the exigencies of the situation. In addition to desk 
research, a year at the Institut fur Publizistik at the University of 
Mainz allowed access to information which was not readily available in 
the United Kingdom. As well as historical documentation, substantial 
use was made of contemporary legislative material, broadcasting policy 
documents, press accounts, and analyses of events by various West 
German commentators.
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Vhere written sources failed to give the required detail and 
insight into recent events, two further methods were employed. The 
first involved a number of personal interviews with various key 
players in broadcasting, drawn from both the public and private 
sector. The interviews were structured to the extent that the same 
basic themes were introduced, but questions were left purposefully 
open-ended to allow respondents to develop their own line of thought. 
There are difficulties in using this type of material in that 
respondent's accounts are often coloured by their own experiences and 
prejudices. However, themes and ideas do emerge which can be followed 
up and used to confirm or negate one's own explanations of events.
The second alternative research method was applied to Chapter 4, 
which sets out to look at possible changes in the television output of 
ARD and ZDF following the introduction of commercial television. 
Statistical analysis of television transmissions in a two-week period 
in October from 1982 to 1987 revealed the extent to which ARD and ZDF 
have altered their television schedules since the introduction of 
private television.
The nature of the study made it necessary to apply a cut-off point 
and the chronological section in Chapter 3 ends with the Federal 
Constitutional Court's decision, published in June 1987. However, some 
judgement was exercised in other chapters to extend this cut-off point 
beyond the end of 1987 into 1988, particularly where events and 
themes spilled over, and where it was felt that the extra information
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would give the reader additional insight into the position in which 
West German broadcasters find themselves.
The questions posed and answered by this study of public service 
broadcasting in West Germany are as follows:
what kinds of changes are taking place and how do these relate
to public service broadcasting?
what elements of continuity are still present?
what are the terms of the political debate on broadcasting and
who are the key players in this debate?
how are the relevant authorities dealing with public service 
broadcasting in view of new technological developments and 
deregulation?
what are the likely consequences of change in terms of public 
service broadcasting's programme content, scheduling policies 
and funding structures?
1.1 The concept of public service broadcasting
The first problem to be tackled is the definition of public service 
broadcasting. This question has to be broached because the transition 
experienced by public service broadcasting can only be fully 
understood by establishing the nature of public service. Yet public 
service broadcasting is not an easily definable or precise concept. 
On the one hand, there are the normative expectations of public 
service, ideas about how the system should ideally function. These
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are usually couched in values associated with a Western-style
democracy. As such the goals of public service are closely connected 
with the principles of diversity, pluralism, equality of access, and 
the maintenance of cultural identity. On the other hand, there is the 
practice of public service, which may or may not live up to these 
normative expectations.
The BBC, established in the 1920s, is still the classic prototype 
of public service broadcasting, and has served as a model for other 
European broadcasting institutions, including those in Vest Germany.
It also acts as the original definitional source of public service. As 
such, a normative definition of public service broadcasting would 
probably encompass the following characteristics <see also 
Broadcasting Research Unit, 1985; Kuhn, 1985, p.4):
independence of the state, commercial bodies, and other 
powerful institutions or individuals;
public funding usually in the form of a licence fee, a type of 
tax paid by owners of reception sets; 
universal geographical availability;
universality of appeal to both minorities and majorities of
interest;
varied and balanced schedules incorporating elements of
entertainment, education, and information;
an obligation to promote national culture and especially 
domestic programme production;
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an obligation to be impartial in the provision of news and
information;
public accountability.
These characteristics cannot be viewed in isolation. For example, 
the way a broadcasting organisation is funded often affects its 
independence of the state or of other organisations. Nor are these 
characteristics confined to public service broadcasting alone. For 
example, the British commercial broadcasting organisation, Independent 
Television (ITV), is funded solely from advertising revenues, but acts 
nevertheless in the public service tradition, because it is required to 
fulfil the same obligations as its more obvious public service 
counterpart, the BBC (see Negrine, 1985, p. 15). Furthermore, 
commercial broadcasters, who are not legally required to adhere to the 
public service tradition, may also exhibit public service 
characteristics. In this respect Jean-Claude Burgelman refers to the 
US system, which transmits few imparted programmes, offers minority 
broadcasting channels, and sustains an investigative tradition in news 
(Burgelman, 1986, p.180). From this, one might conclude that there is 
not much to distinguish between commercial and public service 
broadcasting apart from the profit-making incentive of the former. It 
could also be argued that public service broadcasters are moving 
closer to the commercial model in terms of programming policy, but 
there are still substantial differences between the two in terms of 
organisation, goals, and social obligations. As Wolfgang Hoffmann- 
Riem points out: "Die Kommerzialisierung ist - jedenfalls bisher -
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nicht das bestimmende Element der Programmpianung und -durchfuhrung 
1m offentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk" (1984, p.38).
Independence has generally been secured by establishing public 
broadcasting institutions which although subject to the state in 
matters of overall organisation and finance, enjoy considerable 
autonomy in determining programming policy. Public broadcasting 
stations are self-administrating, and this autonomy is usually 
reinforced by an autonomous source of funding, normally in the form of 
a licence fee, which they are free, subject to general principles of 
good housekeeping, to spend as they see fit (see Lange, 1980, p.30, 
p.62). The licence fee usually constitutes the main source of funding. 
Consequently, the commercial pressures which might occur as a result 
of funding from advertising revenue, are minimised.
In liberal democracies, editorial autonomy, a consequence of 
institutional independence, is regarded as essential if broadcasting is 
to make a balanced contribution to public opinion and to act as a 
forum for debates and controversy (see Heller, 1978, p.22; von Hase, 
1979, p.735; Lange, 1980, p.57). For only if editorial independence is 
guaranteed can the public make informed choices in a democracy. In 
this sense, public service broadcasting has a strong integrative role, 
revealing dissent in society and helping to create social consensus 
(see Lange, 1980, p.ll). Like the press, broadcasting forms a link 
between those who govern, those who are governed, and those who want 
to communicate with the audience.
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In theory, broadcasting independence is ensured; in Vest Germany 
it is even constitutionally guaranteed. However, the reality of 
autonomy is much more complex. Public service broadcasters do not 
operate within a power vacuum, and there are many paints of contact 
both with the state and with other organisations. In fact, it could 
be argued that the official ideology of public service broadcasting 
tends to lay claim to a degree of independence not borne out by the 
realities of its position. Independence is strictly limited by the 
political constitution and consensus of a given society (see Hood, 
1972, p.415). Some critics would go even further, arguing that the 
most powerful groups within society determine the world-view 
portrayed by the broadcasters (see Kopper, 1982, p.193).
Limits to independence are clearly visible when we compare the 
situation of public service broadcasters in the UK and in Vest 
Germany. In both countries the state plays an important role in 
choosing the members of broadcasting's supervisory bodies. In 
Britain, the Queen in Council, but in reality the government of the 
day, appoints the members of the BBC Board of Governors and the IBA 
(Independent Broadcasting Authority), the supervisory body of ITV (see 
Heller, 1978, p.31; Kuhn, 1985, p.6 ). In Vest Germany, central and 
regional governments are restricted as to the number of 
representatives they may nominate to the supervisory broadcasting 
committees, but their effective representation is bolstered by the 
presence of bureaucrats and political allies from other groups and 
institutions (see Hoffmann-Riem, 1979, p.155; Holzer, 1980, pp.59-60). 
In theory, the supervisory bodies are distanced from government, and
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while exercising no executive control over content, they do act as 
trustees for the public interest by ensuring that broadcasters adhere 
to their charters or legislative guidelines. These powers and the 
method of appointment mean that the committees are by no means 
untouched by state influence.
In West Germany, the state is constitutionally forbidden from 
interfering directly in editorial policy (although this may of course 
occur indirectly through Lander representation in the broadcasting 
supervisory bodies), but this is not the case in Britain. Here, the 
Home Secretary, the cabinet minister responsible for broadcasting 
policy, can ask the BBC or ITV to refrain from broadcasting any 
programme (see Hood, 1972, p.408). This is an ultimate sanction which 
has never been used, in spite of frequent government criticism of 
programming, for example over the BBC's coverage of the Falklands 
conflict or of the troubles in Northern Ireland (see Burgelman, 1986, 
p.175; Siune, 1986, p.48). The fact that the ban has never been 
applied, does not bear testimony to the independence of broadcasting, 
because the existence of the threat may of course discipline the 
broadcasters into avoiding anything which might result in a ban (see 
Negrine, 1985, pp.29-30). If this is the case, editorial autonomy is 
curtailed not because programmes are banned, but because certain 
programmes never see the light of day. Furthermore, the British 
government is well aware of its powers, having recently banned the 
transmission of interviews with Sinn Fein, the political wing of the 
IRA. The British Government also has the power to suspend the 
licences of the BBC and ITV at any time and take over broadcasting
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operations (see Heller, 197S, p.9). Such action, too, has never been 
taken, but it was certainly considered for the BBC at the time of the 
General Strike in 1926 (see Hood, 1972, pp.414-415; Tracey, 1977).
In almost all countries, funding constitutes the weakest link in 
the independence argument, impinging as it does on the principle of 
editorial independence. The timing and level of licence-fee increases 
are usually decided by governments and/or parliaments. As a result, 
public service broadcasters are particularly vulnerable to financial 
and political pressure when the licence fee is due to be raised (see 
Hood, 1972, p.411; Holzer, 1980, p.72pp; Lange, 1980, p.65). This 
problem has become worse since the almost universal ownership of TV 
sets, necessitating more frequent increases at a time when public 
service broadcasters are facing competition from "free" commercial 
broadcasting (see Kuhn, 1985, p.8 ). Nor are financial pressures 
confined to the licence fee alone. If, as is the case in Vest Germany, 
public broadcasting is also funded by advertising revenue, there may 
be a strong tendency to promote certain types of programming in order 
to attract advertising support.
Independence is also limited by what is deemed to be socially and 
morally acceptable within society. For example, most public 
broadcasting organisations are subject to wide-ranging rules and 
regulations on taste and decency, obscenity, slander, and copyright. 
Many of these restrictions, such as the ban on pornography, are 
generally felt to be acceptable and are justified in terms of the 
public interest. However, little is known about who determines what
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is in good, taste and what the public feeling is in respect of these 
matters (see Hood, 1972, p.407).
Licence-fee funding has already been mentioned as one of the 
constituents of public service broadcasting's independence. However, 
the licence fee also has another role. It allows the whole service to 
be funded, rather than individual programmes, regardless of whether 
these programmes are made for a majority or for minorities (see Lange, 
1980, p.32; Broadcasting Research Unit, 1985, p.4). Unlike pay
television, there is no connection between the price paid and the 
amount consumed, and in theory the public broadcasters as non-profit- 
making bodies do not have to let considerations of profitability 
influence their technical or editorial decisions (see Hood, 1972, p.413; 
Lange, 1980, p.30, p.64). Public broadcasters can literally afford to 
transmit minority programmes which a commercial company could not 
consider putting in its schedules. This is especially the case for a 
monopoly institution such as the BBC before the introduction of ITV in 
1955, which could afford to concentrate on highbrow, if not elitist 
and paternalistic programming regardless of audience preferences (see 
Kuhn, 1985, p.5).
Alternatively, it could be argued that advertising-funded 
broadcasting does not require the viewing/listening public to pay a 
licence fee at all. However, it should also be remembered that 
advertising-funded broadcasting calls all citizens, not just viewers 
and listeners to account, because the cost of broadcasting is 
indirectly covered by the cost of advertising incorporated into goods
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and services. What is more, public service broadcasters are not 
totally immune from commercially influenced decisions even if they are 
solely funded from licence fee revenues. They must still attract 
significant audiences to legitimate the licence fee, particularly if 
they are in competition with commercially funded broadcasting 
organisations. For example, the BBC is under pressure to attract 
audiences comparable to its rival ITV in order to sustain public 
support for the licence fee, and this has certainly influenced its 
programming policy.
Closely connected with the principle of universal equal payment for 
broadcasting services is the principle that public service 
broadcasting should be universally available regardless of where 
people may live (see Broadcasting Research Unit, 1985, p.l). Those 
who live in urban areas effectively subsidise the high technical cost 
of bringing broadcasting to remote areas. Everyone has the right to 
the same quality of service and the same number of broadcasting 
channels. This is in contrast to cable television, which is not 
universally available, because the high cost of the technical 
infrastructure confines cable to heavily populated, and therefore 
profitable areas (see Lange, 1980, pp.41-42).
Perhaps the most important aspect of public service broadcasting 
is that it should offer something which is of interest to all, in 
short universality of appeal (see Broadcasting Research Unit, 1985, 
p.3; Jenke, 1985, p.419). This obligation stems from the historical 
origins of broadcasting, when one institution often had to satisfy the
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broadcasting needs of the whole nation. This does not mean that all 
programmes must satisfy all people simultaneously, but that
programmes should be offered which appeal to both minorities and 
majorities of taste and interest at different times and over a
reasonable timespan (see Broadcasting Research Unit, 1985, p.3).
Closely allied with the commitment to provide something of interest to 
all, is the commitment to balanced schedules of diverse and wide-
ranging programming incorporating elements of education, information, 
and entertainment, with no one element dominating the others. The 
advantages of such an approach are that people often encounter
programmes which they would otherwise not experience (see
Broadcasting Research Unit, 1985, p.3). This approach runs directly 
counter to the programming philosophies envisaged for cable and 
satellite television, where channels frequently concentrate on one
programming strand such as films, popular entertainment, news, or 
sport.
Universality of appeal also implies that special provision should 
be made for cultural and ethnic minorities (see Broadcasting Research 
Unit, 1985, p.5). This recognises the fact that minority views are an 
important factor in opinion formation in democracies, and that access 
for minorities allows the possibility for them to achieve majority 
status (see Hoffmann-Riem, 1979, p.157; Lange, 1980, p.58).
Alternatively, one might argue that far from offering a valuable
and important contribution to culture and education, public service 
broadcasters only offer something which has been defined by the
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ruling classes or the elite (see Burgeiman, 1986, pp.179-180). The 
main difficulty appears to be the definition of culture in broad terms, 
because public broadcasting's obligations in this area are only a 
rough outline which has to be filled with life by the broadcasters. 
Some have argued that provision for minorities has only been achieved 
after substantial pressure, and that in some areas non-established 
viewpoints and "minorities" such as women or blacks are still under­
represented (see Burgelman, 1986, p.179). Others have observed that 
there is little diversity on public channels, and that there is little 
to distinguish public service broadcasting from its overtly populist 
commercial counterparts, particularly in a situation where private and 
public broadcasters are involved in intense competition for viewers, 
and sometimes for advertising revenue as well (see Hood,1972; Murdoch 
& Golding, 1977).
Public service broadcasting is also seen as having a special 
relationship in respect of the national interest, culture, and 
community (see Broadcasting Research Unit, 1985, p.7; Lange, 1930, 
p.59). Although independent of the state, it is essentially political, 
because it is closely linked with the public sphere, providing a forum 
of social interaction where public opinion is formed and mobilised by 
a reasoning public (see Broadcasting Research Unit, 1985, p.7>. This 
close connection with the concept of the nation-state is reflected in 
the provision of national news and coverage of important national 
events (see Lange, 1980, pp.55-56). It is also reflected in the 
impetus normally given to domestic production, although the 
effectiveness of this tends to vary from country to country. For
- 25 -
example the larger European countries tend to produce more than the 
smaller Benelux and less populous Nordic countries, which are more 
heavily dependent, for reasons of cost and lack of production 
capacity, on imported programmes (see Kuhn, 1985, p.8 ; Burgeiman, 1986, 
p.180; Rolland/0stbye, 1986, p.116).
The obligation to observe impartiality in news and information is a 
further essential component of public service broadcasting, but 
attracts the most criticism either at a structural/societal level, 
because the system is seen to serve the interests of the most powerful 
within society, or in terms of individual cases such as the BBC's 
coverage of Northern Ireland and West German broadcasting's coverage 
of the nuclear energy issue (see Hood, 1972, pp.414pp; Glasgow
University Media Group, 1976, 1980; Holzer, 1980; Barsig, 1981). The 
controversy surrounding impartiality arises because of the assumed 
importance of broadcasting in influencing the decisions people make 
about politics, particularly since television has emerged as one of the 
key elements in the process of political communication. Research into 
effects is not conclusive in this area, with researchers divided 
between those who believe that the media are very powerful (see 
Noelle-Neumann, 1973, p.67pp; Noelle-Neumann, 1982), and those who 
believe that the media are only one influence among many (see 
Katz/Lazarsfeld, 1955).
Yet the extent to which public broadcasters can be impartial is 
limited. In the UK, broadcasters are required to give due 
impartiality, with the emphasis very much on the word "due". For
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example, broadcasters cannot be impartial about the proponents of
racism, because this is not acceptable in British society. Public
service broadcasting is regarded as a national institution and the
constitutional creation of parliament. Consequently, the broadcasters
cannot be impartial about the maintenance and dissolution of a nation;
nor can they be impartial about things which parliament has made
illegal (see Regrine, 1985, p.30). The role of the BBC in this respect
was summed up by John Reith, the first director-general of the BBC,
who described the Corporation as "an institution within the
Constitution" (cit. in Tracey, 1977, p.151). This is also the case in
West Germany, where broadcasters are obliged to adhere to the
constitution, the Basic Law, which forbids them from giving a platform
to those who do not accept the principles it enshrines. Impartiality
is therefore a concept with limitations. As Hood points out:
Impartiality is impartiality within bounds and is applied to those 
parties and organizations which occupy the middle ground of 
politics; where impartiality breaks down is when the news deals 
with political activities or industrial action which are seen as 
being a breach of the conventions of the consensus. (Hood, 1972, 
p.418; see also Uegrine, 1985, pp.30-1)
Impartiality is subject to strains not only when broadcasters are
dealing with political activities or industrial action outside the
middle ground of consensus. Problems can also occur with the
emergence of new political parties. For example, the establishment of
the SDP in the UK upset the idea of two-party politics, and made it
more difficult for the broadcasters to claim that they were being
impartial (see Kuhn, 1985, p.11; Negrine, 1985, p.22). The emergence of
new political groups, for example ecologists and anti-nuclear groups
which cut across traditional party poltical boundaries, also threaten
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to undermine the traditional understanding of impartiality. 
Difficulties can also occur at times of national crisis, for example 
the Falklands War or the handling of terrorism in West Germany, when 
the broadcaster as a national institution is expected to carry the 
government line (see Jenke, 1985, p.418; Negrine, 1985, p.36).
Public broadcasting's claims to detachment and disinterest in the 
context of controversy therefore rest uneasily next to a commitment to 
the existing social and political order. While parliamentary forms of 
political activity fit easily into their coverage, extra-parliamentary 
forms of activity are regarded as illegitimate, and a threat to 
parliamentary democracy. The lack of coverage given over to these 
viewpoints leads to charges of neglect by those groups whose access 
to broadcasting is restricted or whose concerns are seen to be 
portrayed in a negative way. As society becomes increasingly more 
dissected and ideologically polarised, traditional views of balance, 
impartiality, and objectivity appear inadequate, precisely because they 
exclude or marginalise those outside the central boundaries of 
political argument (Ifegrine, 1985, p.23).
Although theoretically autonomous, public service broadcasting is 
also publicly accountable (see Lange, 1980, pp.62-3). Accountability is 
important, particularly in the case of public service monopolies, where 
the audience has no direct influence on programming and where 
revenues are not directly related to the size of the audience. In most 
cases accountability is achieved by the appointment of supervisory 
bodies such as the BBC Board of Governors or the Rundfunkrate,
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broadcasting councils, in Vest Germany. Such is the complexity of 
society today that not everyone can have direct access to 
broadcasting, and the committees act on the public's behalf in the 
public interest. In Britain the membership of these commitees is 
determined by government using a list of independent personalities, 
the "great and the good"; in Vest Germany the committees are supposed 
to reflect the pluralist nature of society.
However, some would argue that there is very little real public 
representation and only token acountability, and that access to 
broadcasting is limited to a narrow range of groups and institutions, 
usually the most powerful (Hood, 1972, p.422, p.427; Garnham, 1973; 
Heller, 1978; Holzer, 1980, pp.61-62>. According to Holzer, referring 
to the Vest German situation: "Im Kapitalismus sind die
gesellschaftlichen Krafte 'relevant', die die herrschenden Prinzipien 
dieser Gesellschaft - Kapitalverwertung und Profitproduktion - auf 
ihrer Seite haben" (Holzer, 1980, p.62). Those groups who do not fit 
into the political mainstream, for example Communists, are excluded 
(see Hood, 1972, p.422). The problems of access and accountability are 
further compounded by the authoritarian structure of public service 
broadcasting and by professional ideologies which may be inherently 
elitist and undemocratic (see Hood, 1972, p.427pp).
Given the discrepancies outlined between theory and practice, one 
might conclude that there is no great difference between public 
service broadcasting and commercial broadcasting. In Britain there is 
certainly little to distinguish between the programme output of the
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BBC and ITV, but ITV is essentially a regulated form of commercialism 
in the public service tradition. This is not always the case in other 
countries. However, even if public service broadcasting functions as a 
monopoly institution, it cannot operate in isolation from the market, 
because it is an industry producing programmes often according to 
commercial imperatives. These imperatives include the predominance of 
the managerial spirit, similar working conditions to the private 
sector, the importance of productivity, and cost-accounting (see Hood, 
1972, p.406, p.411; Burns, 1977; Holzer, 1980, p.17). In commercial 
television the success of individual programmes is measured by 
audience ratings which attract advertisers. The relationship between 
audience ratings and advertising revenue is not so important for 
public broadcasters, but they still relate the size of the audience to 
the cash and resources required to make a programme, and this 
information influences programme schedules (see Hood, 1972, p.406; 
Tracey, 1977, p.240>. Consequently, in spite of the assumed defects of 
public service broadcasting - its reflection of existing power 
structures and links with the commercial world - any far-reaching 
change in its nature and structure cannot be envisaged without a 
similar change in the nature and structure of the society which it 
serves.
Thee origins of public service broadcasting are historical and 
grounded on planned political and social considerations about the need 
to regulate a culturally and politically influential medium (see 
Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.32; Hoffmann-Riem, 1986, p.8). The American 
model of commercial broadcasting was rejected in the 1920s because
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its unregulated nature led to technological chaos of the airwaves (see 
Heller, 1978, p.12; Rolland/0stbye, 1986, p.120). Scarcity of airwaves 
is often proposed as the reason for broadcasting monopolies, because 
they are a scarce national resource (see Hood, 1972, p.408; 
Rolland/0stbye, 1986, p.120), but both Garnham and Burgeiman argue 
that there were certainly enough frequencies to create more than one 
broadcasting organisation in the United Kingdom and Belgium 
respectively (Garnham, 1983, p.13; Burgeiman, 1986, p.186). Indeed, 
Channel 4, which was introduced in the United Kingdom in 1982, could 
have been made available in 1962. Both authors argue that the number 
of broadcasting organisations was limited for political, social, 
economic, and cultural reasons (Garnham, 1983, p.13; Burgeiman, 1986, 
p.186). Essentially, monopolies offered the best way of controlling 
what was believed to be a most persuasive medium, broadcasting. There 
was also concern that radio could interfere with other types of 
communication, and the military is known to have been a proponent of 
one broadcasting organisation in the United Kingdom for fear of 
interference to its own communications (Heller, 1978, p.12).
When television was introduced in the 1950s, the idea of monopoly 
continued, because radio already provided an organisational model of 
public monopoly control. The post-war environment contained strong 
forces against commercialism, particularly as practised in the United 
States (see McQuail, 1986a, p.153; Rolland/0stbye, 1986, p.122), but the 
high costs of TV production and increasing pressure from business and 
advertising interests soon led to pressure for television to be 
supported by advertising. In Britain demands from commercial
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interests were accompanied by political dissatisfaction with the 
output of the BBC, and the commercially funded ITV system was 
introduced in 1954. In West Germany, conservative political forces 
were equally dissatisfied with public broadcasting's output, but their 
alliance with commercial interests failed to bring about the 
introduction of commercial television until 1984.
With the exception of Britain, European public broadcasting has
until quite recently been sheltered from the full extent of market
forces as exemplified by commercial broadcasting. Public broadcasters 
have not been totally immune from the market, but under the concept of 
public service, programmes have not been treated primarily as economic 
goods (see Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.32). In return for this concession, 
public broadcasters have been expected to fulfil certain obligations, 
detailed above. Whether they are still obliged to fulfil these 
obligations in a competitive situation is another issue. In fact, 
whether their existence is still justified in such a situation is an 
issue which needs to be addressed.
1.2 tn t/hp qnn - iTinrPaglTig nrmmprrialiRation
Public service broadcasting has never enjoyed the unequivocal 
support of society, but the last decade has seen a number of
developments which have strengthened opposition to it. These
developments are political, economic, and technological in origin, and 
are rapidly undermining the traditional notion of broadcasting as a 
highly regulated medium following society-led goals. Deregulation has
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resulted in the introduction of commercially-run broadcasting stations 
in the vast majority of Vest European nations, and this is bringing a 
new set of problems for public service broadcasting. In contrast to 
previous periods of broadcasting history, the new developments are on 
a much larger scale and are being realised over a comparatively short 
timespan.
Advances in cable and satellite technologies have allowed an 
increase in broadcasting outlets, invalidating the argument that lack 
of frequencies prevents the introduction of further broadcasting 
stations. However, broadcasting is only one small part of a much 
larger telecommunications revolution. This involves a convergence of 
mass and individual communication with wide applications for business 
including databases, videoconferencing, teletext, home computing, 
electronic banking, office automisation, and so on (see Wolf Thomas, 
1985, p.112; Burgeiman, 1986, p.182).
According to Garnham, attempts to break the dominant position of 
public service broadcasting are part of a much broader international 
pattern. These attempts are determined by underlying economic trends 
and by the efforts of multi-nationals, often backed by nation states, 
to develop the market for so-called information goods and services as 
a new growth sector (1983, p.10; Burgeiman, 1986, p.82). European 
governments are actively promoting the "information" society in order 
to protect national interests in the cultural and industrial sphere 
(see Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.35; Burgeiman, 1986, p.181; Ferguson, 1986a, 
pp.55-56; McQuail, 1986, p.633). The implementation of new
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technologies is seen as a means of remaining competitive in the face 
of strong competition from Japan and the United States, and of 
promoting new employment opportunities in the manufacturing and 
service sectors. Deregulation of broadcasting is regarded as one way 
of harnessing these technologies, but not just for the benefit of the 
viewer. It is also hoped that increased demand for broadcasting 
equipment will give a boost to the domestic electronics sector so as 
to replace declining heavy manufacturing industries (see Hoffmann- 
Riem, 1984, p.35; Miles/Gershuny, 1986, p.27; McQuail, 1986, p.633; 
Siune, Sorbets, Rolland, 1986, p.l7pp). Even if they have doubts, many 
governments see no alternative to the promotion of privately funded 
entertainment services if the potential of the new media are to be 
realised (see Garnham, 1983, p.11; Negrine, 1985a, p.2; McQuail, 1986a, 
p.155).
Governments eager to encourage the new technologies have been 
encouraged by powerful industrial lobbies looking for new investment 
opportunities to replace saturated markets in traditional manufactured 
goods, and keen to acquire the lead in new international markets ahead 
of the Americans and the Japanese (see Garnham, 1983, pp. 10-11; 
Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, pp.35-36; Hoffmann-Riem, 1986, pp.6-7; McQuail, 
1986, p.633). Investment in the new technologies also offers a means 
of diversification for media conglomerates, particularly where anti­
trust legislation acts as a barrier to expansion in core businesses. 
Multi-nationals are also driven by a need to improve their own 
communications facilities in an increasingly internationalised 
business world (Garnham, 1983, pp. 10-11).
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However, cable and satellite do little to alter the distributive 
nature of broadcasting itself, which remains a point-to-multipoint 
service. Cable and satellite are merely a new means of distributing 
an old medium (see Garnham, 1983, p.11; Negrine, 1985a, p.l). Nor is 
cable a recent technology, but increases in capacity have alterea its 
status from that of a relayer of terrestrial services in areas of poor 
reception to that of a potentially prime means of distribution for 
many additional broadcasting services (see Negrine, 1984; Negrine, 
1985b, pp.103-4). What cable and satellite do offer is a way of
circumventing the control of the broadcasting supply by public service 
broadcasters. They also provide a means of realising profit from what 
were previously thought of as publicly available goods by restricting 
access to those who pay extra for cable or satellite reception (see 
Burgeiman, 1986, p.174; see Metcalfe, 1986, pp.37-51).
Technological change in itself, however, is not sufficient to
explain the crisis in public service broadcasting. Independent of 
this, there must be widespread political dissatisfaction with the 
public system either because of its programming policies or for more 
ideological reasons (see McQuail, 1986a, p.170). Combined with the
economic logic of the new media, political dissatisfaction with public 
service broadcasting is even more formidable, because the new media 
are the tools by which the dominant position of public service 
broadcasting will be broken.
For example, in West Germany the CDU/CSU political parties have
long believed that elections are won through television, and that the
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CDU has been unfairly portrayed by the public broadcasters, ARD and 
ZDF (Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.36). Following on from this, the CDU/CSU 
have pursued a two-pronged strategy for many years. On the one hand, 
they have tried to gain supremacy in the internal supervisory bodies 
of ARD and ZDF, while pursuing the objective of commercial 
broadcasting on the other. They believe not only that commercial 
broadcasters will reflect their viewpoints in a better light (see 
Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.36), but also that commercial broadcasting fits 
in with their preference for free-market principles and more choice 
for the viewer. Similar objectives can be observed in Britain's 
Conservative Party.
Perhaps more significant than the new technologies in altering the 
traditional understanding of broadcasting as a public service, are the 
commercial tendencies and deregulation which accompany them. The 
debate about more commercialised forms of broadcasting is not new, as 
shown by the existence of commercial broadcasting in the United 
Kingdom since 1954 and by the long history of attempts to introduce 
commercial broadcasting in West Germany. However, where previously 
public service broadcasting enjoyed considerable political support 
from all parts of the political spectrum, it is now increasingly only 
being tolerated by centre/right governments, and more surprisingly 
subjected to criticism from large sections of its traditional 
supporter base, the establishment and the left (see Garnham, 1983, 
p.21; Burgeiman, 1986).
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The drift towards more commercial forms of broadcasting is also 
governed by pragmatism about what is clearly happening within Europe. 
Cross-border satellite transmissions and video mean that there is 
increasingly less opportunity for governments to regulate what the 
public receives in terms of broadcasting output (see Elliot, 1982, 
p.252; McQuail, 1986a, p.164). Faced with the inevitability of 
commercialism from outside one’s own borders, domestic farms of 
commercialism become more attractive by comparison (see McQuail, 
1986a, p.164). A move towards commercialism in the domestic sphere 
is seen as a way of combating undesirable forms of commercial 
broadcasting from outside national boundaries which pose a threat to 
national culture and domestic advertising revenues (see McQuail, 1986a, 
pp.164-165).
Yet the concept of commercialism is just as difficult to define as 
the concept of public service broadcasting. Under closer examination 
different forms of commercialism are revealed, each carrying its own 
specific advantages and disadvantages. Given the breadth of 
definition, different choices are therefore open to policy-makers. At 
the most basic level, commercial merely implies something which is run 
in an economical, profitable and efficient way (see McQuail, 1986, 
p.634). Taken a step further, there are strong forms of commercialism 
and weaker forms which might be summarised as follows:
a system wholly funded by private capital with little public 
supervision of content such as RTL in Luxembourg;
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a privately funded broadcasting organisation operating under a 
system of public regulation as part of a dual system of public 
service and commercial broadcasting such as ITV in the United 
Kingdom;
the partial funding of public service broadcasting by 
advertising revenue, for example ARD and ZDF in Vest Germany; 
funding by subscription either on a per-programme basis (pay- 
per-view) or channel basis (pay-TV);
the gradual dilution of standards on public service 
broadcasting in the interest of maximising audiences or of 
saving money as a result of competition or economic/political 
pressure;
the use of private producers as a way of procuring either 
ready-made or commissioned low-cost programmes (see Holzer, 
1980, p.70, p.l03pp).
These different forms show that commercialism is not purely 
confined to what is traditionally thought of as commercial 
broadcasting, that is broadcasting which is privately owned, profit- 
making, and funded by advertising, sponsorship, or subscription. 
Several manifestations of commercialism are also applicable to public 
service broadcasting. Indeed, some researchers of the critical school 
have argued that there is no substantial difference between commercial 
broadcasting and public service broadcasting, because public service 
broadcasting works according to similar economic imperatives and 
reinforces existing power structures, which are in turn dominated by
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capitalist forces (Murdock Si Golding, 1977; Garnham, 1979; Holzer, 
1980, p.17, p.61).
In spite of long-standing forms of commercialism, the concept is 
usually discussed negatively and emotionally in academic debate, 
because it serves as the embodiment of a system whose market 
principles stand directly opposed to the idealistic aims of public 
service broadcasting (see McQuail, 1986, pp.633-643; see also 
Silberman, 1969, p.l5pp, p.21). According to Denis McQuail, these 
pejorative connotations of commercialism stem either from an idealist 
view of culture and communication as spiritual goods which should not 
be sullied by the market place or traded for profit, or from a 
political objection to capitalism and to the power of a business class 
whose strength might be reinforced by commercial control of the mass 
media (1986a, p.152). Whatever the ideological interpretation of 
commercialism, the practical constraints of commercialism are bound to 
lead to tensions. For each broadcast programme, unlike many other 
goods or services, is a unique creative effort, and this leads to 
tension between the needs of management efficency and programme 
standards (see Hood, 1972, p.406).
Recent developments within Europe have brought the debate about 
commercialism to a new level. It is no longer simply a question of 
being for or against either commercialism or the non-profit motives 
implicit in the normative aims of public service broadcasting. The 
concept of commercialism, as shown, is too diverse and ambiguous to 
allow such a simplification. Commercial tendencies are now to be
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found in public service broadcasting, as are elements of public 
service in commercial systems. Policy-makers, broadcasters, ana 
academic commentators are therefore faced with a choice. They can 
either make a concerted effort to structure public broadcasting in 
such a way that commercialist tendencies are halted, or they can adapt 
and pick out those forms of commercialism which are beneficial to 
public service broadcasting, without losing the essential character of 
public service. Whatever they decide, they cannot ignore
commercialism, because public broadcasting stations have to act within 
and cooperate with a market-led environment.
The need for a re-examination of past assumptions in the light of 
rapid technological and policy changes is particularly relevant to 
communications theory, which in the main has been opposed to 
commercialism. Denis McQuail suggests that this negative view of 
commercialism has placed theory in a rut, making it less able to 
respond adequately to the changes which are taking place around it 
(1986, pp.642>. He argues that some compromise might be possible 
between theory and commercialism if theory took a more differentiated 
view of the process of commercialism, acknowledging some of the 
positive aspects of a more commercial approach to the production and 
distribution of programmes (1986, pp.643, p.636; see also Connell, 
1983, pp.76-80). He points out that recent technological and social
developments cannot be stopped by theory, and that a more 
differentiated approach to commercialism would allow theory to work 
out alternative solutions based on the goals of diversity and quality 
(1986, pp.641-642). Following on from this, theorists would have to
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work out criteria to decide what types of communication can be
properly left to the market (McQuail, 1986, p.643). The alternative to
a more differentiated view of commercialism which acknowledges its
contribution to popular culture is put more bluntly by Connell:
In general terms, there can only be one (alternative J.P) and that 
is to learn how to deal with the potential of things as they are 
and as they will soon become. Outside of this there is only
irrelevance, something with which the left has become all too 
familiar. (1983, p.8Q>
Jean-Claude Burgeiman comes to similar conclusions on leaving some 
aspects of broadcasting to commercial farces, but argues from a 
different theoretical standpoint to McQuail (1986). His conclusions 
are based on a critique of those who follow the tradition of critical 
theory (or the theory of political economy), but fail to follow it
through. He accuses researchers in the critical tradition of adapting 
a very pro-public service stance now that public broadcasting is under 
threat, whereas they once argued that there was very little to
differentiate between private and public broadcasting, because both 
were subject to the same structural pressures (see Burgeiman, 1986, 
p.173). For example, in the past Nicholas Garnham stressed the 
relationship between broadcasting, the state and the establishment, 
and concluded that the principles of public service broadcasting were 
too constrained by an "essentially authoritarian, hierarchic and
undemocratic" organisational structure (1973, p.37). Garnham's solution 
was to lessen state links with broadcasting and promote 
democratisation with more involvement of the public in the 
broadcasting process and a greater say in the day-to-running of 
broadcasting by broadcasting workers (Garnham, 1973, pp.41-46).
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Murdock and Golding stressed the similarity between public service
broadcasting and commercial broadcasting, because "as with any public
corporation operating in a capitalist economy, the BBC behaves in many
ways as though it were itself a commercial undertaking” (1977, p.21).
The Vest German researcher Horst Holzer, combining a materialistic
approach with empirical research, argued that the principles of public
service broadcasting are constrained by the logic of commercialism,
which turns them into an indirect tool of the state (1975; 1980, p.61):
Die Funkanstalten sind in dem, was sie materieil darstellen und 
kommunikativ-ideologisch tun, an die Hauptaufgabe des Staates im 
entfalteten Kapitalismus gebunden: an die rechtliche, ideologische 
und auch materielle Sicherung der kapitalistischen Verkehrs und 
Produktionsformen, an Formen, also, die die Unterwerfung der 
lebendigen Arbeit, der werktatigen Menschen unter das Kapital 
vermitteln. (Holzer, 1980, p.61)
In fact, before deregulation and privatisation became a reality, 
many researchers stressed public service broadcasting's dependence on 
commercial and political Institutions. Mow that public service 
broadcasting is under threat, they lay less stress on these arguments 
and argue in favour of the retention of public service broadcasting. 
Far example, Garnham acknowledges the defects of public service 
broadcasting, but opposes the assumption that the market is superior 
to a regulated public service as a mode of cultural production and 
distribution (1983, p.14). He argues that the justification of public 
service broadcasting lies in its superiority to the market as a means 
of providing all citizens, regardless of wealth or geographical 
location, with equal access to high-quality entertainment, education, 
and information, so satisfying a range of tastes rather than just the 
most profitable (Garnham, 1983, pp.13-14). Garnham's solution is to
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bring public service broadcasting back to its original ideals, which 
have been clouded by populism and undermined by bad management, 
leaving the BBC little more than a multi-media conglomerate (see 
Garnham, 1983, pp.20-25). In conjunction with this, he argues that the 
left should oppose the expansion of commercialism and new 
technologies in the interests of democracy and promote the expansion 
of public service broadcasting (Garnham, 1983, p.26). Garnham's
opposition to all forms of commercialism is by no means unique (see 
Hoffmann-Riem, 1984; Holzer, 1985).
Burgeiman, and also Connell, suggest that these critical researchers 
would do better to think of ways of improving public service 
broadcasting in practice, rather than just accepting that it is 
"better" than commercial broadcasting in theory, and arguing that it 
should therefore be protected unquestionably (Burgeiman, 1986, pp.176- 
177; Connell, 1983, pp.70-71). Burgeiman suggests a compromise
whereby public service broadcasting would concentrate on the provision 
of information, local initiatives in radio, and innovative forms of 
entertainment, leaving commercial broadcasters to concentrate on 
popular entertainment, which they undertake much better anyway (1986, 
p.194-6). In order to achieve this, public service broadcasting would 
have to undergo structural reforms which would allow a greater spread 
of public representation (see Burgeiman, 1986, p.196).
What, then, are the theoretical postulations which deal with 
commercialism? There are no theoretical statements which deal 
exclusively with commercialism, but some elements from discussions
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about the relationship between communications and society offer a 
starting-point for discussion (see McQuail, 1986, p.635). These pose 
questions about who controls the media, who is being controlled, in 
what way, and with what effects. Pluralist, liberal-democratic views 
of the media place emphasis on the diffusion of power, and see the 
media as a means by which political institutions are held to account. 
Marxist views argue that power is concentrated among dominant groups 
in society, and see the media as a tool which legitimates the position 
of these dominant groups within society, reinforcing their non- 
accountability .
Traditional Marxist theory emphasises the structural effects of 
commercial media, which are seen as reinforcing support for the ruling 
capitalist class. It also stresses ideological and cultural effects 
which as a result of orientation to a mass market, rob the media of 
their critical potential (see McQuail, 1986, p.635; see also Adorno & 
Horkenheimer, 1977, pp.349-383). Capitalist control is achieved either 
through direct ownership of the media or through ruling-class control 
of the state. Adorno, arguing from the viewpoint of cultural 
criticism, points to the standardisation and commercialisation which 
the modes of capitalist production impose on artistic expression, 
making it difficult to introduce anything new or innovative (1985).
The school of political economy takes Marxist cultural criticism 
and traditional Marxist theory one step further with empirical studies 
of the economic bases of production (see Golding & Murdoch, 1977, 
p.l3ff; Garnham, 1979, pp.123-146). These emphasise the logic of
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market forces and link structural effects, such as concentrated 
ownership and cross ownership, with cultural effects (see McQuail, 
1986, p.635; Garnham, 1979, pp.124-125). Class stratification is seen 
as the root of inequality of access to the media, which in turn are 
controlled by a few organisations and individuals (Murdoch & Golding, 
1977, p.13, p.15). As a result, class dominates the dissemination of 
ideas, and inequalities are maintained. Although economics is not seen 
as the sole determinant of media behaviour, economic control is seen 
as the most powerful of many levers, because concentration and 
cross-ownership entail an extension of ruling class control over the 
production and distribution of ideas (see Murdock & Golding, 1977, 
p.21, p.28; Garnham, 1979, p.130). In cultural terms this has two
consequences: less diversity in programming and the exclusion of
minority views, because only the most commercially successful 
programmes are shown (see Murdock/Golding, 1977, p.37).
Non-Marxist theory can also assume a critical view of 
commercialism, because an unregulated market can have undesirable 
effects by giving the public what it wants even if this is damaging 
or socially unacceptable, for example pornography (see McQuail, 1986, 
p.635). Without some kind of regulation, minority interests and tastes 
can be neglected because commercialism tends to intensify competition 
for large audiences (see McQuail, 1986a, p.152). This view of the
media is often called the theory of social responsibility, and it has 
evolved from the experiences of an unregulated press and of a lack of 
broadcasting outlets comparable to the number of press outlets (see
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Tracey, 1977, p.23). Ix places emphasis on impartiality, diversity, 
and accountability of the media.
Not all theories are opposed to commercialism. The theory of the 
free press, even when modified in terms of social responsibility, 
supports the idea that the market rather than the regulator is the 
best guarantee of independence, diversity, and choice (see McQuail, 
1986, pp.635-6; see also Smith, 1980). With the advent of new cable 
and satellite outlets, this is a theory increasingly applied to 
broadcasting under the concept of electronic publishing (see Peter Jay, 
1981). Press theory maintains that economic competition - assuming 
that there is both free access to newcomers and the absence of 
concentration - promotes journalistic competition and diversity, which 
reflects the plurality of society, so creating a free market place of 
ideas (see Tracey, 1977, pp.21-22; Lange, 1980, p.29). According to 
these views, commerce can be morally neutral, because market forces 
determine what will be transmitted rather than the political and moral 
judgements of self-appointed guardians (see McQuail, 1986a, p.155). 
Commercialism can increase quality and at a lower cost by making more 
funding available, and profitable operations are likely to be able to 
support high-cost services to small audiences, who may be profitable 
target audiences for advertisers (see McQuail, 1986a, p.155).
The theoretical positions outlined above help to define 
commercialism within the context of society. However, there are a 
number of general arguments against commercialism in broadcasting
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which cut across theoretical or ideological allegiances. These 
arguments are outlined below.
Some argue that commercialism encourages concentrated ownership 
and cross-ownership, because the high costs of programme production 
can only be supported by large, wealthy organisations (see Lange, 
1980, pp.78-79; Garnham, 1983, p.16; Volf Thomas, 1985, p.121; McQuail, 
1986a, p.153). Concentration and cross-ownership benefit those who by 
virtue of their economic power already have the greatest access to the 
media (see Murdock & Golding, 1977, p.37; see Garnham, 1983, p.15; 
Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.45).
In the interest of profit maximisation, commercial broadcasters are
seen to pander to the interests of advertisers rather than to viewers
(see Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, pp.44-45). A seminal work on commercial
television economics states:
The first and most serious mistake that an analyst of the 
television industry can make is to assume that TV stations are in 
business to produce programms. They are not. TV stations are in 
the business of producing audiences. These audiences or means of 
access to them are sold to advertisers. The product of a TV 
station is measured in dimensions of people and time. The price of 
the product is quoted in dollars per thousand viewers per minute of 
commercial time. (Owen et al, 1974, p.4)
Consequently, while public service broadcasting is supposed to have
cultural goals and the production of programmes at its core,
commercial broadcasting is believed to follow other aims - namely the
earning of advertising revenue, profit maximat ion and the treatment of
the audience as potential consumers. Programming is placed around
advertising messages both in terms of themes, usually the most
popular, and in terms of when advertising breaks occur, usually at the 
most gripping moment of a transmission (see Kiefer, 1979, p.677; 
Lange, 1980, p.43; Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.46). According to Wolfgang 
Hoffmann-Riem, advertisers do not have to exercise direct influence on 
broadcasters, because everyone knows what type of programmes 
contribute to the commercial recipe for success (1984, p.46).
The pursuit of commercial goals is believed to result in less real 
choice for the audience. In the interest of maximising commercial 
revenue, the same types of programmes are shown, usually those which 
can be produced or acquired at low cost, but which attract the largest 
audiences, such as serials, quiz shows, and acquired programmes (see 
Murdock & Golding, 1977, p.37; see also Holzer, 1980, pp.120-22; Lange, 
1980, p.44; Garnham, 1983, p.15). Broadcasters do not even have to 
show the best programmes, merely those which will attract the largest 
audiences and prevent viewers from switching to another channel (see 
Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.45).
Conflicts and controversies which could irritate the audience and 
reduce the efficiency of the advertising message are either avoided or 
pushed to the margins of the schedule (see Kiefer, 1979, p.677; 
Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.46). Even if serious topics are covered, they 
tend to be treated in a superficial way, because programme content 
should support the commercial message (see Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.46; 
Jenke, 1985, p.420).
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Given the emphasis on the tried and tested formula of populist
programming, commercial approaches to broadcasting are seen to result
in a neglect of dissenting and minority cultural, racial, or political
interests. First, the programming needs of these audiences are
neglected because they are not sufficiently large and/or rich enough
to attract attention from advertising interests (see Murdock and
Golding, 1977, p.39; Lange, 1980a, p.139). Second, the views of such
minorities may be incompatible with the image which commercial
broadcasters wish to project to their majority audience. As Murdock
and Golding point out:
In general, then, the determining context for production is always 
that of the market. In seeking to maximise this market, products 
must draw on the most widely legitimated central core values while 
rejecting the dissenting voice or the incompatible objection to a 
ruling myth. The need for easily understood, popular, formulated, 
undisturbing, assimilable fictional material is at once a 
commercial imperative and an aesthetic recipe. (1977, p.40)
If this is the case, then commercialism acts as a barrier to change,
because it promotes social, political, and economic status quo
(Hoffmann-Riem, 1979, p.153; Elliot, 1982, p.250). In this way the
power of the existing ruling class is consolidated, because those who
want change cannot publicise their dissent and lack the resources to
communicate to a broad audience by alternative means (see Murdock &
Golding, 1977, p.37).
Commercialism is also attacked for posing a threat to national 
culture. The need to maximise revenues results in pressure on costs. 
This works against domestic productions and expensive minority 
programming, and in favour of cheap imports, usually American in 
origin, or domestic imitations of cheap imports such as game-show
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formats or serials ( see Elliot, 1982, pp.244-247; Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, 
p.33). Domestic producers cannot compete effectively with cheap US 
imports, because these have already achieved their profit targets in 
the huge US market for syndicated television (see Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, 
p.33). Moreover, when commercial revenues take a downturn, as was the 
case for ITV in the late 1960s, production budgets are one of the 
first items to be cut back (see Hood, 1972, p.412>.
Unlike public broadcasting, which is universally available, 
commercial services are believed only to supply those areas where it 
is profitable to supply services first, usually densely populated urban 
areas (see Broadcasting Research Unit, 1985, p.2). This is
particularly the case for cable television, where the high cost of 
installation means that it is unlikely to be made available in remote 
areas (see Volf Thomas, 1985, p.124). Subscription as a form of 
funding can also affect universality. Unlike the licence fee, which 
guarantees everyone the same level and amount of service, pay 
television can disenfranchise those who are unable to pay. 
Consequently, while pay television offers the least threat to 
advertising-funded media, it threatens to nullify the public-good 
nature of information, because individuals are excluded on the basis 
of their willingness to pay (see Elliot, 1982, p.245, p.249; Metcalfe, 
1986, p.45).
On a more general level commercialism, especially if it is allied 
with advertising, is criticised for addressing individuals as 
consumers driven by self-interest. This in turn leads to public
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conservatism and conformity OtcQuail, 1986a, p.154). Commercialism
is:
equated with conscience-less encouragement of popular prejudice and 
the wish for easy, immediate gratification or worse (pornography, 
vicarious violence etc). In this version, it offends against the
work ethic and ideals of social and moral improvement, which tend 
to favour values and ends such as: the public good over private 
pleasure; the freedom and creativity of the cultural/information 
producer; education, truth and social improvement; diversity of 
viewpoint and cultural expression; the national or regional 
language or culture. (McQuail, 1986a, p.154).
Commercialised production does not always result in bad or inferior 
products per se. The film industry, for instance, produces quality 
films in spite of being privately owned, and there are plenty of 
quality newspapers and magazines too (see Burgelman, 1986, p.185). As 
Burgelman points out, what is "good" or "bad" does not simply result
from the way in which it is produced (1985, p.185). Perhaps, there
has been too much effort into claiming that public service 
broadcasting is better because the public needs to be protected. This 
could be an elitist attitude, and it does not fully explain why public 
service broadcasting is better. Nor does it give any clue as to what 
might be better provided by commercial broadcasting organisations.
Given the assumed negative effects of commercialism on 
broadcasting generally, what are the assumed effects of commercialism 
on public service broadcasting in particular? On the one hand, you 
have to consider its position as a competitor to privately-owned 
commercial broadcasters. On the other, you have to consider the 
effects of commercial income such as advertising, sponsorship, or 
subscription on public broadcasters, as is the case in Vest Germany.
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As pointed out earlier, some researchers argue that public service 
broadcasting is tainted by commercialism even if it is not subject to 
commercial competition. According to Horst Holzer, the technical and 
economic base of public service broadcasting is directly linked to 
commercial interests and to the movements of capital, and this puts 
pressure on public service broadcasters to become more commercially 
orientated in their approach (Holzer, 1980, p.76; see also fturdock & 
Golding, 1977).
In mixed systems where public service broadcasters compete with 
commercial broadcasters, competition can either force public service 
broadcasters to adopt a more commercial approach or force them into 
programme niches aimed at minority audiences (see Lange, 1980, p.72; 
Garnham, 1983, p.23; Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.48). The latter is not 
evident in Europe, but the Public Broadcasting System in the United 
States caters for niches which are not adequately served by the 
mainstream networks (see Kleinsteuber/MUller, 1985). According to 
Kleinsteuber/Xiiller, a system modelled on the US model of public 
broadcasting would only be an alternative in Vest Germany "wenn man 
dem offentlich-rechtlichen System seine Existenz- und Weiter- 
entwicklungsmoglichkeiten raubte und das System der Gebuhren- 
finanzierung mit zusatzlichen Verbeeinahmen zerstorte" (1985, p.406; 
see also Hoffmann-Riem, 1980, p.354). If the populist approach is 
adopted, commercial competition can upset the balance of public 
service broadcasting as it seeks to combine the contradictory goals of 
public service, which are society-originated goals, and the goals of 
mass consumer satisfaction. In this respect, commercial systems have
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the upper hand because they have fewer programme obligations and can 
usually draw on larger financial resources (see Lange, 1980a, p.143).
Forced to compete with commercial broadcasters in order to 
maintain audience share and so justify licence-fee support, public 
service broadcasters can become little different from their commercial 
competitors (see Elliot, 1982, p.251). This type of commercialism may 
be the weakest form, but is also the most widespread. Self­
commercialisation is an accusation frequently levelled at the BBC 
because of its pursuit of ratings (in order to justify the licence fee) 
and it has been seen to result in editorial and programme conformity 
(see Hood, 1972, p.411). It has been argued that if the BBC were 
consistently to have less than a 30% share of the audience (the case 
when ITV was first introduced) then its enemies would be in a 
position to urge its demise (see Hood, 1972, p.411; Hegrine, 1985,
p.19). In the event of consistently low audiences, the licence fee 
becomes more difficult to sustain as a means of public funding.
Competition with commercial broadcasters can also affect programme 
supply as public broadcasters stretch their finite financial resources 
(see Negrine, 1985, p.20). If several organisations compete for the 
same programmes, this can have an inflationary effect, forcing up the 
price of rights to acquired programmes and sporting events (see 
Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.48; Jenke, 1985, p,421; Volf Thomas, 1985,
p.121). In-house production can be affected, too, as public service
broadcasters try to compete with the wages offered by their more
affluent commercial rivals. This was the situation faced by the BBC
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(von Hase, 1979, p.736). If wages in the public sector do not keep 
apace with those in the private sector, valuable and highly trained 
personnel can be lost (see Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.39, p.48). Lack of 
funding can result in increasing reliance on co-productions and 
independent productions, which bring economic, or rather commercial 
criteria into public service broadcasting (Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.39). 
Less emphasis on domestic production can also have implications for 
further licence fee awards (see Jenke, 1985, p.422).
The appearance of narrowcast channels such as those which 
concentrate on films or sport can also upset the balance of public 
service broadcasting. The prospect of many channels concentrating on 
different themes or types of content runs counter to the principle of 
public service broadcasting sandwiching programmes of minority appeal 
amongst more populist output (see Burgelman, 1986, p.184). One of 
the arguments in favour of public service broadcasting is that a 
balanced schedule allows viewers to come into contact with content 
which they would not normally encounter. If narrowcast channels 
became the norm, the public would be in a position to avoid such 
programmes of narrow appeal, by tuning in to more populist channels.
The situation is made worse if several broadcasters compete for 
revenue. For example, in West Germany public broadcasters are 
partially funded by advertising, and therefore have to compete with 
private broadcasters for this revenue. Already competition with new 
commercial TV stations for advertising revenue is leading to a more 
populist programming at the times when advertising is broadcast. In
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Britain the principle of separate sources of funding for different 
channels was a long-held principle. This was because it was fere thar 
if ITV and BBC were forced to compete for the same source of funding, 
there would be less choice in programming, as each sought to maximise 
their audiences with the same type of output (see Broadcasting 
Research Unit, 1985). Separate sources of funding represented a way 
of enhancing competition in programming rather than competition for 
revenues through concentration on the same types of programming. 
More recently this principle has been dropped to encourage new cable 
and satellite channels. According to Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, public 
service systems supported by advertising do alter their programmes to 
attract large audiences (see Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.39). This is not 
such a problem if they have a monopoly of advertising on television 
or radio, but the situation alters dramatically once commercial 
broadcasters begin to compete for a piece of the same advertising 
cake (see Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.39).
1.3 RgY.ig.W-
As a matter of principle, the issue of commercialism has been 
resolved in most countries. The debate no longer revolves around 
whether commercialism should be allowed, but how and in what forms it 
should be introduced, and what should be done with public service 
broadcasting. This research attempts to establish the solutions 
developed in Vest Germany, and to identify the route taken by ARD and 
ZDF in coping with the prospect of commercial competition.
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In what way, then, does commercialism in the form of more 
broadcasting outlets threaten public service broadcasting? An 
increase in commercialism threatens public service broadcasting's 
dominant or monopoly status and as such its claim on audiences and 
revenue. It also implies much more. It poses a threat to the public 
service ethos and offers the prospect of broadcasting becoming less 
socially accountable and less committed to the public interest. The 
public service broadcasters have two options. First, they can 
orientate their programme philosophy towards high standards. This 
poses the threat of being accused of elitism, or of degenerating into 
a "niche" broadcasting outlet for minority interests. Second, they can 
compete directly with commercial stations. This poses the threat of 
being accused of offering nothing substantially different. If public 
service broadcasting loses the ability to stand out from other 
broadcasting channels, it will forfeit a large part of the 
justification for its further existence, because its survival to the 
present day has ultimately been justified by the fulfilment of public 
service ideals in programming output.
- 56 -
CHAPTER TVO
PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTDfG Iff VEST GERMANY
Any examination of Vest German public service broadcasting's role 
in a dual system would be incomplete without reference to its 
structures and to the ideas and events which shaped its early 
development. In this respect history is of prime importance. The 
experiences of the Veimar Republic and National Socialism not only 
serve to put recent post-war history into context, but also represent 
a constant reminder of a past which must never be repeated.
2.1 From statist neutrality to party propaganda. B roadcasting  in
the Veimar Republic and under National Socialism
Broadcasting emerged as a result of several inventions at an 
international level, most of which were initially developed with other 
ends in mind (see Behrens, 1986, pp.106-11). As a process, its 
origins are social rather than technical, because the capacity to 
broadcast existed long before its potential as a form of mass 
communication was recognised (see R. Villiams, 1974, p.25; Curran and 
Seton, 1985, p.125). As Bertolt Brecht rightly pointed out: "Nicht die 
offentlichkeit hatte auf den Rundfunk gewartet, sondern der Rundfunk 
wartete auf die offentlichkeit" (cit. in Bausch, 1973, p.299).
At the beginning of the century experiments were carried out in 
wireless telegraphy, as opposed to wireless telephony (voice
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transmissions) with the Marconi Wireless Telegraphy and Signal 
Company playing a prominent role (Briggs, 1961, pp.25-31; Sandiord, 
1976, p.61>. However, as distinct from broadcasting (i.e. the
transmission of messages to an infinite number of receivers) these 
early experiments were used as a means of point-to-point 
communication, involving specific messages to specific receivers. The 
potential of reaching a wider public was not recognised at this stage 
(Briggs, 1961, p.5; Lerg, 1980, p.36). In both Britain and Germany, 
wireless communications were mainly used by the military, in shipping, 
and for the purpose of maintaining contacts with the colonies (Briggs, 
1961, p.29; Lerg, 1965, p.25). The outbreak of the First World War in 
1914 hastened the pace of technical innovation as wired 
communications with the outside world were severed (see Lerg, 1980,
p.37; Curran and Seton, 1985, p.125). After hostilities ceased, more
attention was focussed on the public possibilities of radio, those
involved having been encouraged by the success of experimental
transmissions carried out by both sides during the war (Sandford, 
1976, p.62).
In post-war Germany the introduction of radio was hampered, as the 
new Weimar Republic embarked upon a period of political and economic 
upheaval. In the revolution of November 1918, former military 
wireless units were taken over by revolutionary committees, and 
demands were made to wrest the control of telegraphy from the post 
office authorities (Pohle, 1955, p.31). The Ministry of Posts
regained control in January 1919, and the Post Office, the Reichspost, 
took over the army's central transmitting installation at Konigs
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Wusterhausen near Berlin on 1st February 1919 (Lerg, 1980, p.40). A 
wireless department was established at the Ministry of Posts under 
Hans Bredow, a former board member of the telecommunications firm, 
Telefunken (Lerg, 1980, p.40). Bredow is regarded as the father of
German broadcasting (Lerg, 1965, p.119).
Having regained control, the Ministry of Posts, under Bredow's 
influence, set about taking the initiative on broadcasting. At Kdnigs 
Wusterhausen links were established between Germany and the rest of 
Europe, and wireless telegraphy was used to relay news to regional 
post offices (Flottau, 1978, p.12). The news agencies, Wolfsches 
Telegraphenbiiro and Hollandsch Niewsbureau, were allowed to relay 
reports to subscribers by wireless telegraphy from 1919 (Montag, 1978, 
p.20). Business news was transmitted by the Eildienst GmbH, a private 
company, owned by the state, and closely associated with the German 
Foreign Office (see Montag, 1978, p.21; Lerg, 1980, pp.53-59). In 1922 
the Eildienst became the first organisation in Germany to introduce 
voice transmissions (Lerg, 1980, p.59). These experiments do not 
represent broadcasting in its established form, because there was no 
public reception. What they do reveal are two tendencies which had 
far-reaching consequences for the early development of broadcasting 
in Germany: the Reichspost owned and controlled the technical
apparatus of transmission and left content nominally to third parties 
(Flottau, 1978, p.13). This gave the post office authorities influence 
not only on broadcasting technology, but also on programme content.
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From the start the Ministry of Posts was intent on taking charge 
of radio. Its control over licensing was derived from the 
Telegraphenregal Cl), a state monopoly of telegraphic communication, 
incorporated into Article 48 of the Imperial Constitution of 1871, 
and Article 88 of the Veimar Constitution (Flottau, 1978, p.13). In 
1892 the state monopoly of telegraphic services was incorporated 
into a law which gave the state the sole right to erect and run 
telegraph-transmitting installations (see Lerg, 1980, p.30). In 1908 
this was extended to all forms of wireless telegraphy (Lerg, 1980,
p.30). The Ministry of Posts* jurisdiction over communications, 
allowed it to undertake measures to safeguard the state's ultimate 
jurisdiction over communications, without the necessity of introducing 
legislation (Pohle, 1955, p.33). These powers were to be used
constantly as broadcasting became established.
Questions of state security were to play an important role in the
organisation of broadcasting. First there was a desire to regulate
broadcasting, in order to prevent the unregulated "Wellenchaos" which 
existed in the United States (see Lerg, 1965, p.123). Also, the
proliferation of illegal reception by amateur enthusiasts reinforced 
the conviction that radical groups should not gain control of the new 
medium and so seek to undermine the shaky foundations of the new 
Republic (Lerg, 1980, p.72, p.93).
Although the Ministry of Posts controlled developments from an 
early stage, it had to resort to private funding, because the state had 
no funds to finance the introduction of broadcasting (Pohle, 1955,
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p.44). This involved political considerations, because private
interests had to be found which would offer no opposition to the
state. Wolfgang Schiitte writes:
Es nimmt deshalb nicht Vunder, daB die mit Rundfunk befafite 
Reichsbehorde, das Reichspostministerium, die neue Entwicklung nur 
zu fordern gedachte, wenn sie das Reich kein Geld kosten wiirde. 
Als Geldgeber muBten politisch unverdachtige Leute gefunden werden, 
die sich aber staatlichem Reglement nicht widersetzen durften. 
Denn die Gefahr, daB der Rundfunk ohne strenge Aufsicht miBbraucht 
werden konnte, erschien zu groB. (cit. in Montag, 1978, p.23)
Attempts by the Reichspost to involve newspaper publishers and 
news agencies failed, because of squabbles amongst the press and a 
failure to recognise the potential of broadcasting, an oversight the 
press was to regret in later years (Lerg, 1980, pp.50-52). In January 
1923, inspired by the example of the British Broadcasting Company (a 
private company established in 1923 by British radio manufacturers, 
and replaced in 1926 by the British Broadcasting Corporation, the 
BBC), the three most important German wireless manufacturers 
(Telefunken, Lorenz, and Huth) joined forces to apply for a licence to 
erect and run transmission installations (Lerg, 1980, p.77).
Programmes would have been supplied by a private company, the 
Deutsche Stunde - Gesellschaft fur drahtlose Belehrung und 
Unterhaltung GmbH. The manufacturers were working on the assumption, 
that they would be granted a monopoly in the market for receivers, 
similar to their British counterparts (see Pohle, 1955, p.34). This 
plan failed because of opposition from other manufacturers (Lerg, 
1980, p.90). However, more importantly the Reichspost was reluctant 
to relinquish technical control to private interests (Lerg, 1980 p.73). 
In the end the Reichspost decided to build transmission facilities
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itself, leaving programming to private initiatives (Montag, 1973,
p.22).
On 22nd May 1922 the Deutsche Stunde, a private broadcasting 
company, was established in Berlin as a subsidiary of the Eildienst 
GmbH (Lerg, 1980, p.67). The Reichspost managed to secure the state's 
influence by obtaining 51% of the new company's voting shares, held in 
trust by one of the founders, Ludwig Voss, the managing director of 
the Eildienst (Montag, 1978, p.22). The first public broadcast by the 
Deutsche Stunde took place on 29th October 1923 from Berlin (Flottau, 
1978, p.14). The first news bulletin was broadcast on 9th November 
1923, and reported Hitler's abortive Munich putsch (Sandford, 1976, 
p.64).
In the run-up to the introduction of public broadcasts the 
transmission of news had become a source of conflict between the 
Ministry of Posts, responsible for telecommunications, and the 
Ministry of the Interior, responsible for security (Pohle, 1955, p.25). 
The unstable political situation had engendered strong doubts about 
broadcasting content, and in this context the Minister of the Interior 
was brought into the debate, because the Minister of Posts was 
unwilling to assume supervisory responsibility for political 
programmes (see Flottau, 1978, pp.17-18; Lerg, 1980, p.82). In May 
1923, the Ministry of the Interior intervened, because it wanted more 
state control of content (Lerg, 1980, p.85). Officials at the Ministry 
of the Interior were keen to encourage "Reichs- und republikanische 
Staatsgedanken" (Pohle, 1955, p.36). The feasibility of this was
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regarded sceptically by the Ministry of Posts which would have 
preferred more apolitical content (Lerg, 1980, p.91). Officials at the 
Ministry of the Interior centred their plans on the Aktiengesellschaft 
fur Buch und Presse as a provider of news (later Drahtloser Dienst - 
Aktiengesellschaft fur Buch und Presse, abbreviated to Dradrag). This 
company had been established in May 1923 by SPD politicians using 
money from the Fonds zum Schutze der Republlk (Pohle, 1955, p.36). 
The Dradag was heavily influenced by the Ministry of the Interior, 
which held 51% of its shares (Montag, 1978, p.23).
Under pressure from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of 
Posts concluded a contract with both the Deutsche Stunde and the 
Dradag on 24th November 1923 (see Flottau, 1978, p. 17). The Dradag 
broadcast news and political programmes, leaving literary and musical 
content to the Deutsche Stunde. According to the Dradag contract, 
news and political programmes could only be broadcast with special 
permission. In the case of the Deutsche Stunde the Ministry of Posts 
reserved the right to install advisory committees to supervise 
literary and musical content (Flottau, 1978, p.17). In this way the 
state kept control over technical installations, and was given 
extensive powers over content.
Although the provision of programming was mainly the preserve of 
the Deutsche Stunde and Dradag, regionalism was an essential 
characteristic of German broadcasting. Originally the Deutsche Stunde 
had planned a national service, but this was neither technically 
feasible nor politically acceptable to the individual German states,
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the Lander (Pohle, 1978, p.34). The regional structure of German
broadcasting, which is still evident today, owes much to Hans Bredow,
who recognised the cultural diversity of Germany. Hans Bausch writes:
Aus dieser technischen Notwendigkeit machte Bredow eine 
kulturpolitische Tugend, weil er erkannt hatte, daB ein von Berlin 
ausgestrahltes Einheitsprogramm den traditionellen deutschen 
Kulturlandschaften nicht zugemutet werden durfte. (Bausch, 1956, 
p.17)
Bredow concluded an unofficial agreement with the Deutsche Stunde, 
whereby the latter would organise the establishment of 9 regional, 
private broadcasting companies (.Vertraullche Vereinbarung zwischen Dr. 
Bredow und EX. Voss, dem Leiter der MDeutschen Stunde", in Fischer, 
1957, p.76). Although these companies (2) were established by private 
interests, the state's influence was secured, because they were 
required to hand over 51% of their shares and a seat on the board 
each to the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Posts and the 
Deutsche Stunde (Flottau, 1978, p.16). In January 1926 the regional 
stations were supplemented by the Deutsche Welle GmbH, which 
broadcast programmes to the whole country on longwave (Lerg, 1980, 
p.173). This was owned by the Reich and the Land of Prussia in a 
ratio of 70:30 (Lerg, 1980, p.173).
From 1925 there was a growing conviction at the Ministry of Posts 
that broadcasting had outgrown private initiative (Pohle, 1955, p.48). 
This was to prove an occasion for increased state control. In 1925 
Bredow persuaded the regional companies to found an umbrella 
organisation, the Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft (RRG), to exercise uniform 
administrative, technical and financial control of broadcasting (Pohle, 
1955, p.39; ubereinkunft Bredow/RPK/Rundfunkgesellschaften 1925, in
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Fischer, 1957, p.77). The Lander protested that their jurisdiction
over cultural matters was being usurped (Pohle, 1955, p.40). A
compromise was reached which gave the Lander and the Ministry of the 
Interior control over programming; financial and technical control 
was exercised by the Reichspost (Lerg, 1980, p.194). The Reichspost 
took a 517# share in the RRG, and Hans Bredow was appointed 
Rundfunkkommissar for the RRG at the Ministry of Posts (Pohle, 1955, 
p.48, p.54). The Reichspost was able to secure further economic 
control by requiring that the regional companies hand over a 51% 
controlling interest in their concerns to the RRG (Flottau, 1978,
p.19). Although the RRG was responsible for the coordination of 
administrative and financial affairs, it was increasingly drawn into 
programming questions (Pohle, 1955, p.55).
The Lander and the Ministry of the Interior brought their influence 
to bear in programme rules issued on 17th December 1926 (.Richtlinien 
fur die Regelung des Rundfunks, in Fischer, 1957, pp.79-81). Mews and 
topical programmes had to be Mstreng uberparteilich" (p.79). The 
Dradag became the RRG’s news department, and the regional stations 
were restricted as to which news items were obligatory, and which 
were optional (pp.79-80). Control of other political content,
broadcast by the regional companies, was subjected to supervisory
committees, uberwachungsausschiisset composed of two representatives
from the Lander and one from the Ministry of the Interior (p.80).
Supervision of literary and musical content was to be undertaken by
cultural committees, Kulturbeiratet whose members were named by the
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Lander in consultation with the Ministry of the Interior (p.81). Both 
types of committees could veto programmes (pp.80-81).
Although broadcasting was not officially an object of the state, 
state control was almost absolute. Moreover, the reforms of 1926 made 
it easier for the state finally to nationalise broadcasting in 1932. 
Heinz Pohle writes that nationalisation by a government without a 
majority: "beweist uns einmal mehr, wie weit bereits die tatsachiiche 
Entwicklung staatlicher EinfluBnahme auf dem Rundfunk, ira Grunde 
verankert in den Rundfunkbestimmungen von 1926, fortgeschritten war” 
(1955, p.118).
Any vestige of independent broadcasting was erased. The 49% 
private share in the RRG was transferred to the Lander (Pohle, 1955, 
p.125), The private shares in the regional stations were redistributed 
between the Lander and the RRG in a ratio of 49 to 51 (Pohle, 1955, 
p.125). A second Rundfunkkommissar, Erich Scholz, was appointed from 
the Ministry of the Interior to supervise programmes and the 
neutrality of political content (Pohle, 1955, p.125). Bredow, the 
Rundfunkkommissar from the Ministry of Posts, was made responsible 
for broadcasting organisation, finance, and international relations 
(Pohle, 1955, p.125). Membership of the RRG administrative council 
was divided up between representatives from the two ministries and 
the Lander, and a programme committee was established with 15 
members, appointed by the Minister of the Interior (Pohle, 1955, 
p.125). The Dradag was liquidated as a private company and became a 
news department within the RRG. The uberwachungsausschiisse in each
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of the regional stations were replaced by Staatskommissare. These 
were appointed by Land governments in consultation with the Ministry 
of the Interior (Pohle, 1955, p.125). In this way state control over 
programme content was increased. Economic and technical control had 
rested with the state since 1926. The reforms were justified by Erich 
Scholz, a member of the MSDAP, in a broadcast on 28th July 1932: "Fur 
den Rundfunk . . . kann und darf es nur eine Losung geben: nicht das 
Interesse dieser oder jener Partei, sondern das der Staatspolitik gibt 
in alien Fallen den Ausschlag" (cit. in Pohle, 1955, p.124).
From this account it is clear that the introduction of broadcasting
was mainly determined by the Ministries of the Interior and Posts
with little reference to parliament. This was in part conditioned by
the unstable political situation, with many different groups jostling
for power. Referring to the exclusion of parliament Pohle writes:
Eine solche Funktion gab es iiberhaupt gar nicht, denn darin waren 
sich sowohl Reichs- wie Landesvertreter einig: um die ohnehin schon 
schwierige Situation noch nicht weiter zu erschweren, muBte man den 
Reichstag aus alien Verhandlungen fernhalten, die das Verhaitnis 
von Rundfunk und Staat betrafen und iiber die zukiinftige 
Organisation des Rundfunks und seine offentlich-rechtlichen 
Grundlagen entschieden. (Pohle, 1955, p.41>
In this respect Hans Bredow played an important part, because he 
was determined to avoid the political abuse of broadcasting by 
excluding parliaments from the policy-making process. Looking back, 
Bredow wrote: "In einer Zeit, in der die Parteipolitik das Leben
vergiftete und alles drunter und driiber ging, hielt ich es fur 
notwendig, den Rundfunk von Regierungen und politischen Parteien 
unabhangig zu machen" (cit. in Lerg, 1965, p.121). However, although
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parliament was excluded from any decisions relating to broadcasting, 
it proved impossible to exclude state control, particularly over 
programme content and via partial ownership of the broadcasting 
companies (Flottau, 1978, p.21). Ultimately, control by the state 
became increasingly inseparable from political influence and abuse of 
broadcasting. The emphasis was placed on securing the state, rather 
than on securing democracy. This is explained partly by the political 
instability of the period, and partly by the underdeveloped 
understanding of democracy within Germany. Drawing comparisons with 
the pluralistic supervision of public broadcasting in Vest Germany, 
Heiko Flottau comments: "Die Kontrolle des Rundfunks durch
'gescllschaftlich relevante Gruppen* war damals unmoglich" (1978, p.21). 
In retrospect, German broadcasting in the 1920s could not be 
conditioned by freedom from the state, and freedom from censorship, 
because social and political conditions were completely different from 
those prevailing now. The effects of the medium were unknown, and 
there was concern that it should not destabilise the fragile 
foundations of the Veimar Republic (see Sandford, 1976, p.67>.
The desire to keep parliamentary politics out of broadcasting 
policy was carried over into programming. The insistence on 
neutrality in news, cultural, and entertainment programmes may have 
been a serious error of judgement. It was not neutrality in the sense 
of diversity of opinion and the broadcasting of counterbalanced ideas, 
but rather neutrality through the exclusion of almost anything 
political. The cultural role of broadcasting was seen to be more 
important than its politically integrative or educational role. In a
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speech Bredow stated that broadcasting should be used as a 
"Sprachrohr der deutschen Ku'ltur, aber nicht des deutschen
Bruderzwistes". He added: "Politische Kampfe gehoren in die
Parlamente und die Presse, der Rundfunk soli ein Instrument der Kultur 
und des Ausgleiches, also ein Verkzeug des Friedens sein" (cit. in 
Fohle, 1955, p.61). As a result, debates about the future of the 
Weimar Republic were left to an increasingly hostile and right-wing 
press, a radicalised central Parliament, riots, and intimidation. Later 
there were some attempts to introduce a political element into
broadcasting, with talks on political themes, but censorship and 
overcautiousness reduced their effectiveness and their percentage to 
insignificance (Pohle, 1955, pp.77pp>. At the time there were calls 
for more attention to political issues, but as Pohle has pointed out 
the political situation, and perhaps the intolerance of the audience 
meant that such a change could never be a real possibility (1955, 
p.76).
The state-dominated broadcasting system finally lost any remaining 
independence when the Rational Socialists took power in 1933. Whereas
Bredow had tried to keep politics out of broadcasting, the Rational
Socialists recognised radio as a key instrument of their propaganda 
machine. Broadcasting was brought under the the control of the 
Reichsministerium fur Volksaufklarung und Propaganda, and the 
broadcasting stations were purged. Any regionalism that had remained 
after 1932 was abolished, and control was centralised (Flottau, 1978, 
p.23). The RRG came under the direct control of the Propaganda 
Ministry, and the powers of the Reichspost were reduced. Broadcasting
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output was not only severely censored, but adapted to fit national 
Socialist policies, including racial policies (Flottau, 1978, p.24).
Political events had come full circle as the neutrality of broadcasting 
output in the Veimar Republic was transformed into a political tool of 
the National Socialists. The factors which had played a role in this 
transformation were taken into account when broadcasting was 
reorganised after the Second World War.
2.2 The-origins of Vest German public service broadcasting. A relic 
of the occupation
The origins of public service broadcasting in that part of Germany
which was to become the Federal Republic of Germany, are to be found
in the period of Allied occupation after the Second World War (see
Herrmann, 1975a, p.211). They are in fact historical, based on
practicalities, not theoretical (Reichert, 1955, p.23>. Although no
uniform concept for broadcasting can be distinguished, the French,
British, and American Allies had similar aims in mind (see Bausch,
1980, pp.18-19). Primary amongst these, was the belief that
broadcasting must be independent from the state and other dominant
influences. This is summed up in a written statement by the American
military governor on 21st November 1947:
Es ist die grundsatzliche Politik der US-Militarregierung, daB die 
Kontrolle der offentlichen Meinungsbildung, wie Presse und Rundfunk, 
verteilt werden soil und von jedem herrschenden RegierungseinfluB 
freigehalten werden muB. Im Rahmen dieser Politik sollen die 
Rundfunkorganisationen als der Allgemeinheit dienende Einrichtungen 
geschaffen werden, frei von der Herrschaft irgendeiner Gruppe mit 
Sonderinteressen, von staatlichen, wirtschaftlichen, religiosen oder 
irgendwelchen anderen Einzelelementen der Gemeinschaft. (cit. in 
Flottau, 1978, p.25)
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This belief in the independence of broadcasting was shaped by the
experiences of National Socialism and by the mistakes of the Veimar
period. Corporations of public law were established to strengthen the
principle of broadcasting independence. These served the public
interest, and were guided by the principles of impartiality, public
accountability and diversity of opinion, principles which were
reinforced by the establishment of institutionalised supervisory
committees, composed of representatives drawn from different groups
within Vest German society. In the words of Reich:
Das Besondere einer Anstalt des offentlichen Rechts besteht darin, 
daB diese Anstalt keine Eigentumer hat. Eine Aktiengesellschaft 
gehort den Aktionaren, ein Staatsbetrieb dem Staat; eine Anstalt 
des offentlichen Rechts gehort juristisch niemandem. Deshalb hat 
niemand Anspruch auf Dividende oder sonstige Vorteile. 
AusschlieBlich dem Nutzen der Allgemeinheit soil die Anstalt des 
offentlichen Rechts und demzufolge auch die Arbeit des Rundfunks 
dienen. (Reich, 1963, p.382)
The influence of the BBC model is clearly visible, and as John
Sandford points out, "to this day the Federal Republic's broadcasting
corporations have more in common with the BBC than with any other
broadcasting service" (1976, p.71). However, German experience also
shows the difficulties of imposing a foreign model against strong
internal opposition.
In 1945 the Allies were keen to use the media as a means of 
reeducation in the principles of democracy, humanity, and tolerance, 
in order to repair the intellectual, emotional, and moral exhaustion of 
German culture after years of National Socialist rule (see Tracey, 
1983, p.23). Broadcasting passed completely into Allied hands,
although control was gradually returned to the Germans, as had been
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intended from the start (Mettler, 1975a, p,48; Herrmann, 1975a, p.211). 
In September 1949 the French, British, and American military governors 
were replaced by the Allied High Commission, which issued a law 
requiring Allied approval for any structural changes in the 
broadcasting system established by them (Bausch, 1980, p.240). The 
existence of this veto may have stopped some of the more ambitious 
plans of German politicians to alter the system to their advantage 
(see Bausch, 1980, p.160). Final jurisdiction over broadcasting 
remained with the Allies until 5th May 1955, when the Federal Republic 
of Germany gained full sovereignty. Hans Bausch writes that the 
Allies took four years to establish their ideas of broadcasting in a 
democracy, and a further six to see that the system they had 
introduced survived in its basic principles (1980, p.18).
The broadcasting stations founded by the Allies mirrored the 
division of Germany into zones of occupation. Decentralization is 
perhaps the only feature post-war Vest German broadcasting shares 
with the Veimar period, although centralist control in the form of a 
reconstituted Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft was deliberately avoided 
(Flottau, 1978, p.27). The repercussions of zonal division survive to 
this day, because broadcasting stations were established of greatly 
different size. The Americans established four stations in their zone 
of occupation: Bayerischer Rundfunk (BR), Hessischer Rundfunk (HR), 
Suddeutscher Rundfunk (SDR) and Radio Bremen (RB) (see Schiitte, 1975, 
pp.227-230, p.232). This coincided with with their own federal
tradition and system of multiple broadcasting units, run in accordance 
with the principle: "Die Macht muS verteilt werden" (Bausch, Interview,
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29.7.1987). The tiny station of RB, which serves only 150,000 people, 
owes its existence to the British concession of an American naval 
enclave in the north (Kapust, 1979, p.39). The French and the British, 
in common with their own centralised broadcasting systems,
established single stations in their zones. The British founded NWDR
(Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk) by military ordinance in January 1948 
(see Schutte, 1975, pp.226-27). NWDR was based in Hamburg and served 
5 million listeners in North Rhine-Westphalia, Hamburg, Schleswig- 
Holstein, Vest Berlin, and Lower Saxony. The French established the 
Sudwestfunk (SWF) by military decree in October 1948 (see Schutte, 
1975, pp.230-231). This served the Rhineland-Palatinate and the
former Lander of Baden and VUrttemberg-Hahenzollern. In 1952 the 
last two Lander were combined with the American occupied Land of 
WUrttemberg-Baden to form the new Land of Baden-Vurttemberg. This 
created an anomaly, because Baden-Wiirttemberg was now served by two 
stations, SWF and SDR.
In terms of organisation, it was the British who provided the
model of public service broadcasting. The Americans had wanted to 
introduce commercial broadcasting in their zone, in accordance with 
their own national experience (see Montag, 1978, p.33). This tallied 
with their concept both of independence from the state and of 
pluralism, where democracy and liberty are secured by economic
competition (Mettler, 1975a, p.106). Financially this was not
possible. According to Bausch: "Die Amerikaner hatten uberhaupt keine 
Idee. Da es nichts zu essen gab in Deutschland, konnten sie auch den 
Rundfunk nicht kommerziell organisieren" (Bausch, Interview, 29.7.1987).
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When the idea of private broadcasting proved Utopian the Americans 
opted for the British model of independent public corporations, in 
order to fulfil their concept of pluralism in at least a limited way. 
The French, too, rejected their own national experience of state- 
controlled broadcasting for a system of public service broadcasting. 
The British, alone, attempted to apply their own model (of the BBC) to 
German practice.
In an attempt to reinforce further the principle of broadcasting 
independence, the Allies reduced the powers of the postal authorities 
(see Bausch, 1980, pp.24-43). The Reichspost, which had been a source 
of state influence in the Veimar Republic, was forced to transfer its 
transmitters to the new broadcasting stations. Its powers were 
confined, to licence fee collection, dealing with technical interference 
and licence fee evasion (Hoffmann, 1975, p.29).
2.2.1 German opposition to Allied plans
Allied insistence on independent public service broadcasting, 
supervised by internal committees, composed of representatives from 
groups and institutions, was opposed by many Vest German politicians, 
who regarded the new system as a "Besatzungsdiktat" (see Jank, 1967, 
p.21; Bausch, 1980, p.19). They would have preferred a return to the 
state-dominated system of the Veimar Republic (Hoffmann, 1975, p.38; 
Bausch, 1980, pp.20-21). This showed an inability to understand the 
role of independent media in a democracy (see Lucius D. Clay, American 
military governor, cit. in Bausch, 1980, pp.22-23). However, in
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contrast to Veimar, where parliament had been excluded, Vest German
political representatives argued that control of broadcasting should
rest with the Lander parliaments, who, unlike other groups, were the
only legitimate elected representatives of the people (see Bausch,
1980, p.161). Politicians across the spectrum were suspicious of
group representation and the concept of impartiality in broadcasting,
because they believed these would only benefit group interests, rather
than the public interest (see Hoffmann, 1975, p.39, p.33; Bausch, 1980,
p.55). An SPD critic, writing about NVDR, commented:
Vir (the SPD) hatten. . . darauf hingewiesen, daB ein
uberparteiliches Institut, das sich gegen eine Mitarbeit der 
Parteien wehrt, einen politisch undurchsichtigen Korper darstellt, 
dergestalt, daB er Raum zu Angriffen, sei es gegen einzelne Parteien 
oder gegen die Parteien uberhaupt, freilaBt. (cit. in Hoffmann, 1975, 
p.39)
It has been widely assumed that the experience of National 
Socialism made politicians fearful of the political effects of 
broadcasting (see Hoffmann, 1975, p.62). State control was seen as a 
corrective for the negative effects of broadcasting and fitted in with 
past practice. Referring to the Veimar Republic and Vest German 
politicians' reluctance to accept independent broadcasting, Klaus Berg 
writes:
Etwas aus der Staatskontrolle zu entlassen, erschien fast wie die 
Erteilung eines Freibriefes. Die staatliche uberwachung war in der 
Veimarer Republik gerade das Mittel gewesen, mit dem man 
Auswiichsen aller Art und auch dem vermeintlichen ubel der 
"Politisierung des Rundfunks" glaubte begegnen zu konnen. (cit. in 
Bausch, 1980, p.82)
Allied determination to secure broadcasting's independence had 
varied results depending on how successful German opposition proved
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to be. The Americans decided to give the Germans control earlier than 
the British, but took longer to achieve this, because of their 
insistence on satisfactory Land legislation to comply with the 
principle of independence from the state (see Montag, 1978, pp.34-35; 
Bausch, 1980, pp.65-127). For instance, the Americans rejected several 
drafts for an SDR law, because these gave the Land government too 
much influence (Bausch, 1980, p.93-105). Barbara Mettler shows how 
the Bavarian authorities got round the American insistence on 
broadcasting independence (1975b, p.245). The Americans had refused 
to accept executive representation in the pluralistic supervisory 
councils of BR, but they were prepared to accept parliamentary 
representation, drawing on their own experience of a separate 
legislature and executive (Mettler, 1975b, p.245). However, in Germany 
this distinction is not so clear, and so the Bavarian government was 
able to secure indirect influence in BR's supervisory councils 
(Mettler, 1975b, p.245). Mettler also sees the Bavarian success in 
opposing American demands for independent broadcasting as a result of 
an American restorative policy, which came to place less emphasis on 
eradicating National Socialism, and more emphasis on opposing 
Communism (Mettler, 1975a, p.7, p.10).
The British, too, had problems in convincing the Germans of the 
merits of independent broadcasting. The transferral of NVDR into 
German hands was entrusted to Hugh Greene, later Director-General of 
the BBC (see Tracey, 1984). Greene, in his own words, believed that 
"das Statut der unabhangigen BBC mit erforderlichen und verniinftigen 
Modifikationen den deutschen Verhaltnissen angepafit werden konnte".
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(Greene, 1970, p.54) Greene was determined, not to submit to party- 
political demands for "demokratische Kontrolle" in the form of 
uberwacbungsausscbusse, with representation from the party 
organisations (Greene, 1970, p.54). However, he was keen to involve 
the Germans in discussions about RWDR's future legal status (Greene, 
1970, p.54).
The political parties managed to water down Greene's proposals for 
UWDR to facilitate the dominance of party political and state 
interests (Hoffmann, 1975, p.41). The 16-member HauptausscbuB, which 
was supposed to represent the public interest and elect the board 
iVerwaltungsrat), was constructed in such a way as to give state and 
party political interests a majority (see Hoffmann, 1975, pp.41-42; 
Schaaf, 1975, p.299). The first HauptausscbuB contained six SPD 
representatives, two CDU representatives and one liberal (Hoffmann, 
1975, p.42). Four of its members were prime ministers of the
participant L&nder (Hoffmann, 1975, p.41). The powers of the
HauptausscbuB were increased to include budgetary powers, later useful 
in getting rid of politically unpalatable employees on the pretext of 
rationalisation (see Schaaf, 1975, p.300). The Verwaltungsrat,
modelled on the BBC's Board of Governors, and supposedly independent 
of special interests, also became a victim of party political 
interference. The HauptausscbuB was supposed to select the members of 
the Verwaltungsrat, but it was agreed that the Land representatives on 
the HauptausscbuB should each nominate a member (Hoffmann, 1975, 
p.43). The remaining two seats were proposed by the trade unions and 
the Uorth Rhine-Westphalian representative on the Hauptausscbuss
- 77 -
(Hoffmann, 1975, p.43). Not only had the interests of other groups 
been pushed back in favour of state and party political interests, but 
the HauptausscbuB had been reduced to an "Akklamationsgreraium" 
(Hoffmann, 1975, p.43).
In agreeing to these concessions, Greene may have underestimated
the political parties' ability to assume a dominant role in the
supervisory committees. He had attempted to apply the BBC model, with
the HauptausscbuB taking the role of the monarch in appointing the
Verwaltungsrat> which was modelled on the Board of Governors (Schaaf,
1975, p.299). Unlike Britain, where the Board of Governors acted as
independent personalities without party political allegience, the West
German supervisory committees were regarded as party political bodies
from the start. Michael Tracey argues that Greene was quite aware of
the problems posed by the political parties, but was prepared to take
a risk in the hope that politicians in the supervisory committees
would not abuse their position (1983, p.52, p.109). Regardless of any
institutional measures, politicisation was probably inevitable, because
of political distrust of broadcasting and a lack of party political
consensus about broadcasting's role in a liberal democracy. Tracey
points out the difficulty of the task which Greene faced in
establishing in one year what had been achieved in Britain over
centuries within the framework of a totally different political culture
(1983, p.64). In comparing the BBC to NVDR, Tracey writes:
Die Arbeit der BBC war politisch von der lebensbejahenden 
Atmosphare abhangig, vom Einverstandnis mit ihrer Rolle, innerhalb 
der britischen Kultur. Ohne diese Atmosphare konnten alle 
institutionellen Vorrichtungen bei der Griindung einer unabhangigen 
Organisation nur versagen. Es gab ungliicklicherweise fiir Greene
- 78 -
niemals die Gelegenheit, ais Chef des NVDR, diese Bedingungen zu 
schaffen. (1983, p.52)
Once the British handed control of NVDR to the Germans, it began to
disintegrate and become "ein Stuckchen mehr Behorde" (Dierck Ludwig
Schaaf cit. in Flottau, 1978, p.32).
The introduction of a foreign model to Vest German conditions was 
therefore only a partial success in terms of the Allied aim of 
independent broadcasting. Rightly or wrongly, the Vest German 
political authorities adapted the model to fit in with their own ideas 
of broadcasting in a democracy. Vhat is clear, however, is that 
politicisation of Vest German broadcasting has its roots in this early 
period, and is not just a phenomenon of the 1970s.
2.2.2. The Germans in control
Although the Vest Germans complained about the provincialism of 
the broadcasting system established by the Allies, they managed to 
increase the number of broadcasting stations still further. At the 
same time, the influence of the state and the political parties was 
increased at the expense of other groups. As Hans-Matthias Kepplinger 
points out: "Je alter die Anstalten sind, desto geringer ist in der 
Regel der in ihren Organen angelegte StaatseinfluS" (1982, p.81).
In 1953 Vest Berlin left NVDR and established its own station, 
Sender Freies Berlin (SFB). After much controversy NVDR was split in 
1955 to form Vestdeutscher Rundfunk (VDR), based in Cologne and
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serving North Rhine-Westphalia, and Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR), 
based in Hamburg, and serving the Lander of Hamburg, Lower Saxony and 
Schleswig-Holstein (Bausch, 1980, p.212>. Following a plebiscite in 
1955, the French returned the Saarland to West Germany, and a separate 
station for this Land, Saarlandischer Rundfunk (SR), was established 
in 1957 (see Schiitte, 1975, pp.234-235). In 1961 the Deutsche Welle 
(DW) and Deutschlandfunk (DLF) were established by central government 
for the purpose of overseas broadcasts. ZDF, the only national 
station broadcasting solely television, was established by inter-Land 
agreement in 1961, and started transmissions in 1963. In rational 
terms it may have been more sensible to reorganise the stations 
territorially, but in spite of proposals for reform, including the 
Itlchel-Kommission report in 1970 on broadcasting in the south-west, 
nothing has changed (see Sandford, 1975, pp.75-76). Bausch concludes 
that any reform would probably require a territorial reform of the 
Lander, and this is unlikely (1980, p.244).
The disintegration of NWDR is an obvious example of political 
dissatisfaction with the Allied system of broadcasting. The split was 
in part the result of resentment in North Rhine-Westphalia about the 
centralisation of broadcasting activities in Hamburg, and the 
dominance of the SPD Lander of Hamburg and Lower Saxony (Hoffmann, 
1975, p.48; Schaaf, 1975, p.305; Bausch, 1980, p.204). The North Rhine- 
Westphalian CDU government also resented what they saw as the leftist 
bias of NWDR, which was variously described by the CDU as being 
"unchristlich", "atheistisch", and "kommunistisch" (see Hoffmann, 1975, 
p.34). These accusations were reinforced by the liberal climate Greene
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had fostered at NVDR and by the employment of several prominent left- 
wing journalists (see Schaaf, 1975, p.297). Legislation for a separate 
station for North Rhine-Westphalia, Vestdeutscher Rundfunk (VDR), was 
introduced in January 1954. The British did not intervene as NWDR 
collapsed, because according to Rudiger Hoffmann: "Die Stabilitat des
Systems war wichtiger geworden als die Einlosung demokratischer Vert- 
und Ordnungsvorstellungen" (1975, p.50).
The WDR broadcasting law of Nay 1954 established a parliamentary 
model of broadcasting. This was a further development on the NWDR 
model, which had become dominated by party political forces. The 
members of the VDR supervisory body, the Rundfunkratt representing the 
public interest, were elected by the Land parliament, instead of being 
selected by groups and institutions, as was the case in the US- 
established broadcasting stations under the pluralistic model. The 
North Rhine-Vestphalian prime minister, Karl Arnold (CDU), justified 
this decision calling parliament "die vom Volk autorisierte legitime 
Vertretung aller Belange des iiffentlichen Lebens" (cit. in Schlie, 1979, 
p.55). According to Arnold, the pluralistic model resulted in the 
representation of narrow group interests, which threatened to devalue 
democracy and undermine parliament (see Bausch, 1980, pp.218-219).
However, the introduction of the parliamentary model at WDR 
resulted in a monopolisation of broadcasting supervision by the 
political parties. In the event, the Land parliament's role was 
decidedly limited, because the party political leaderships had worked 
out a prior list of Rundfunkrat candidates, which proportionally
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reflected political strengths (see Bausch, 1980, p.222). The
Rundfunkrat's right to elect the administrative council, the
Verwaltungsrat, was restricted by party political solutions worked out
beforehand (Bausch, 1980, p.222). The Verwaltungsrat, which was
dominated by party political interests, was strengthened at the 
expense of the director-general, the Intendant, and the Rundfunkrat. 
It was responsible for supervising programme content, and could issue 
directives in individual cases to the Intendant (see Hoffmann, 1975,
p.72). It was also given far-reaching powers over appointments and 
financial matters (Hoffmann, 1975, p.73). This opened up the route to 
Proporzt whereby top jobs in broadcasting are awarded according to 
party political considerations (Hoffmann, 1975, p.73; Bausch, 1980, 
p.223). NDR, created by the remaining NWDR participants (Schleswig- 
Holstein, Lower Saxony, and Hamburg) followed North Rhine-Westphalia's 
example in June 1955, with a law similar in construction to the WDR 
broadcasting law. Here politicisation was reinforced by the necessity 
to reflect the party political interests of three Lander.
In Bausch's view, the disintegration of NWDR marked the beginning
of "der Einbruch der Parteien" in West German broadcasting,
indem nicht mehr die gesellschaftlich relevanten Krafte die 
Aufsichtsgremien stellten, sondern die Landtage, und die Landtage 
konnten das nur nach dem Proporz, nach der jeweiligen 
Zusammensetztung der Parlamente. Da fing das an. (Interview,
29.7.1987)
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2.3 The structure of public service broadcasting in Vest Germany
According to Helga Montag, public service broadcasting in West 
Germany is characterised by the principles of federalism, corporations 
of public law, and pluralistic control (1978, p.26). By describing the 
system and associated problems, some light can be shed on the nature 
and practice of this complex system.
Vest Germany’s federal structure, encompassing ten federal states
or Lander, and West Berlin, which has a special status, is largely
reflected in regionally-based broadcasting stations. Decentralization
is reinforced by the fact that the Landert as opposed to the Federal
government or Bund in Bonn, are responsible for broadcasting policy,
which comes under their constitutionally guaranteed sovereignty in
matters of culture and education (Art. 30. Grundgesetz fur die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. Mai 1949, in Ring, 1980, A-1 1,
pp.1-6). Federalism is generally regarded as beneficial to
broadcasting's independence because it results in a division of power,
and diversity. Bausch writes:
Foderalismus bedeutet eine vertikale und eine horizontale 
Gewaltenteilung, namlich eine Verteilung der Funktionen in gestufter 
Ordnung zwischen dem Staat und der gegliederten Gesellschaft 
einerseits, und eine Verteilung der Funktionen in raumlicher 
Aufgliederung andererseits. Foderalismus ist also nicht nur 
regionale Aufteilung der Macht, sondern ist auch verbunden mit dem 
Zwang zur Kooperation im Zeichen der Subsidiaritat und der 
Solidaritat. Er ist zugleich ein Bekenntnis zu gemaBigtem 
politischem und sozialem Pluralismus und bedeutet Abwehr gegen die 
Allmacht des Staates, Abwehr gegen die radikale Forderung einer 
Autonomie der gesellschaft lichen Gruppen, Abwehr gegen 
Kollektivismus. (Bausch, 1980a, p.67)
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However, variations in the size of stations has meant that small 
stations, like RB, SFB and SR, can only exist on subsidies from their 
larger neighbours, set out in an agreement amongst the regional 
broadcasting stations (AJRD-Vereinbarung Finanzausglelch vom 29. 
November 1983, in ARD Jahrbuch 1984, pp.386-7).
There are now nine regional stations established by law or by 
inter-land agreement if a transmission area covers more than one 
Land. These stations are:
Hessicher Rundfunk (HR), established in 1948, based in Frankfurt, 
and serving Hesse 
Radio Bremen (RB), established in 1948, and serving the city state 
of Bremen
Siiddeutscher Rundfunk (SDR), established in 1949, based in
Stuttgart, and serving the northern part of Baden-Viirttemberg 
Bayerischer Rundfunk (BR), established in 1948, based in Munich 
and serving Bavaria 
SUdwestfunk (SVF), established in 1949, based in Baden-Baden, and 
serving the Rhineland-Palatinate and the southern part of Baden- 
Wurttemberg on the basis of an inter-Land agreement 
Sender Freies Berlin (SFB), established in 1953, based in West
Berlin, and serving this area
Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR), established in 1955, based in
Hamburg and serving Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, and the city 
state of Hamburg on the basis of an inter-Land agreement
Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), established in 1955, based in
Cologne, and serving North Rhine-Westphalia
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Saarlandischer Rundfunk (SR), established in 1957, based in
Saarbrticken, and serving the Saarland.
On 9th June 1950 the regional stations or their antecedents entered 
a loose federation for cooperation purposes, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
der offentlich-recht lichen Rundfunkanstal ten der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (ARD) (see Satzung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der offentlich- 
rechtlichen Rundfunkanstal ten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ARD) vom 
9, Juni 1950 in der Fassung vom 7.Juni 1962f in Ring, 1980, C-V 1, 
pp. 1-4). The original idea of cooperation had been initiated by Hans 
Bredow in 1947, and had been further encouraged by Hugh Greene (see 
Herrmann, 1975a, p.213>.
However, initially there was some reluctance to cooperate because 
memories of the Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft were still strong, but 
mutual problems made cooperation a necessity (Herrmann, 1975a, pp.213- 
214; Flottau, 1978, p.40; Kapust, 1979, pp.40-41). The establishment of 
ARD also provided a means of presenting a united front against 
Federal Government attempts in the 1950s to increase its influence on 
broadcasting (see Kapust, 1979, p.40; Bredow cit. in Bausch, 1980, 
pp.257-258). ARD has no legal status, but represents the public 
interests of all the regional stations. Major decisions affecting ARD 
are taken by the Hauptversammlung, composed of the Intendanten and 
the chairmen of the supervisory councils in each station; decisions 
of a day-to-day nature are taken at regular meetings of the 
Intendanten (.Satzung der ARDt Paragraph 5, p.3).
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ARD achieved its true significance with the introduction of 
television, which was too expensive for individual broadcasting 
stations acting on their own. In March 1953 the ARD stations signed 
an agreement, the Femsehvertrag, which established a network system 
to run the first television channel, Deutsches Fernsehen (DFS) 
(Verwal tungsvereinbarung der Landesrundfunkanstalten iiber die 
Zusammenarbelt auf dem Gebiet des Fernsehens C'Fernsehvertrag") vom 
27. Marz 1953, in der Fassung vom 2. Juli 1964, in Ring, 1980, C-V 2, 
pp.1-4). This agreement also sets the level of contributions from 
each station to the network. The individual stations contribute 



















In rational terms it would have made more sense for each station 
to specialise in certain types of programming, but the stations have 
held fast to the principle that each station should maintain the full 
spectrum of broadcasting departments (see Femsehvertragt Ziffer 5, 
p.2). Some specialisation does occur, with the larger stations taking 
on greater responsibilities. The network news department is based at 
NDR, and major sports coverage is centred at WDR. Each ARD station 
has the right to opt out of the network in order to offer regional 
alternatives (Femsehvertragt Ziffer 6, p.3>. Cooperation for Deutsches
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Fernsehen was made obligatory with the passage of an inter- Land 
agreement on 17th April 1959, the Abkommen iiber die Koordinierung des 
Ersten Fernsehprogramms (in ARD Jahrbuch, 1970, p.311). The 
programme schedules of the ARD television network are put together by 
the Standige Frogrammkonferenzt which meets under the chairmanship of 
the ARD Programmdirektor and is composed of the Intendanten of the 
individual stations, or their deputies (Femsehvertrag, Ziffer 3 & 4, 
pp. 1-2). The background work for the Programmkonferenz is undertaken 
by the Programmdirekti on, based in Munich. The Standige
Programmkonferenz is advised by a committee, the Fernseh beira t, 
composed of members from the supervisory councils of each station 
(Femsehvertrag, Ziffer 3, p.l).
In addition to the networked television channel, each station opts 
out of the schedule between 18.00-20.00 to transmit regional 
programmes, although entertainment programmes predominate in order to 
attract advertising, which can only be shown before 20.00. Each 
station is also involved in the regional third television channels. 
These are run either by individual stations or (in two cases) jointly 
by three stations. They are: Bayern 3 (BR) since 22nd September 1964; 
Hessen 3 (HR) since 6th October 1984; Nord 3 (SDR,SFB,RB) 
experimentally since 4th January 1965 and officially since 20th 
September 1965; Vest 3 (VDR) since December 1965; and Sudwest 3 
(SVF,SDR,SR) since 4th April 1969. Three or four radio channels are 
run by each station for its transmission area.
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Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) was established on 6th June 1961 
by an inter-Land agreement (.Staatsvertrag iiber die Errichtung der 
Anstalt des offentlichen Rechts "Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen", in Ring, 
1980, C-1V 3.1, pp. 1-10). Based in Mainz, it broadcasts a national
television service only, and is not part of ARD. It started
broadcasting on 1st April 1963. An addition to the ZDF - Staatsvertrag 
obliges both ARD and ZDF to coordinate their national television 
services, so that the viewer can choose between alternative programmes 
(.SchluBprotokoll zu dem Staatsvertrag der Lander iiber die Errichtung 
der Anstalt des offentlichen Rechts "Zweites Femsehen'\ in Ring, 1980, 
C-IV 3.1, p.10). A coordination agreement between the two forms the 
basis of a joint schedule which fixes programmes at 15 minute 
intervals. This includes protected areas to prevent the scheduling of 
popular entertainment programmes against current affairs programmes 
(see Scharf, 1979, p.245).
The radio stations Deutschlandfunk (DLF), aimed at German and 
European audiences, and the Deutsche Welle (DW), which broadcasts to a 
global audience, both belong to ARD. They were established 
exceptionally in 1960 by central government because they do not target 
domestic audiences. RIAS (Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor) in West 
Berlin, established by the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 
1946, has only an advisory status within ARD. Financed by the 
American and West German governments, its target audience is in the 
German Democratic Republic.
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The public broadcasting stations still have the legal status of 
corporations of public law, an organisational form designed to enhance 
their independence and neutrality from both the state and private 
interests. They are self-administrating. The state has no control 
over programme content, or the day-to-day running of the stations. 
The Lander governments are only allowed to practise limited legal 
supervision of the stations, to ensure that broadcasting legislation is 
adhered to (see Jank, 1967, pp.101-102).
2.3.1 The programme obligations of public service broadcasting.
The programme obligations of the individual broadcasting stations, 
their Programmauftrag, are set out in broadcasting laws and standing 
orders. At ZDF there are additional programme guidelines, the 
Richtlinlen fur die Sendungen des "Zwelten Deutschen Fernsehens"t dated 
11th July 1963 (in Ring, 1981, C-IV 3.3, pp.1-3). These are a set of 
general principles concerned with the right to private life, respect of 
marriage, the family, work, etc. They also contain political aims 
including the promotion of democracy, peace, and the peaceful 
unification of Germany. The ARD television network is also subject to 
a set of programme principles, the Griindsatze fur die Zusammenarbeit 
1m ARD-Gemelnschaftsprogramm "Deutsches Fernsehen", approved by the 
the Intendanten on 9th July 1971, and updated on 1st December 1982 
(in ARD Jahrbuch, 1983, pp.403-404). These rules contain clauses on 
balance, objectivity, the separation of facts and opinion. They 
represent a strengthening of the rules contained in the individual 
broadcasting laws, and an attempt to offer a uniform set of rules for
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the networked television channel. In practice, the fulfilment of the 
obligations contained in the broadcasting laws and guidelines depends 
on internal and external power structures, and on the broadcasters' 
view of their role. They can never be more than a framework to judge 
programme output.
The broadcasting stations have a duty, enshrined in most of the 
broadcasting laws, to provide information, education and entertainment 
in a balanced way. For example, the HR broadcasting law demands “die 
Verbreitung von Nachrichten und Darbietungen bilaender, 
unterrichtender und unterhal tender Art" (Art .2, Gesetz Uber den 
Hesslschen Rundfunk vom 2 Oktober 1948, in Ring, 1981, C-1V 1.2.1, 
pp.1-6). The three components are meant in the broadest sense and 
cannot be separated from each other. Entertainment, for instance, can 
contain informative and educative elements (see Scharf, 1979, pp. 238- 
239).
This general obligation is supplemented by other rules. Most 
stations have clauses stipulating that broadcasting should serve 
democracy, freedom, peace, and international understanding as well as 
encouraging social equality, tolerance, respect for the individual, 
humanity, and cultural consciousness in various formulations. 
Programmes must adhere to the Constitution, the Grundgesetz. 
Broadcasting as a whole, not individual programmes, must strive to 
reflect the diversity of existing opinion. Broadcasting must be 
independent and not serve any one interest. News must be impartial, 
objective, and truthful. News and comment must be separated, and
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doubts about the accuracy of information sources must be mentioned. 
Programmes must not upset moral or religious views. Nor must they 
encourage prejudice on grounds of race, colour or creed or incite to 
violence or crime. Some, like BR, NDR, SWF, SR, and VDR, have special 
clauses on the provision of regional programming or on the reflection 
of regional characteristics. All laws contain a clause on the right to 
reply and also rules aimed at protecting young people from
inappropriate programming. Some stations have additional programme 
obligations. For example, DV and DLF must present a comprehensive 
view of Vest Germany to foreign listeners. ZDF is obliged to promote 
the reunification of Germany "in Frieden und Freiheit" (.Paragraph 2).
Advertising rules for television are contained in Paragraph 22,
Clause 3 of the ZDF Staatsvertragt but were made applicable to ARD by 
an addition to the ZDF agreement (SchluBprotokoll zu dem Staatsvertrag 
der Lander iiber die Errichtung der Anstalt des offentlichen Rechts 
"Zweites Deutsches Fernsehenw, in Ring, 1981, C-IV 3.1, p. 10). 
According to this, advertising must be separated from other 
programmes, and cannot be transmitted after 20.00, on Sundays, or on 
public holidays. The prime ministers fixed a limit of 20 minutes of 
advertising a day on ZDF and ARD. The influence of advertisers on
editorial content is not allowed. Rules on advertising have since
been reinforced with the passage of the 1987 inter-land agreement on 
the reorganisation of broadcasting (see Chapter 3).
One cannot examine the programme obligations of public 
broadcasting without reference to the concept of Ausgewogenheit as it
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relates to programming. According to Arthur Williams, Ausgewogenheit 
has a narrower meaning than the English term "balance", implying 
detailed measurements and weighing out (1976, p.81). Ausgewogenheit 
is a controversial term, which has played a central role in political 
disputes concerning the output of public broadcasting. According to 
Jorg Aufermann, Ausgewogenheit has often been abused or misunderstood 
by politicians, who have used it in their arguments to underline the 
left or right bias of public broadcasting (1977, p.301). This abuse, 
in his view, has undermined the autonomy of the broadcasting stations, 
and the principles underlying them - balance, diversity of opinion, 
editorial freedom, and journalistic fairness (1977, pp.301-302).
Albert Scharf states that Ausgewogenheit has now come to symbolize 
"angepaBtes Duckmausertum, undemokratischen Untertanengeist, 
Selbstzensur und Langeweile" (1981, p.202).
The ability of the political parties to interfere in this way is 
reinforced by their representation, and that of their sympathisers, on 
the internal broadcasting supervisory councils. There have been 
numerous instances of threats to break legislative agreements, public 
statements on lack of Ausgewogenheit^ and outright interference in 
programme policy by the political parties in their attempt to 
institute their concept of Ausgewogenheit (see Aufermann, 1979, pp.365- 
369). Party political obsession with Ausgewogenheit has also affected 
personnel policy in the broadcasting stations, because of the 
insistence on political balance amongst leading broadcasting employees 
(see Schneider, 1979, pp .364-394). For instance, a political 
commentator who is a member of the CDU, or thought to be sympathetic
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to it, has to be balanced out with a colleague sympathetic to the SPD. 
Personnel packages are often agreed by the political parties, leaving 
only a formal decision to the supervisory committees and the
Intendant (see Appel, 1976, p.461>. In many instances the political 
allegiances of an employee appear to be more important than
professional experience (see Aufermann, 1977, pp. 310-311). This has
implications for the independence and critical nature of broadcasting,
because journalists become too dependent on their party political
patrons. Of course, journalists do not always follow the party line, 
but the job of rectifying the situation would appear to rest too
heavily with the political parties, at the expense of the internal 
supervisory committees and the Intendant, who are legally responsible 
for ensuring that Ausgewogenheit is upheld.
The term Ausgewogenheit was first introduced by the Constitutional
Court in 1961. It is rarely found in broadcasting legislation,
although other terms, which refer to impartiality, objectivity,
neutrality, and diversity of opinion, cover its meaning. The Court
required that broadcasting be organised in such a way as to ensure
daB alle in Betracht kommenden Krafte in ihren Organen EinfluB
haben und im Gesamtprogramm zu Wort kommen konnen, und die fur
den Inhalt des Gesamtprogrammes Leitgrundsatze verbindlich machen, 
die ein MindestmaB von inhaltlicher Ausgewogenheit, Sachlichkeit 
und gegenseitiger Achtung gewahrleisten. UJrteil des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 28. Februar 1961 (Femsehurteil) in 
Lehr & Berg, 1971, p.222)
The use of the word "MindestmaB", would appear to change the concept
of Ausgewogenheit from a quantitative or mathematical idea to a
qualitative one. To give all opinions equal time would be Utopian,
because not all groups have the same significance. It would also seem
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to imply that Ausgewogenheit applies to the whole spectrum of
broadcasting output, including entertainment, which according to the 
Constitutional Court is also a factor in the formation of opinion 
iFernsehurteil} in Lehr & Berg, 1971, p.254). However, most
discussions about Ausgewogenheit have centred on political balance 
between the CDU/CSU and SPD in news and current affairs output, and 
in personnel matters, thus narrowing the interpretation and resulting
in a polarisation between the two parties (see Schwarzkopf cit. in
Scharf, 1981, p.217). If broadcasting was looked at in its entirety, 
accusations of a lack of Ausgewogenheit might be more difficult to 
sustain.
The essence of Ausgewogenheit means that the broadcasting stations 
must not identify themselves with certain interests or organisations, 
and that no group within society must be excluded from expressing its 
opinions. This is part of broadcasting's integrative function, which 
is not incompatible with its critical function (see Bericht der
Kommission zur Untersuchung der rundfunkpolitischen Entwicklung im 
sudwestdeutschen Raum, 1970, cit. in Flottau, 1978, p.132). It implies 
diversity of opinion, and the right to report controversial themes and 
minority views (see Schwarzkopf, cit. in Scharf, 1981, p.217). This 
ties in with constitutional pronouncements, which have called 
broadcasting not only a "Medium", but also "ein eminenter Faktor" in 
the formation of public opinion (Femsehurteil, in Lehr & Berg, 1971, 
p.254). Ausgewogenheit does not refer to the content of an individual 
programme, but to the totality of output (Aufermann, 1977, p.3 09; 
Flottau, 1978, p.131). In the case of the ARD network, Ausgewogenheit
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is applied to separate programme areas <Grundsatze fur die 
Zusammenarbeit im ARD-Gemeinschaftsprogramm "Deutsches Fernsehen" vom 
9. Juli 1971t in ARD Jahrbuch, 1983, p.403). Nor does Ausgewogenheit 
refer to ARD and ZDF in sum, only to the output of one channel. For 
instance, a ZDF current affairs programme with a bias to the right, 
cannot be balanced out by an ARD offering leaning to the left 
(Aufermann, 1977, p.310).
Ausgewogenheit is, in fact, structurally linked to democracy, by
ensuring that the public are provided with the necessary information
and diversity of opinion to allow informed choices. The concept of
Ausgewogenheit is, however, clearly confined to the existing democratic
order, which is reflected in broadcasting legislation requiring loyalty
to the Grundgesetz and democratic norms (see Aufermann, 1977, p. 303).
This means that there can be no balance of opinion between the
opponents and the proponents of democracy (Schwarzkopf cit. in Scharf,
1981, p.217). Further limits to Ausgewogenheit are to be found in the
inequalities of society, which must be reported and portrayed in both
an abjective and an objectively critical way (Aufermann, 1977, p.311).
These limitations are reinforced by the need to select information
(see Scharf, 1981, p.216). Aufermann states, however:
Eine "unausgewogene" soziale Realitat ausgewogen darzustellen, hieSe 
nichts anderes, als Konflikte und Interessengegensatze zu 
verschleiern und veranderungsbedurftige soziale MiBstande oder 
politische Fehlentwicklungen zu tabuisieren; das aber liefe auf 
einen (apologetischen) Anpassungsjournalismus und eine 
(ideologisch)-manipulative Publizistik hinaus. (1977, p.312)
This shows that there are clearly two sides to the Ausgewogenheit
coin. It exists, on the one hand, to protect the public from biased
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□pinion. On the other hand, it allows journalists to open up the lid 
on social inequalities, thus reinforcing broadcasting's role as "ein 
eminenter Factor" in shaping public opinion.
2.3.2 Pluralist supervision of public broadcasting in theory and in 
pcag-tise.
The principle of institutionalised pluralist supervision in Vest 
German public broadcasting aims to ensure public accountability and 
independence from the state and other groups. Supervision by internal 
committees, as distinct from control, is concerned with the final 
product and the fulfilment of legal norms, rather than with motives 
and internal processes (see Ronneberger, 1986, p,267). In theory 
editorial decisions rest with the broadcasters, and ultimately with 
the Intendant. Some distinction has to be made between direct 
accountability to the public, and institutionalised supervision. The 
former is limited and can only be gauged by correspondence and 
ratings, leaving the public interest represented in small internal 
committees (see Ronneberger, 1986, p.268).
The internal supervisory structure of Vest German public service 
broadcasting is based on a tripartite system. Its three components 
are a broadcasting council (Rundfunkrat), an administrative council 
(Verwaltungsrat), and the director-general (Intendant). Most of the 
broadcasting laws are fairly uniform in this respect, although there 
are differences, relating to different composition, the division of
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power between each supervisory body, and the extent of political or 
state representation (see Jank, 1967, p. 18).
The Rundfunkrat (Fernsehrat in the case of ZDF) is the largest 
supervisory body with a membership ranging from 11 to 66. The 
Rundfunkrat represents the public interest. In theory its members are 
not representatives of the groups and organisations which nominate 
them. The Rundfunkrat is responsible for electing the Intendant. At 
SVF this is done jointly by the Rundfunkrat and the Verwaltungsrat. 
The Rundfunkrate advise the Intendant on programme policy, and make 
sure that the programme rules are adhered to. In most cases they 
approve or draw up the standing rules. At VDR and NDR, new 
legislation passed in 1985 and 1980 respectively has led to an 
increase in power for the broadcasting councils of these stations. 
Programme supervision, prior to these reforms, was located in the 
smaller and unrepresentative Verwaltungsrat (Staatsvertrag iiber den 
Norddeutschen Rundfunk vom 16. Februar 1955t in Ring 1981, C-IV 1.3.1, 
pp.1-11; Gesetz iiber den "Vestdeutschen Rundfunk Koln" vom 25. Mai 
1954t in Ring, 1981, C-IV 1.9.1, pp.1-11). At BR, Rundfunkrat approval 
is required for the appointment of top broadcasting personnel right 
down to departmental heads (.Bayerisches Rundfunkgesetz vom 10. August 
1948, Art .7, in Ring 1981, C-IV 1.1.1, pp. 1-9). The Rundfunkrate 
approve the budget and yearly accounts. At NDR and WDR, Rundfunkrat 
approval is needed for the purchase or production of programmes 
costing over a certain amount. The broadcasting councils have no 
executive powers, although they are empowered at ZDF, DLF, and DV to 
issue additional programme guidelines.
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Although the Rundfunkrate cannot intervene directly in programme 
affairs, some of their powers allow indirect influence. Directly they 
can influence programme content by advising the Intendant, supervising 
adherence to the programme rules, issuing programme guidelines at ZDF, 
DW and DLF, and by programme supervision after transmission. 
Indirectly, the Rundfunkrate can influence programmes by way of 
personnel and financial decisions. Under the new VDR broadcasting 
law of 1985, these powers are very extensive (.Gesetz iiber den 
"Westdeutschen Rundfunk Koln, dated 11.1.1988, in MPD II, 1988, pp. 157- 
168).
The composition of the broadcasting councils varies from station 
to station. The groups and institutions which nominate or elect 
members include parliaments, governments, the trade unions, employers' 
organisations, the churches, sporting federations, consumer groups, 
cultural and educational institutions, and groups representing women, 
youth, senior citizens and immigrant workers. There are two models 
for selecting broadcasting councils. In the pluralistic, standisch 
model, the majority of broadcasting council members are selected 
directly by groups and institutions. The remainder are nominated by 
the Land parliament. This model was applied in those areas under 
American occupation, because the Americans were keen to limit 
executive representation in the supervisory councils. Under the 
parliamentary model, the members of the Rundfunkrat are either elected 
in their entirety by the Land parliaments, or elected in part by 
parliaments and delegated in part by governments, as is the case at 
DW and DLF. BR, HR, RB, SDR, SWF and SR operate under the pluralistic
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model. A mixed system, incorporating elements of both models,
operates at SFB, SDR, WDR and ZDF (see Kepplinger, 1982, p.82). The 
system whereby the Rundfunkrat was elected in its entirety by the
Land parliaments, is no longer used, since WDR and SDR introduced new 
legislation in 1985 and 1980, respectively, which brings them closer 
to the pluralistic model.
The move away from the parliamentary model by SDR and WDR is a 
positive development, because of the inherent defects in the
parliamentary system of selection which resulted in polarised 
broadcasting councils that were dominated by government,
parliamentary, and party political interests. The proximity to the 
political parties, and in particular the governing party, undermined 
the principle of broadcasting's independence from the state, and faced 
Rundfunkrat members with a conflict of loyalties between party 
political and public interests (see Schlie, 1979, pp.60-61). The
concentration of party political interests in the supervisory bodies 
also constituted an inhibition of the classical liberal media function 
of control and criticism. As Franz Ronneberger points out: "Wie laBt
es sich vertreten, dafi diejenigen, die durch die Medien kontrolliert 
werden sollen, umgekehrt die Medien kontrollieren?" (1986, p,266).
In most cases limits have been placed on the number of government 
and parliamentary representatives in the broadcasting councils, At 
SDR members of the government are excluded (Paragraph 4.4, Satzung fur 
den "SUddeutschen Rundfunk" in Stuttgart, in Ring, 1981, C-IV 1.7.2, 
pp.1-6). A similar clause is contained in legislation for RB
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(Paragraph 5.5 Gesetz iiber die Errichtung und die Aufgabe einer
Anstalt des offentlichen Rechts - Radio Bremeny in Ring, 1981, C-IV
1.4.1, pp. 1-9) At ZDF the number of government and parliamentary 
representatives in the 66-member television council is particularly 
high, because account has to be taken of all the Lander involved 
(Paragraph 14, Staatsvertrag iiber die Errichtung der Anstalt des 
offentlichen Rechts nZweites Deutsches Femsehen", in Ring, 1981, C-IV
3.1, pp.1-10). At ZDF, each Land government nominates one 
representative, and a further three members are nominated by central 
government. Twelve members are nominated by the party political 
leaderships, on the basis of their strength in the Bundestag. Direct 
party political and government representation therefore constitutes 
almost 40% of the Fernsehrat's membership. Government influence is 
increased by the way the remaining Fernsehrat members are chosen. 
Unlike other broadcasting laws, under which groups and institutions 
choose their own candidates, the ZDF Staatsvertrag requires that 21 
members be selected by the Land prime ministers from a list of three 
candidates, submitted by each group and institution. A further 
fourteen members representing the realm of culture, education, science, 
the self-employed, women, youth, and the family, are chosen directly by 
the Land prime ministers. The churches are the only group to send
Fernsehrat members without prime ministerial veto. In this way the
political parties have a stronger hold over ZDF than at any other
station.
In spite of the limits placed on government and parliamentary 
representation, the political parties still manage to dominate the
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affairs of the Rundfunkrate. This is particularly the case at ZDF. 
So-called Freundeskreise, semi-official groupings organised along 
party political lines, are used to secure the allegiance of non­
political representatives. There are advantages, as Ronneberger points 
out. The existence of Freundeskreise makes it easier to reach 
compromises, resulting in stable majorities and less group interest
(Ronneberger, 1986, pp.274-5). The political parties are better
informed than other groups, and know how to structure debates 
(Ronneberger, 1986, p.275). Reinhard Appel, editor-in-chief at ZDF, 
recalls an instance where a non-political Rundfunkrat member
commented: "Ohne Freundeskreis wiiSte ich nicht, was los ist" (Appel,
1976, p.464). However, these advantages do not obscure the fact that 
non-political issues are more easily politicised, and interests which 
do not fit in with the Freundeskreise are neglected (Ronneberger, 
1986, p.275). The system tends to focus power in the hands of the 
political parties, who only represent one group amongst many.
Some of the grosser malfunctions of the system have been 
eliminated by WDR’s and JTDR's move towards a pluralistic method of 
broadcasting council composition. However, there are still inherent 
structural problems in the pluralistic model. These problems relate 
to the status of the groups and institutions represented in the 
councils (see Montag, 1978, p.29). The criteria for selection seem 
vague and somewhat arbitrary, tending to favour those groups which 
are well-organised and which already have ample access to media 
channels (see Ronneberger, 1986, 277). Another factor relates to the 
relevance of groups and institutions, as the present system does not
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seem to give enough, thought to the loss of importance of some groups, 
and the rise in importance of others. Schwarzkopf refers to the 
'Perpetuierungs-Bonus‘ of certain groups and institutions Ccit. in 
Ronneberger, 1986, p.284). Hennig uses the example of refugee
organisations, which although influential after the war, are not so 
relevant today (Hennig, 1981, p.56). Their proximity to the CDU/CSU 
may explain their continued representation (Hennig, 1981, p.56). Some 
groups are obviously chosen for their specialist knowledge, for 
example the universities. Other criteria seem to be the size of 
membership, or function and importance in society (see Ronneberger, 
1986, pp.277-282). The type of groups represented depends on
legislation passed by the Lander, which may seek to include those 
groups that fit in best with party-political motives. Unlike the 
political parties, groups and institutions are also encumbered by a 
lack of democratic legitimation, relying instead on a smaller interest- 
orientated base (see Montag, 1978, p.29).
The most recent broadcasting laws have gone some way to solving 
the dilemma of relevance, and have sought to make representation more 
flexible and adaptable to changes within society. At RB five 
broadcasting council members are chosen to represent interests which 
are not easily organised or insufficiently represented (Paragraph 6.2, 
Gesetz iiber die Errichtung nd die Aufgaben einer Anstalt des 
offentlichen Rechts - Radio Bremen, in Ring, 1981, C-IV 1.4.1). The 
1980 2TDR broadcasting law sets aside nine broadcasting council seats 
for new groups. These are chosen by the Land parliaments of each 
participatory Land (Paragraph 17, Staatsvertrag iiber den Norddeutschen
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Rundfunk (NDR), in Ring, 1981, C-IV 1.3.1). The 1985 WDR law makes 
special provision for the interests of the old, the handicapped, and 
immigrant workers (Paragraph 15.5., Gesetz Liber den HVestdeutschen 
Rundfunk Koln", in MPD 11/1985, pp.92-103). However, further reform of 
this nature depends on the Lander, who may find it difficult to 
reconcile their own party political interests with increased 
competition from other groups within the broadcasting councils.
An arrangement aimed at increasing the relevance of pluralist 
representation was proposed by Walter ftahle and Wolfgang Langenbucher 
in 1973 (1973, pp.322-330). Arguing that existing criteria of selection 
strengthened those groups who already have ample access to 
broadcasting channels, they put forward the alternative of 
"Umkehrproporz" to secure a better position for underrepresented 
interests:
Die Auswahl der gesellschaftlich relevanten Gruppen sollte nicht 
oder nicht ausschlieBlich nach ihrer Bedeutung Qtacht, GroBe usw.) 
in der Gesellschaft erfolgen, sondern nach dem Kriterium, wieweit 
die jeweilige Gruppe zu ihren Zugangschancen zur offentlichen 
Kommunikation gefahrdet ist. Allgemeiner laBt sich dieses 
kommuikationssoziologische Selektionskriterium so formulieren: Die
Zugangschance einer Gruppe zum Rundfunkrat sollte umgekehrt 
proportional zu ihrer Zugangschance zur offentlichen Kommunikation 
sein. (1973, p.328)
The proposal is interesting and undoubtedly fairer than the present
system, but it is unlikely that the Lander would allow such a
weakening of party political representation. Other problems
associated with pluralist control are lack of time, the infrequency of
meetings, which usually occur every three months, and dependence on
the broadcasting stations for information (see Hennig, 1981, pp.65-66).
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The Verwaltungsrat is smaller than the Rundfunkrat, and is 
composed of between 7 and 9 members. It is either elecxed in its 
entirety by the Rundfunkrat (DW, DLF, and NDR), or mainly elected by 
the Rundfunkrat, with the remainder belonging ex officio, or elected by 
the Land parliaments. At SFB the Verwaltungsrat is a sub-committee 
of the Rundfunkrat. However, as a rule membership of the Rundfunkrat 
excludes membership of the Verwaltungsrat. At RB, HR, SFB and WDR 
there is station employee representation, but as Kepplinger points out 
this means that supervision is exercised by those who are supposed to 
be supervised (1982, p.83). SDR is the only station to exclude
government members from the Verwaltungsrat. In some cases party 
political dominance of the Verwaltungsrat is more concentrated than in 
the Rundfunkrat. This is particularly the case at ZDF, where the 
nine-member council in December 1986 included three Land prime 
ministers, the Vest German foreign minister, and three leading civil 
servants (see ZDF Jahrbuch, 1986, p.47). At BR the presidents of the 
Bavarian Landtag, the Senat, and the Land administrative court make up 
three of the seven members. The strong representation of the state in 
the Verwaltungsrat is historical and represents an attempt to counter 
Allied insistence on limited party political influence in the 
broadcasting councils (see Jank, 1967, p.65).
The administrative councils are involved in supporting and 
supervising the financial management of the stations. In most cases 
their approval is required for financial decisions, and in some cases 
decisions relating to employment contracts over a certain wage level. 
Although the Verwaltungsrate are not involved in programme
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supervision, their supervision of financial matters allows ample scope 
for indirect influence. At NDR and WDR the administrative councils 
are specifically barred from intervening in programme policy. This is 
a reversal of earlier legislation which placed programme supervision 
and the election of the Intendant in the hands of the Verwaltungsrat. 
At SWF and ZDF, the powers of the administrative councils are greater 
than at other stations. The SWF Verwaltungsrat supervises the 
activities and running of the station as a whole. If there are 
differences of opinion about editorial policy between the SWF 
Intendant and the Rundfunkrat, the Verwaltungsrat makes the final 
decision. It also elects the Intendant jointly with the Rundfunkrat. 
At ZDF, the administrative council, besides undertaking economic 
supervision, supervises the activities of the the Intendant in general.
Of all the supervisory components, the role of the Intendant has 
diminished most in significance over the years as the balance of
power has shifted towards the supervisory committees. The Intendant 
represents the station's outside interests and manages the station in 
accordance with the wishes of the broadcasting and administrative 
councils. He is also ultimately responsible for editorial policy, and 
approves most staff contracts, unless these require the approval of
the supervisory bodies. The decrease in the significance of the 
Intendant may be due partially to the increase in broadcasting
activities and the increase in transmission hours (see Bausch, in
Fischer, 1979, p.233). This has resulted in a need to delegate 
responsibilities. However, with the exception of RB, the position of 
Intendant has remained monocratic. Since 1979, the Intendant at RB
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has headed a directorate, responsible for running the station, which 
means that his managerial responsibilities are less than those of his 
counterparts. At SDR the Intendant shares the financial management of 
the station with a managing director, but the Intendant makes any
final decisions. There have been calls for an extension of this form 
of Intendanzt but apart from RB, and an experiment at SFB in the 
1950s, there have been no further experiments of this kind (see 
Fischer, 1979, pp.15-16). If the system was extended to other 
broadcasting stations, it might reinforce politicisation in the search 
for a politically balanced station management.
The Intendant's position is different to that of the other
supervisory bodies, because he is also an employee of the station.
This means that his loyalties are split between the broadcasters and
the supervisory bodies. Hans Bausch, Intendant at SDR defined his
role to me in the following way:
Also im Gesetz steht, der Intendant ist allein fiir das Programm 
verantwortlich. Daran halte ich mich. . .Ich muB fiir meine Arbeiter 
Freiraum schaffen, daB sie frei arbeiten konnen, ich muB denen auch 
immer noch auf die Finger klopfen diirfen. Ich muB denen sagen, das 
geht nicht, das ist zu teuer, oder das ist nicht korrekt oder so 
ahnlich, oder ich verantworte das nicht, schlicht und einfach. 
(Interview, 29.7.1987)
The Intendant must also maintain a working relationship with the 
supervisory bodies, because they are not only responsible for his
appointment, but also approve many of his decisions. According to 
Martin Meuffer, former Intendant of MDR, those responsible for the 
Intendant's election often expect something in return, especially in
personnel policy (cit. in Fischer, 1979, p.35). There do appear to be
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direct attempts at interference from politicians, but the degree to
which they are successful depends on the Intendant's ability to stand
firm. On this subject Bausch says:
Politiker anrufen, das gibt's schon. Mich rufen sie inzwischen 
nicht mehr an, weil sie wissen, es hat keinen Zweck, aber bei 
anderen Kollegen, die auch weniger lang Erfahrung haben, oder die 
gar mehr oder weniger als Mitglieder einer Partei auf ihren Stuhl 
gekommen sind, da rufen die schon an. (Interview 29.7.1987)
The appointment of the Intendant is usually political, and
sometimes controversial (see Briining & Nax, 1976, p. 104; Bausch cit. in
Fischer, 1979, p.26). Most Intendanten are members of either the SPD
or the CDU/CSU. The proportion of those with a journalistic
background has fallen over the years; many have a legal background
(see Fischer, 1979, p.354). At present there are only three
Intendanten with a journalistic background; Hans Bausch at SDR, Peter
Schiwy at MDR, and Friedrich Mowottny at VDR. This small number can
be partly explained by the diminishing creative nature of the post,
and the increasing significance of managerial talents (see Seuffer in
Fischer, 1979, p.34). Bausch comments: "Die erwiesene Befahigung zum
Management ist fiir die Vahlgremien wichtiger als die Herkunft aus
einem Kommunikationsberuf" (cit. in Fischer, 1979, p.355). However,
another reason for this development may be the past inability of the
supervisory bodies to control Intendanten with a journalistic
background. On this subject, Hoffmann writes:
Die Erfahrung namlich hat gezeigt, daB journalistische sowie
rundfunk- und fernsehspezifische Fachkenntnisse das "wertvollste 
Instrument" der Intendanten darstellen, urn Angriffe gegen die 
Rundfunkanstalten zu parieren. (1976, p.117)
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However, an increase in Intendanten with a journalistic background is 
not the perfect solution, as events at SFB, involving the former 
television correspondent, Lothar Loewe, revealed. Loewe was forced to
leave his post as Intendant of SFB after a series of editorial and
financial blunders.
In spite of the decline in the role of the Intendant, it is still 
important in maintaining the integrity and independence of the 
station. To a large degree this depends on personalities, and the
ability to maintain an independent stance in the face of undue 
pressure from the supervisory bodies, political parties, and
broadcasting employees.
2.4 The constitutional position of Vest German broadcasting
The degree to which the media are "free" or "independent" mirrors 
to a certain extent the social and political structures of a nation. 
It follows that the notion of press and broadcasting freedom is widely 
accepted as an intrinsic component of the democratic order in 
countries like Vest Germany and the United Kingdom. In Vest Germany 
the constitutional framework plays an important role in shaping the 
normative expectations of broadcasting. An examination of the legal 
foundations of Vest German broadcasting is therefore essential, as 
they reveal why broadcasting is organised as it is, and why 
reinterpretations are undertaken in the light of new experience.
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The West German Grundgesetz, the Basic Law, which has priority 
over all other laws, acts as a legal shield to protect the media from 
censorship and interference. The adoption of the Grundgesetz in 1949 
was a direct result of the experience of past upheavals, and in 
particular of National Socialism. According to John Sandford, this 
historical past means that there is "a much higher level of awareness 
of the legitimacy of questions about media purposes than in a country 
with a much more consistent continuity of political experience like 
Britain" (1988, p.6).
Article 5 of the Grundgesetz remains central to any constitutional 
interpretation of Vest German broadcasting law. It stipulates:
1) Jeder hat das Recht, seine Meinung in Wort, Schrift und Bila 
frei zu auBern und zu verbreiten und sich aus allgemein 
zuganglichen Quellen ungehindert zu unterrichten. Die 
Pressefreiheit und die Freiheit der Berichterstattung durch 
Rundfunk und Film werden gewahrleistet. Eine Zensur findet nicht 
statt.
2) Diese Rechte finden ihre Schranken in den Vorschriften der 
allgemeinen Gesetze, den gesetzlichen Bestimmungen zum Schutze der 
Jugend und in dem Recht der personlichen Ehre. (cit. in Ring, 1981, 
A-1 1)
The Grundgesetz says little on broadcasting directly, except for 
the statement in the second sentence of the first paragraph, which 
guarantees the freedom to report. The fathers of the Constitution did 
discuss the idea of anchoring the principle of public service 
broadcasting within Article 5. However, this was rejected, because of 
concern about fixing future organisational forms, which might exclude 
alternative developments (see Klein, 1978, p.42; Montag, 1978, p.36). 
The attempt to fix the principle of public service broadcasting in the
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Basic Law was also unsuccessful, because a significant proportion of 
the commission which drew up the Basic Law considered public service 
broadcasting to be a "Besatzungsdiktat" (see Bausch, 1975, p.19).
Otto Schlie calls the first paragraph of Article 5 the "kiassisches 
Grundrecht der MeinungsauBerungsfreiheit" (1979, p.52). It encompasses 
the basic right of all, including broadcasters, to express their 
opinion and inform themselves from generally available sources. The 
term "allgemein zugangliche Quellen” is important because it enshrines 
the right of the individual (suspended in the National Socialist 
period) to listen to foreign stations (see Herrmann, 1975, p.384). The 
first clause of paragraph one protects all kinds of statements and all 
types of broadcasting content (see Herrmann, 1975, pp.82-83). The 
second clause of paragraph one, guaranteeing the freedom of the press 
and the right of broadcasters to report is, according to Herrmann, 
"eine verstarkende Wiederholung und Veiterbildung" of the first clause 
(Herrmann, 1975, p.60). Whereas this privileged status is afforded to 
the press as a whole, broadcasting and film are explicitly guaranteed 
only the right to report, although other broadcasting activities are 
clearly protected in the first clause. According to Herrmann this was 
done to prevent broadcasters from regarding broadcasting freedom as 
their own individual right (1975, p.54). Broadcasting freedom is not 
an individual right, but the recognition of broadcasting's need for 
independence, in order for it to fulfil a public function in the 
formation of public opinion (see Klein, 1978, p.21). As facts and 
opinion cannot be clearly separated, it is now generally accepted in
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the Federal Republic that broadcasting freedom is equal to the freedom 
of the press (see Schlie, 1979, p.52).
The second paragraph of Article 5 sets out the limits to the 
freedom of expression and information. As Robertson points out: 
"Free speech is what is left of speech after the law has had its say" 
(1985, p.3). "Allgemeine Gesetze" refer to criminal and civil law, and 
copyright (see Herrmann, 1975, p.384). In disputes, individual freedom 
and broadcasting freedom have to be weighed against each other (see 
Herrmann, 1975, p.385). Broadcasting freedom can therefore only be 
limited to protect the basic rights of others.
The Grundgesetz, in guaranteeing the freedom of information and
opinion, allows the individual to become freely and actively involved 
in society and the democratic process. The media are a necessary
component of the democratic process as they provide much of the 
opinion and information on which the informed choices of the 
individual are based. This constitutes the substance of the media’s 
constitutionally guaranteed right of function.
The Grundgesetz is therefore essential for the guaranteed freedom
of broadcasting, and by extension for the public, political, and
constitutional life of the country, but where ambiguities have arisen, 
or where politicians have no longer been able to find viable solutions 
to complex situations, the Federal Constitutional Court has been called 
upon to clarify and rectify. This legal definition has taken on extra 
significance with the emergence of the new media. It is clear that
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the law is not static in its interpretation, but adaptable according to 
changing conditions, although the central core of basic rights and 
broadcasting freedom remains central to any redefinition of what is 
permissabie. Kleinsteuber has described the Court's judgements on 
broadcasting as the "Kommunikationsverfassung" <1982, p.24). The 
Court's decisions are legally binding, and cannot be overturned by the 
Land parliaments or the Bundestag. The Constitutional Court is after 
all Vest Germany's Supreme Court (Bausch, Interview, 29.7.1987).
The Court's early decisions were instrumental in maintaining the 
public service broadcasting monopoly, although it has never declared 
private broadcasting to be unconstitutional. Called upon to make 
judgements on specific cases, it has always used the opportunity to 
make general statements on the constitutional position of 
broadcasting. There have been five major judgements on broadcasting 
since 1961. The first three are dealt with here, as they represent 
the situation before the dual system of broadcasting was introduced. 
The remaining two will be dealt with in Chapter 3.
The Court's broadcasting decision on 28th February 1961, the so- 
called Fernsehurteilt arose as a result of central government, under 
Chancellor Adenauer, establishing a private television organisation, 
Deutschland-Femsehen GmbH> to license private programme providers. A 
complaint was brought by the SPD Lander, Hamburg and Hesse, who saw 
the Bund infringing upon the Lander's constitutionally guaranteed 
jurisdiction over culture and education (Kulturhoheit), and therefore 
over broadcasting (see Montag, 1978, pp.93-125). The Bund's actions
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were declared unconstitutional (Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
vom 28.Februar 1961 iFernsehurteil), in Lehr & Berg, 1971, pp.221-256).
The Court decreed that the Lander alone had the right to legislate 
on broadcasting. Central government’s legislative powers were limited 
to the technical side of broadcasting (p.221). It left open the Bund's 
right to legislate for overseas broadcasting services (p.243). The 
Bund's jurisdiction over telecommunications was subordinate to Lander 
jurisdiction over broadcasting policy, and it was required to act 
according to ”der Grundsatz bundesfreundlichen Verhaltens" (p.242). 
However, the Court granted the Bund the sole right to erect and run 
transmitters, althought it could not confiscate those transmission 
facilities already owned by the broadcasting stations (p.221, p.243).
The Court’s main concern was with the independence of broadcasting 
and broadcasting's "offentliche Aufgabe" (p.244). Central to its 
interpretation was the importance of Article 5 of the Grundgesetz, 
which guarantees the institutional independence of the media from the 
state. Broadcasting was not only a "Medium", but also "ein eminenter 
Faktor" in the formation of public opinion (p.254). This role was not 
only confined to news and current affairs, but to the totality of 
broadcasting output as well (p.254). However, the Court stated that 
broadcasting was subject to a "Sondersituation" (p.254). Unlike the 
press, which is characterised by a number of publications, an increase 
in the number of broadcasting stations was hindered by a lack of 
broadcasting frequencies and by high costs, which meant that it would 
remain the privilege of a few (p.254). For this reason broadcasting
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had to be subject to legislation to enable it to carry out its function
in the formation of public opinion, and to maintain its independence
from the state and other powerful groups (p.255). The Court demanded
that broadcasting be organised in such a way that:
a lie in Betracht kommenden Krafte in ihren Organen EinfiuB haben 
und im Gesamtprogramm zu Wort kommen konnen, und daB fur den 
Inhalt des Gesamtprogramms Leitgrundsatze verbindlich sind, die ein 
MindestmaB von inhaltlicher Ausgewogenheit, Sachiichkeit und 
gegenseitiger Achtung gewahrieistet. (p.255)
The Court did not exclude the possibility of private broadcasting
as long as it was organised in the same way as public service
broadcasting (p.255). Public service broadcasting monopolies were 
deemed constitutional, because public broadcasting was independent of 
the state and other groups, and because it guaranteed that the full 
scope of opinion within society was represented, both in programming 
and in the internal supervisory councils (p.255). The "Sonder-
situation" of broadcasting, as regards frequencies and cost, was 
reconfirmed by the Constitutional Court’s judgement on 27th July 1971 
(Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 27. Juli 1971 in dem
Verfahren zur uberpriifung der VerfassungsmaBigkeit der Mehrwertbe- 
steuervng der RundfunkgebUhren - Xehrwertsteuerurtei 1, in IP 7 & 8, 
1971, pp.207-236).
The Constitutional Court decision of 16th June 1981 dealt with the 
refusal of the Saarland government to grant a broadcasting licence to 
the Freies Femsehen AGt a private broadcasting company, according to 
a clause in the Saarland broadcasting law, which had been added in 
1967 (Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 16. Juni. 1961, in
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Ring, 1981, A-III 3, pp. 1-25). The case gave the Court an opportunity 
to scrutinise the constitutional position of broadcasting in the light 
of the new media. Particular attention was paid to the 
"Sondersituation" of broadcasting and to whether it was still relevant 
given the emergence of cable and satellite. In the event the Court 
declared the Saarland law to be unconstitutional because it did not 
satisfy the demands of broadcasting freedom.
The Court reaffirmed broadcasting's constitutionally guaranteed 
role in contributing to the formation of public opinion, and the need 
for broadcasting to be independent of the state and other powerful 
interests (pp.16-17). To ensure this function, the Court ruled that 
legislation was still necessary, even if there was an increase in 
distribution outlets and the costs of broadcasting fell (p.17). The 
legislator was required to undertake material, organisational, and 
procedural measures, to ensure the fulfilment of freedom of 
information and opinion, guaranteed in Article 5 of the Grundgesetz
(p.16).
The Court's insistence on the continued need for broadcasting 
legislation, was based on doubts about the effectiveness of market 
forces in securing diversity of opinion in broadcasting (p.17). 
Broadcasting's role in contributing to the formation of public opinion 
meant that it could not be left to "das freie Spiel der Krafte", 
especially if this resulted in a concentration of opinion formation in 
the hands of a few (p.18). The Court rejected the notion of public
broadcasting making up the deficits of diversity in private
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broadcasting, because biased opinion in private broadcasting would 
distort the equilibrium of access for different opinions in society
(p.18).
At this point the Court modified its earlier rulings. In addition 
to accepting the internally pluralistic system, exemplified by public 
service broadcasting, it was also prepared to accept the externally 
pluralistic model of broadcasting organisation, where plurality is 
achieved by a number of competing broadcasting channels or programme 
providers. In allowing this model, the Court stated that the 
legislator had to ensure that "das Gesamtangebot der inlandischen 
Programme der bestehenden Meinungsvielfalt auch tatsachlich im 
wesentlichen entspricht" (p.19). For both models, the Court demanded 
that the legislator enact binding rules guaranteeing "ein KindestmaB 
von inhaltlicher Ausgewogenheit, Sachlichkeit und gegenseitiger Achtung 
gewahrleisten" (p.19). Unlike the internally pluralistic model, the 
individual programme provider operating under the external pluralistic 
model was not subject to Ausgewogenheit, but was required to ensure 
"sachgemaBe, umfassende und wahrheitsgemaBe Information und ein 
MindestmaB an gegenseitiger Achtung" <p.l9). In total, therefore, 
private broadcasters operating under the externally pluralistic model, 
had to satisfy the same requirements as regards diversity of opinion 
and Ausgewogenheit, as public broadcasting.
The Court had given some indication of the legal requirements 
necessary for private broadcasting, and by modifying the demands made 
of private broadcasting, was partially acknowledging that technology
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was changing the broadcasting landscape, allowing a greater number of 
broadcasting channels. Further concessions made by the Court included 
less strict constitutional demands for experimental cable pilot
projects, and the acceptance that external plurality could be achieved
by different programme providers sharing the same frequency (p. 19).
However, some aspects of the judgement were still unclear. The Court 
gave no indication of the criteria by which external plurality could 
be said to be reached. This placed legislators and potential
programme providers in a situation of uncertainty, as they could not 
be sure when they had to apply the principles of internal pluralism 
and when they were free to apply external pluralism.
2.5 Review
From this account it is clear that the shape of public broadcasting 
in Vest Germany has been determined by a historical past which gave 
scant regard to the principles of media freedom. The institution of 
public service broadcasting, guided by the principles of independence 
from the state, pluralist control, and service in the public interest, 
was an attempt by the Allies to rectify these past failings. However, 
the political parties found it difficult to accept the principle of 
independent, impartial broadcasting. There was little political 
consensus about the role of broadcasting in a liberal democracy. Most 
ideas centred on using broadcasting as a tool of politics, or of 
keeping it under tight control. This was born of the experiences of 
the National Socialist period, which made politicians suspicious of the 
medium and its assumed effects. The opposition of West German
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politicians to independent broadcasting, reveals the difficulties of
imposing a foreign model on a totally different political culture.
Looking back at the British contribution to public service
broadcasting in West Germany, Hans Bausch, SDR Intendant, said to me:
Das einzige, was der Hugh Greene nach Deutschland gebracht hat, war 
eben die Idee des Public Broadcasting. Das war den Deutschen nicht 
vertraut. Die sahen das mehr oder weniger gouvernemental. Da wo 
sie 1933 aufgehort hatten, woilten sie nach 1945 weitermachen. 
(Interview 29.7.1987)
Dissatisfaction with the system established by the Allies resulted 
in concerted party-political attempts to dominate the supervisory 
councils of the broadcasting stations. The increase in the role of 
the Land parliaments, which were considered to be the legitimate 
elected representatives of the people, proved a way of bypassing the 
stipulation that the government should not control broadcasting. This 
was particularly evident from 1955, when the Federal Republic of 
Germany gained full sovereignty. The interests of the socially 
relevant groups in the councils were pushed back in favour of party- 
political interests. This was particularly the case at WDR and NDR, 
where the Land parliaments officially, but the party-political 
leaderships in reality, determined the composition of the councils.
The fact that the principle of broadcasting independence has 
survived owes much to the Grundgesetz and the rulings of the 
Constitutional Court. In the face of concerted attempts to undermine 
the independence of broadcasting, Article 5 of the Grundgesetz has 
provided a clear definition of the role of broadcasting in society. 
Even with the advent of commercial broadcasting, the principles of
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freedom of information and opinion still hold true, and have to be 
given priority over commercial considerations and the interests of the 
state.
Hates
1. The term Regal refers to concessions formally granted by German 
rulers to individuals to run monopolies, like the customs service and 
postal services (see Sandford, 1976, p.63; Lerg, 1980, p.29).
2. The nine regional broadcasting companies in the Veimar Republic 
were Funkstunde AG Berlin; Ostmarken-Rundfunk AG Konigsberg; Nordische 
Rundfunk AG Hamburg; Mitteldeutsche Rundfunk AG Leipzig; Schlesische 
Funkstunde AG Breslau; Vestdeutscbe Funkstunde AG Munster, Deutsche 
Stunde in Bayern GmbH in Muncben; SUdwestdeutscbe Rundfunkdienst AG 
Frankfurt am Main; SUddeutsche Rundfunk AG Stuttgart.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LONG ROAD TOWARDS A DUAL SYSTEit OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
BROADCASTING
There are two strands in the factors determining public
broadcasting's future in a dual system of private and public
broadcasting. First there are those determinants on which public 
service broadcasters have little influence (see. Lapple, 1984, p.8). The 
federal states, the Landert decide the organisational framework in 
which broadcasting is to function. Economically, the stations are 
dependent on licence fee income determined by the lander, and on
advertising income determined by the market. Second, there are 
measures that the stations themselves can undertake in order to 
safeguard their future. However, any financial, programme policy, or 
expansionary measures undertaken by them are, to a large degree,
determined and shaped by political, and economic factors outside their 
general sphere of influence.
The emergence of a dual system of private and public broadcasting 
has been made possible by the introduction of cable and satellite, and 
the use of recently found local terrestrial frequencies. Commercial 
competition is, therefore, no longer a theoretical possibility 
involving matters of principle, but a reality, which first came about 
on 1st January 1984, with the inauguration of a cable pilot project in 
Ludwigshafen. Here a distinction has to be made between technology 
and content. As Johannes Kreile points out: "In Wirklichkeit sind
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Kabel- und Satellitenfernsehen jedoch nur Erscheinungsformen des alten 
Mediums Rundfunk, nur ira Gewande der neuen Technik" (1986, p.3).
This chapter focuses on the political events surrounding the 
introduction of a dual order, and in particular, Lander attempts to 
reach an inter- Land agreement on the reorganisation of the 
broadcasting system. These sought to guarantee the further existence 
of ARD and ZDF, while at the same time ensuring the right conditions 
for private broadcasting to thrive. The lengthy disputes surrounding 
the extent to which public broadcasting’s existence should be 
guaranteed, revealed the degree to which public broadcasting is 
dependent on the Lander. They also provided a clear indication of the 
polarisation of viewpoints existing between the Christian Democrats 
(CDU) and their allies from Bavaria, the CSU, who support the 
introduction of private broadcasting, and the Social Democrats (SPD), 
who are ideologically opposed to private broadcasting. The process of 
negotiation imposed severe strains on the federal system of media 
policy-making, which requires compromise between all the Lander 
regardless of their different party political leaderships. When 
political agreement seemed almost impossible, it was the 
Constitutional Court, as so often in the past, which brought clarity by 
reaffirming the constitutional principles which have guided 
broadcasting policy from the start. In making its judgement the Court 
took account of new developments in broadcasting, and provided a 
constitutional framework in which the dual system can operate. The 
chapter ends with an account of the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 
June 1987, because it represents a resolution of public broadcasting's
- 121 -
public role within a dual system, and also sets pointers for the 
future development of broadcasting in Vest Germany generally.
3.1 Stagnation or devfiJLopjnfiat? Public broadcasting’s demands for
continued support within a dual system of broadcasting
Under the threat of commercial competition, the public broadcasters
set out their demands for continued existence within a dual system. A
declaration by the ARD Hauptversammlung on 30th November 1983
constituted the conclusion of a process of internal discussion on
their future role within a competitive environment (.Stuttgarter
Erklarung der ARD zur Nedienpolitik, in MP 11/1983, p.801; see also
Lapple, 1984, p.8). Here it was stated:
Der offentlich-rechtliche Rundfunk ist die unersetzbare 
Organisationsform des Rundfunks fiir alle. Sein Bestand ist jedoch 
nur gesichert, wenn ihm programmlich, technisch und wirtschaftlich 
auch eine Funktions- und Entwicklungsgarantie gegeben wird. (p.801)
The demand for a guarantee of function and further development was 
to be repeated constantly throughout Lander negotiations on the dual 
system of broadcasting. The declaration concluded that such a 
guarantee should also include long-term financial security from the 
licence fee and advertising, and priority access to all new 
technological developments (p.801). It was argued that restriction to 
existing technologies and channels contradicted the obligation to act 
as a "Rundfunk fiir alle", and thus ran counter to the public interest 
(p.801>. A guarantee of function and further development was justified 
in the declaration by reference to the obligations of public
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broadcasting, its integrative role in providing access to various 
groups and institutions in its supervisory bodies, and its ability to 
cater for both minorities and majorities of interest (p.801). It was 
argued that broadcasting could not be left to the market alone, and 
that public service broadcasting had to be allowed to continue its 
"kulturelle Aufgabe" (p.801>. The declaration was clearly guided by 
the fear that once private broadcasting was allowed, public 
broadcasting would be left to stagnate, or worse, be restricted to the 
provision of unprofitable minority programmes, leaving popular mass 
programming to commercial channels.
Similar demands had been put forward a month earlier by the
chairmen of the ARD supervisory committees (.Erklarung der
Gremlenvorsitzenden der ARD vom 19.10.1983 zur Position der
offentlich-recht lichen Rundfunkanstalten in der kunftigen
Medienlandschaftt in HP 11/1983, pp.802-803). The emphasis here was
clearly placed on a guarantee of function and further development, in
addition to a guarantee of existence. The chairmen stated:
Allzuleicht wiirde die Verkiirzung auf eine Bestandsgarantie am Ende 
zu einer Aufrechterhaltung eines formalen Gehauses fiihren, das 
schlieBlich sich selbst ad absurdum fiihrt, da es nicht mehr 
akzeptanzfahig ausgefiillt werden kann. Die bloBe Fortexistenz 
offentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunkanstalten kann und darf nicht unser 
Anliegen sein. Die Programmaufgabe der offentlich-recht'lichen 
Rundfunkanstalten ist dynamisch zu verstehen. (p.802)
Both declarations, and subsequent statements, from the public 
broadcasters showed a a unified purpose in achieving equality of 
opportunity with private broadcasting in terms of access to the new 
technologies, financial support, and expansion into new programme
- 123 -
areas. Implicit in both statements was the supposition that public 
broadcasting was infinitely superior to anything that commercial 
broadcasting could offer. This superiority was grounded on public 
broadcasting's legally defined obligations to provide balanced output 
for both minorities and majorities, and its commitment to the public 
interest, rather than to profit. This notion of superiority formed the 
main justification for the demand of a guarantee of existence, function 
and further development.
3.2 Previous attempts to introduce private broadcasting
Pressure to introduce private broadcasting to Vest Germany and 
break the dominance of public service broadcasting is not a recent 
phenomenon, and can be traced back to the 1950s (see Volf Thomas, 
1976, pp.342-356; Montag, 1978, pp.76pp; Gattberg, 1979, pp.l77pp>. The 
most significant attempts to introduce private broadcasting are 
illustrated here, in order to give some idea of the motives behind 
these attempts, and the reasons why they were not successful.
The first major attempt to introduce private broadcasting began in 
the early 1950s. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (CDU) was dissatisfied 
with the broadcasting system established by the Allies, and was intent 
on extending central government control and influence on broadcasting 
at the expense of both the Lander and the public broadcasters (see 
Gottberg, 1979, p.177). He believed that NVDR, in particular, had been 
established as part of a conspiracy by the British Labour government, 
and was therefore ideologically suspect (Bausch, Interview, 29.7.87;
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Steininger, 1975, p.343>. However, Adenauer found that his plans were 
initially obstructed, because Vest Germany did not achieve full 
sovereignty from the Allies until 5th May 1955 (Bausch, Interview, 
29.7.87; Montag, 1978, p.37).
In 1957, ARD applied to the Ministry of Posts for a licence to run 
a second television service, but the application was rejected, arousing 
suspicions that central government was considering a private service 
(Montag, 1978, p.93). Central government's attempts to negotiate with 
the Lander for more influence over broadcasting failed because the 
Lander were wary about relinquishing any control .over broadcasting 
policy (see Gottberg, 1979, pp.180-183). As negotiations with the 
Lander were bearing no fruit, central government introduced draft 
legislation on 30th September 1959, which foresaw the establishment of 
a public station, Deutschland-Femsehen, which would entrust 
programming to private companies (Montag, 1978, pp.94-95>. The
federal parliament in Bonn approved those parts of the law which set 
up the external broadcasting services, DLF and DV, but delayed 
sanctioning the Deutschland-Femsehen until central government and the 
Lander had reached a negotiated compromise (Montag, 1978, p.95). 
Frustrated by both the Lander and the Bundestag, Adenauer applied his 
own solution. On 25th July 1960, Adenauer and the Minister of Justice, 
Fritz Schaffer, who was acting on behalf of the Lander, but without 
their consent, signed an agreement establishing the Deutschland- 
Femsehen GmbH (DFG), a private company owned by both the Lander and 
central government (Gottberg, 1979, pp.238-239). Vhen the Lander 
refused to take up their 49% share in the DFG, ownership of the
- 125 -
company passed into the hands of central government (Montag, 1978, 
p.95).
Central government's motives were primarily political, with 
commercial considerations playing a secondary role (see Gottberg, 
1979, p.226). Harald von Gottberg argues that the initiative for 
private broadcasting would probably never have started had the Lander 
and the broadcasting stations given in to central government's 
demands for more influence over broadcasting. Helga Montag, too, 
argues that political motives were dominant, but recognises that 
private broadcasting fitted in with the ideology of the CDU/CSU. She 
writes:
Es ging darum, den EinfluB der Bundesregierung auf das Fernsehen zu 
vergroBern. Der Gedanke, Privat initiative dabei einzuschalten, 
entsprach den gesellschaftspolitischen Vorstellungen der CDU/CSU 
und ihrem Bemiihen, die freie wirtschaftliche Betatigung zu fordern. 
(1978, p.101)
The DFG itself would not have produced any programmes, but would 
have entrusted production to the Freies Fernseh GmbH (FFG), a private 
television company, founded on 5th December 1958 by press, publishing, 
and business interests (see Gottberg, 1979, pp.201-219). Those
involved in the FFG drew their inspiration from the success of 
commercial television in the United Kingdom (see Montag, 1978, p.84). 
However, unlike Britain, where commercial television involves a number 
of regional ITV companies independent of government, the FFG alone 
would have provided programmes, subject to the influence of central 
government (Gottberg, 1979, p.195). Without public knowledge, central 
government had entrusted the FFG with the preparations for the second
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television channel in December 1959, and had agreed to act as a 
guarantor for any loans the FFG secured (Montag, 1978, p. 112).
Adenauer's plans were halted by the first television judgement of 
the Constitutional Court on 28th February 1961, referred to in the 
preceding chapter (in Lehr & Berg, 1971, pp.221-259). This confirmed 
Lander jurisdiction over broadcasting policy, and the independence of 
broadcasting from the state. It effectively put an end to further 
attempts by central government to impose its will directly on 
broadcasting. Private broadcasting was not forbidden by the Court, 
but was required to fulfil the same requirements of programme range 
and internal pluralist supervision as public broadcasting. The FFG 
was disbanded, and the Lander took the opportunity to fulfil public 
expectations of a second television service with the establishment of 
ZDF by inter-Land agreement in June 1961.
Another major attempt to break the hold of public service 
broadcasting was linked to press concern about the inequality of 
competition between broadcasting and the press, especially in the 
acquisition of advertising (see Bausch, 1979, p.594). The press case 
was taken up by the organisation representing the newspaper 
publishers, the Bund Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (BDZV). It was argued 
that public broadcasting's monopoly of television advertising 
conflicted with its cultural obligations, and endangered the economic 
base of the print sector (see Montag, 1978, p.l25pp). In order to 
investigate the substance of these complaints, central government set 
up an independent commission on 29th April 1964, the Kommission zur
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Untersuchung der Vettbewerbsgleicheit von Fresse, Funk/Fernsehen und 
Film, commonly called the Michel-Kommlssion after its chairman, Elmar 
Michel (see Bausch, 1979, p.595).
In the meantime, the BDZV turned its attention to ZDF, which was 
undergoing a financial crisis (Gottberg, 1979, p.305). On 27th 
November 1964 the BDZV published a plan to take over production and 
advertising at ZDF by establishing a press-owned company, the Fresse- 
Fernsehen-AG (see Montag, 1978, pp.l42pp; Bausch, 1979, p.596). It was 
proposed that ARD should stop advertising, and that ZDF should stop 
receiving licence fee support (see Gottberg, 1979, p.303), The Presse- 
Fernsehen-AG would be funded by advertising, out of which it would 
finance ZDF (see Montag, 1978, p.143). The ZDF inter-Land agreement 
would have remained in force. However, this solution would have 
resulted in the dominance of one group, the press, and a decrease in 
responsibility for both the Intendant and the Fernsehrat (see 
Gottberg, 1979, pp.317-318). It would almost certainly have led to a 
Constitutional Court ruling. The Lander prime ministers therefore 
rejected the proposal on constitutional and financial grounds (see 
Montag, 1978, pl48; Bausch, 1979, p.596).
Having failed to secure press participation in ZDF, and finding 
themselves excluded from the third television channels which the 
Lander had determined should be awarded to the ARD stations, the 
newspaper publishers sought to gain political support for a ban on 
advertising on ARD and ZDF. A draft law was introduced to the 
Bundestag by the CDU and the FDP in March 1965 (see Bausch, 1979,
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p.596). It failed to be adopted due to lack of time, but was probably 
unconstitutional, because it interfered with Lander jurisdiction over 
broadcasting policy (see Gottberg, 1979, pp.322-323).
The press case was ultimately weakened by the publication of the 
Kichel-Kommission report in September 1967. This dismissed the 
accusation of unfair economic competition between the press and 
broadcasting, the central argument on which the press had based its 
case (Montag, 1978, p. 151; Bausch 1979, p.597). According to the 
report, the relationship between the press and broadcasting was 
complementary, not substitutive (see Montag, 1978, p.152). The 
Commission expressed doubts about press involvement in television 
advertising, and television in general. It concluded that television, 
if run by the press, might result in a press monopoly of the 
advertising market, and a press monopoly of public opinion, and this 
was incompatible with constitutional demands (see Bausch, 1979, p.597). 
The findings of the Kichel-Kommission were backed up by a further 
commission set up by central government to examine press 
concentration. The Kommission zur Untersuchung der Gefahrdung der 
wiirtschaftlichen Existenz von Presseuntemehmen und der Folgen der 
Konzentration fiir die Keinungsfreiheit in der Bundesrepublik, commonly 
called the Giinther-Kommission, after its chairman, Eberhard Gunther, 
reported in June 1968. It revealed the extent of press concentration, 
and underlined the role of public broadcasting as a counterweight to 
the dominance of large publishing concerns, and as an important 
contributor to the formation of public opinion (see Montag, 1978, 
p.156).
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A further attempt to introduce private broadcasting was stopped by 
the Federal Administrative Court on 10th December 1971 (.Urteii des 
Bundesverwaltungsgerich ts zur Frage der Zulassung einer juristischen 
Person des biirgerlichen Fechts zum Ausstrahlen von Fernsehsendungen 
im Lande Berlin, in ARD Jahrbuch, 1972, pp.295-304). A group of
newspaper publishers from Vest Berlin, who had formed a private 
company, the Fernsehgesellschaft Berliner Tageszeitungen mbH (FBI), 
appealed to the Court, because the Vest Berlin Senate refused to grant 
FBT a broadcasting licence (see Montag, 1978, pp.157-160). The Court 
concluded that it was not unconstitutional for private interests to be 
excluded from broadcasting (1972, p.295). The Court stated that even 
if the lack of available frequencies was overcome, the interests of all 
groups in society had to be taken into account (1972, p.301). It was 
not enough just to ensure the availability of . frequencies, because 
socially relevant groups had to be in a position to use these
"faktisch" (1972, p.301). In the Court's view this would only happen
if groups had access to sufficient funds (1972, p.301). It therefore
concluded that: "Veder die Zahl der zur Verfiigung stehenden Frequenzen
noch die finanzielle Lage ermoglichen zur Zeit ein freies Spiel der
Krafte im Fernseh-/Rundfunkbereich" (1972, p.295). Unlike the
Constitutional Court, the Administrative Court can only refer to
specific cases, but by blocking the Berlin newspaper publishers, it 
had ensured that any future attempts to introduce private broadcasting 
would have to be decided in the Constitutional Court, as commercial 
interests had exhausted all other legal avenues.
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Further initiatives to introduce private broadcasting occurred in 
the Saarland and Bavaria. Attempts by the Bavarian CSU to allow 
private broadcasting, and to strenghten the CSU's hold over BR by 
increasing state and parliamentary representation in BR's supervisory 
committees, were encountered by a citizens' committee, the 
Biirgerkomitee Rundfunkfreiheit (Bausch, 1979, p.598). Vith the aid of 
a public petition and a citizens' decision, the committee was able to 
secure a change in the Bavarian constitution in 1973 (Bausch, 1979, 
p.598). The new clause 111a stipulated that, "Rundfunk wird in 
offentlicher Verantwortung und offentlich-rechtlicher Tragerschaft 
betrieben" (cit. in Bausch, 1979, p.598). According to Gottberg, this 
attempt to introduce private broadcasting was secondary to Ihe CSU's
aim of gaining more control ovex- broadcasting (1979, p.367). In spite
of the new clause in the Bavarian constitution, private broadcasting 
was still passible, because the clause only stipulated that the
provision of broadcasting should be a public responsibility, not 
specifically a responsibility borne by a public broadcasting station 
(see Gottberg, 1979, p.446).
In the Saarland, a private company, composed mainly of press
interests, the Freie Rundfunk AG (FRAG), tried to activate a clause in 
the Saarland broadcasting law which allowed private broadcasting (see 
Montag, 1978, pp.161-171). These plans were dashed by the 
Constitutional Court ruling of 1981, referred to in the previous 
chapter, on the grounds that the law did not offer sufficient 
safeguards to guarantee broadcasting independence (in Ring, 1981, Pi- 
Ill 3, pp.1-25).
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In North. Germany, too, there were attempts to break the dominance 
of public service broadcasting. On 13th July '1977, Prime Minister 
Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) of Schleswig-Holstein, announced that he 
would be cancelling the NDR inter-Land agreement, because of NDR‘s 
lack of programme balance, its precarious financial situation, and its 
lack of coverage for regional issues (see Bausch, 1980, p.941).
Stoltenberg was joined in his attacks by Prime Minister Ernst Albrecht 
(CDU) of Lower Saxony, who recognised an opportunity to break up NDR 
and introduce private broadcasting (see Bausch, 1980, p.952). In 
November 1979 Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein signed an 
agreement setting up their own public station, thereby excluding the 
third partner in NDR, the SPD Land of Hamburg (see Bausch, 1980, 
p.957). The disintegration of NDR was only stopped by the 
intervention of the Federal Administrative Court on 28th May 1980. The 
Court ruled that NDR must continue as a station serving Lower Saxony 
and Hamburg, even if Schleswig-Holstein decided to opt out (see 
Bausch, 1980, p.960; Bundesverwaltungsgerichtsurteil zum Nordeutschen 
Eundfunki in MP 7/1980, pp.503-514). Lower Saxony had not cancelled 
the NDR-agreement in time, and would have had to continue its 
participation in NDR together with Hamburg. In a subsequent re­
working of the NDR inter-Land agreement, Schleswig-Holstein and Lower 
Saxony agreed to continue to support NDR, on condition that it lost 
its monopoly in 1983, thus opening up the way for private competition 
(see Der Spiegel, 23/1983, p.26).
These examples of attempts to break the monopoly of the public 
service ethos and introduce commercial broadcasting, are by no means
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exhaustive, but they help to illustrate the continuity of the campaign 
and the stability of the groups and arguments involved (see Montag, 
1978). These groups include the press, which has always argued that 
it must have access to broadcasting, in order to secure its financial 
survival. Others interested in the introduction of commercial 
broadcasting include advertisers, who want a more liberal advertising 
climate. The CDU/CSU are the natural allies of these private interests 
because, of their commitment to private enterprise. However, the 
CDU/CSU's main motive for introducing private broadcasting would 
appear to be their distrust of a system, which they regard as not 
being conducive to their political interests. According to Gottberg, 
these past attempts to introduce private broadcasting, represented 
"unter der Losung des Vortes Freiheit, der Versuch. . .die 
Zugangsmoglichkeiten zu dem Medium zugunsten einiger machtiger 
Interessengruppen zu verandern" (1979, p.3>.
The reasons for the failure to establish private broadcasting are 
to be found in the lack of sufficient technical capacity, and in the 
rulings of the courts, and above all the Constitutional Court. Private 
broadcasting was never forbidden by the Constitutional Court, but its 
requirement in 1961, that private broadcasting be organised in such a 
way that the plurality of opinion was reflected in its internal 
supervisory structures and in its programming, proved to be too high 
a hurdle for commercial aspirants (BauSch, Interview, 29.7.1987).
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3.3 Cable - a means of introducing private broadcasting
The traditional argument against private broadcasting, first 
proposed by the Constitutional Court in 1961, that lack of frequencies 
and prohibitive costs prevented a multiplicity of programme providers, 
was no longer passible with the emergence of cable. Cable television, 
which allows the distribution of many broadcasting channels into the 
home, gave the discussion about private television a new impetus in 
the 1970s.
In September 1973, the federal minister for research and 
technology, and posts and telecommunications, Horst Ehmke (SPD), 
announced the setting up a commission to investigate advances in 
communications technology (see Ehmke, 1973, pp.433-443; Sura, 1987, 
p.9). The commission was supposed to put forward proposals for "ein 
wirtschaftlich verniinftiger und gesellschaftlich wiinschenswerter 
Ausbau des Telekammunikations-systems" (cit. in Reichardt, 1980, p.10). 
Membership was drawn from the Lander, academe, central government, 
local government, the political parties, the trade unions, the press, 
broadcasting, commerce and industry. The Kommisslon fur den Ausbau 
des tecbnischen Kammunikationssystems (KtK) presented its report to 
the federal government on 27th January 1976 (see KtK, 1976, pp.4-38). 
As it had been initiated by central government, it was cautious about 
making any statements on media policy, as this is an area regulated 
by the Lander (see Lange, 1976, p.93). It therefore concentrated its 
enquiries on network provision, on aspects of technology, finance and 
public demand.
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Against original expectations cable television took up only a small 
part of the final report. The KtK concluded that broadband cable had 
been overestimated in public debate, and that many new forms of 
telecommunication could just as easily be accommodated on existing 
narrowband networks, such as the telephone system (KtK, 1976, pp*5- 
11). In making its recommendations on broadband cable, the KtK drew a 
distinction between those systems best suited for television 
distribution (Breitbandverteilnetze), and those suited to both mass 
and individual communication, similar in structure to the telephone 
network (.Breitbandvermittlungsnetze') (KtK, 1976, p.11; see Mertler- 
Meibom, 1983, p.25). The latter was felt to require further research
and development before high levels of investment could be justified 
(KtK, 1976, pp.15-16).
The major significance of the report lay in its statements about
tree-and-branch cable systems, Breitbandverteilnetze. The KtK stated
Da die Errichtung eines bundesweiten Breitbandverteilnetzes wegen 
des Fehlens eines ausgepragten und drangenden Bedarfs heute noch 
nicht empfohlen werden kann, und da neue Inhalte - auch solche, die 
nicht Rundfunk sind - erst der Entwicklung bediirfen, werden 
zundchst Pilotprojekte Otodellversuche) mit Breitbandkabelsystemen 
empfohlen. (KtK, 1976, p.13)
The KtK had found neither a distinct demand for more TV channels, nor
a strong identifiable need for local broadcasting, which would have
justified heavy public investment in tree-and-branch cable systems
(KtK, 1976, p.12, p.30). Cable pilot projects of five years' duration,
provided a means of answering questions about future demand and
individual needs, which could not be forecast at this stage.
Recognising that the projects would play a vital role in assessing
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public acceptance and economic viability, the KtX recommended that 
cable services should be offered within "eine mbglichst vieifaitige 
Versuchsordnung", subject to a decision by the Lander (KtK, 1976, 
p.15). This would appear to imply services other than public service 
broadcasting, although the question of who should provide cable 
programmes was left open.
Publication of the KtK report led to further discussion about 
private television. Hartmut Reichardt claims that rather than 
contributing to debate about the new media, the KtK opened up a 
discussion about the desirability of public service broadcasting, "eine 
Forderung nach einem ganziich anderen Rundfunksystem fur diese 
Republik" (1980, p.10). The CDU/CSU insisted that private programme 
providers should be allowed to participate in the pilot projects 
(CDU/CSU smm Bericht der Kommission fur den Ausbau des technischen 
Kommunlkationssystemsy in MP 2/1976, pp.72-74, here p.73). The SPD, 
however, maintained that the pilot projects should be undertaken by 
the public service stations (SPD: publizistische Gewaltenteilung auch 
bei Kabelfemsehent in MP 2/1976, pp.74-75).
On 11th May 1978, the Lander agreed to implement four pilot 
projects in Munich, Ludwigshafen-Mannheim, Cologne or Wuppertal, and 
West Berlin (BeschluB der Klnisterprasidenten der Lander betr. 
Kabelfemsehen und Breitbandkommunika tion> in Bauer, Detjen, Muller 
Romer, 18.1.1). In December 1978 North Rhine-Westphalia decided to 
replace Cologne or Wuppertal with Dortmund. At the end of 1979 
Baden-Wiirttemberg decided to drop out, leaving the Rhineiand-
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Palatinate to continue alone in Ludwigshafen (see Sura, 1977, p.10). 
The Lander agreed to allow private programme provision on the basis 
of a model submitted by the Rhineland-Palatinate. It was also stated 
that "wahrend der Versuchsphase weitere Pilotprojekte nur in den 
genannten Organisationsform durchgefiihrt werden sollen" (in Bauer, 
Detjen, Muller Romer, 18.1.1). The use of the phrase "nur in den 
genannten Qrganisationsformen" was vague enough to be interpreted 
more broadly at a later stage.
On 14th November 1980, the Lander agreed that costs of DM140 
million for all four pilot projects, should be raised from the licence 
fee (BeschluB der Klnisterprasidenten der Lander betr.
Gemeinschaftliche Finanzierung der Pilotprojekte "Kabelfernsehen" durch 
die Lander> in Bauer, Detjen, Muller Romer, 18.1.2). This decision was 
incorporated in to the licence fee agreement of 6th July, 1982, which 
placed a DM0.20 levy on broadcasting licences iStaatsvertrag iiber die 
Hohe der Rundfunkgebiihr und zur Anderung des Staatsvertrags iiber 
einen Finanzausgleicb zwischen den Rundfunkanstalten, in Bauer, Detjen, 
Muller Romer, 15.4.2). However, perhaps of most interest is the note 
added to the 1980 agreement, on the insistence of the Lower Saxony 
Prime Minister, Ernst Albrecht (CDU). This modified the earlier
agreement of 1978, which had stated that further projects should only 
take place "in den genannten Organisationsformen", by stating that 
media policy decisions by individual Lander outside the pilot projects
should not be excluded (in Bauer, Detjen, Muller Romer, 18.1.2).
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Delays in implementing the pilot projects, and the intervening 
struggles about who should be responsible for programming, were 
accompanied by a decline in the acceptance of their experimental 
nature. Following the change in 1982 from an SPD/FDP to a 
CDU/CSU/FDP government in Bonn, the experimental nature of the 
projects was made superfluous by central government's decision to 
allow the post office to start a policy of cabling the whole country 
(see H. Schmidt, 1983, p.844; Scherer, 1985, pp.165-172). Also, the 
Lander decision in 1978 to delay individual Land initiatives until the 
completion of the pilot projects, was rendered void, once individual 
Lander passed legislation allowing private broadcasting on a permanent 
basis (see Reichardt, 1980, p. 10; Schmidt, 1983, p.844).
The first pilot project in Ludwigshafen was hailed as "eine 
medienpolitische Vende" when it began on 1st January 1984 (see 
Frenkel, 1984, p.50). The pilot projects ran for three years, but were 
a disappointment to those who had expected a rush of public interest. 
The limited transmission areas of Ludwigshafen, Munich, and Vest 
Berlin, proved too small to attract advertising support for local 
private broadcasting (see Kabel-Projekte: Urknall ohne Echo,
Wirtschaftswoche, 14.8.1987, p.60). After three years, only 61,000 
households were connected to cable in Ludwigshafen out of 180,000 
households passed <.Virtschaftswochet 14.8.1987., p.60; "Es war der 
Schlilssel zum freien Markt", FR, 5.12.1986). Dortmund, the only pilot 
project run by a public station, VDR, proved an exception, because 
VDR's local offerings were not dependent on advertising. However, the 
exclusivity of public broadcasting provision in Dortmund, was broken
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even before the project commenced on 1st June 198b, because the North 
Rhine-Westphalian government passed a provisional law allowing 
satellite channels from other Lander to be fed into North Rhine- 
Westphalian cable networks (Gesetz iiber die vorlaufige Veiter- 
verbreitung von Rundfunkprogrammen in Kabelanlagen, in Mi?D 11/1985, 
pp.103-4). In Munich, public interest was very disappointing, and the 
project only attracted 7,000 households before it was prematurely 
terminated in December 1985 after 21 months (see Wirtschaftswoche, 
14.8.1987). New Bavarian legislation, passed on 15th December 1984, 
allowed satellite channels previously only available in Munich, to be 
fed into all Bavarian cable networks (.Gesetz iiber die Erpiohung und 
Entwicklung neuer Rundfunkangebute und anderer Nediendienste in Bayern 
MiiG in MPD 1/1985, pp.1-10). Responsibility for private channels, 
passed from BR and ZDF to a new public authority, the Bayerische 
Landeszentrale filr neue Medien (BLM). This complied with Article Ilia 
of the Bavarian constitution, which demands that broadcasting be run 
as a public responsibility. Vest Berlin had promised the best chances 
of success, because 200,000 households were already cabled when the 
project began on 28th August 1985 (see Wirtschaftswoche, 14.8.1987, 
p.60). However, this was still not enough to attract advertising for 
local channels, and legislation was amended in March 1986 to allow 
private terrestrial television and FM radio, in order to attract larger 
audiences (see Kabelpilot- und Versuchsgesetz filr drahtlosen Rundfunk 
im Land Berlin vom 27. Juli 1984, in der Fassung vom 27.3.1986, in 
Bauer, Detjen, Muller Romer, 18.2.2).
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Vhat the pilots did provide was a model for permanent legislation 
on the introduction of private broadcasting. This was particularly 
the case of the Rhineland-Palatinate cable pilot law, passed on 4th 
December 1980 (.Landesgesetz iiber einen Versuch mit Breitbandkabel, in 
MP 12/1980, pp.531-533). This combined elements of external pluralism 
and internal pluralism. An external supervisory authority, the Anstalt 
fur Kabelkommunikation (AKK), with a committee (Versammlung) made up 
of representatives drawn from groups and institutions, was responsible 
for supervising balance over the totality of channels on offer on 
cable.
In terms of programming the pilot projects offered very little in 
terms of new or original content. Apart from access channels and 
struggling local services, public service channels, both existing and 
new services, provided the bulk of channels on offer. The pilot 
projects were seen mainly as a launch pad for national private 
channels like SAT 1 and RTL Plus. It was also clear that cable alone 
offered no chance of success for private channels, who have pinned 
their hopes to local terrestrial frequencies in order to increase their 
potential audience (see FK, 18.7.1986, pp.1-6). In the final analysis 
the pilot projects had not stimulated any debate about the economic 
and social desirability of more broadcasting channels, as originally 
intended by the KtK. This debate was effectively stifled by other 
media policy developments, reducing the pilot projects to a means of 
testing private broadcasting for future national distribution (see 
Schmidt, 1983, pp.844-5).
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3.4 Lauder initiatives for the introduction of private broadcasting
Any semblance of the experimental character of the pilot projects 
was nullified by the passage of Lander legislation allowing private 
broadcasting on a permanent basis. The first initiative was taken by 
Baden-Wurttemberg in March 1982, with the introduction of a draft law, 
intended to motivate discussion (Entwurf filr ein Gesetz iiber die neue 
Medien - Landesmediengesetz Baden-VUrttemberg, in MP 2/82, p.202-209). 
The first such piece of legislation was passed by Lower Saxony in May 
1984 (Niedersachsisches Landesrundfunkgesetz, MP 6/1984, pp.486-496). 
Since this period most of the Lander have passed legislation allowing 
the introduction of private broadcasting (1).
The impetus for the introduction of these laws came from the 
Constitutional Court judgement of June 1981, described in Chapter 2 
(in Ring, 1981, A-III 3, pp.1-25). To reiterate: in this judgement the
Court, in recognition of technological progress which allowed a 
greater number of broadcasting channels, accepted the external 
pluralistic system, where diversity of opinion and content is judged 
over a broad range of channels, in addition to the internal pluralistic 
model, where diversity of opinion and content is achieved in each 
channel, subject to supervision by internal pluralistic committees. 
Encouraged by this concession, the CDU/CSU Lander set about 
introducing legislation on private broadcasting, which was markedly 
less stringent than the legislation governing public broadcasting.
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Most legislation opted for the externally pluralistic model 
(Bavaria, Vest Berlin, Rhineiand-Palatinate) or a system mixing 
elements of internal and external pluralism (Baden-Wurttemberg, Lower 
Saxony, the Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein). In a mixed system each 
channel must exhibit diversity of opinion, unless there are a 
sufficient number of programme providers using the same medium, to 
justify external pluralism. Channels licensed in the SPD Lander of 
Hamburg and North Rhine-Westphalia must be internally pluralistic. In 
the case of nationally distributed satellite channels these 
distinctions are academic, as the inter-Land agreement (reached in 
1987) on the reorganisation of broadcasting, which will be discussed 
later, foresees internal plurality of opinion in each channel, unless 
there are three nationally distributed private channels using the same 
medium (e.g TV or radio), and run by different programme providers 
(.Staatsvertrag zur ffeuordnung des Rundfunkwesens, 3.4.1987, in KuR, 
25.4.1987, pp.18-26). Only then can there be plurality of opinion 
judged according to the totality of channels available. If the 
conditions of external plurality are not met, the programme provider 
has to institute an internal programme committee to ensure diversity 
of opinion. In the case of consortia it is sufficient to prevent the 
influence of those with more than a 50% shareholding by drawing up a 
contract or a set of rules. Most of the Land laws have since been 
amended to comply with this clause.
In all cases the Lander laws established external public 
authorities, to license and supervise private broadcasting channels. 
These contain supervisory committees, drawn from groups and
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institutions, similar to the Rundfunkrate of public broadcasting. 
Baden-Wurttemberg, and Berlin, however, have instituted small five- 
member committees composed of independent individuals acting in an 
honorary capacity, and appointed by parliament. This is reminiscent 
of British supervisory practice, and may represent an attempt to break 
the tradition of supervision by committees drawn from groups and 
institutions. The laws contain liberal rules on advertising, allowing 
generally up to 20% of transmission time for advertising and the 
possibility of commercial breaks in programmes which exceed 60 
minutes in duration.
The passage of these laws constituted a definite break with the 
public service ethos, but initiatives by each Land provided no uniform 
basis for the national distribution of private channels, and no 
security for private channels which had to take account of different 
stipulations in each Land. For this reason an agreement between all 
the LMnder was necessary to prevent HKleinstaatereiM in broadcasting.
3.5 A change in government - a change In policy
The progress achieved by the Ldnder in passing legislation to 
allow private broadcasting, and the availability of cable, satellite, 
and local terrestrial frequencies to distribute it, would not have been 
possible without substantial assistance from the Federal Government in 
Bonn. A factor which had worked against the establishment of private 
broadcasting throughout the 1970s, had been the hostile stance assumed 
by the SDP/FDP coalition, which held power in Bonn from 1969 to 19S2.
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Although the Lander are responsible for formulating broadcasting 
policy, central government holds the trump card, because it is 
responsible for telecommunications policy, as carried out by the 
Federal Post Office. As the introduction of private television was 
dependent on a cable and satellite policy undertaken by central 
government, efforts to establish private broadcasting had been 
effectively blacked.
The SPD/FDP coalition's stance was firmly put in a statement by
Chancellor Schmidt following the SPD's victory in the 1980 election:
Die sozial-liberale Koalition wird - wie friiher - auch in Zukunft 
fur den privatrechtlichen Charakter der Presse und fur den 
offentlich-rechtlichen Charakter der elektronischen Medien, d.h. des 
Rundfunks und Fernsehens, eintreten. Dieses historisch gewachsene 
publizistische Gleichgewicht gehorte einmal zum Grundkonsens aller 
demokratischen Parteien in der Bundesrepublik. Es ware gut, wenn 
die Parteien des Bundestages zu diesem Konsensus zuriickkehren 
konnten. (Ifedien in der Regierungserklarung des Bundeskanzlers, in 
MP 12/80, p.844)
This strong aversion to commercial broadcasting was a reflection of 
the Chancellor's "personliche erhebliche Skepsis gegeniiber der 
zunehmenden Fernseh-Berieselung der Heranwachsenden und gegeniiber der 
Beeintrachtigung des Familienlebens durch die elektronische Medien" 
(p.844).
In this respect, the Chancellor, who was adjudged to be on the 
right wing of his party, could count on total party support. More 
pragmatically, however, it was recognised that private television 
might upset the political balance, as public service broadcasting was 
generally considered to be fairer in its coverage of the SPD than the
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predominantly conservative press. This fear was summed up by Egon
Bahr, the SPD chief whip, in December 1979:
Wir werden aufpassen miissen, daB hier nicht eine Situation 
geschaffen wird, durch die de facto die Situation der gedruckten 
veroffentlichten Meinung auf dem Bildschirm ubertragen wird. Dann 
hatte namlich die SPD bei den Wahlen wahrscheinlich keine Chance 
mehr. (cit. in Barsig, 1981, p.188)
However, even as the government in Bonn was holding firm in its 
opposition to private broadcasting, the foundations for its eventual 
introduction were being laid. On the one hand technological 
developments were occurring which could not be ignored, even by a 
government opposed to commercial broadcasting. Sanctioning cable 
would ultimately result in demands for private television, but ignoring 
developments in the new media would affect Vest Germany's future as 
an industrial nation. This paradox was revealed in 1979 when Post 
Minister Gscheidle's decision to cable eleven cities to secure jobs and 
future investment possiblities for the Federal Post Office forced the 
government to act to prevent the creation of spare capacity, which 
would have resulted in calls for private broadcasting (see Kremeraorf, 
1983, p.20). The plan was halted by the government in September 1979, 
when it was stated that the Post Office would not prejudice the 
results of the cable pilot projects by creating spare capacity for 
extra channels (Medienpolitischer BeschluB des Bundeskabinetts vom 
26.9.1979, in MP 10/79, pp.719). Instead, the SPD/FDP government 
decided in April 1981 to pursue a policy of fibre optic cabling, which 
is more suited to individual and business communications, rather than 
coaxial cable tree and branch systems, which are best suited for 
television (see Kedlenpolitische EntschlleBungen der Bundesregierung,
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in MP 6/1981, p.444). A decision for this type of network would have 
made a tree and branch system, distributing predominantly television, 
less of a possibility (see Kremersdorf, 1983, p.24).
The government's attempts to stifle cable, were contradicted in its 
policy concerning direct broadcast satellites (DBS), which allow 
individual reception of television programmes by small dish antennae. 
In April 1980, the government signed an agreement with France for the 
joint construction of a DBS satellite system for both France and West 
Germany (in Ring, 1981, F II.2). The German DBS system would be 
called TV-Sat. In spite of its hostility to private broadcasting, the 
SPD/FDP coalition in Bonn was encouraging developments and a 
technological capacity which would later be used as a pretext to 
introduce private broadcasting channels.
The turning point came in September 1982 with a new CDU/CSU/FDP
coalition government in Bonn, which was intent on bringing about
change and providing the technological basis for the introduction of
private broadcasting. This was firmly stated in Chancellor Kohl's
statement to the Bundestag on 13th October 1982:
Die politische Blockade des Ausbaus moderner Kommunikations- 
technologien wird beendet. Die Bundesregierung wird im Zusammen- 
wirken mit den Bundeslandern die Medienordnung erneuern. So sollen 
die Meinungsvielfalt erhoht, die Urteilskraft des Burgers heraus- 
gefordert und der Informations- und Meinungsaustausch iiber 
nationale Grenzen hinaus gestarkt werden. (cit. in MP 10/1982, 
p.679)
The new Minister of Posts, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, reinforced 
central government's commitment to the introduction of private
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broadcasting, by announcing that the Federal Posx Office would be 
investing DM1 billion a year into coaxial cable from 1983 (see 
Spiegel-Gespracht 43/1982, p. 68). What had proved to be a major 
barrier to private broadcasting in the past, a lack of frequencies, was 
lifted.
3.3 The search for a solution in a dual system of broadcasting
After years of political wrangling about the desirability of cable 
and satellite, and especially private broadcasting, the conditions 
necessary to break the public service monopoly had been achieved. On 
a technological level, cable and satellite existed to distribute 
additional broadcasting channels. On a political level, the principle 
of private broadcasting had been resolved by the election of a 
government in Bonn which had pledged its support for private 
broadcasting by initiating an extensive cabling policy.
At a constitutional level the Constitutional Court had modified its 
demands in 1981, so giving the Lander greater legislative freedom to 
introduce alternative forms of broadcasting. However, at Land level 
there were major problems to be resolved. These problems stemmed from 
the CDU/CSU's support of private broadcasting, and the opposition of 
the SPD Lander. They were brought to a head by a recognition of the 
fact that satellite technology allowed the national distribution of 
additional channels Into cable systems, or in the case of DBS, allowed 
individual reception. In the interest of national uniformity a 
compromise by the Lander on the co-existence of private and public
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broadcasting was imperative, if a situation was to be avoided where 
each Land pursued its own policy. However, negotiations for an
inter-land agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting have 
revealed the fragility of the federal system of media policy-making. 
Negotiations begun in June 1981 were concluded in 1987 only after 
countless failed attempts at agreement.
3.6.1 Negotiations commence
On 4th June 1981 the Lander prime ministers dealt with the issue 
of satellite broadcasting for the first time, in reaction to a joint 
plan by the BDZV and RTL, the Luxembourg commercial broadcasting 
company, to beam a private satellite channel into Vest Germany from 
Luxembourg (see BeschluB der Kinisterprasidenten der Lander betreffend 
der Beteiligung der deutschen Zeitungsverleger an europaischen 
Rundfunksatellitenprogrammen vom 4. Juni 1981, in Ring, 1981, F.II. 1.1). 
It was agreed that satellite broadcasting fell under the jurisdiction 
of the Lander. The prime ministers also expressed their willingness 
to solve the issue of satellite broadcasting together. Vith a joint 
solution in mind, they asked the Lander broadcasting experts to 
prepare a report on satellite broadcasting.
The report was presented over a year later at the prime ministers' 
annual meeting, held in Travemiinde between the 20th and 22nd October 
1982 (see Bericht iiber Fragen des Satelliten-Rundfunks, in MP 12/1982, 
pp.776-784). It examined satellite technology, foreign initiatives, 
programming, and the possibilities and limitations of satellite
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broadcasting in Vest Germany. The report's recommendations 
concentrated on the two year pre-operational phase of the DBS 
satellite, TV-Sat. TV-Sat entered its operational phase, once a second 
reserve satellite had been launched. The report recommended that two 
transponders on the pre-operational satellite be used for two 
television channels, and one for the transmission of 16 digital radio 
channels (p.782). It proposed that ARD and ZDF's existing services be 
placed on the two television transponders, but that this should not 
exclude the possibility of cooperation with third parties on the basis 
of existing public service broadcasting legislation (p.782). This 
solution coincided with a proposal put forward by ARD and ZDF (p.782- 
783). For public broadcasting this solution would have been ideal, 
because the public stations would have retained ultimate 
responsibility for programme content.
The prime ministers took note of the report, and agreed that TV- 
Sat should be used for the transmission of two television channels 
and 16 radio channels in the pre-operational phase iVorlaufiges 
Ergebnisprotokoll, in HP 12/82, p.776). However, the transmission of 
ARD and ZDF with the possibility of third party cooperation was only 
considered as "ein moglicher Veg" (p.776). A final decision on who 
should use TV-Sat was delayed, pending talks between the broadcasting 
commission of the Landert ARD and ZDF, and interested third parties 
(p.777>.
Negotiations on the possibility of cooperation between the public 
broadcasters and other parties, including the press, took place in the
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first half of 1983 (see Kreile, 1986, p.57). However, differences 
emerged about the extent to which private interests should be allowed 
to carry responsibility for their own programmes, and whether they 
should be allowed to acquire their own advertising (see GroB, 1986, 
p.52; Kreile, 1986, p.60). This was the solution favoured by the BDZV, 
but its implementation would have required changes to existing 
broadcasting legislation, which at this time did not permit autonomous 
private broadcasting (GroB, 1986, p.52). ARD and ZDF were naturally 
opposed to this solution, and proposed instead that advertising on 
their terrestrial services be increased by five minutes to 25 minutes 
a day, in order to use the extra advertising revenue for programme 
innovations on TV-Sat (see Kreile, 1986, p.60).
The difficulties in achieving a cooperative solution, which 
maintained public broadcasting's overall responsibility, and satisfied 
the broader ambitions of potential commercial interests, pushed the 
possibilities of telecommunications satellites to the forefront of 
discussions (see GroB, 1986, p. 53). Telecommunications satellites are 
less powerful than DBS and are not generally used for individual
reception of broadcast channels because they require large reception 
antennae. Instead, programmes are fed into cable systems, but 
dependence on cable is offset by lower costs and a greater number of
transponders. A decision by the Lander on the use of
telecommunications satellites had been forced by the decision of the 
Minister of Posts, Christian Schwarz-Schilling (CDU) to rent two
transponders on ECS 1, a telecommunications satellite operated by 
Eutelsat, a non-profit making cooperative with membership drawn from
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European PTTs (see von Sell, 1984, p.186). According to GroB, Schwarz- 
Schilling and some of the CDU/CSU prime ministers were hoping to 
bypass the need for legislation, by defining transmission via 
telecommunications satellite as point-to-point communication rather 
than as broadcasting (GroB, 1986, p.53).
The Lander prime ministers discussed telecommunications satellites 
at a meeting held in Stuttgart from the 19th to 21st October 1983 
(see GroB, 1986, pp.53-54). Here it was agreed that the responsibility 
for regulating any type of satellite broadcasting rested with the 
Lander and not with the Federal Post Office (see GroB, 1986, p.53; 
Kreile, 1986, p.63). The Lander broadcasting commission was asked to 
work out a concept on the use of telecommunications satellites by 15th 
December 1983 (see GroB, 1986, p.54>. According to Rolf GroB, this 
decision blocked attempts by individual Lander to install national 
private broadcasting without the agreement of the other Lander (1986, 
p.54). At a meeting of the prime ministers in Bonn on 15th December
1983, no agreement could be reached on a CDU proposal, which 
envisaged awarding one ECS 1 transponder to a private programme 
provider, and a further transponder to a public station (see Kreile, 
1986, p.66). It was therefore decided to delay further talks until
1984.
3.6.2 A compromise in sight - the SPD's change in attitude
A compromise on the national distribution of private channels by 
satellite seemed possible once the SPD had modified its policy of
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hostility towards private broadcasting. This modification of policy 
was brought about by several factors. As more and more CDU/CSU 
Lander passed legislation permitting private broadcasting, the SPD 
Lander found themselves burdened with a policy which was no longer 
sustainable. The CDU/CSU's control of central government and the 
Federal Post Office, and the fact that satellite broadcasting respects 
neither Land nor national borders, made it clear that private 
broadcasting could no longer be stopped. This had become particularly 
evident in an episode involving the BDZV's attempt to cooperate with 
the Luxembourg private broadcaster RTL in the transmission of a 
satellite television channel from Luxembourg to Vest Germany (see 
GroS, 1981, pp.373-382). Additionally, the maintenance of an anti­
commercial stance would probably have been difficult to justify to 
the electorate in SPD Lander, if they were denied access to private 
broadcasting being enjoyed by those living in CDU/CSU Lander.
A turnaround amounting to a toleration of private broadcasting 
occurred on 16th February 1984 with the publication of a policy 
document worked out by the SPD‘s media commission (J!fedienpolitisches 
Aktlonsprogramm 1984 der SPD-Kedienkommission, in MP 2/1984, pp.149- 
151). However, the document did not approve of existing developments 
in broadcasting. The SPD promised to fight the "blinde Modern is ierung 
und Kommerzial is ierung des Rundfunkwesens" (p.151). The cable 
strategy of the Federal Post Office, involving coaxial cable, which is 
suited to television distribution rather than individual communication, 
was criticised for being economically unviable and technologically 
obsolete (p.149). Instead, the SPD supported DBS, which would allow
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individual reception by dish, antennae throughout the country, unlike
cable, which is limited to certain areas (p.150). The distribution of
television programmes by telecommunications satellites, which are best
suited for cable distribution was deemed "medienpoiitisch,
wirtschaftlich und technisch. . . fragwiirdig" (p.151). In spite of
these criticisms, it was recognised that a situation had arisen where
total opposition to private broadcasting could no longer be sustained,
if the SPD was to continue to have any influence on Vest Germany's
broadcasting future. It was stated that:
Die Uutzung der Satellitentechnik durch unsere Nachbarn, die 
Versuche zur Fremdkommerzialisierung des deutschen Rundfunkwesens, 
die politischen Machtverhaltnisse im Bund und in der Mehrzahl der 
Lander, die privatwirtschaftliche Rundfunkveranstalter zuiassen 
wollen, usw., erschweren das Festhalten an einem ausschliefilich 
offentlich-rechtlich organisierten Rundfunkwesen in der 
Bundesrepublik und machen es unter Umstanden sogar unmoglich. 
(pp.149-150)
The extent of the SPD's toleration of private broadcasting was 
linked to several conditions. Primary amongst these was the demand 
that private broadcasting should be organised on internally 
pluralistic lines, by exhibiting diversity of opinion in individual 
channels, and by the representation of groups and institutions in its 
supervisory bodies (p.150). This demand was caused by distrust of the 
externally pluralistic model, Mda Kommunikationsgerechtigkeit und 
Meinungsvielfalt durch die Konkurrenz einer Vielzahl von selbstandigen 
Veranstaltern (AuBenpluralitat) vor allem aus wirtschaftlichen Griinden 
in uberschaubarer Zukunft nicht herstellbar ist" (p. 150). Acceptance 
of private broadcasting was further linked to the imposition of quotas
- 153 -
on domestic production, and the avoidance of concentrated ownership, 
particularly by the press (p.150, p.151).
Central to the policy document however, were those points relating
to public broadcasting. It was stated that:
Die SPD ist zur Weiterentwicklung unseres Rundfunkwesens durch die 
Zulassung neuer Veranstalter bereit. Bedingung dafiir aber ist die 
Garantie fur den Bestand und die Entwicklung der bestehenden 
offentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten. (p.151)
The demand for a guarantee of existence and further development for
public broadcasting included access to the new technologies and secure
financial backing (p.151). In the event of inadequate licence fee
funding and/or severe competition from private broadcasting, there was
a veiled threat to increase the level of advertising in public
broadcasting (p.151).
The modification of SPD policy on private broadcasting was not 
supported by the trade unions, the SPD's traditional allies, who 
continued to oppose the introduction of private broadcasting (see 
Kedienpolitische Positionen des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, in MP 
5/1984, pp.419-425). More seriously, however, the decision to tolerate 
private broadcasting worked out by the party in Bonn conflicted with 
the differing standpoints assumed by the SPD Lander. For instance, in 
Hesse the Land government was totally opposed to the introduction of 
private broadcasting into Hessian cable networks (see Hall, 1984). 
This stance may have been partly coloured by the SPD's dependence on 
Green Party support in the Hessian Landtag. In Hamburg, a more 
conciliatory approach was adopted in recognition of the fact that two
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of Vest Germany's major publishing groups, the Axel Springer-Verlag 
and Gruner und Jahrt are based in Hamburg, and are heavily involved in 
attempts to establish private broadcasting. It was therefore in 
Hamburg's interest to satisfy two of its most important industrial 
concerns, and provide them with an incentive to stay in Hamburg (see 
Hall, 1984a). This was achieved by the passage of a provisional law 
in October 1984, which allowed satellite channels to be fed into 
Hamburg's cable networks (Gesetz iiber die vorlaufige Veiterverbreitung 
von Rundfunkprogramme in Kabelanlagen, in MPD 10a/1984, p.833). The 
law was criticised as a 'LEX APF', after the private television news 
company, Aktuell Fresse-Femsehen, a consortium involving 165 
newspaper publishers, which is based in Hamburg (see Hail, 1984a; FR, 
5.10.1984).
The SPD had therefore reached a position where private 
bruadcasting could be tolerated, but there were still many problems 
and internal divisions to be resolved. The party had spent so long 
opposing private broadcasting, that it was difficult for it to 
formulate a credible long-term broadcasting policy.
3.6.3 Compromise exposed - the SPD backs down
A compromise between the SPD Lander and the CDU/CSU Lander on the 
use of ECS 1 was reached on 23rd February 1984, shortly after the 
publication of the SPD's new policy document on 16 th February 
(.Gemeinsames Satelliten-Nutzungskonzept der Lander. Vorlaufiges 
Ergebnisprotokoll der Besprechung der Ministerprasidenten der Lander,
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in MP 2/1984, p.152). Under tills agreement the east beam of ECS 1
was awarded to ZDF for the distribution of its planned German- 
language cultural channel, 3SAT. The SPD Lander noted that the AKK 
(.Anstalt fiir Kabelkommunikation), the Ludwighafen cable authority, 
would license a programme provider for the west beam of the satellite 
on behalf of all the Lander. It was also agreed that the Intelsat 
telecommunications satellite, in addition to the transport of private 
channels, would be used for the transport of ARD's third television 
channels to Vest Berlin, and for the distribution of other public 
service channels. In the interest of equality with ZDF, other public 
service channels seemed to imply ARD's planned cultural channel, Eins 
Plus, although this was not specifically mentioned.
Martin Stock writes: "Der ^cooperative Foderalismus ist Anfang 1984 
in ein medienpolitisches Labrynth geraten" (1986a, p.5). The CDU/CSU 
Lander had finally managed to achieve a consensus on the national 
distribution of commercial satellite channels. In doing this the cable 
pilot projects, which had been limited in time and scope in order to 
test the acceptance of cable, had been irretrievably rejected. There 
was no longer a question mark over the future of cable and satellite 
broadcasting and its corollary, commercial broadcasting. The only 
thing which remained to be settled were the details.
Given the content of the SPD policy document of 16th February, it 
is difficult to understand why the SPD Lander allowed the west beam 
of ECS 1 to be awarded to private broadcasting on the basis of 
provisional legislation governing the Ludwigshafen cable pilot project.
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The consent of the SPD Lander can only be explained as a concession
in return for the guarantee of existence and further development for
public broadcasting, which had been demanded in the SPD policy
document on 16th February. However, only the prospect of such a
guarantee was mentioned in the prime ministers' agreement:
Die Regierungschefs der Lander beauftragen die Rundfunkkommission 
der Ministerprasidenten weiterhin, Grundsatze zur Sicherung des 
Bestandes und der Weiterentwicklung des offentlich-rechtlichen 
Rundfunksystems zu erarbeiten. Dabei soil im Rahmen eines 
rundfunkrechtlichen Gesamtkonzepts eine technische und finanzielie 
Garantie fur das System offentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunkanstalten 
abgegeben werden. (p. 152)
On 28th April 1984 the AKK awarded the west beam of ECS 1 to a 
21-member consortium, composed of press and business interests, later 
to become the SAT 1 broadcasting channel. 76 other applications were 
rejected (see ECS 1-Vest beam von der Anstalt fur Kabelkommunikation 
vergebent MP 3/1984, pp.228-229). The AKK justified its decision by 
pointing out that the SAT 1 consortium was the only applicant to 
satisfy technical, organisational, economic, and programme requirements 
(p.228). The plurality of the consortium was ensured by its diverse 
membership and its willingness to cooperate with other interested 
groups (p.228). According to the AKK, it was the only contender to 
offer scope for local insertions and information programmes in its 
programme schedule (p.228). Furthermore, two of the consortium's 
participants, the Programmgesellschaft fur Kabel- und Satelliten- 
rundfunk mbH (PKS), and the newspaper organisation, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), had been successfully involved as programme 
providers in the Ludwigshafen cable pilot project (p.228).
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The consent of the SPD Lander to the award of the ECS 1 west beam 
to a private channel, and the subsequent award of the transponder by 
the AKK to the SAT 1 consortium, clearly contradicted many of the 
points in the SPD’s policy document of February 1984, which had agreed 
to tolerate private broadcasting only under certain conditions. The 
SPD had demanded that private broadcasting be subject to internal 
plurality, but the Ludwigshafen cable pilot law, on which the award of 
the transponder was based, operated the externally pluralistic system, 
by which diversity of opinion is achieved over a range of channels 
(see Paragraph 18, Landesgesetz Liber einen Versuch mit Breitbandkabel 
vom 4.Dezember 1980, in Bauer, Detjen, Muller Romer, 18.4.2). Contrary 
to SPD demands, this law contained no quotas on domestic production. 
Furthermore, the SAT 1 consortium was dominated by press interests, 
something the SPD had warned against in its policy document. The 
publishing houses of Burda, Bauer, Holtzbrinck, and the Axel Springer- 
Verlag had a combined holding of almost 30%. A further 20% share in 
SAT 1 was held by APF, which is owned by 165 newspapers. The Axel 
Springer-Verlag in turn held a 35% share of APF. PKS, owned by 
several banks and business interests, held a 40% share in SAT 1 (see 
Media Perspektiven, 1985, p.18). It should also be remembered, that 
the SPD had sanctioned the use of a telecommunications satellite, 
although the use of such a satellite for television distribution had 
been deemed "medienpolitisch, wirtschaftlich und technisch fragwiirdig” 
in the February policy document (in MP 2/1984, p. 151),
Given the pronouncements of the Constitutional Court (BVG) in 1981, 
it was even doubtful whether the AKK had the power to license a
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private channel for national distribution (see von Sell, 1984, p.187). 
In 1981 the Court had accepted a laxer regulatory regime for the pilot 
projects because they were experimental in nature (see Urteil des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 16. Juni 1981, in Ring, 1981, A-III 3, 
p.18). The pilots, too, had to be subject to legislation, but the Court 
conceded that legislators had "eine erheblich groBere 
Gestaltungsfreiheit", because the pilots served to gain further 
knowledge. The licensing of SAT 1, however, affected all the Lander, 
and as such the experimental legislation was probably insufficient to 
satisfy constitutional demands, which included legally fixed criteria 
for the selection of applicants, especially if there was insufficient 
capacity to accommodate all (BVG 16. Juni 1981, in Ring, 1981, A-III 
3, p.20; von Sell, 1984, p.189).
It was clear that the SPD's weak bargaining position had forced it 
into a situation where it could only react to what was already 
happening and becoming established fact. Having spent so much time 
and effort saying no to private broadcasting, the SPD could not 
realistically tolerate it in a consistent and logical way. The 
CDU/CSU, on the other hand, had achieved a tactical success at a time 
when Lower Saxony alone had passed legislation allowing private 
broadcasting on a permanent basis.
3.6.4 The Bremerhaven Resolution - a step in the right direction
Once a decision had been taken on the use of ECS 1, the prime 
ministers turned their attention to a plan for the implementation of a
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dual structure of private and public broadcasting. In February 1984, 
the prime ministers asked the Lander broadcasting commission to work 
out a plan for the award of future satellite capacity, in particular on 
TV-Sat. The commission was also asked to work out a guarantee of 
existence and further development for public broadcasting, and a set 
of uniform rules for the national distribution of private channels 
(see Gemeinsames Satellitenkonzept der Lander. Vorlaufiges Brgebnis- 
protokoll der Besprechung der Minis terprasi den ten der Lander am 23. 
Februar 1984, in MP 2/1984, p.152). The broadcasting commission under 
the joint chairmanship of Lothar Spath (CDU), Prime Minister of Baden- 
Wiirttemberg, and Klaus von Dohnanyi (SPD), Mayor of Hamburg, farmed a 
working party to work out the details, before emerging with a plan on 
29th June 1984 (see GroB, 1986, p.56).
Before the plan was discussed by all the prime ministers, the 
chairmen of the SPD parliamentary party at both national and Land 
level issued a policy document in Diisseldorf on 28th September 1984 
iSozialdemokratische Position zur Medienpolitik, in MP 10a/1984, 
pp.839-840). This was an attempt to coordinate the activities of the 
parliamentary party and the SPD prime ministers, and it used the 
policy document worked out by the SPD media commission in February 
1984 as its starting point (p.839). The document was an elucidation 
of the demands made in February. In spite of the SPD Lander's 
decision in February to accept the licensing of SAT 1 by the AKK, the 
party still stuck to the principle of internal pluralism for private 
broadcasting (p.840). Perhaps as a reminder of what had happened 
with the AKK, it also demanded that private broadcasters be subject to
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precise rules on licensing and content in accordance with 
constitutional demands (p.840). The document stated that ARD ana ZDF 
should be awarded a transponder each on the TV-Sat, and that they 
should also be given access to telecommunications satellites (p.840). 
The document rejected any freeze on advertising levels on public 
channels (p.840). In the case of private broadcasting, it was argued 
that advertising should not exceed 15% of transmission time and that 
no commercial breaks should be allowed within programmes (p.840). 
The policy document also demanded a ban on sponsored advertising and 
on advertising on both Sundays and public holidays for private 
broadcasting (p.840).
Prime Minister Spath (CDU) and Mayor Dohnanyi (SPD) met a week 
before the prime ministers' meeting in Bremerhaven on 17th October 
1984 to discuss the SPD's demands. These demands included domestic 
production quotas for private television, the introduction of 
advertising on WDR's radio services, which was non-existent at this 
time, and the award of DBS transponders to both ARD and ZDF (Kriiik 
an Medienpapier zog sich lange hfn, FR 18.10.1984, p.18). The Lander 
were under pressure to reach an agreement on TV-Sat at least, so that 
the Minister of Posts, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, could award a 
contract for the reserve satellite, TV-Sat 2 (Bine Einigung ist noch 
nicht in Sicht, FR 4.10.1984). The SPD's demands were met with 
threats from the CDU/CSU. For instance, Prime Minister Uwe Barschel 
(Schleswig-Holstein) stated that the CDU/CSU Lander might be forced to 
conclude a separate agreement on TV-Sat if no agreement was reached 
with the SPD Lander (.Eine Einigung ist noch nicht in Sicht, FR
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4.10.1984; see also Die Union nimmt "medienpolitische Kleinstaaterei" 
in Kauf. Alleingang bei Privatsendern angedroht, FR 16.10.1984, p.i).
The Lander prime ministers finally consented to a provisional 
agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting at a meeting held in 
Bremerhaven from October 17th to 19th October 1984, the so-called 
Bremerhaven Resolution (.Vorlaufiges Ergebnisprotokoll der 
Ministerprasiden tenkonferenz vom 17. bis 19. Oktober 1984 in 
Bremerhaven, in MP 10/1984, pp.791-793). It constituted a framework 
for the coexistence of private and public broadcasting, and an attempt 
to bring some uniformity to the diverse nature of individual Land 
policy, although private broadcasting would continue to be supervised 
and licensed according to Land law (p.791).
In accordance with SPD demands, it was agreed to grant public 
broadcasting a guarantee of existence and further development. This 
included access to the new technologies, including satellite 
broadcasting, and a guarantee of adequate funding, mainly by the 
licence fee, to enable ARD and ZDF to participate in satellite 
broadcasting (p.791). However, it was also stated that private 
broadcasting must be given a framework which allowed it to meet the 
challenge of national and international competition (p.791). This 
required access to transmission facilities, appropriate sources of 
income from advertising, and a guarantee of national distribution and 
reception (p.791). Although the public service stations had been 
awarded a guarantee of existence and further development, the terms in
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which the guarantee was couched placed ARD and ZDF in a less 
advantageous position than their commercial competitors.
In the case of TV-Sat, it was decided to award three transponders 
to new programme providers (p.793). ZDF and ARD were only awarded a 
shared transponder for one television channel on the reserve satellite, 
TV-Sat 2, which was to be launched some time after TV-Sat 1 (p.793). 
However, it was stated that ARD and ZDF might be allowed to cooperate 
with private programme providers, although there was no explanation 
about the form this cooperation should take (p.793). The fourth 
transponder on the first satellite was to be used for the transmission 
of 16 digital radio channels. These were to be divided between each 
Land and DLF, with the remainder awarded to the Lander according to 
size of population (p.793). In addition to TV-Sat, it was decided to 
award six transponders on the Intelsat communications satellite, to 
ARD, Bavaria, Berlin (for the transport of ARD third television 
channels), Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, and jointly to North 
Rhine-Vestphalia and Hamburg (p.792). The award of an Intelsat 
channel to ARD was obviously a recognition of its parity with ZDF, 
which had been awarded an ECS 1 transponder in February for the 
purpose of a new culturally-orientated channel, 3SAT. However, there 
was nothing concrete in the resolution about the type of satellite 
channels public broadcasters might be allowed to provide. There was 
some hope that ZDF might be given a transponder on the first TV-Sat 
satellite in place of digital radio, as the prime ministers asked the 
broadcasting commission to consider this as a possibility (p.793).
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The Bremerhaven Resolution's stipulations on broadcasting finance 
constituted the strongest restrictions on public broadcasting. It was 
stated that the licence fee would continue to be the main source of 
public service broadcasting's income (p.791). It was agreed that the 
public stations' financial requirements would be examined on a regular 
basis and amended, if necessary, to take account of general inflation 
and extra costs incurred by new obligations (p.791). The procedure 
for fixing the licence fee was to occur with "ein moglichst hoher Grad 
der Objektivierbarkeit" (p.791). As the system for fixing the licence 
fee was (and still is) highly politicised, involving the Lander prime 
ministers and the ratification of an agreement by each Landtag, the 
insistence on objectivity may have been optimistic.
The squeeze on public service broadcasting's funding was further 
reinforced by restrictions on advertising. The Resolution stated that 
as public broadcasting was likely to have a competitive advantage over 
private broadcasting for some time, private broadcasting's economic 
opportunities had to be formulated in such a way as to ensure its 
success (p.791). With this competitive advantage in mind, it was 
decided that advertising on public channels be frozen at existing 
levels in respect of amount, structures, and transmission areas 
(p.792). The existing rules on television advertising for ZDF and the 
ARD network included a 20 minute daily limit broadcast between 18.00 
and 20.00. Existing rules on radio were left to the supervisory 
bodies of each individual station, although advertising on Sundays and 
public holidays was forbidden in both radio and television. A note 
attached to the Resolution extended the freeze to the third television
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channels (p.793). This affected HR, whose broadcasting council had 
agreed to introduce advertising to HR's third channel from January 
1985 (see Lehr, 1984, p.ll). The Resolution allowed VDR, the only 
public station with no advertising on its radio services, to introduce 
the same amount of radio advertising as SDR, the station with the 
least amount of daily radio advertising, totalling 48 minutes (p.792).
The blanket freeze on advertising on radio and the third channels, 
effectively robbed the public stations' supervisory councils of their 
right to determine levels of advertising. Furthermore, it was not 
clear how public broadcasting should finance new channels, especially 
if a licence fee increase was not in the offing. For in addition to 
satellite channels, public broadcasters were also hoping to use 
recently available Fit frequencies for radio. The Resolution's only 
concession on advertising was the possibility of allowing public 
broadcasting stations, like private broadcasters, to transmit 
advertising on Sundays and public holidays provided that this did not 
lead to an increase in advertising revenue (p.792).
In contrast to the restrictions placed on advertising in public 
channels, nationally distributed private channels were allowed to 
contain advertising amounting to 20% of daily output, with the 
possibility of commercial breaks within programmes if these exceeded 
60 minutes (p.792). As advertising on Sundays and public holidays 
was not mentioned in the Resolution it has to be assumed that this 
too, was allowed. The same can be said of sponsored advertising.
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These rules reflected similar regulations contained in legislation by 
the CDU/CSU Lander on private broadcasting.
The programme regulations for nationally distributed private 
channels were kept to a minimum. They included a general clause 
concerned with taste and decency, and the prevention of violent or 
pornographic programmes (p.792). Private channels had to respect laws 
on the protection of young people, and undertake not to incite racism 
or war, or endanger the security of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(p.792). Provided these conditions, and the rules on advertising, were 
kept, private channels would be given equal status with public service 
broadcasting for distribution into cable networks (p.792). Further 
reference to programme content placed the onus on the individual 
programme provider. It was expected only that nationally distributed 
private channels should contain appropriate amounts of information, 
education, and German language productions (p.791). Any reference to 
the need for each channel to exhibit diversity of opinion was omitted.
Reaction from the public broadcasters to the Bremerhaven Resolution 
was predictably hostile. The major points of controversy concerned 
the imprecision of the guarantee of existence and further development 
for ARD and ZDF, the limitations placed on advertising, and the award 
of capacity on TV-Sat. Friedrich-Vilhelm von Sell, former Intendant 
of VDR, called the Resolution an "eklatante Benachteiligung des 
offentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks" and an "unverhiillte Bevorzugung 
privater Rundfunkveranstalter” (cit. in Mu£ Funk dem Fernsahen 
weichen, FR 25.10.1984). Klaus Berg, chairman of the ARD/ZDF legal
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commission, rejected the notion of a competitive advantage over 
private broadcasters and claimed: "Die Ungleichgewichtigkeit oeider 
Systeme is nur scheinbar, ohnehin nicht vergleichbar und vor allem 
allenfalls kurzfristig" (1985, p.10). Wolfgang Lehr, former Intendant 
of HR, believed the freeze on advertising would make the public 
service stations more dependent on the licence fee, and consequently 
more dependent on the Lander which grant it (Lehr, 1984, p.ll). He 
pointed out that the freeze would affect the small and medium-sized 
ARD stations most, as they were more dependent on advertising revenue 
(Lehr, 1984, p.ll).
In an official ARD reaction, Friedrich Wilhelm Rauker, former 
Intendant of NDR and chairman of ARD, wrote to the Lander prime 
ministers under] ining ARD disappointment at being awarded only a 
shared transponder with ZDF on TV-Sat 2, and requesting that ARD be 
allowed its own transponder on TV-Sat 1 (Schreiben des ARD-
Vorsitzenden Friedrich Vilhelm Rauker vom 6.11,1984 an die 
Ministerprasidenten der Lander betr. Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesenst MP 
11/1984 pp.888-890, here p.889). He rejected the idea that public 
broadcasting had an advantage over private broadcasting, because 
public broadcasting had a greater range of programme obligations to 
fulfil and finance than private broadcasting (p.889). According to 
Rauker the limits placed on advertising were "besonders 
einschneidend", and failed to recognise the different financial 
strengths of individual stations, whose licence fee income varied 
considerably according to their size (p.889). The same points were 
stressed even more vehemently by the chairmen of the ARD supervisory
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committees (Erklarung der Gremienvorsitzenden der ARD in Berlin am 
27,11.1934 zu einem Staatsvertrag iiber die Neuordnung des 
Rundfunkwesens, MP 11/1984, p.890). They declared that the guarantee 
of existence and further development for public broadcasting was 
imprecise and insufficiently secured, whereas private broadcasting had 
been "in erheblichem MaBe bevorzugt" (p.890).
Dieter Stolte, Intendant of ZDF, appears to have been more 
optimistic about the Bremerhaven Resolution (see Erhalt und Zukunft 
der ARD sichern, FR 12.11.1984, p.20). He pointed to public 
broadcasting's access to the new media, in particular to satellite 
broadcasting (p.20). Furthermore, the licence fee would continue to be 
the main source of public service funding, regardless of which 
channels were watched (p.20).
In a letter to the Rhineland-Palatinate Prime Minister Bernhard 
Vogel (CDU), the chairman of the Lander broadcasting commission, the 
churches protested about the removal of a ban on advertising on 
Sundays and public holidays in the Bremerhaven Resolution (Schreiben 
der Kirchen vom 12. November 1984 an Ninisterprasiden t Bernhard Vogel 
zu einem Staatsvertrag der Lander zur Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesens 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, MP 11/1984, p.897-898). Prime 
Minister Vogel, in a reply, rejected the churches call for a ban on 
advertising an Sundays and public holidays ("1Verbeverbot an Sonntagen 
nicht aufrechtzuhalten". Kinisterprasident Bernhard Vogels Antwort auf 
das Nedien-Moritorium der beiden Kirchen, MP 1/1985, p.59). He argued 
that such an action was pointless, because foreign channels did not
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observe this rule, and would absorb advertising income meant for Vest 
German channels if the ban continued.
Franz Arnold, a former advisor to the the Federal Post Office, saw 
the Bremerhaven Resolution in a more positive light (1984, p.ll). As 
with most compromises, nearly everyone was dissatisfied with certain 
points (1984, p.ll). Arnold argued that a DBS transponder each for 
ARD and ZDF, which constituted a doubling of programme output, might 
affect programme quality if the licence fee remained the same. He 
pointed out that programme quality was the main justification for 
public service broadcasting. If two instead of three TV-Sat channels 
had been awarded to private television, allowing ARD and ZDF a DBS 
channel each, there was a risk that the two private channels would be 
parcelled out according to party-political lines, which would ignore 
population concentrations in the north. Arnold supported the award of 
three TV-Sat channels to private television, according to Lander 
groupings in the south, north, and west. He believed that the 
Bremerhaven Resolution was a satisfactory compromise balancing 
political demands with the necessity of keeping foreign private 
channels out, via the absorption of domestic advertising revenue by 
domestic private channels.
3.6.5 An illusory consensus? Negotiations collapse
On the basis of the Bremerhaven Resolution, the broadcasting 
commission was asked to draw up a draft inter-Land agreement to be 
presented at the prime ministers' next meeting on 19th December 1984
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(.Vorlaufiges Ergebnisprotokoll der Ministerprasidentankonferenz vom 17 
bis 19. Oktober in Bremerhaven, MP 10/1984, p.793). At this point, the 
SPD began to show disquiet about the Bremerhaven Resolution, which 
was generally seen as a success for the CDU/CSU Lander. Many of the 
demands included in the SPD policy documents of February 1984 and 
September 1984 were not included in the Bremerhaven Resolution (see 
Medienpolitisches Aktionsprogramm 1984 der SFD Medienkommission, MP 
2/1984, pp.149-151; Sozialdemokratische Positionen zur Medienpolitik, 
MP 10a/1984, pp.839-40). In these documents the SPD had insisted on 
two TV-Sat channels for the public stations and no advertising freeze 
on public channels. In the case of private broadcasting they had 
demanded internal plurality, domestic production quotas, the prevention 
of multi-media monopolies, a ban on sponsored advertising, and a limit 
of 15% of daily transmission time for advertising with no commercial 
breaks within programmes.
Strong disatisfaction about the concessions made at Bremerhaven 
was beginning to emerge amongst the rank-and-file SPD membership. 
Johannes Rau (SPD), Prime Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, doubted 
whether the Bremerhaven Resolution would be approved by the SPD- 
dominated Land parliaments (see Der Medienfrieden wahrte nur kurzt FR, 
9.11.1984, p.16). Mayor Dohnanyi (SPD) of Hamburg, an architect of the 
Resolution, recognised that many SPD members were dissatified, but he 
warned against rejection because this might threaten the future of ARD 
and ZDF (cit. in Erhalt und Zukunft der ARD sichern, FR 12.11.1984, 
p.20). However, Dohnanyi had the support of the Hamburg parliament. 
In Hesse, the SPD was dependent on its coalition partner, the Green
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Party, which was hostile to private broadcasting (see Scharfe Kritik 
an Rundfunkbeschlu8t FR 24.10.1984, p.14). The Mayor oi Bremen, Hans 
Koschnick (SPD), while acknowledging disappointment amongst some 
sections of the SPD, supported the Resolution for it was in his view a 
means of avoiding the collapse of ARD, and of securing the survival of 
small stations like Radio Bremen. Ke added: "Ich habe eine anaere 
Position als die SPD-Ministerprasidenten Rau und Borner, denn der WBR 
und der Hessische Rundfunk konnen auch ohne Werbung und 
Finanzausgleich existieren, Radio Bremen nicht" (cit. in Erhalt und 
Zukunft der ARD sichern, FR 12.11,1984, p.20).
Albrecht Muller (SPD), a former media policy advisor to Chancellor 
Brandt and Chancellor Schmidt, called the Bremerhaven Resolution "eine 
mittlere Katastrophe" for the SPD (1984, p.12). In particular, he 
criticised the pragmatic attitude adopted by the Mayor of Hamburg, 
Klaus von Dohnanyi. He accused Dohnanyi of turning Hamburg into a 
media showcase, by introducing legislation aimed at attracting private 
channels to Hamburg, in order to safeguard the city's many media- 
related jobs (p.12). Muller disagreed with Dohnanyi's argument that 
the new media could not be prevented, and that if nothing was done, 
Vest Germany would relinquish the chance to determine its own media 
policy (p. 12). Muller argued that the taxpayer and the state made the 
introduction of private broadcasting possible in the first place, by 
subsidising cable installed by the Federal Post Office (p.12). He 
added that the CDU/CSU needed national distribution of private 
channels by satellite, and restrictions on public service broadcasting,
weil sie wissen, daS privates Fernsehen ohne Mithilfe des Staates,
der den Satelliten und die Kabei subvent ioniert, und ohne die
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Mithiife der SPD-Lander (vor allera in Nordrhein-Westfalen) beim 
Einspeisen in die Kabeianiagen kein Geschaft werden wvirde. (1984,
p.12)
According to Muller, this fact had been ignored by the SPD. He stated 
that the CDU would no longer take the SPD seriously, because of media 
policy statements which failed to achieve their expressed aims (1984a, 
p.10). Citing past concessions on the cable pilot projects, and the
use of satellite channels, he concluded that the SPD had never gained 
by giving in to CDU/CSU demands.
The SPD's internal divisions, and increasing demands for changes to
the Bremerhaven Resolution brought criticism from their political
opponents. Uwe Barschel (CDU), Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein,
said that if the Bremerhaven Resolution was not ratified by the SPD
parliaments, the CDU/CSU Lander could, theoretically, seek their own
solution on TV-Sat by reaching an agreement with the Bundespost (see
"nm Interview", Neue Medien Newsletter, 10.11.1984). However, in the
Constitutional Court decision of 28th February 1961, the following
principle had been stated:
Wo immer der Bund sich in einer Frage des Verfassungslebens, an 
der alle Lander interessiert und beteiligt sind, urn die 
verfassungsrechtlich relevante Vereinbarung bemuht, verbietet ihm 
jene Pflicht zu bundesfreundlichem Verhalten, nach dem Grundsatz 
divide et impera zu handeln, d. h. auf die Spaltung der Lander 
auszugehen, nur mit einigen eine Vereinbarung zu suchen und die 
anderen vor den Zwang des Beitritts zu stellen. (cit. in Lebr & 
Berg, 1971, p.251)
Furthermore, the Court had indicated that central government must not 
favour those Lander with governments of a similar political complexion 
(p.251>. Barschel argued that the Court ruling did not apply to TV- 
Sat, because it had been made at a time when DBS was not available.
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He also argued that a separate agreement on TV-Sat by the CDU/CSU 
Lander was permissible if the utmost had been done to secure an 
agreement between all the Lander ("nm Intervierf\ Neue Medien 
Newsletter, 10.11.1984).
A policy document submitted by the SPD national party leadership 
on 20th November 1984 was obviously an attempt to be more 
conciliatory in an increasingly polarized situation (.Medienpolitische 
EntschlieBung des SFD-Parteivorstandes, MP 11/1984, p.891>. This
resolution represented a further departure from earlier policy 
documents. Where previously the SPD had demanded a 15% daily limit 
on advertising in private channels, and a ban on commercial breaks 
and sponsorship, it now requested only a reduction of advertising "auf 
das notwendige MaBH, and any reference to commercial breaks and 
sponsorship was dropped (p.891). There was no longer a demand for 
domestic production quotas, only a call for "die Sicherung und 
Forderung einheimischer kultureller Produktionen" in private 
broadcasting (p.891). However, the resolution did call for the 
possibility of cancelling any inter-Land agreement by 1988, in order 
to reconsider amongst other things, production quotas (p.891). 
Referring to the freeze on advertising on ARD and ZDF channels, the 
SPD stated that the public stations must be allowed to finance 
satellite radio by advertising, because the Bremerhaven Resolution’s 
advertising freeze in respect of transmission areas, would have 
prevented the ARD stations from transferring their radio services, 
which are partially funded by advertising, to satellite (p.891).
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Prior to the submission of a draft inter-Land agreement, it oecarae 
clear that the limitations placed by the Bremerhaven Resolution on WDR 
radio advertising were becoming a controversial issue. The Resolution 
had stipulated that VDR be allowed to introduce 42 minutes of radio 
advertising a day, an amount equal to NDR, which broadcast the 
smallest amount of radio advertising of all the ARD stations. The SPD 
national leadership, in an attempt to ease negotiations, had agreed not 
to insist on lifting these restrictions (SPD verzichtei auf 
Nachbesserung, FR 26.11.1984, p.11). However, a few days prior to this 
decision, Frank Dahrendorf, the SPB's media spokesperson, declared that 
the party wanted to allow advertising on VDR radio equivalent to the 
average of all the ARD stations, or 120 minutes a day (FR 26.11.1984,
p.11).
On 19th December 1984, the Lander broadcasting commission 
presented a draft inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation of 
broadcasting at the prime ministers' meeting in Bonn iBntwurf 
Staatsvertrag zur Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesens Stand 14.12.1984, MPD 
11/1985, pp.45-48). The draft resembled the Bremerhaven Resolution 
with some changes.
As with the Bremerhaven Resolution, it was agreed to award the 
first three transponders on TV-Sat to new (i.e. private) channels. For 
this purpose individual Land shares were calculated in the following 
percentages: Baden-Viirttemberg 35%, Bavaria 40%, Berlin 20%, Bremen
10%, Hamburg 15%, Hesse 30%, Lower Saxony 35%, Uorth Rhine-Westphaiia 
60%, the Rhineland-Palatinate 25%, the Saar 10%, and Schieswig-
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Holstein 20% (p.45). This division of capacity constituxea a
disadvantage for North Shine-Westphalia, which was given less than 
its population merited (see SPD-Landern gelang Nachbesserung des 
Staatsvertrags nicht% FR 17.12.1984, p.l). The term "new programme 
providers" (also used in the Bremerhaven Resolution), instead of 
private channels, was included on the insistence of North Rhine- 
Westphalia, who wanted to leave open the option of possible 
cooperation between WDR and the the Vestdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 
(WAZ), the largest newspaper concern in North Rhine-Westphaiia (see 
GroB, 1986, p.70). The Bremerhaven Resolution was modified to allow 
ARD and ZDF a shared transponder on the first satellite, TV-Sat 1, so 
giving them the chance to use DBS from the start, bun the disadvantage 
of a shared transponder still remained (p.45). However, if any ARD 
stations' involvement with private satellite channels, exceeded that of 
ZDF by 10%, then ARD's share in the transponder fell to 40% (p.45). 
This would appear to relate to any WDR cooperation with WAZ. Digital 
radio was moved to the fifth transponder on the second satellite, TV- 
Sat 2 (p.45).
ARD and ZDF's right of access to satellite technology was given 
more precision by imposing on them the obligation to establish one 
new satellite channel each, although it was not specified what type of 
satellite they could use (p.46). ARD's channel had to reflect the 
cultural diversity of Europe (p.46). ZDF's channel had to portray the 
cultural diversity of the German-speaking countries, possibly in 
cooperation with foreign stations (p.46). This amounted to acceptance 
of ARD and ZDF's planned cultural channels, Eins Plus and 3SAT
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respectively. However, this acceptance was to be disputed by the 
CDU/CSU Lander in later negotiations.
The guarantee of funding for public broadcasting was amended to 
include continued commitment to the equalisation agreement, which 
regulates subsidies from the larger ARD stations to SFB, SR, and RB 
(p.46). The freeze on advertising was reinforced by backdating it to 
19th October 1984 (p.46). This meant that HR would be prevented from 
introducing advertising to its third television channel. It also meant 
that advertising was banned from any future public service channels. 
In the case of new Fit radio channels and digital radio on TV-Sat, 
undertaken by individual ARD stations, this limitation was 
particularly galling, because these would also be denied licence fee 
support, which could only be altered for the purpose of "neue 
geraeinsam iibertragene Aufgaben" like satellite television (see p.46). 
The ban on advertising for Fit radio might then have forced the SPD 
Lander to award FM frequencies, available from 1985, to private 
interests (see SPD-Landern gelang Nachbesserung des Staatsvertrages 
nicht, FR 17.12.1984, p.l).
Rationally distributed private satellite channels were to be 
licensed and supervised according to individual Land legislation 
(p.46). This ignored the fact that DBS, unlike telecommunications 
satellites, which can be regulated at the point of entry into cable 
systems, are nationally available by means of individual reception 
antennae. By refusing to include any rules on diversity of opinion 
and content, the rights of those L&nder which had not passed
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legislation allowing private broadcasting would have been overruled. 
The conditions for national distribution of private channels only 
included adherence to advertising stipulations, and general rules on 
taste and decency including a ban on pornographic, violent, or racist 
content (p.47). The advertising rules were extended to include a
clause on sponsored programmes. These could only be broadcast if the 
name of the sponsor was mentioned at the beginning and the end of the 
transmission, and if there was no direct link between programme 
content and the sponsor's business interests (p.47). As was the case 
with the Bremerhaven Resolution, it was only expected that nationally 
distributed private channels would contain appropriate amounts of 
information, education, and domestic productions (p.47).
negotiations collapsed on 19th December 1984 following
disagreements about the amount of advertising to be allowed on WDR 
radio, although other problems, including advertising on public
channels generally, the award of TV-Sat transponders, the lack of 
regulations for private channels, and the imprecision of those
stipulations concerning the licence fee, undoubtedly played a role too. 
The SPD Lander had demanded that VDR be allowed to transmit 80-110 
minutes of radio advertising a day (see Keine Einigung tiber Rundfunk- 
Vertrag, FR 20.12.1984, pp.1-2). This was unacceptable to the CDU/CSU 
Lander. Prime Minister Johannes Rau of North Rhine Westphalia, 
justified this demand by pointing out that WDR contributed DM82 
million a year to the DM148 million equalisation fund, used to 
subsidise RB, SR, and SFB (p.2>. He added that he could not override 
the North Rhine-Vestphalian parliament, which was at this time
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considering a new VDR law, with a decision made by the other prime 
ministers (p.2>.
Following failure to reach an agreement on the 19th December, the 
SPD prime ministers issued a declaration in an attempt to keep 
negotiations going (Erklarung der sozialdemokratischen Minister- 
prasidenten in DUsseldorf am 5. Januar 1985 zur Neuordnung des Rund- 
funkwesens in der Bundesrepublik, 5tP 1/1985, pp.57-58). Here, it was 
pointed out that attempts to freeze advertising in terms of 
transmission areas would prevent the ARD stations from transferring 
their terrestrial radio services, which contained advertising, to TV- 
Sat (p.57). Instead it was proposed, that advertising be allowed on 
ARD's DBS radio services, provided there was no increase in 
advertising income (p.57). The restriction of 42 minutes of 
advertising a day on VDR's radio services was rejected (p.57). It was 
pointed out that BR, which contributed far less to the equalisation 
fund, was allowed to broadcast 160 minutes of radio advertising a day 
(p.57). It was recommended that VDR be allowed to broadcast 
advertising equal to the average amount of advertising transmitted by 
all the ARD stations (p.57). In the case of advertising on HR's third 
television channel, the SPD prime ministers stated that this could 
only be changed by HR's supervisory councils (p.57). In recognition 
of the fact that an agreement on quotas for German and European 
production was unlikely, the SPD prime ministers proposed that the 
broadcasting commission should report on the levels of German and 
European content on both private and public channels after three
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years, and at three year intervals thereafter (p.58). Measures could 
then be undertaken if the situation proved to be unsatisfactory (p.58).
Unlike the SPD Lander, the CDU/CSU Lander■ proved to be far less 
conciliatory, They were annoyed with the SPD's constant changes of 
mind, which had included toleration of private broadcasting and the 
Bremerhaven Resolution on the one hand, and then attempts to alter the 
Resolution. Lothar Spath (CDU), Prime Minister of Baden-Wurttemberg, 
blamed the SPD's "Uachbesserungsvorschlagen" for the breakdown in 
negotiations (.Keine Binigung iiber Rundfunk-Vertrag} FR 20.12.1984., 
p.2). At a meeting of the CDU/CSU prime ministers in Bonn in January 
1985, Uwe Barschel (Schleswig-Holstein) and Ernst Albrecht (Lower 
Saxony) refused to give further concessions to the SPD (see "Saubere 
Trennung" auf dew TV-SAT I?, FR 10.1.1985, p.14). Lothar Spath 
appeared to be more placatory, offering the prospect of a TV-Sat 
channel each for ZDF and ARD, and the possibility of advertising on 
public satellite radio, provided that this remained "kostenneutral" 
(see "Saubere Trennung" auf dem TV-Sat l?t FR, 10.1.1985, p.14). He 
stated that cooperation between private and public broadcasters might 
be possible at a regional level, but insisted that national 
broadcasting needed clear separation between the private and public 
sectors (p.14). However, where there had previously been talk of 
negotiation, Spath now spoke of "sondieren" or sounding out (p.14).
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3.6.6 Further negotiations founder
Following the collapse of negotiations on 19th December 1984 there 
was a period of inactivity until March 1985, when Bernhard Vogel 
(CDU) of the Rhineiand-Palatinate and Klaus Dohnanyi (SPD) of Hamburg 
met for further discussions (Ein KompromiB deutet sich an, FR 
7.3.1985, p.18). Advertising on VDR radio remained a major problem,
but the CDU/CSU were prepared to compromise. The SPD demanded 85 
minutes of advertising a day, while the CDU/CSU admitted that they 
would not insist on a 42 minute limit (p. 18). This was not enough to 
bring about any significant movement in the deadlock.
Jurgen Biissow (SPD), the North Rhine-Vestphalian government media 
spokesman, admitted that North Rhine-Westphalia was considering 
dropping out of attempts to conclude an inter-Laud agreement (see 
Neues in Sachen Kedienstaatsvertrag, FR 25.6.1985, p.13). He suggested 
awarding 4 TV-Sat channels to ARD, ZDF and 2 private channels, each 
to be decided by the SPD and CDU/CSU Lander (p.13). Instead of a full 
inter-Land agreement, he proposed that advertising and rules for the 
protection of children and young people be fixed by an administrative 
agreement between the Lander, or by a slimmed-down version of an 
inter- Land agreement (p.13). This idea was rejected by Edmund 
Stoiber, state secretary at the Bavarian chancellory, who called the 
proposal a sign of the "medienpolitische Hilflosigkeit und Zerissenheit 
der SPD" (p. 13).
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In July 1985 Prime Minister Vogel (CDU), Mayor Dohnanyi (SPD;, ana. 
the Minister of Posts, Christian Schwarz-Schilling held aiscussions in 
Bonn to get negotiations moving (see Neue Gesprache uber 
Rundfunkstaatsvertrag, FR 9.7.1985, p.7). Schwarz-Schilling was
anxious to know which programme providers would be interested in a 
TV-Sat transponder so that he could contact them, in order to sort out 
technical and financial details (p.7>. It was agreed to adopt a 
procedure whereby the Federal Post Office would start negotiations
with ARD, ZDF, the private channels, SAT 1 and RTL Plus, and the WAZ
newspaper concern on TV-Sat (p.7). If the other prime ministers
agreed to this proposal, Schwarz-Schilling, secure in the knowledge 
that he had customers for TV-Sat, would then award a contract for the 
second DBS satellite by the beginning of August, with Lander 
negotiations for an inter-Land agreement resuming in September (p.7). 
This plan failed because Hesse and Lower Saxony wanted more than five 
candidates to be considered (see TV-SAT: Vogel nennt der Post noch
keine Namen> FR 5.8.1985, p.12). It was therefore decided to delay 
informing Schwarz-Schilling of those interested in TV-Sat until 
October 1985, giving time for other applicants to make their interest 
known (p. 12).
The prime ministers met in Saarbriicken on 23rd and 24th October 
1985, but prospects for the conclusion of an inter-Land agreement were 
slim. Prior to the meeting, the prime ministers were criticised for 
their failure to reach an agreement which gave private broadcasting 
the security it needed both by the BDZV, whose members are heavily 
involved in private broadcasting, and by SAT 1, the private satellite
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channel, which had been distributed on ECS 1 since January 1985 (see 
SAT 1, 1985, pp.764-769; BDZV, 1985, pp.769-772>. The BDZV and SAT 1 
called for restrictions on advertising in public service broadcasting, 
and a halt to further expansion by ARD and ZDF.
At Saarbriicken, Prime Minister Vogel and Mayor Dohnanyi put 
forward proposals which would make transmission times for advertising 
on ARD and ZDF more flexible, provided that advertising income was 
fixed as a percentage of total income (see Bald Binigung im Lander- 
Jfedlenstreit, FR 18.10.1985, p.12). If advertising revenue fell, the 
volume of advertising could be increased. In addition to allowing 
public channels to advertise on Sundays and public holidays, they also 
considered the possibility of shifting ARD and ZDF's advertising 
threshold from 20.00 to 20.30, provided no advertising was introduced 
to the third television channels or satellite channels (p.12). 
However, such a solution failed to take into account the limits to 
extending advertising time, especially if advertising prices fell 
considerably due to competition from private broadcasting (see GroB, 
1986, p.75). Negotiations between the prime ministers finally broke 
down in Saarbriicken, because of Hesse's refusal to pressurise HR into 
removing advertising from its third television channel, although other 
unresolved issues were also a factor (see GroB, 1986, p.77).
3.6.7 Advertising on HR3.
The issue of advertising on HR's third television channel had been 
threatening to erupt ever since the HR broadcasting council approved
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the introduction of two five minute advertising blocks between 7pm
and 8pm in June 1984, to take effect in January 1985 (see GroB, 1986,
p.70). This contradicted both the Bremerhaven Resolution and the
draft inter-land agreement, which each aimed to freeze advertising.
The Hessian government refused to take any action against HR, arguing
that the decision to introduce advertising was an autonomous decision
by the broadcasting council, which could not be overturned by the
state (see Neue Annaherungsmdglichkeiten bei Rundfunk-Staatsvertrag,
MEL, 12.1.1985, p.l). According to Bernd-Peter Arnold, head of radio
regionalisation at HR:
Der Hessische Rundfunk hat es (the introduction of advertising to 
its third channel) gemacht, weil er der Meinung ist, er ist 
rechtens Verbung im Dritten Programm zu machen, und wenn es nicht 
ausdriicklich heiBt im Dritten darf keine Werbung stattfinden, dann 
heiBt es sie darf stattfinden. Sie muB ja nicht eigens erlaubt 
werden.
The CDU/CSU thought differently (see also Ricker, 1985). In a 
letter to the permanent secretary of the Hessian state chancellory, 
Reinhart Bartholomai (SPD), Hanns-Eberhard Schleyer, the permanent 
secretary of the Rhineland-Palatinate state chancellory, drew attention 
to the ZDF inter-land agreement, which contained advertising 
stipulations applicable to ARD, ZDF, and, in his opinion, the third 
television channels (Schreiben von Staatsekretar Hanns-Eberhard 
Schleyer vom 6. August 1984t XP 9/1984, pp.715-716). He backed up
his argument by referring to the existence of a Lander declaration, 
dated 30th April 1965, where it had been agreed that there should be 
no advertising on the third television channels (p.715). The Hessian 
prime minister had signed this agreement on 3rd August 1965 (p.715).
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At the same time the broadcasting stations nad given assurances not 
to introduce advertising to the third channels (p.715). Schleyer was 
convinced that the limits placed on television advertising applied to 
the whole of ARD’s output, and not just to the ARD network (p.715). 
This was supported by the fact that advertising was not transmitted 
during ARD network programmes, but during the preceding regional opt- 
outs (p.716).
In a reply, Reinhart Bartholomai countered these arguments by 
stating that the ZDF-Staatsvertrag only applied to the ARD network of 
which the regional opt-outs were an integral part (Antwortschreiben 
von Staatssekretar Reinhart Bartholomai vom 28. August 1984, M? 
9/1984, pp.716-719). He argued that the third television channels 
were not covered by the advertising rules contained in the ZDF- 
Staatsvertragt because the third channels did not exist when the ZDF- 
Staatsvertrag was concluded. Furthermore, in his view, the Hessian 
prime minister’s agreement in 1965 not to introduce advertising on 
HR's third channel was only a promise aimed at getting assurances 
from HR that there would be no advertising on this channel (p.718).
In financial terms, the advertising revenue earned by HR from 
advertising on its third channel did not represent a threat to the 
press or new private channels, but it had a symbolic value for the 
CDU/CSU in their fight to get the best opportunities for private 
broadcasting. The Rhineiand-Palatinate government decided to take 
Hesse to the Federal Administrative Court in Berlin to force it to 
stop HR from transmitting advertising on HR3 (see Mainz klagt gegen
iVerbung im dritten Fernsehprogramm Hessens, SDZ 9.1.1986, p.6). The 
national CDU media spokesman, Dieter Weirich, recommended the 
cancellation of inter- Land agreements on the licence fee by the end oi 
1987 if HR did not comply (see iVachsender Druck auf Hessischen 
Fund funk, SDZ 20.1.1986, p. 16). In a speech to the Bavarian senate the 
permanent secretatary of the Bavarian chancellory, Edmund Stoiber 
repeated the threat, and added that a cancellation of the inter -Land 
equalisation agreement, which regulates financial subsidies from large 
to small ARD stations, might be considered as a further option 
(Frivater Appetit auf den Gebiihrentopf, SDZ 31.1.1986, p.21).
In a speech to the Hessian Landtag, which occasioned the 
introduction of a bill allowing the reception of satellite channels in 
Hesse, Prime Minister Borner (SPD) rejected the blame levelled at Hesse 
and HR for the collapse of negotiations for an inter-Land agreement 
(Borner, 1986, pp.113-120). The bill did not allow the establishment 
of private channels in Hesse, only their reception from other Lander. 
Although Hesse was opposed to private broadcasting, it did not feel 
that it could constitutionally block the reception of private channels 
(p.114). Besides, individuals could receive these channels by 
installing their own dish antennae.
Borner, however, was concerned with the national distribution of 
satellite channels, which he argued must be subject to an inter-Land 
agreement and detailed regulation, because they affected all Lander 
(p.117). In his opinion, any solo efforts by the CDU/CSU Lander were 
unconstitutional. He underlined the autonomy of HR and the right of
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the Hessian government to determine its own legislation for regional 
broadcasting in Hesse (p.117). In his view the issue of HRS 
advertising constituted pressure, by Bavaria in particular, to force a 
broadcasting policy on other Lander. In this sense, advertising on HR 
3 was just a pretext to force the pace of negotiations, for Bavaria 
would have found some other reason if this one had not existed 
(p.118). In the event of a cancellation of inter-land agreements on 
the licence fee and equalisation, Borner could envisage a situation 
where those ARD stations in SPD Lander (VDR and HR), could adequately 
subsidise SR and RB (p.119). If the CDU/CSU Lander undertook a 
separate agreement on TV-Sat, he could also envisage cooperation 
between Hesse and North Rhine-Vestphalia for the establishment of an 
advertising-supported satellite channel, which would impede the 
chances of any private channels operating under an agreement forged 
by the CDU/CSU Lander (p.119). However, Borner ended his speech on
a conciliatory note. In spite of counter-threats against the CDU/CSU, 
he was not interested in separate agreements, believing unanimity 
amongst the Lander to be a necessity (p.119). He was prepared to 
consider the question of advertising on HR3, but only if attempts to 
pressurise Hesse ceased (p.119),
3.6.8 Elns Plus - a pretext to argue
Further controversy arose quite suddenly after the collapse of 
negotiations in Saarbriicken in October 1985 at the beginning of 1986. 
The argument concerned the lack of legislatory approval for ARD's 
planned cultural satellite channel, Eins Plus, which was due to start
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on 29th March 1986. This was another episode in a long string of 
controversies which had included advertising on VDR radio, ana 
advertising on HR3. Eins Plus may have been pushed to the fore, 
because the controversy surrounding advertising on HR3 was on noia, 
awaiting the outcome of court proceedings initiated by the Rhineland- 
Palatinate.
Attempts by the CDU/CSU Lander to prevent Eins Pius at such a late 
stage were surprising, given that ARD’s intentions had been known to 
the prime ministers since the end of 1983 ( see Eins Plus - Ein
deutschsprachiges Kulturprogramm fiir Europa> MP 2/1984, pp. 151-155). 
ARD's preference for its own satellite channel, rather than cooperation 
with private channels, had also been communicated to the prime 
ministers in January 1985 (Schreiben des ARD Vorsitzenden Friedrich
Vilhelm Rauker vom 11. Januar an die Ministerprasidenten der Lander 
zur kiinftigen Ordnung des Rundfunkwesens in der Bundesrepuhlik 
Deutschland, MP 1/1985, p.50). An administrative agreement, which 
provided the basis for the channel, was agreed by the ARD stations on 
3rd December 1985 and signed in February 1986 (Verwaltungs-
vereinbarung der ARD-Landesrundfunkanstalten fiir das Satelliten- 
programm "Eins Plus" vom 3.December 1985, ARD Jahrbuch, 1986, p.405). 
Furthermore, the prime ministers had already given their implicit 
approval to Eins Plus in earlier agreements, obviously designed to 
give it equal status with ZDF, which had been awarded an ECS 
transponder for its cultural channel, 3SAT, in February 1984 (see 
Gemeinsames Satellitennutzungskonzept der Lander - Vorlaufiges 
Ergebnisprotokoll der Besprechung der Lander, MP 2/84, p.152). 3SAT
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had been broadcast from ECS 1 since December 1984. ARD's right to 
participate in satellite broadcasting had also been guaranteed in the 
Bremerhaven Resolution (in MP 10/1984, pp.791-793) and the draft 
inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting of 
December 1984 (in MPD 11/1985, pp.45-48). At Bremerhaven it had also 
been decided to award ARD a transponder on the telecommunications 
satellite, Intelsat V (p.791). Additionally, the draft inter- Land 
agreement had even placed ZDF and ARD under the obligation of 
providing culturally orientated satellite channels (p.46).
The CDU/CSU's attacks, in which Bavaria and Baden-Viirttem berg 
played a leading role, were grounded on the assumption that Eins Plus 
could only exist on the basis of a ratified inter -Land agreement (see 
Vankell, 1986a, p.l). They based their argument on Constitutional 
Court pronouncements, which demanded that the Lander parliaments 
legislate "wesentliche Entscheidungen” (see Ott, 1986, p.27).
Edmund Stoiber (CSU), permanent secretary at the the Bavarian state 
chancellory, argued that the 1959 inter-Land agreement on the 
coordination of the ARD television network, proved that further ARD 
channels needed legislative approval (see Ott, 1986, p.27). This 
agreement had stated: "Die Rundfunkanstalten werden ermachtigt und 
verpflichtet, gemeinsam eln Fernsehprogramm zu veranstalten" 
(.Abkommen der Lander iiber die Koordinierung des ersten 
Fernsehprogramms vom 17.1.1959> ARD Jahrbuch, 1970, p.311). Stoiber 
put the emphasis on the word Hein" to underline his argument that only 
one channel had been permitted by the Lander in 1959 (see Ott, 1986,
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p.27). The CDU/CSU also argued that the Intelsat V transponder had 
only been awarded to ARD at Bremerhaven for technical purposes, and 
that nothing had been agreed on Eins Plus (see Vankell, 1986, p.l). In 
fact there had been no stipulations on the experimental use of the
satellite in the Bremerhaven Resolution. The CDU/CSU Lander were also
concerned that the cost of Eins Plus would necessitate an unacceptable 
rise in the licence fee (see Vankell, 1986, p.l). Edmund Stoiber argued 
that when the licence fee was last set, there had never been any 
mention of further national public broadcasting channels (see Ott, 
1986, p.27). Stoiber also rejected the idea of feeding Eins Plus into 
Bavarian cable networks, because the Bavarian new media law,
responsible for the regulation of cable and satellite, only allowed new 
public broadcasting channels if these did not usurp other programme 
providers (see Ott, 1986, p.27; see Art.27 Gesetz iiber die Erprnbung 
und Entwicklung neuer Rundfunkangebote und anderer Mediendienste in 
Bayernt MPD 1/1985, pp.1-10).
The reasons behind this sudden flurry to prevent Eins Plus were to 
be found in the failure to reach an agreement on an inter-Land
agreement an the reorganisation of broadcasting. The political 
climate had undoubtedly worsened since the breakdown of negotiations 
in Saarbriicken in October 1985. Private broadcasters were
experiencing financial difficulties and expressed fears about excessive 
competition from Eins Plus, although the channel was to contain no 
advertising, and its highbrow content was unlikely to offer an 
insurmountable challenge. Jurgen Doetz, managing director of SAT 1, 
claimed: "Das zieht uns nur potentielle Zuschauer a'b und bringt den
- 189 -
Gedanken des Privatfunks nicht weiter" (cit. in SDZ 7.2.1986). The 
CDU/CSU was obviously anxious to show its commitment to private 
broadcasting, having been criticised by private programme providers 
for not doing enough in their interests (see SAT 1, 1985, pp.764-769; 
BDZV, 1985, pp.769-772).
ARD put forward its case for Eins Plus, arguing that existing ARD 
agreements and existing broadcasting legislation provided sufficient 
justification for the channel (see Vankell, 1986, p.l). For instance, 
the Fernsehvertrag, an agreement amongst the ARD stations which 
provides the basis for ARD television network, had been concluded on 
the 27th March 1953 without an inter-Land agreement (see Vankell, 
1986, p.l). Eins Plus was being established along the same lines. 
Neither the third channels nor other cooperative ventures had required 
legislative approval in the past. The Lander had concluded an inter­
land agreement for the coordination of the ARD TV network six years 
after the Fernsehvertrag on 17th April 1959, but according to ARD, 
this merely obliges the ARD stations to cooperate in providing a 
networked television channel, and does not constitute legal approval 
of the Fernsehvertrag (see Morgenstern, 1986, p.10). According to 
Albert Scharf, BR's lawyer, "Velche Programme wir mit wem 
veranstalten, das ist AusfluS unserer Programmautonomie" (cit. in Ott, 
1986, p.27). The ARD broadcasters also drew attention to the last 
licence fee increase in 1983, which had included a sum of DM 0.45 in 
each licence fee for innovations like Eins Plus (see Vankell, 1986b, 
p.2). Moreover, ARD argued that Eins Plus was an experiment in the 
same vein as ZDF's 3SAT, which also lacked legislative approval from
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the Land parliaments (see Vankell, 1986b, p.3). Bearing this in mind, 
ARD could have argued that Sat 1, the nationally distributed private 
channel, lacked legislative approval too. Its licence came from the 
AKK in Ludwigshafen, on the basis of the experimental Rhineiana- 
Palatinate cable pilot project law, which was not originally intended 
for the supervision of national satellite channels.
On 3rd February 1986 Prime Minister Spath (CDU) of Baaen- 
Wiirttemberg tried to reach a compromise on this issue 
(Ninisterprasident Lothar Spath: ARD Rundfunkanstalten kdnnen iVeg fiir
Kedienstaatsvertrag der Lander frei machen, Pressemitteilung 3.2.1986t 
MP 2/1986, p.20-21). He proposed that if ARD made a binding
declaration to stop advertising on HR3 by 30th June, he would 
recommend to the prime ministers that Eins Plus should be allowed to 
transmit for three months on a trial basis (p.21>. This plan came to 
nothing. On 13th March 1986, the prime ministers met in Bonn to 
discuss the inter-Land agreement, but talks broke down because of 
Eins Plus (see Intendanten beraten emeut iiber MElns Flus"t FR
17.3.1986, p.20).
Following the break down in Lander negotiations, there were renewed 
threats about cancelling inter-Land agreements on the licence fee (see 
Vankell, 1986b, p.3). Baden-Vurttemberg, however, decided to initiate 
legal proceedings against SVF and SDR. SWF, the Baden-Vurttemberg 
station where Eins Plus is based, was sent a warning letter by the 
Baden-Wurttemberg government on 14th March demanding that it cease 
its involvement with the channel, because Eins Plus had no legislative
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approval (see Vankell, 1986b, p.l). The Baden-Wurttemberg government 
was excercising its rights of legal supervision over SWF, rights wnich 
are contained in clause 21 of the SWF broadcasting law iStaatsvertrag 
Uber den SUdwestfunk vom 27. August 1951t in Bing, 1981, C-IV 1.8.1). 
Rights of legal supervision by governments are contained in most 
broadcasting laws, but must only be used to ensure that the procedures 
of broadcasting law are adhered to; government powers do not include 
supervision of content (see Jank, 1967, p.104). SWF complained that 
the Land government's insistence on an immediate withdrawal from Eins 
Plus exceeded its powers of legal supervision (see Wankeil, 1986b, 
p.l).
In Bavaria the Land ministry of education and culture, responsible 
for the legal supervision of BB, took action on 26th March 1986, in 
order to prevent BR's participation in Eins Plus (see Janssen, 1986a, 
p.2). The ministry demanded that the BR broadcasting council lift its 
decision to allow BR participation in Eins Plus by 30th April 1986 
(see Janssen, 1986a, p.2). It also demanded that BR leave the ARD 
administrative agreement on Eins Plus (see Janssen, 1986a, p.2). At 
another level decisions were being taken to prevent Eins Plus being 
fed into Bavarian cable systems. In collusion with the state 
chancellory, the Bavarian supervisory authority for private 
broadcasting, the Landesmedienzentrale, announced that it was not 
possible to feed Eins Plus into Bavarian cable networks (see Ott, 
1986, p.27).
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The Land administrative court in Karlsruhe rejected Baden-
Wurttemberg ’s application for an injunction to prevenx SWF's
involvement in Eins Plus on 26th March 1986 (see Frenkel, 1986, p.3). 
The court stated that Baden-Vurttemberg was not allowed to object to 
the "Tatigkeit" of SWF by instituting administrative proceedings (see 
Ott, 1986a, p.3). Baden-Wurttemberg therefore appealed to the
Verwaltungsgericbtshof in Mannheim (BescbluB des Verwaltungs-
gericbtsbofs von Baden-Vurttemberg zum Verbot von "Bins Plus" vom 27. 
Harz 1986t ARD Jahrbuch, 1986, pp.404-411). The appeal was rejected 
on 27th March 1986 and the first court’s ruling was upheld. The court 
pointed to the experimental nature of Eins Plus, and referred to the 
similar status of ZDF's 3SAT, against which no action had been 
undertaken. It admitted that the legal right of public stations to 
establish new channels was unclear, but SVF had not overstepped its 
rights. The court stated that any decision on the legality of Eins
Plus required a ruling from the Constitutional Court.
The courts in Baden-Wurttemberg had restricted their judgements 
mainly to administrative aspects, but the Bavarian courts went further 
in their statements. BR had started proceedings at the Munich 
Administrative Court to get the ministry of education and culture’s 
measures rescinded (see Janssen, 1986a, p.2). It won this case on 
27th March 1986.
The Munich court stated that an inter-Land agreement was not 
necessary for BR’s involvement in Eins Plus, and it referred to the 
constitutionally guaranteed right of broadcasting stations to make
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autonomous programme policy decisions (see Janssen, 1986a, p.3;. The 
court rejected the view that the inter- Land agreement on the 
coordination of the ARD television network obliged the broadcasting 
stations to seek legislative approval for Eins Pius also, because this 
agreement only referred to obligations connected with the first 
television channel, without excluding additional channels (see Janssen, 
1986a, p.3).
The ministry appealed to the Munich Verwaltungsgerichtshof, which
rejected the appeal on 28th March 1986 and upheld the previous
decision (Entscheidung des Bayerischen Verwa 1 tungsgeri ch tsh ofs zum
Verbot von "Eins Plus" vom 28. Karz 1986, ARD Jahrbuch, 1986, pp.412-
413). The court felt that the argument about Eins Plus disrupting
the broadcasting scene was contradictory, because Bavarian legislation
on private broadcasting seeks to promote programme diversity, and
does not exclude public broadcasting from participation in new
technical possibilities. More importantly the court referred to past
Constitutional Court rulings and stated:
Vor allem aber wiegt eine Erschwernis der Marktchancen privater 
Anbieter fiir die Interessenabwagung weit geringer als eine mogliche 
Beschneidung des den offentlichen Rundfunkanstalten zustehenden 
Grundrechts der Rundfunkfreiheit. (p.413)
The economic survival of private broadcasting, one of the Bavarian
government's main arguments for a ban on Eins Plus, was therefore
seen by the Court as subordinate to the higher ideals of broadcasting
independence. The court pointed out that if BR was forced to opt out
of Eins Plus, it would lose an opportunity of gaining experience in
this field of broadcasting. Referring to the financial arguments used
- 194 -
against Eins Pius, the court pointed out that the licence fee contained 
a sum for innovations. Furthermore, the court posed the question of 
whether it would be better for the broadcasting stations, rather than 
the Lander, to determine the level of licence fee in the interest of 
broadcasting independence (p.413). The court had clearly approved 
BR's participation in Eins Plus, although it made no ruling on the
channel's distribution into Bavarian cable networks.
The four court decisions were a decisive defeat for CDU/CSU 
aspirations. Ott calls the decisions "Jfachhilfeunterricht in Sachen 
Demokratie und Staatslehre fiir Itedienpolitiker der Union und der SPD" 
(Ott, 1986a, p.3). The route to preventing Eins Plus via the
administrative courts had effectively been blocked, and any further 
action by the CDU/CSU Lander would have necessitated proceedings at 
the Constitutional Court. Although the decisions were a victory for 
ARD, the status of Eins Plus was still not clear. The extent to which 
governments might exclude ARD and ZDF from certain areas of
broadcasting in order to protect private stations would have to wait 
for a Constitutional Court case brought by SDR and SWF against the 
Baden-Wurttemberg media law.
Eins Plus began broadcasting, as scheduled, on 1st April 1986. 
Initially the authorities responsible for cable and private
broadcasting in Baden-Wurttemberg and Bavaria tried to delay the 
distribution of the channel into cable networks in these Lander, but 
this problem was eventually overcome. Perhaps the most significant 
thing to emerge from the Eins Plus controversy, however, was the ARD
- 195 -
stations' ability to stick together in the face of adversity. 
Considering their number, rivalries, and different types of party 
political dominance, this was no mean feat.
3.6.9 Going separate ways - north and south
CDU/CSU frustration at Lander negotiations breaking down in
Saarbriicken in 1985, and in Bonn again on 13th March 1986, resulted 
in two initiatives by the CDU/CSU Lander for awarding saxellite
transponders on TV-Sat to private channels. Threats to pursue
independent agreements had frequently been made in the past, in order 
to pressurise the SPD into signing an inter -Land agreement, but they 
now appeared to constitute a real threat to the unity of media policy­
making amongst the Lander.
The CDU/CSU Ldnder had been encouraged to pursue a separate course 
by central government's decision on 5th March 1986, to allow the
Federal Post Office to award transponders on TV-Sat according to a 
key agreed by the Lander in the draft inter -Land agreement of 14th 
December 1984 (see Bleibt die ARD vor der TiiY?, FR 13.3.1986, p.22). 
This provoked SPD threats of a constitutional complaint against any 
attempts to sign such separate agreements (see Medienstaatsvertrag 
der NNordschiene"> FR 24.3.1986, p.18). Paul-Leo Giani, at the state 
chancellory of SPD-led Hesse, argued that any separate agreements were 
unconst it itutional because DBS satellites, unlike telecommunications 
satellites which can be regulated at the point of entry into cable 
systems, can be directly received in the home, and would therefore
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have affected all Lander (see Klagt SPD gegen Medienvert rage, FR
4.4.1986, p.18). Oskar Lafontaine (SPD), Prime Minister of the 
Saarland, objected to any separate agreements on principle, but floated 
the idea of a Nedien-Dreieck, a concept which allowed the remaining 
SPD Lander to claim a TV-Sat transponder for their use (see Frenkel, 
1986, p.3).
The SPD*s threats were to no avail. The so-called 'south track' or 
Sudschiene was signed by the CDU/CSU prime ministers of Bavaria, 
Baden-Wurttemberg and the Phineland-Palatinate on the 12th May 1986 
(Staatsvertrag iiber die gemeinsame Nutzung eines Pemseh- und 
Hdrfunkkanals auf Rundfunksatelliten, RuF 3/1986, pp.404-407). The 
'north track* or Nordschiene was signed by Lower Saxony, Berlin and 
Schleswig-Holstein on 20th March 1986 (.Staatsvertrag iiber die 
Verbreitung von Fernsehen iiber Rundfunksatellit, RuF 3/1986, pp.398- 
403). Hamburg, the only SPD Land to take part in these separate 
initiatives, became a member of the Nordschiene. Both agreements were 
open-ended to allow the conclusion of an inter-Land agreement at a 
later date. They were each concerned with the award of a TV-Sat 
transponder to private television channels. More importantly still 
for private channels, they linked the award of a TV-Sat transponder to 
the award of local terrestrial frequencies, which had become available 
following efforts by the Federal Post Office. Terrestrial frequencies 
give private channels cheap access to audiences at no extra cost to 
the viewer, and are therefore very attractive.
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The signing of these partial agreements was seen as a serious 
departure from the principle of unity and consensus in West German 
media policy (see Fuhr, 1986, pp.299-309; Stammier 1986, pp.3-4). 
They were also regarded as a threat to the autonomy of those Lander 
which objected to private broadcasting, but could still be reached by 
TV-Sat transmissions (see GroB, 1986, p.77). Peter Giotz, the SPD whip 
in the Bundestag-, called the agreements "den Beginn des Zerfalis aer 
ARD" ana stated: "Hit dieser Art Partikularismus drohx der
bundesdeutschen Medienlandschaft langweiliger Provinzialisraus" (Glotz, 
cit. in Neue TV-Programmen der "Sudstaatenu, FR 13.5.1986, p.l).
Political and legal reservations about these separate agreements 
led Lothar Spath (CDU), Prime Minister of Baden-Wlirttemberg, to 
propose a provisional inter-Land agreement (Vorschalt-Staatsvertrag) 
on 14th April 1986. This would have given both the Nord- and 
Sudschiene the legitimacy they required, and would have allowed the 
immediate award of terrestrial frequencies to private channels (GroB, 
1986, p.78; Die ARD begru'Bt Vorschlag von Spath, FR 22.4.1986). Such a 
provisional agreement would have excluded controversial issues like 
advertising on HR's third television channel, and would have dealt 
almost exclusively with TV-Sat by absorbing both the Nord- and 
Sudschiene. The agreement would also have covered Eins Plus and 3SAT, 
the funding of public television, and the national distribution of 
private satellite channels into cable networks. A later agreement 
(.Rahmenstaatsvertrag) would then have covered issues of advertising 
and programme regulation. The Spath plan was generally regarded as a 
way of establishing operational arrangements before an impending
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Constitutional Court case in November, whicn had been filed against 
legislation in Lower Saxony allowing private broadcasting 
(Niedersachsishes Landesrundfunkgesetz, MP 6/1984, pp.486-496). This 
judgement was also expected to make important pronouncements on the 
status of broadcasting in West Germany.
The Lander broadcasting experts drew up a partial agreement on the 
basis of Spath's model in July 1986, but it was unlikely to be 
accepted, because the SPD-Land of Hesse refused even to take part in 
negotiations prior to the Constitutional Court's ruling on the Lower 
Saxony broadcasting law (see Teilstaatsvertrag zur Neuordnung des 
Rundfunkwesens, KuR 25.6.1986, Stand 20.5.1986; Referenten schlagen 
Vorstaatsvertrag vor, FR 1.7.1986). As expected, the issue of 
advertising on public channels, and more detailed stipulations on the 
national distribution of private satellite channels, were left to a a 
later agreement (Rahmenstaatsvertrag) to be signed by 30th June 1987.
The proposal for a provisional agreement was dropped, primarily 
because of Hesse's protests, but negotiations continued. A
breakthrough was finally achieved on 3rd October, when the prime
ministers undertook a unanimous resolution in Hamburg (BeschluB der 
Ministerprasidenten zur Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesens, FKD 10.10.1986, 
p.l). This provided a basis for any future inter-Land agreement, and 
took account of any rulings to be made by the Constitutional Court in 
November. It was agreed to award two TV-Sat transponders to private 
channels on the basis of the Nordr and SUdschienet and a further two
transponders to public channels. The resolution also approved the
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award of local terrestrial frequencies to private channels. The prime 
ministers declared that they were willing to accept SO to 100 minutes 
a day of radio advertising on VDR's radio channels, and the prospect 
of licence fee funding for the Land authorities, responsible for 
licensing and supervising private channels. Most significantly, Hesse 
agreed to give up its opposition to an inter-Land agreement once the 
Constitutional Court had delivered its judgement in November 
(.Erklarung des hessischen Ministerprasidenten> FKD 10.10.1986, p.l).
3.7 Constitutional clarity
Any further decisions on an inter-Land agreement were put on hold 
pending the Constitutional Court's ruling on the constitutionality of 
the Lower Saxony broadcasting law (see Niedersachsisches 
Landesrundfunkgesetz, MP 6/1984, pp.487-496). The Lander, as on many 
occasions in the past, were unable to make decisions in the spirit of 
federalism. Once more it was left to the Constitutional Court to 
define what was constitutionally possible within broadcasting (see 
Berg, 1986, p.689).
Although the court case dealt specifically with the legality of the 
Lower Saxony media law of 23rd May 1984, the Court was expected to 
make rulings on broadcasting in general, and in particular, on the 
role of public broadcasting and private broadcasting respectively, 
within a dual system. The constitutionality of private broadcasting 
itself was never in doubt, as the Court had never ruled that it was
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unconstitutional in its earlier rulings of 1961, 1971, and 1981 (see 
Chapter 2).
However, in 1981 the Court had adapted its earlier interpretations 
on how private broadcasting should be organised. In the rulings of 
1961 and 1971, it had stipulated that private broadcasting be 
organised in such a way that plurality of opinion was reflected in its 
internal supervisory structures and in its programming (see Urteil des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 28.Februar 1961 (.Fernsehurteil), in Lehr 
& Berg, 1971, pp.221-256, here p.255; Urteil des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 27Juli 1971 in dem Verfahren zur 
iiberprUfung der VerfassungsmaBigkeit der Mehr-wertbesteuerung der 
Rundfunkgebiihren - Mehrwertsteuerurteil> in MP 7 & 8/1971, pp.207- 
236). In 1981 the Court introduced the concept of external pluralism, 
where diversity of opinion is not reflected within internal 
supervisory bodies, but in the totality of programmes broadcast 
(Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 16. Juni. 1981, in Ring, 
1981, A-III 3, pp.1-25, here p.19). The externally pluralistic model
with supervision by pluralistically composed, external supervisory 
authorities was deemed acceptable by the Court as a way of organising 
private broadcasting. However, although the Court had sanctioned two 
different models of broadcasting organisation, it stipulated that 
overall, the externally pluralistic system had to match the same 
standards of diversity of opinion and programme range as public 
broadcast ing (p. 19).
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By 1986 changes in the Court’s interpretation of the constitutional 
position of broadcasting were imminent because so much had changed 
since 1981. Private broadcasting had become a reality, aided by the 
emergence of cable and satellite technologies. The Lower Saxony 
broadcasting law and most of the other laws governing private 
broadcasting were based on the externally pluralistic system. This 
made the impending court case an acid test of this broadcasting model. 
The Court case also provided an opportunity to clear up the 
controversies surrounding the legality of separate agreements like the 
Nord- and Sudschiene.
The case had been filed in 1984 by the SPD parliamentary party in 
the Bundestag. The SPD argued that the Lower Saxony broadcasting law 
failed to secure the independence of broadcasting from the state, and 
failed to live up to constitutional demands for programme diversity 
and plurality of opinion in broadcasting (see Wankell, 1986c, p.l).
3.7.1 The Constitutional Court’s decision
The Court's decision on 4th November 1986 was markedly different 
from earlier decisions (Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 4. 
November 1986 (Vlertes Fernsehurteil)t in FPD 7.11.1986, pp.1-42). 
Inevitably, its basic findings were still guided by the demands of 
Article 5. of the Basic Law, which holds that the freedom of 
broadcasting serves to contribute to the free formation of opinion 
within society (p.17). However, the judgement was also pervaded by a 
degree of pragmatism which took into account the recent liberalisation
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of' the Vest German broadcasting environment. Overall the Lower 
Saxony media law was found to satisfy constitutional demands, but 
some clauses of the law were declared unconstitutional.
Those clauses which allowed the Lower Saxony chancellory, or 
effectively the Land government, an evaluative role in the award of 
broadcasting licences, at the expense of the LandesrundfunkausschuB> 
the supervisory authority for private broadcasting in Lower Saxony, 
were declared unconstitutional (p.31pp). In this respect nothing had 
changed, as earlier constitutional rulings had always stipulated that 
broadcasting must be free of state interference. Amongst those 
clauses declared unconstitutional by the Court were the stipulations 
relating to balance in broadcasting (p.22). The Lower Saxony law had 
stipulated that each individual channel must provide balanced 
programming (internal plurality), if balance was not guaranteed by the 
existence of other broadcasting channels (external plurality) (Article 
15). This was criticised by the Court, because there were no 
qualitative or quantitative criteria to distinguish when a channel had 
to be balanced in itself, and when balance could be achieved in 
combination with other broadcasting channels (p.22). The Court put 
forward the example of the Schleswig-Holstein media law as a possible 
solution (p.22). Here, external plurality operates if in addition to 
the public channels, four West German generalist channels, distributed 
by the same technology, are available to the public (Rundfunkgesetz 
fur das Land Schleswig-Holsteint 27.11.1984, 3tPD 1/1985, pp.32-41, 
Article 11, Clause 2).
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Indirectly, the Court also referred to the Nordschiene and the 
SUdschiene. The Court concluded that the constitutional principle of 
"bundesfreundliches Verhalten” between the Lander on matters which 
affect them all, required that they cooperate in regulating nationally 
distributed satellite channels (p.38; see also Berg, 1986, p.69i). In 
the case of direct broadcast satellites, like TV-Sat, the Lander were 
obliged to come to a unanimous agreement, because DBS channels can be 
received directly in the home, and therefore influence ail Lander 
(p.38). However, the issue of a national supervisory authority was 
left open. This ruling effectively meant that the the Sord- and 
SUdschiene were unconstitutional, because they imposed private 
broadcasting against the wishes of those Lander, like Hesse, who were 
opposed to it.
In declaring some clauses of the Lower Saxony law to be 
unconstitutional, the Court had given further guidance to the Lander 
on legislation for private broadcasting. However, those parts of the 
ruling which attracted most attention related to the dual system of 
public and private broadcasting, a term used by the Court for the 
first time.
The Court reaffirmed the special status of broadcasting, outlined 
in earlier judgements (p.18). These had maintained that access to
broadcasting, unlike the press, was limited by lack of frequencies and
high costs (p.18). In spite of satellite and cable, the number of
television channels available to all would continue to be small,
because of dependence on terrestrial distribution. What had changed
- 204 -
was the emergence of a European broadcasting market involving foreign 
satellite channels which could be received directly in the home (p.18). 
This consideration was to play a key role in the Court's 
reinterpretation of broadcasting's special status.
Outlining the dual system of broadcasting, the Court proceeded to 
undertake "eine Art Arbeitsteilung und qualitative Abstufung" (Stock, 
1987a, p.6) between public and private broadcasting, placing different 
demands on each system. This was the nub of the whole judgement. 
Where the Court had previously demanded that private and public 
broadcasting systems separately satisfy the demands of the Basic Law 
as regards the provision of a broad range of programming and the 
reflection of the full scope of opinion within society, it now accepted 
lower standards for private broadcasting within the context of 
broadcasting as a whole.
The reasons given by the Court for regarding broadcasting as a 
whole, rather than as two separate systems, were based on what it saw 
as the realities of the existing situation. In the Court's view, 
balanced diversity of opinion could be undermined by channels directly 
available in the home, and by foreign satellite channels, which are 
largely removed from the jurisdiction of Lander legislation (p.19). In 
this respect the concept of "gleichgewichtige Vieifalt" could only ever 
be a "Zielwert" (p.19). In its appraisal of the emergence of a 
European market in broadcasting, which might distort West German 
standards on diversity, the Court took the economic prerogatives of 
domestic private broadcasters into account. It stated that private
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broadcasting could not be subjected to legislative conditions which 
would make its existence difficult, if not impossible (p.19). To all 
intents and purposes it appeared as if the Court was accepting the 
supremacy of economic reasoning above constitutional principles.
The Court's acceptance of the economic priorities of private 
broadcasting formed the basis of new assumptions, enshrined in the 
concept of a dual system. The totality of broadcasting channels in 
Vest Germany would now have to comply with constitutional demands 
(p.19). Prior to this the totality of private channels had had to 
match the same standards of plurality and breadth as public 
broadcasting.
Vithin such a dual system, public service broadcasting was required 
by the Court to undertake the basic provision of services or "die 
unerlaBliche 'Grundversorgung'" (p.19). In fact Grundversorgung
implies much more than basic provision. In undertaking Grund- 
versorguDgt the public system was seen to satisfy essential functions 
for democracy and cultural life in Vest Germany (p.19). As with 
previous Court rulings the so-called "klassische(r) Auftrag” of 
broadcasting, was broadly defined. In addition to news, entertainment 
and the formation of political and public opinion, the Court placed 
particular emphasis on broadcasting's cultural responsibilities (p.19). 
This amounted to an affirmation of the tasks which public service 
broadcasting has always been constitutionally obliged to fulfil. More 
importantly, it meant that certain types of programming, such as 
entertainment, could not be extricated from public service
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broadcasting. Grundversorgung was not the same as Minimalversorgung 
(see Berg, 1986, p.800)
The Court gave several reasons lor imposing the obligation of 
Grundversorgung on public broadcasting. It pointed out that for many 
years to come public broadcasting would be the only service to reach 
the whole country by terrestrial means (p.19). Furthermore it was the 
Court's view, that public broadcasting was more capable of fulfiiing 
this function than private broadcasting, because it is not so 
dependent on high ratings, necessary to secure advertising revenue 
(p.19). The Court added that the emergence of private channels, and a 
European broadcasting market, made it all the more important that the 
classical role of broadcasting be reinforced by national terrestrial 
channels (p.19). "Nach der Lage der Dinge", this role was seen to to 
belong to the public channels.
The Court recognised that the imposition of Grundversorgung on 
public broadcasting would have consequences for public broadcasting's 
future existence. The Court stated that public broadcasting and its 
funding by the licence fee was legitimated by its classical function 
and the provision of basic services (p.20). To enable public 
broadcasting to satisfy these demands, the Court stipulated that it 
was necessary for the Lander to guarantee public service 
broadcasting's technical, organisational, staffing, and financial 
requirements (p.20>.
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Turning its attention to private broadcasting, the Court stated 
that private channels were unlikely to satisfy constitutional demands 
for the provision of a comprehensive range of information. First, 
dependence on distribution by cable and satellite meant that private 
channels were only available to a small section of the population. 
This limited their ability to contribute fully to the dissemination and 
formation of public opinion (p.18). Second, there were too few private 
television channels to reflect the plurality of views within society 
(p.18). Most damning was the Court's analysis of economic factors 
which diminished the ability of private channels to offer a full range 
of information, opinion, and culture. The Court recognised that 
private broadcasting's reliance on advertising revenue, led to a 
necessity to achieve high ratings by showing cheap popular 
programming (p.18). Under these circumstances it was accepted that
private channels would be unlikely to transmit expensive minority and 
cultural programming, because these programmes are not seen by 
sufficiently large audiences to attract advertisers (p. 18). However, 
the Court was prepared to accept the negative effects of funding by 
advertising on private broadcasting, because it felt that there was 
not sufficient alternative income available (p.30).
In outlining the deficits of balance and breadth structurally 
inherent in private broadcasting, the Court had distanced itself from 
arguments claiming that private broadcasting brought more choice and 
better quality. As with earlier judgements, it stated that the 
regulation of private broadcasting could not be left to the markex 
because a market in broadcasting was unlikely to occur in the
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foreseeable future, and because such a solution was incompatible with 
constitutional demands (p.20).
However, having shown up the deficiencies of private broadcasting, 
the Court then proceeded to reduce the constitutional demands placed 
on it. As long (“solange und soweit”) as public broadcasting fulfilled 
the obligation of Grundversorgung, the Court felt it was justifiable to 
reduce constitutional demands for breadth of content and for balanced 
diversity of opinion in private broadcasting (p.20). The reduced 
demands for private broadcasting were therefore linked to the public 
system’s successful attainment of its constitutional role, although the 
Court reaffirmed an earlier judgement of 1981, which had ruled that 
the balanced output of public stations could not compensate for the 
imbalances of private broadcasting (p.20). However, if imbalances in 
private broadcasting were not serious, they were deemed acceptable by 
the Court, provided that the diversity of existing opinion was fully 
expressed within public broadcasting channels (p.20).
For a private system of broadcasting, operating under external
supervision by independent authorities, the Court insisted on a
Grundstandard, or basic level of balanced diversity (p.20). Under
this standard, minor imbalances were acceptable, provided that there
were sufficient safeguards to prevent major imbalances to the
diversity of opinion (p.20). According to the Court this entailed:
die Moglichkeit fur alle Meinungsrichtungen - auch diejenigen von 
Minderheiten im privaten Rundfunk zum Ausdruck zu gelangen, und 
den AusschluB einseitigen, in hohem MaBe ungleichgewichtigen 
Einflusses einzelner Veranstalter oder Programme auf die Bildung
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der offentlichen Meinung, namentlich die Verhinderung ces
Entstehens vorherrschender Meinungsmacht. (p.20)
In achieving such a standard the legislator had to impose material, 
organisational, and procedural rules (p.20). The Court drew special 
attention to the legislator's role in preventing the concentration of 
broadcasting in the hands of a few, because such developments were 
difficult to reverse once started (p.20). It referred in particular 
to dominant multi-media concerns and double monopolies of combined 
press and broadcasting interests in local and regional areas (p.28).
On the subject of external supervision of private broadcasting, the 
Court stated that the system of internal supervision, as practised in 
public broadcasting, was more suitable for securing plurality of 
□pinion, in spite of its weaknesses (p.26). External supervisory 
authorities could only ever be reactive, and had less influence over 
programming because they were not involved in scheduling and the 
production process (p.26). However, external supervision, in spite of 
its defects, was still constitutional, because internal supervision, in 
the Court's opinion, would have removed "das Grundelement 
privatautonomer Gestaltung und Entscheidung" of private programme 
providers. The Court seems therefore to have been thinking once more 
of the economic success of private channels rather than reflecting on 
earlier constitutional rulings (see p.26).
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3.7.2 Reactions and interpretations
At first sight the Court's ruling appears to have placed public 
broadcasting in a privileged position as the supplier of 
Grundversorgung. However, the fulfilment of this role clearly 
liberated private broadcasters from the onus of providing a broad 
range of programming, and of portraying the full breadth of opinion 
within society. At the same time the public service concept had been 
reinforced. Closer inspection of the judgement, however, reveals a 
number of unresolved issues, which arose from a lack of precision in 
the Court's pronouncements (see Stock, 1987).
The Court's decision was claimed as a victory by both sides and 
interpreted accordingly (see Hoffmann-Kiem, 1987, p. 19; Janssen, 1986b, 
p.l; Fuhr, 1987, p.145). In the eyes of the supporters of public 
broadcasting, the judgement constituted a guarantee of existence and 
further development which prevented public broadcasting from being cut 
back in its programming, funding, or plans for further expansion (see 
Berg, 1986a, p.800; Berg, 1987, p.269). Grundversorgung was seen to 
include all forms of programming, and all types of technical 
distribution (Berg, 1986, p.690). Furthermore, private broadcasting's 
existence, especially in terms of reduced constitutional demands of 
plurality, was seen to depend on the continued existence of public 
broadcasting (see Berg, 1986a, pp.801-2). At the other extreme, some, 
like the West German Ministry of the Interior, interpreted the concept 
of Grundversorgung in such a narrow way that it would have been 
possible to strip public broadcasting of those areas of broadcasting
- 211 -
which were not deemed to come under the rubric of Grundversorgung 
(1986, pp.21-24). This included pay television, specialist narrowcast 
channels, videotext, satellite television channels like Eins Plus and 
3SAT, the national distribution of existing third television channels, 
and further radio networks (Bundesinnenministerium, 1986, p.2i).
These reactions to the judgement reveal the differing conclusions 
drawn from the Court’s pronouncements. Most attention was directed at 
the concept of Grundversorgung, a term which in itself was non new, 
but to which the Constitutional Court had given its own particular 
definition (see Stock, 1987, p.l6pp). Subsequent evaluations of 
Grundversorgung ranged from partial provision in a compensatory way 
to make up for the deficits of private broadcasting, to full public 
provision of all types of programmes via all types of technologies. 
These differences clearly showed the lack of clarity and the vagueness 
in the Court's initial definition.
It was clear that Grundversorgung did not mean Miniwalversorgung 
(Berg, 1986a, p.800), because the Court had mentioned all types of 
programming including entertainment, news, information, and especially 
culture (see Hoffmann-Riem, 1987, p.22). Accordingly, these individual 
components, in particular entertainment, cannot be taken away from 
public broadcasters. ARD and ZDF cannot be reduced to the status of 
"Nischensender", but, as ZDF's Frogrammdirektor Alois Schardt 
emphasised to me in an interview, they must continue to cater for both 
majority and minority tastes (Interview, 11.8.1987). The emphasis on 
culture was clearly a reference to the failings of private
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broadcasting, and perhaps also, a warning against commercial
tendencies in public broadcasting (see Berg, 1987, p.272). According
to Schardt, Grundversorgung is,
die Prazisierung des Auftrages, den die Kundi'unkanstaiten ha ben, 
gemaS ihren eigenen Gesetzen, und das heiBt, aaB die 
Grundversorgung in die eine Richtung die Programmmischung nicht 
verandert, sagen wir zugunsten von Massenaktraktivitat, und in die 
andere, daB die Rundfunkanstalten nicht eine Zusatzversorgung zu 
machen haben fur diejenigen Bereiche, die die privaten Anbieter 
nicht bedienen. (Interview, 11.8.1987)
Whether Grundversorgung, also included further regional or local
programming, as Berg maintains, was at this stage unclear, as the
Court had made no mention of public broadcasting's obligation to
provide additional regional or local services (see Berg, 1986, p.690).
In fact, apart from listing the programme components of
Grundversorgung, the Court made no reference to the amount of time
devoted to each programme component, thus implying that this was left
to the public broadcasters.
Some confusion arose because the Court had stated that public 
broadcasting was capable of fulfilling Grundversorgung because its 
programmes are distributed terrestrially, and are therefore available 
in the majority of homes. The emphasis on terrestrial distribution 
was a worrying aspect, because other means of distribution, like 
satellite, might eventually replace terrestrial broadcasting as the 
main source of television programmes, thus making Grundversorgung 
unnecessary (see Dieter Stolte, ZDF Intendant, in Dem Pathos folgt die 
realistische Einschatzung zum Bundesverfassungsgerichtsurteil, FK
14.11.1986, p.9). Linking Grundversorgung with terrestrial
distribution would also affect any technical, financial, staffing, and
organisational measures which the legislator was constitutionally 
obliged to undertake in order that public broadcasting coula fulfil 
Grundversorgung. If satellite and cable channels were not part of 
basic provision by public broadcasting, they were not entitled to 
these safeguards (see Kammann, 1986a, p.3). According to Ernst Fuhr,
ZDF's legal expert, the Court's reference to terrestrial distribution 
did not confine public broadcasting to this technology of distribution 
alone (1987, p. 153). In his view, the Court's reference to terrestrial 
distribution was purely descriptive, and subordinate to the more 
important aspect of programme content (Fuhr, 1987, p. 153; see also 
Berg, 1987, p.273).
There were also differences of opinion about the degree of 
guarantee given by the Court to public broadcasting as the supplier of 
Grundversorgung. According to Berg, the Court's linking of 
Grundversorgung to public broadcasting's organisational, staffing, 
technical, and financial requirements, constituted a guarantee of 
existence and further development (1986, pp.690-691; 1986a, p.800). 
The public broadcasting system could not be frozen at existing levels 
or limited in terms of funding, access to technologies of distribution, 
or programming (see Berg, 1986, p.691). Klaus Berg also believed that 
the obligation of Grundversorgung, now made it impossible for the 
Lander to deny or delay further licence fee increases, in order to 
improve the chances of private broadcasting's success (1986, p.690; 
1986a, p.800;).
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Wolfgang Hoff'mann-Riem, however, is more selective in his 
interpretation of any guarantees given by the Court, referring to a 
"Garantie der bisherigen Funktionsfahigkeit" (1987, p.22; see also 
HeBler cit. in Feaktionen auf BVG-Urteil Uberwiegend posit iv, 1986, 
p.l). This, in his view, did not include the right to become involved 
in all forms of broadcasting, but the ability to function within the 
existing framework. In this sense public broadcasting had been given 
a limited guarantee of further development which would allow it to 
function within the context of changing conditions, and to adapt to 
future developments, especially to those developments associated with 
the Europeanisation of broadcasting (1987, p.22). If constitutional 
guarantees pertained to existing public service obligations, it was up 
to the legislator to decide whether other forms of service, which were 
not part of Grundversorgung, should be opened up to public 
broadcasting (Hoffmann-Riem, 1987, p.23).
A further issue concerned the duration of Grundversorgung (see 
Stock, 1987, p.14). According to some, the demands made of public 
broadcasting could be reduced, if private broadcasting improved its 
ability to reflect the full scope of opinions within society, or became 
more widely available (see Hartstein, 1986, p.4; see also Jurgen Doetz 
cit. in Karlsruhe und die Folgen, KuR 10.1.1987, p. 15). However, it 
should be remembered that the Court had rejected a compensatory role 
for public broadcasting in balancing out the imbalances of private 
broadcasting (p.20; see also Berg, 1987, p.270). Furthermore, the 
structural deficits of private broadcasting, caused by its reliance on 
advertising income, would seem to imply that this factor played a
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greater role in the Court’s decision to support the continuance of 
Grundversorgung by public broadcasting (see Berg, 1987, p.270).
In reducing the demands of diversity and balance for private
broadcasting, the Court had clearly linked the existence of private
broadcasting to the satisfactory fulfilment of Grundversorgung by
public broadcasting. This fact is confirmed by ZDF Programmdirektor
Alois Schardt, who emphasises the existential links between the two,
rather than the compensatory function of public service programmes:
Also es ist in diesem Urteil, in dem die Grundversorgung vorkommt, 
ja auch festgelegt, daB die Privaten nur deshalb so sein konnen, wie 
sie sind, weil es die offentlich-rechtlichen gibt. Das heiBt, es 
gibt eine Interdependenz zwischen den Privaten und den offenxlich- 
rechtlichen, nicht in der Programmgestaltung, sondern in der 
Existenz. (Interview, 11.8.1987)
According to HDR's legal expert, Klaus Berg, this existential
relationship ought to have made the Lander and private broadcasters
more committed to a a stronger public system:
weil nur so eine Rechtfertigung fur den groBeren Spielraum bei der 
Programmgestaltung hinsichtlich Vielfalt und Ausgewogenheit 
besteht, der sich wiederum in verminderten Kosten und hoheren 
Einnahmen niederschlagt. (1986, pp.689-670; see also Hoffmann-Riem, 
1987, p.22)
Some felt that the Court had paid insufficient attention to how a 
dual system should function in practice, and that it had capitulated 
to technological and economic developments and the private lobby (see 
also HeBler in Reaktionen auf BVG-Urteil iiberwiegend positiv, KuR
8.11.1986, p.12; Hoffmann-Riem, 1987, p.20). It was argued that
insufficient attention had been paid to the communications needs of 
society, and that the Court had failed to take the principle of
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freedom of communication, the public interest, and the integrative 
function of the media fully into account (see Hoffmann-Riem, 1987, 
p.19; Stock, 1987, p.16). Instead, it was argued that the Court, by 
reducing the demands made of private broadcasting, was supporting the 
principle of economic freedom and the way commercialism and market 
forces function in the media (see Kammann, 1986a, pp.3-4; Hoffmann- 
Riem, 1987, p. 19; Stock, 1987). Some spoke of the danger of a "Zwei- 
Klassen-Rundfunk" (see Hans Wolfgang HeBler, media spokesman of the 
Evangelical Church cit. in Reaktionen auf BVG-Urteil iiberwiegend 
positlv, KuR 8.11.1986, p.12), which would allow private broadcasting 
to concentrate entirely on popular entertainment programmes. This, it 
was believed, would result in a decline of public broadcasting inxo a 
cultural enclave, because it was still required to cater for all types 
of programme needs (see Kammann, 1986, p.5; Grimm, 1987, p.33).
The problems associated with the judgement which have been touched 
upon here, serve to underline the vagueness of some of the Court's 
pronouncements, especially those which dealt with the future role of 
public broadcasting. A lack of clear definition for the concept of 
Grundversorgung, and the failure of the Court to say anything 
substantial about the future funding of public broadcasting, were two 
obvious areas which required further attention. Answers to these and 
other issues were expected in a further Constitutional Court ruling. 
This involved a complaint filed by SDR and SWF against the Baden- 
Wiirttemberg media law (.Landesmediengesetz Baden-VLirttemberg, 
16.12.1985, in Bauer, Muller-Romer, Posewand, 17.1.2), which forbade 
public broadcasters from undertaking any further expansion into
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regional or local broadcasting, text services, and specialist 
narrowcast services. The law had also prohibited advertising in any 
local and regional public broadcasting programmes. This had been 
justified on the grounds that the interests of private broadcasters 
had to be protected. The case provided an acid test case for the 
argument that public broadcasting could not be excluded from an area 
of broadcasting because of the structural and programme deficits 
inherent in private broadcasting. The prospect of a favourable 
decision for public broadcasting was good, because the Court had just 
warned against the danger of concentrating broadcasting in the hands 
of a few, placing particular emphasis on the danger of double 
monopolies covering television and the press in local areas.
3.8 Stumbling blocks on the way to a final agreement
The Constitutional Court ruling of 4th November 1986 had given the 
Lander further guidance in their attempt to reach an inter- Land 
agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting. It was now clear 
that the Sordr and SUdschiene would need to be replaced or 
complemented by a unanimous decision by the Lander on TV-Sat. 
However, TV-Sat was only one stumbling block on the route to a final 
agreement. The existence and further development of ARD and ZDF, 
advertising, and the issue of licence fee support for the supervisory 
bodies of private broadcasting were still a source of division (see 
Biissow, 1987, p.4).
- 218 -
The SPD Land of Hesse, which had. constantly been accused of 
blocking attempts to conclude an inter-Land agreement, was not slow to 
react to the Court's ruling, seeing the judgement as vindication of its 
earlier objections (see "Eckpunkte" fur Medienstaatsvertrag vorgelegt, 
FR 14.11.1986). In November it put forward a series of proposals for 
an inter- Land agreement (Eckpunkte fur einen Staa tsvertrag Liber den 
Satellitenrundfunky HP 11/1986, p.739-744). These recommended the 
establishment of a national pluralistic authority to supervise and 
license nationally distributed satellite channels (p.740). Such an 
authority would also have been responsible for awarding local 
terrestrial frequencies to national programme providers (p.742). On 
the subject of advertising on HR's third television channel, there was 
a hint of compromise. Hesse insisted that it was up to the legislator 
or HR to decide the extent of advertising on the third channel, but 
the degree to which advertising capacity on the third channels was 
used would depend on the level of licence fee support sanctioned by 
the Lander (p.744).
The CDU/CSU Lander were intent on reaching a final decision on the 
inter- Land agreement at the next meeting of the Lander prime 
ministers on 18th December 1986. This urgency was driven not so much 
by a desire to sort out the problems of TV-Sat, but by the wish to 
find approval for the award of local terrestrial frequencies to 
private channels, an aspect which had also been covered by the Nord- 
and SUdschiene (see Jakob, 1986a, p.3). Impatience on the part of the 
CDU/CSU resulted in threats to cancel inter- Land agreements both on 
the licence fee and on the equalisation of funding between the public
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stations, if no decision was reached by the 18th December (see 
Janssen, 1986c, pp. 1-2; KUnaigung der Gebiihrenvertrage als
Druckmittelt FR 2.12.1986).
Cancelling the licence fee agreements would have had serious
implications for the principle of uniform licence fees throughout Vest 
Germany, and would also have affected the financial status of ZDF, 
which receives 30% of the television licence supplement. Furthermore, 
the existence of the smaller public stations was threatened by both
the collapse of a uniform fee, and by the collapse of the equalisation
agreement, which regulates financial subsidies from the larger
stations to the smaller stations of SFB, RB and SR. The CDU/CSU 
Lander announced that the licence fee agreements would be cancelled 
"vorsorglich” if no agreement was reached on 18th December (Janssen, 
1986c, p.2; Vollen Unionslander Gebuhrenstaatsvertrag auf jeden Fall 
kiindigen?, FR 11.12.1986). If there was no agreement by 31st March 
1987, they threatened to cancel the equalisation agreement also (FR
11.12.1986).
The SPD LMnder of North Rhine-Vestphalia, Hesse, the Saarland, and 
Bremen countered these threats by announcing their intention of 
ratifying a separate equalisation agreement if negotiations broke down 
(.Vollen Unionslander Gebuhrenstaatsvertrag auf jeden Fall kiindigen?, 
FR 11.12.1986), This would have secured the future of RB and SR by 
replacing equalisation with subsidies from VDR and HR (Fundfunk- 
Staatsvertrag erst im neuen Jahr?t FR 9.12.1986). Furthermore, a 
separate agreement would have allowed a rival Vestschiene to compete
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for TV-Sat transponders with the Nordr and SUdschiene (Janssen, 
1986c, p.2; FR 9.12.1986).
As expected no agreement was reached on 18th December. Bavaria, 
Baden-Wiirttemberg, Lower Saxony and the Rhineland-Palatinate cancelled 
the 1974 inter- Land licence fee agreement, which sets out the 
procedure and conditions of the licence fee. They also cancelled the 
1982 agreement, which sets the level of the licence fee. Both 
cancellations would have taken effect on 31st December 1987 (see Und 
welter wird gedroht und gedriicktt FR 22.12.i986; GebUhrenvertrage: 
Auch Niedersachen kUndlgt, FR 29.12.1986). The cancellation of these 
agreements did not render them null and void, as they continued to be 
valid for the remaining Lander Those who had decided to cancel would 
have had to set their own level of licence fee. Those CDU/CSU Lander 
which had cancelled the licence fee agreements, stated that their 
actions should not be over-dramatised. They were merely an attempt 
to pressurise the SPD Lander into signing an inter- Land agreement on 
the reorganisation of broadcasting (Und welter wlrd gedroht und 
gedrucktt FR 22.12.1986). Indeed it was clear that the cancellations 
were mainly an attempt to pressurise, rather than a serious threat to 
the future of public broadcasting. Many issues were already in the 
process of being resolved, but details still had to be worked out.
It was already accepted that the supervisory authorities of private 
broadcasting should receive a proportion of the licence fee, to enable 
them to carry out their duties (see Jakob, 1986a, p.5). This issue had 
been brought up by Bavaria, which with reference to the Constitutional
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Court, argued that the the link between quality in public broadcasting 
and the justification of licence fee funding, was also justification 
for licence fee support for the authorities which supervised private 
broadcasting (see "Grundversorgung" in der Substanz bereits 
umstritten, KuR 12.11.1986, p.15). Consequently, if private 
broadcasting was to be encouraged to cater for minorities and provide 
cultural programmes, and if advertising was not conducive to this type 
of content, as had been argued by the Court, then private broadcasting 
should be allowed to benefit from the licence fee at least indirectly. 
It was argued that licence fee support would help the supervisory 
authorities to influence private broadcasting in a positive way. 
Similar steps had already been undertaken in Bavaria, where the state 
had awarded the Bavarian Landesmedienzentrale a subsidy of DM2 
million to encourage religious, social, and cultural programming (see 
Hartstein, 1986, p.5; see also Edmund Stoiber, head of the Bavarian 
State Chancellory in, "Grundversorgung" In der Substanz bereits 
umstritten, KuR 12.11.1986, p.15). Where the SPD and CDU/CSU Lander 
differed was over the amount of licence fee to be given to these 
authorities, and how this money should be used. The SPD Lander 
disagreed with the view of Lower Saxony and Bavaria that private 
broadcasters should benefit directly from the licence fee (see Und 
weiter wird gedroht und gedruckt, FR 22.12.1986).
Another source of dispute was North Rhine-Westphalia's claim, as 
the largest Land, to a transponder on TV-Sat (see Biissow, 1987, p.4; 
Schleyer, 1987, p.3). This would have given it parity with those 
Lander who had signed the Ford- and SUdschiene, and would have
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allowed it to award the transponder to either a private channel, or to 
a joint venture involving VDR and private interests (see FR
22.12.1986). The CDU/CSU Lander, however, supported the idea of two 
channels each to be shared between the private and public channels, 
rather than a solution which would have given three transponders to 
private interests and two to public channels (FR 22.12.1986).
A further dispute concerned the licensing of national satellite 
channels. Hesse insisted that this should be done by a national 
authority (see Eckpunkte fur elnen Staatsvertrag uber den 
Satellitenfernsehen, MP 11/1986, pp.739-744). However, Lothar Spath, 
the CDU Prime Minister of Baden-Viirttemberg, wanted licences to be 
awarded under existing Land legislation (Und welter wird gedrtickt und 
gedroht, FR 22.9.1986).
By March 1987 agreement seemed close at hand (Ein paar 
Stolperstelne liegen noch im Veg, FR 12.3.1987). An attempt was made 
to reach a compromise by combining two draft agreements, previously 
put forward by both political camps (Entwurf der unlonsreglerten 
Lander vom 16.12.1986, FKD 20.2.1987, pp.1-9; Entwurf der SPD-reglerten 
Lander vom 5.2.1987, in FKD 20.2.1987, pp.1-9). These negotiations 
paid off. The inter- Land agreement on the reorganisation of 
broadcasting was finally signed by the Lander prime ministers in Bonn 
on 12th March 1987 (.Staatsvertrag zur Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesens, 
KuR 25.4.1987, pp.18-26). Subject to ratification by all the regional 
Land parliaments, it would be enacted on 1st January 1988.
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3.8.1 The inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting
The agreement signed by the prime ministers in March 1987 forms 
the basis of a dual system of private and public broadcasting in Vest 
Germany (.Staatsvertrag zur Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesens, in KuR
25.4.1987, pp.18-26; see also Begriindung zum Staatsvertrag zur
Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesenst in KuR 31.5.1987, pp.2-16). It
constituted an attempt to secure both the existence and further
development of public broadcasting, and the chances of success for 
private broadcasting (see Praambel, p. 18).
In awarding TV-Sat transponders, it was decided to give three out 
of the five transponders available to private interests (p.18). This 
was in deference to the SPD, and in particular to the Land with the 
largest population, Morth Rhine-Westphalia, which had wanted a so- 
called Vestschiene, comparable to the Nord- and SUdschiene that had 
been concluded by the CDU/CSU Lander and Hamburg (see Entwurf der 
SPD-regierten Lander vom 5.2.1987t in FKD 20.2.1987, pp.1-9). However, 
the third transponder on the first satellite was temporarily awarded 
to ZDF for the transmission of 3SAT, until such time as the SPD 
Lander had decided to whom they would award this transponder (p.18).
The fourth transponder on the first satellite was awarded to ARD for
the transmission of Eins Plus. However, as long as digital radio did 
not have a transponder of its own, ARD would be required to vacate the 
channel from 13.00 to 18.00, to allow the transmission of 17 radio 
channels (p.19). The fifth available transponder on the second 
satellite, to be launched at a later date, was awarded to ZDF for the
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transmission of 3SAT, provided that the SPD Lander awarcied a 
transponder on the first satellite to a private channel (p.19). This 
was the compromise which the CDU/CSU Lander had been forced to accept 
in order to gain SPD approval for the Nord- and SUdschiene (see 
Leudts, 1987, p.l).
A large section of the agreement dealt with the existence ana 
further development of public broadcasting. Any doubts about the 
future of Eins Plus and 3SAT were removed. Both ARD and ZDF were 
given the obligation of each providing a culturally-orientated TV 
channel (p.19). For this purpose they were allowed to cooperate with 
other European programme providers, but no distinction was made 
between private or public partners. ARD and ZDF were also permitted 
to participate in pan-European channels, like the now defunct Europa, 
provided that they did not contribute substantial proportions of 
programming, and provided that advertising on these channels was not 
aimed at West German audiences (p. 19). However, although the future 
of Eins Plus and 3SAT seemed secure, a barrier was put up against 
further public expansion into satellite broadcasting. Any additional 
nationally distributed public television channels would require 
political approval in the form of an inter-Land agreement (p.19).
The licence fee, and cross-subsidies to small ARD stations, as laid 
down in the inter-land equalisation agreement, would continue to 
constitute the main source of funding for public broadcasting (p.19). 
The licence fee is set by the Lander prime ministers, subject to 
ratification by the Landtage. The way the licence fee is set (the
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procedure for setting the licence fee is covered in Chapter 6), had 
proved a controversial issue in earlier negotiations. The CDU/CSU 
Lander wanted to retain the existing system, while the SPD wished to 
alter it, in order to remove some of the political pressure, which in 
its view, threatened the future of public broadcasting (see Biissow, 
1987, p.4; Schleyer, 1987, p.5). However, the inter-Land agreement did 
little to alter existing arrangements. It was agreed thar the 
financial requirements of public broadcasting would be ascertained 
every two years (p.20). This would take into account existing and new 
broadcasting channels, participation in the new technologies, 
inflation, and the development of advertising and other income (p.20). 
However, a note attached to the agreement stated that any examination 
of financial requirements would not include the costs of distributing 
the ARD third channels on a national basis (p.25). This was an 
effective barrier against attempts by BR and VDR, in particular, to 
establish a national presence for their regional third television 
channels. A further note promised to consider changes to the
composition of the KEF (Kommission zur Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs
der Rundfunkanstalten), a highly political body which advises the 
prime ministers on the level of licence fee increases (p.26), It was 
agreed that the next licence fee increase would take place on 1st 
January 1989 (p.26).
In order to give ARD and ZDF a certain amount of parity with 
private broadcasting, it was decided to permit the insertion of one 
commercial advertising break within television programmes which
lasted more than sixty minutes (p.19). Exceptions to this rule were
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possible for sports transmissions (p.19). Tiie agreement also opened 
up the possibility of introducing advertising to public channels on 
Sundays and public holidays, provided that this did not result in an 
increase in advertising income (p.20). This measure obviously took
into account the fact that public broadcasting's advertising income 
might decline, if it was subject to private competition. An extension 
of the time allowed for advertising would have made up for this 
shortfall. A note, attached to the agreement, also allowed the public 
broadcasters to shift radio advertising to digital satellite radio, 
provided that this did not lead to an overall increase in advertising 
income (p.26). Sponsored programmes were to be allowed on public 
television "in der bisherigen Weise", provided they did not serve the 
economic interests of third parties (p.20). Apart from these 
concessions, the agreement continued to place television advertising 
on public channels under the same rules as before; a maximum of
twenty minutes a day before 20.00 on the the ARD TV network and ZDF. 
Advertising on Eins Plus and 3SAT was not allowed (p.20).
The controversy surrounding the introduction of advertising to HR's 
third television channel was resolved by backdating the freeze on
advertising on public channels to 1st January 1967 (p.20). This
prevented the introduction of advertising to other ARD third 
television channels. However, HR was exceptionally allowed to continue 
the transmission of advertising on its third television channel until 
it had been awarded sufficient licence fee income to fund its new 
fourth radio network, but was expected to cease advertising on the
third TV channel by 1991 (p.25). This was a curious solution, because
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HR had. never justified the introduction of advertising to its third
television channel as a means of funding its fourth radio network.
According to Bernd-Peter Arnold, head of radio regionalisation at HR:
Die Verbung im Dritten Programm ist nicht eingefiihrt worden, um 
das vierte Horfunkprogramm zu finanzieren. Das ist nur ein Teil 
der Vahrheit. Aber das is jetzt Politik. (Interview, 26.8.1987)
The other contentious advertising issue had involved the level of 
advertising on VDR radio. It was decided to freeze radio advertising 
on all ARD stations from 1st January 1987 (p.20). However, each ARD 
station was allowed to broadcast 90 minutes of radio advertising 
daily. Although this provided a solution for VDR, it, together with 
the stipulations on advertising on the third television channels, 
removed a substantial area of decision-making from the autonomous 
internal ARD supervisory bodies (see Kammann, 1987, p.4>.
The remainder of the agreement dealt with nationally distributed 
private broadcasting channels. It was decided to use two per cent of 
licence fee revenues to fund the independent supervisory authorities 
of private broadcasting and access channels (p.20). For a period of 
four years this money would also be used to fund an increase in the 
availability of terrestrial frequencies for the reception of private 
broadcasting channels (p.20). Private broadcasters could not be 
directly funded from the licence fee, but the subsidy towards the 
establishment of a terrestrial infrastructure constituted indirect 
support, because it increased the number of viewers available to 
private channels, and therefore made them more attractive to 
advertisers. The decision also freed private broadcasters from
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funding the supervisory authorities through levies. Amendments to the 
existing licence fee agreements to allow these changes effectively 
nullified the cancellations of the inter -Land licence fee agreements, 
submitted earlier by Baden-VUrttemberg, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, and the 
Rhineland Palatinate (p.24).
According to the inter-Land agreement, private broadcasting 
channels were to be licensed on the basis of Land law, rather than by 
a central authority, as had been proposed by Hesse (p.21). The task 
of licensing channels from other Lander or countries, and supervision 
of programme content rested with the supervisory authorities in each 
Land (p.23>. The clauses on advertising mirrored existing Land 
legislation; twenty per cent of broadcast output daily, in blocks, 
with a break permitted within programmes which lasted longer than 60 
minutes (p.21>. Sponsorship was permitted, if editorial content 
exhibited no direct relationship with the economic interests of the 
sponsor <p.21).
The stipulations on plurality of opinion in nationally distributed 
private broadcasting channels reflected the demands made by the 
Constitutional Court in November 1986. Private channels had to 
reflect existing diversity of opinion "im wesentlichen”. Within 
generic channels, adequate access had to be given to the "bedeutsamen" 
opinions within society, and minority viewpoints had to be taken into 
consideration (p.21>. Taking its lead from the Constitutional Court, 
the agreement stipulated that each individual channel would have to 
exhibit diversity of opinion if there were fewer than three separate,
- 229-
domestic, nationally available, private, generic channels 4 ll there 
were three or more generic channels, plurality of opinion would be 
judged from the totality of channels available, unless the supervisory 
bodies for private broadcasting stipulated otherwise (p.21). In order 
to counter concentration of ownership private programme providers 
would only be allowed one generic channel and one specialist 
narrowcast channel each in both radio and television (p.21). This 
stipulation also applied to major shareholdings (above 25% > by 
individual companies or their subsidiaries in individual channels (see 
p.21). A further legacy of the Constitutional Court's ruling was the 
stipulation that in the case of fewer than three nationally available, 
private, generic channels, the programme provider had to exclude the 
possibility of one-sided influence on the formation of public opinion. 
This could take place either in the form of a programme committee 
with effective influence on programme content, or in the case of 
consortia, like SAT 1, by agreements which excluded dominant influence 
by individual consortium members (p.22).
The programme rules for nationally distributed private channels 
mirrored legislation passed by the Lander. Few of the rules are 
binding. Private channels are expected to transmit adequate amounts 
of information, culture, and education, and to contain a considerable 
proportion of domestic and European productions (p.22). In a 
departure from practice at ARD and ZDF, the churches are only entitled 
to transmission time on request, and can be charged for the costs of 
transmission (p.22). The stipulations on news and current affairs 
were more concrete in accordance with constitutional demands. News
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must be impartial, truthful, and clearly separated from editorial 
comment (p.22). The agreement contained rules to prevent programmes 
which encouraged racial hatred, violence, or which contained 
pornographic content (p.22). It also contained specific rules about 
the type of programmes which could be broadcast when children or 
young people might be watching (p.22).
3.8.2 Reactions to and evaluation of the the inter-Land agreement
The signing of the inter-Land agreement marked the end of three
years of hard negotiations between the Lander. As with most 
compromises no-one was completely satisfied with the end result, but 
the principle of cooperative federalism had just about survived (see 
Lafontaine, 1987, p.3). Speaking on behalf of the public broadcasters, 
SDR Intendant Hans Bausch told me that the agreement was "kein 
Meisterwerk der Legislative" but "ein Modus Vivendi, also eine Art fur 
das Weiterexistieren, kein Friedens vert rag, sondern ein 
Waffenstillstandsvertrag" (Interview, 29.7.1987). Andreas Schardt, 
Justiziar at SAT 1 told me, "Hit dem Staatsvertrag kann man leben" 
(Interview, 5.8.1987). By all accounts the public broadcasters were 
happy with the final agreement, and private broadcasters could live 
within its confines (see Hilf, 1987a, p.20; Lafontaine, 1987, p.3).
To a large extent the agreement had been shaped by the
Constitutional Court's decision in Rovember 1986, which laid down 
conditions which could not be ignored by the negotiators, especially 
in respect to plurality of opinion in a dual system of broadcasting
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(see Kammann, 1987, p.3; Lafontaine, 1987, p.3). Without the
Constitutional Court’s ruling it is doubtful whether the inter-Land
agreement, if it had been concluded at all, would have been so
advantageous to public broadcasting. According to Kammann, much of
the credit for the shape of the final draft lay with the SPD Land of 
Hesse, which had refused to be browbeaten by CDU/CSU demands (1987a, 
p.4). By contrast, the attitude of the other SPD Lander had been 
lacklustre, and more intent on limiting damage to public broadcasting 
than on influencing the future shape of private broadcasting.
Looking back over three years of negotiation, public service
broadcasting had secured a great deal more from the agreement than
would have initially been thought possible. Its existence and further
development was to a large extent secured, especially as the threat of
differing licence fee levels had now receded. The retention of a
universal licence fee and the equalisation agreement reduced the threat
of Ihe collapse of public broadcasting, and was especially important
for the future survival of the smaller ARD stations. However, the
prospect of regular licence fee increases was by no means guaranteed,
as the Lander had agreed only to check the financial requirements of
public broadcasting on a regular basis. This has implications for the
guarantees of existence and further development contained in the
agreement, and these were succinctly put to me by ZDF
Programmdirektor, Alois Schardt:
Ich sehe eine echte Bestandsgarantie, die immer auf Rachsicht 
sieht, die Chance der Fortentwicklung, denn man kann nur bestehen, 
wenn man sich fortentwickeln kann. Die Fortentwicklungsgarantie 
ist in der Form nicht gegeben, sie ist nur, wenn Sie so woilen, in 
der Bestandsgarantie immanent. In dem Rundfunkstaatsvertrag, steht 
drin, daB sich alie zwei Jahre die Ministerprasidenten sich
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vergewissern, ob wir eine Gebiihrenerhohung brauchen. Sie haben
nicht gesagt, wir werben Ihnen eine geben. (Interview, i 1.8.1987)
Although the rules on advertising remained essentially the same as 
before, the separate clauses on advertising on HR's third television 
channel, the alterations to the amount of advertising on raaio, 
permission to insert commercial breaks, and the possibility of the 
eventual introduction of advertising on Sundays and public holidays 
were important concessions. The inter-Land agreement had also 
brought clarity about the future of Eins Plus and 3SAT. Both ZDF and 
ARD had gained access to a transponder each on TV-Sat. Although ZDF 
was only temporarily awarded a transponder on the first satellite, in 
anticipation of the SPD Lander nominating a third private broadcasting 
channel, it seemed doubtful whether a third transponder would 
eventually go to private interests, since the Vest German advertising 
market is believed by some to be unlikely to be able to support three 
national private channels (see Leudts, 1987a, pp.1-2). According to 
Kammann, the award of a third channel to private interests was merely 
an attempt to save face for Sforth Rhine-Vestphalia (1987a, p.5).
However, not all the stipulations of the inter-Land agreement found 
favour with the public stations. ARD criticised the decision to fund 
the supervisory bodies of private broadcasting from the licence fee 
(see ARD-Hauptversammlung bekraftigt Zustimmung zum Medien- 
Staatsvertragt KuR 1.3.1987, p.10). According to Bausch, ARD and ZDF 
could have initiated constitutional proceedings against this clause on 
the grounds of misuse of the licence fee, but this was rejected
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because it might have endangered the inter-Land agreement with far 
worse results for public broadcasters (Interview, 29.7.1987). There 
was also dissatisfaction about the limits placed on participation in 
pan-European channels, and about the limited possibilities of reacting 
to new developments, such as specialist narrowcast channels (.ARD 
besorgt iiber Staats vertrags-Mus terbegrun d ung, KuR 16.5.1987, p. 14). 
The ARD stations would also have preferred more flexibility for 
advertising on public television, especially in respect of advertising 
after 20.00, which the inter-Land agreement did not allow (see ARD- 
Vorsitzender pladiert fur flexiblere TV-Verbung, KuR 16.5,1987, p.15; 
Hilf, 1987a, p.23).
Although private broadcasters were not entirely satisfied with the
final agreement, it was generally agreed that they had been given
sufficient security for further development. Some criticism was
expressed about the advertising concessions awarded to the public
stations (see Jurgen Doetz, Managing Director of SAT 1 cit. in Leudts,
1987a, p.3). According to Andreas Schardt, SAT l’s Justiziar, the
Lander had attempted to treat public and private broadcasters in an
equal fashion, but this approach was fundamentally flawed:
Eine rechtliche Gleichbehandlung von privatem und offentlich- 
rechtlichem Rundfunk fuhrt zumindest fur die nachsten 5, 6, 7 Jahre 
wo der private Rundfunk noch in der Entwicklung ist, zu einer 
wirtschaftlichen Ungleichbehandlung. Das muB jeder sehen, der sich 
in der Medienpolitik auskennt. (Interview, 5.8.1987)
However, the decision to fund the supervisory bodies of private
broadcasting from the licence fee freed private broadcasters from this
financial burden. As this money was also to be used to improve
terrestrial reception of private broadcasting, the economic survival of
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private channels, in terms of larger audiences, and consequently more 
advertising revenue, was given a significant boost.
Hans-Wolfgang HeBler, the media expert of the Evangelical church, 
saw the inter-Land agreement as a compromise between political and 
business interests which ignored the interests of different groupings 
within society (HeBler, 1987, p.22). This feeling is echoed by
Kammann, who realises, however, that this was the price to be paid for 
compromise: "Die besiegelte generelle Abkehr vom Kuiturgut Rundfunk 
ist der tatsachliche hohe Preis fur das hohe Gut der Einheitlichkeit" 
(Kammann, 1987a, p.5; see also Lafontaine, 1987, p.4). Predictably, as 
a representative of the church, HeBler criticised the agreement for 
allowing advertising on Sundays and religious holidays (1987, p.23). 
However, he admitted that public broadcasting had received a better 
deal than might have been expected (1987, p.22>.
The inter- Land agreement of 1987 did not complete the 
restructuring of broadcasting in West Germany. It merely set the 
stage for further developments, by providing a framework for future 
reference. In March 1987, SAT 1 was awarded a TV-Sat transponder in 
accordance with the stipulations of the SUdschiene> to which Bavaria, 
the Shineland-Palatinate and Baden-Wiirttemberg were signatories (see 
SAT 1 erhalt Kanal auf Rundfunksatelllt, FR 23.3.1987). However, the 
promise of a DBS transponder was of less significance than the 
terrestrial frequencies which went with the award. As expected, a 
further TV-Sat transponder was awarded to SAT l's rival, RTL Plus, 
under the conditions of the Nordschiene, to which Hamburg, Lower
- 235 -
Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, and West Berlin belonged (see RTL plus 
erhalt "Nordkanal" des TV-SAT, FR 6.4.1987). This too was linked to
the more interesting prospect of terrestrial frequencies.
3.9 Further clarity f C o n s t itutional Court
The Constitutional Court delivered a further broadcasting judgement 
on 24th March 1987 and publicised it on 4th June 1987 in response to 
a case brought by SWF and SDR against the Baden-Wiirttemberg Land 
media law, which had come into force on 1st January 1986 (BeschluB 
des Ersten Senats des Bundesverfassungsgerichts Liber die Verfassungs- 
beschwerden des SDR und des SWF gegen das Landesmediengesetz Baden- 
Wiirttemberg von 24.JKarz 1987, in FKD, 12.6.1987, pp.1-40; see also 
Landesmediengesetz Baden-Wiirttemberg, 16.12.1985, in Bauer, Detjen, 
Miiller-Romer, 17.1.2). The central issue concerned the law's attempt 
to exclude public stations from certain areas of broadcasting (local 
broadcasting, specialist narrowcast channels, and pay services), in 
order to improve the chances of success far private broadcasting. 
However, the Court was also expected to make further pronouncements 
on the dual system of broadcasting.
The Court gave further definition to the concept of basic provision 
by public broadcasting. It stated categorically that Grundversorgung 
did not imply "eine Mindestversorgung" allowing the removal of certain 
types of programming from public broadcasting (p.19). Sfor did Grund­
versorgung imply a division of obligations, in the sense that certain 
programmes were part of basic provision, allowing the remainder to be
provided solely by private broadcasting channels (p.19). According to 
the Court, basic provision consisted of three elements: a tecnnology
(at present terrestrial distribution, which allowed reception by ail), 
programme content, and safeguards to ensure the portrayal of plurality 
of opinion in broadcasting (p.19). This put an end to the argument 
that public broadcasting was tied to terrestrial distribution. 
Furthermore, by declaring public service broadcasting's exclusion from 
certain technological forms of distribution to be unconstitutional 
(p.37), the Court declared that these might eventually be included in 
Grundversorgung, if they replaced traditional broadcasting (p.39).
The Court declared those clauses of the Baden-Wiirttemberg law 
unconstitutional which forbade public broadcasters from initiating or 
expanding sub-regional and local broadcasting services, or, in fact, 
any other areas of broadcasting (p.l8pp, p.34pp, p.36). The Court's 
reasons for declaring these clauses unconstitutional were not 
connected to the principle of Grundversorgung, as the Court admitted 
that these services were not part of public broadcasting's obligation 
of basic provision (p.19, p.37). They were declared unconstitutional 
because they conflicted with the principle of free forming of opinion 
as guaranteed in Article 5 of of the Basic Law (p.23).
According to the Court, the introduction of private broadcasting 
within a dual system of broadcasting only made sense if the diversity 
of programming was improved overall, in spite of the deficiencies of 
private broadcasting (p.23). For this to take place there had to be 
competition between different channels (p.23). To introduce private
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broadcasting as a means of encouraging programme competition, and yet 
to forbid public broadcasting from certain areas of activity, was 
therefore a contradiction, and a barrier to the formation of opinion 
within society. The Court ruled that public broadcasting must be 
given equal access to all areas of broadcasting, even to those which 
were not considered to be part of Grundversorgung (p.23). More 
importantly, the legislator had to ensure that public broadcasting had 
sufficient funds to provide programming in competition with private 
broadcasting (p.23). In confirming public broadcasting's right to 
equal participation in all areas of broadcasting the Court rejected 
Baden-Wiirttemberg's argument about the need to protect the economic 
existence of private broadcasting, for in its view: "Marktchancen
konnen eine Frage wirtschaftlicher, nicht aber der Meinungsfreiheit 
sein" (p.25). Even beyond the basic provision of services by public 
service broadcasting, the state, in this case Baden-Wiirtemmberg, could 
not pass legislation which kept certain areas of broadcasting activity 
exclusively for private channels.
The Court added that as local and regional programmes were not 
part of Grundversorgungt public broadcasting had no priority of access 
over commercial channels, but it had to be given the same opportunity 
as private broadcasting in this area (p.28). Equal access was 
sufficiently secured in these areas of broadcasting, if several private 
channels competed with one public channel (p.28). However, in the 
event of a shortage of technical capacityj public channels wishing to 
undertake regional or local programming would have to split their
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existing terrestrial frequencies, provided That this did not affect the 
provision of other services which were part of Grundversorgung (p.29).
Although the Court was prepared to uphold public broadcasting's 
access to all areas of broadcasting, it declared that the law's ban on 
advertising in the local and sub-regional services of SDH and SWF to 
be constitutional, as was the requirement that public broadcasters 
would need approval by law to institute subscription or pay-per-view 
services (p.29pp, p.31). The Court justified the advertising ban in 
the interests of protecting the economic survival of private 
broadcasters, but stipulated that the funding of public channels had 
to be secured by some other way, otherwise public broadcasting would 
be indirectly prevented from engaging in local and regional 
broadcasting, and this would have been incompatible with 
constitutional demands (p.29).
According to the Court, the restrictions on pay and pay-per-view 
services referred only to methods of funding, and did not prevent 
public stations from offering additional specialist narrowcast 
channels (p.31). Such programmes were not part of Grundversorgung, 
because they were only aimed at a narrow audience, and their content 
was of such a specific nature, that they could not contribute fully to 
the formation of public opinion (p.32). However, as was the case with 
regional or local broadcasting, public broadcasters had to have the 
same opportunities as private broadcasters to provide narrowcast 
channels, especially if these contained programmes, in particular 
cultural and educational programmes, which private channels were
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unlikely to transmit (p.32). As with regional and local broadcasting, 
the legislator would have to find some other means of funding public 
service broadcasting's activities in this area, if it was not to be 
indirectly denied access to the provision of specialist narrowcast 
channels (p.33).
3.9.1 Evaluations and reactions
In retrospect, the Constitutional Court's ruling of March 198? was 
more significant than its predecessor of November 1986. Where the 
fourth judgement had opened up new opportunities for private 
broadcasting, the Court's fifth acted as a brake, reinforcing the 
principles of freedom of expression and information, the need to 
secure the comprehensive formation of opinion within society, and 
broadcasting independence.
Some of the confusion about the previous definition of 
Grundversorgung was removed (see Jakob, 1987, p.3). It was now quite 
clear that Grundversorgung did not imply a minimum of services, and 
that public service broadcasting's existing terrestrial services could 
not be taken away, and reserved for private channels. Grundversorgung 
was not a static concept, but a dynamic term which allowed for 
adaptation to changes in technology and programme content. Its basic 
premise is reception by all, which for the time being means 
distribution by existing terrestrial frequencies, but does not exclude 
satellite distribution at a later date.
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More importantly, the Court’s ruling removed the notion of 
protected areas of activity for private broadcasting. In aoing so it 
reinforced the principle of the freedom of broadcasting from the 
state, as the legislator cannot forbid public service broadcasting 
from any field of broadcasting. New standards had been set for the 
autonomy of public broadcasting. Theoretically there is noxhing to 
stop public broadcasting from embarking on additional regional and 
local services and narrowcast services in competition to private 
broadcasting, even though these are not part of basic provision or 
Grundversorgung. The Court's fourth broadcasting judgement in 
November 1986 appeared at times to be guided by the need to protect 
the economic existence of private broadcasting. The fifth judgement 
reinstated balance by reiterating the need to secure competition 
between different channels, rather than economic competition.
In terms of broadcasting finance the public stations would appear 
to have won a significant victory. Although regional, local, and 
narrowcast services are not part of basic provision, the legislator is 
obliged to secure other sources of funding, if advertising, pay, or 
pay-per-view funding are prohibited. In theory the public stations 
therefore have an important weapon in their fight to gain adequate 
funding, because in setting the licence fee, the Lander can no longer 
restrict increases on the grounds that the public stations are 
providing services which go beyond the obligation of Grundversorgung. 
Of course, ARD and ZDF will still have to take the public's willingness 
to pay for further licence fee increases into account (see Bullinger, 
1987, p.7). Moreover, even in giving a value to Grundversorgung, the
position of ARD and ZDF is by no means secure. As Hans Bausch, SDR
Intendant, pointed out to me:
Ver liegt nun fest, wievie'l Geld man fur die Grundversorgung haben 
mufi oder nicht. Vo steht geschrieben, ich brauche mein eigenes 
Symphonieorchester, das mich DM20 million im Jahr kostet. Ist das 
Grundversorgung oder nicht. . .Ich wiirde mich nicht darauf 
verlassen, daB irgendjemand definiert, was Grundversorgung im 
Hinblick auf die finanziellen Auswirkungen bedeutet, und das, mufi 
man realistisch sehen, was politisch durchsetzbar ist. (Interview
29.7.1987)
The judgement had given public broadcasting a more secure basis of 
existence, notwithstanding the fact that further developments may 
force the Court to alter its assumptions further in the future (see 
Bullinger, 1987, p.6). In any case, Willibald Hilf, Intendant of SVF, 
pointed out in 1979 that broadcasters would be unwise to be lulled 
into complacency by any of the Court's rulings: “Der offentiich-
rechtliche Rundfunk kann sich nicht einfach auf den Lorbeeren der 
Urteile des Bundesverfassungsgerichts ausruhen, er mufi seine Position 
immer wieder aktiv zu legitimieren suchen” (cit. in Fischer, 1979, 
p.424). This view is shared by Hans Bausch, who in his interview with 
me indicated that he was aways mindful of the changes in attitude 
which could occur simply from changes in the composition of the Court 
(Interview, 29.7.1987).
The judgement constituted a setback for private broadcasting, 
especially in the area of local and regional broadcasting (see Jurgen 
Doetz, Managing Director of SAT 1 cit. in Reaktionen auf Karlsruhe: 
Private enttauscht, SDR/SVF zufrieden, KuR 6.6.1987, p.8). It was 
feared that public broadcasting would extend its services to such a
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degree that they would need more funding, thus requiring an extension
to advertising, which would affect the further existence of private
broadcasting (KuR 6.6.1987, p.8). These fears were underlined to me by
Andreas Schardt, Justizlar at SAT 1:
Nur die Gefahr, daB ein Vildwuchs entsteht, daS das offentlich- 
rechtliche Monopol macht was es will, und immer starker seine 
Alimentationsanspriiche stellt, die ist nicht zu ubersehen. Das ist 
auch der Hauptkritikpunkt an diesem Urteil, das da moglich eine 
uferlose Ausweitung moglich ist. (Interview, 5.8.1987)
3.10 Review
Ironically, after so much effort to achieve agreement on TV-Sat, 
the satellite failed to function properly following launch and the
project was abandonned in February 1988 (see Endgultiges "Aus" fur TV- 
Sat 1, FR 25.2.1988, p.18). The failure of TV-Sat does not appear to 
have affected the progress of private broadcasting, which has found 
consolation in the availability of terrestrial frequencies. These 
offer the prospect of larger audiences at no extra cost to the viewer 
who does not have to invest in a satellite dish (Andreas Schardt,
Interview, 5.8.1987).
For ARD and ZDF, TV-Sat was not the central issue of negotiations 
on an inter- Land agreement. Their main concern was to achieve
security for their existing services and the chance of moving into new 
areas of activity. In this respect, the Constitutional Court judgement 
of March 1987 combined with the inter-Land ageement was far more 
beneficial to them than the judgement of November 1986. As the
suppliers of Grundversorgung the future of ARD and ZDF's traditional
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activities in television and radio is guaranteed. They even have a 
claim to institute new services such as sub-regional radio and 
narrowcast services which are not part of Grundversorgung. However, 
the future of all their activities remains subject to the uncertainties 
of funding. It is true that the Lander are obliged to ensure adequate 
sources of funding in law, but there is no guarantee that these will 
be forthcoming because of the party political differences inherent in 
the Lander process of policy-making and because of the difficulties in 
giving a financial value to the services which ARD and ZDF provide.
What the events leading to the signing of the inter-Land agreement 
amply demonstrated, was the dependence of ARD and ZDF on a fragile 
system of Lander policy-making. The squabbles surrounding these 
events and the time it took to resolve all the issues involved placed 
the public service broadcasters in an awkward position over which 
they had little influence. A route out of this labyrinth was only 
brought about by the intervention of the Federal Constitutional Court.
Motes
1. Texts of the new broadcasting laws allowing private broadcasting 
can be found in Die Neue Medien (Bauer, Detjen, Muller Romer) or Media 
Perspektiven. By January 1988 the following laws had been passed or 
were under consideration. Most of these have since been amended to 
take account of the inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation of 
broadcasting:
- Baden-Vurttem berg - Landesmediengesetz Baden-Wiirttemberg 
(LMedienG), 16.12.1985 (in Bauer, Detjen, Muller Romer, 17.1.2)
- Bavaria - Gesetz iiber die Erprobung und Entwicklung neuer 
Rundfunkangebote und andere Mediendienste in Bayern 
(Medienerprobungs- und -entwicklungsgesetz), 22.11.1984 (in MPD 
1/1985, pp.1-10
- Berlin - Kabelpilot- und Versuchsgesetz fur drahtlosen Rundfunk im 
Land Berlin, 27.7.1984 ((in Bauer, Detjen, Muller Romer 18.2.2)
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- Bremen - Gesetz iiber die vorlaufige Weiterverbreitung von Rundfunk- 
programmen in Kabelanlagen, 11.7.1985 (in Bauer, Detjen, Muller Romer 
17.4.2)
- Hamburg - Hamburgisches Landesmediengesetz (HmbMedienG), 3.12.1985, 
(in Bauer, Detjen, Muller Romer 17.5.2)
- Hesse - Entwurf eines Gesetzes iiber den privaten Rundfunk in 
Hessen Stand 25.11.1987 (in KuR 6.2.1988)
- Lower Saxony - Fiedersachsisches Landesrundfunkgesetz,16.3.1987 (in 
FKD 27.1987, pp.10-20)
- Forth Rhine-Vestphalia - Rundfunkgesetz fur das Land Kordrhein- 
Vestfalen, 11.1.1988 (in MPB 11/1988, pp.137-155
- Rheinland-Pfalz - Landesrundfunkgesetz, 24.6.1986 (in KuR 30.6.1986, 
pp.15-20
- Saarland - Rundfunkgesetz fur das Saarland, 28.11.1984, pp. 16-31 
(in MPD 1/1985, pp.16-31.
- Schleswig-Holstein - Rundfunkgesetz fur das Land Schleswig- 
Holstein, 27.11.1984 (in MPD 1/1985, pp.32-41).
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CHAPTER FOUR
LIVING WITH A DUAL SYSTEM
The Constitutional Court’s rulings in November 1986 and March 1987 
gave public broadcasting clear obligations with regard to the 
provision of a full range of programme output, incorporating 
information, education, entertainment, and especially cultural 
programming. In this respect nothing had changed, because public 
broadcasting has always been obliged to provide balanced and 
comprehensive programming.
References to public broadcasting's responsibility for Grund­
versorgung constituted recognition both of the deficiencies of 
commercial broadcasting and of the limited extent to which competition 
could contribute to diversity of opinion and a broad range of 
programming. More importantly, the Court had rejected the notion of 
public broadcasting as a "Nischen-Rundfunk", to which many supporters 
of public broadcasting had objected (see Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.48). 
Realisation of this concept would have involved public broadcasting 
concentrating on information and minority programmes, leaving more 
populist programming to private broadcasters. However, the public 
broadcasters still remain subject to greater demands on the type of 
programmes they broadcast than their private competitors, who do not 
have to pay so much attention to minority programmes, information, 
and culture.
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In theory the traditional role of public broadcasting has been 
reinforced by the rulings, but in practice the public broadcasters 
must still face the challenge of private competition. In the long­
term private broadcasting channels will almost certainly undermine the 
position of ARD and ZDF as the dominant forces in West German 
broadcasting (see Stolte, 1984, p.26). Regardless of Constitutional 
rulings about public service broadcasting's role in a dual system, it 
is the audience who will decide which system best serves its needs. 
The way in which public broadcasting responds to the commercial 
challenge will show the extent of its commitment to Grundversorgung, 
and its ability to offer something substantially different from its 
commercial rivals and yet still manage to appeal to the majority of 
the audience with populist programming.
Changes in the programme policy of the public stations are already 
visible. In order to examine the type and extent of these changes, 
the separate components of the terrestrial TV output of the ARD 
stations and ZDF have been examined. Attention has been focused on 
the terrestrial public channels as these represent both the 
overwhelming bulk of public service output, and the strongest bulwark 
against commercial competition at a national level. Public service 
activities in satellite, cable, and radio have been dealt with 
separately in chapter five on the expansion of public service 
broadcasting. A quantitative analysis of the programme output of ZDF 
and the ARD network was undertaken for a two week period in each year 
from 1982 to 1987 to establish whether there had been any substantial 
quantitative changes in programme output in recent years (see 4.8).
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4.1 Indications for the future. Inroads by private channels
Competition in the form of privately-owned satellite channels 
arrived at the beginning of 1984, but remains an unknown quantity 
because the majority of Vest German households are still dependent on 
the terrestrial services of ARD and ZDF. ARD and ZDF currently enjoy 
the advantages of technological, financial, and human resources. 
However, these advantages are likely to diminish as private 
broadcasting becomes more established, drawing viewers and 
advertising revenue away from the public stations (see Schwaderlapp, 
1984, p.159; Schardt, 1984, p.917; Berg, 1985, p.10; Konrad, 1985, p.150; 
Stolte, 1985, p.164).
The threat of this happening on a rapid scale has been delayed due 
to the slow spread of cable television, on which private satellite 
channels like SAT 1 and RTL Plus are dependent for reception. By the 
end of 1987, 8.9 million households were passed by cable,
approximately 34.4% of all West German television households. Of 
these, 3.2 million homes, or 12.5% of all homes were actually 
connected, signifying a take-up rate of 36% (.Ende 1987 mebr als drei 
Millianen Kabelhaushalte, FR 10.2.1988). However, the increasing 
availability of local terrestrial frequencies in urban centres like 
Munich, Hamburg, Vest Berlin, and the Main-Rhine area around 
Frankfurt, is gradually solving the problem of reception, and may in 
fact supercede cable as the chief means of receiving SAT 1 and RTL 
Plus. Ironically then, it appears as if the old media of distribution 
hold the key to profitability for private broadcasting, particularly as
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terrestrial distribution removes the necessity for the public to 
invest in a cable connection. In Vest Berlin, for instance, 800,000 
households can receive private television off-air (Kabel & Satellit 
27.7.1987, p.3).
Nationally, SAT 1 and RTL Plus pose the greatest threat to the 
superiority of public television, although they have recently been 
joined by Pro Sieben, formally Eureka TV, and Tele 5, formally KMP 
musicbox. None of the new private channels have yet reached the 
profit zone, but they are likely to weather problems of profitability 
and low audiences, because of substantial backing from the largest 
media and publishing concerns in the country. In 1985 SAT 1 spent 
DM250 million and earned only DM7.5 million in advertising revenue; 
RTL plus spent DM60 million against DM18 million in revenues (see 
Cable & Satellite Europe 2/1986, pp.19-21). By 1987 both channels 
were expected to earn DM5 0m each in advertising revenues with 
expenditure running at DM150m and DM120m for SAT 1 and RTL Plus 
respectively (see Krieg der Vellen, Virtshaftswoche 14.8.1987, p.62). 
In achieving their long-term aims private broadcasters will 
undoubtedly be helped by a laxer regulatory regime than their public 
service rivals, which allows them to concentrate on cheap, imported 
programmes rather than on expensive domestic production and minority 
programming.
SAT 1 has six shareholders, having shed four of its original 
members in 1987 (see Jakob, 1986, p.3). Its principal shareholders 
are: the Programmgesellschaft fur Kabel- und Satellitenrundfunk (PKS,
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40%), the Aktuell Presse-Fernsehen (APF, 15%), the Axel Springer-Veriag 
(15%), and the Holtzbrinck-Gruppe (15%) (SAT 1: Neue Organisation, 
verandertes Programm, FK 5.12.1986, p.5). Yet one of the most
important participants in SAT 1 does not appear in this list. Leo 
Kirch, Vest Germany's premier film and television distributor, holds a 
51% share in PKS through his Taurus-Film GmbH & Co KG (49%), and 
through his lawyer Joachim Theye (2%) (.Kirch dominiert bei SAT 1, MP 
6/1988, p.391). Kirch also has a 26% stake in the Axel Springer- 
Verlag, in turn a 35% shareholder in APF, a consortium of 145
newspaper publishers, responsible for producing SAT l's news and 
current affairs output (see Allianz Kirch/Springer: Der Weg ist of fen, 
FR 15.7.1987; TOt 30.3.1988, p.12; EXX 27.4.1988, p.4). Kirch's
activities are not only confined to SAT 1 for he also owns the
Teleclub pay movie service, and his son Thomas, holds a 49% share in 
Pro Sieben. As Vest Germany's dominant distributor Kirch also 
provides SAT 1 with 60% of its programmes (see A. Villiams, 1988, 
p.33).
RTL Plus, SAT l's main rival, has five principal shareholders: 
Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de T616diffusion (CTL), the Luxembourg-based 
television and radio concern (46.1%), the Ufa Film- und Fernseh GmbH 
(38.9%), the newspaper publishing concern Vestdeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung (VAZ, 10%), the magazine publisher Burda GmbH (2%), and the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ, 1%) (see Verleger-TV: Neues Spiel, 
Virtschaftswoche 14.8.1987, p.62). The last two used to be members of 
the SAT 1 consortium, before differences forced them to seek their 
fortunes elsewhere (Jakob, 1987, p.3). Ufa is owned by the largest
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media concern in West Germany, the Bertelsmann AG (50%) and the 
publishing group, Gruner & Jahr (50%), itself a 74.9% subsidiary of 
Bertelsmann (see Williams, 1988, p.34). Bertelsmann also has a
minority interest in CLT, because of its 14.29% share of Fratel 
Luxembourg, which in turn has a 28% share in CLT (see Williams, 1988, 
p.34).
SAT 1, RTL Plus, Tele 5 and Pro Sieben are all generalist 
entertainment channels, concentrating on a mix of popular fiction and 
light entertainment, most of which is imported. Very few programme 
are produced in-house (see Lenz, 1987, pp.6-7). Acquired programmes 
account for approximately three quarters of SAT l's transmissions and 
for over half of RTL Plus transmissions (see Kruger, 1987, p.557). By 
comparison purchased programmes account for only about 20% of output 
each on the ARD network and on ZDF (see Kruger, 1987, p.557).
Differences in the programming philosphies of public and private 
stations were shown in a study undertaken in February 1987 (Kruger, 
1987, pp.549pp). At peak time (7pm-llpm> fiction (feature films, 
series) and light entertainment accounted for over 70% of all SAT 1 
and RTL Plus transmissions (p.556). At SAT 1 the emphasis is clearly 
placed on feature films (49%) and series (21%) (p.556). At RTL Plus 
fiction constituted 57% of output (films 42% and series 15%), with a 
further 13% devoted to light entertainment (p.556). As expected, 
fiction and entertainment also accounted for significant proportions 
of peak-time transmissions on the public channels (ARD 60%; ZDF 48%), 
but this was still less than the private channels. Moreover, ARD and
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ZDF appeared to be less reliant on feature films (ARB 8%; ZDF 11%), 
devoting more time to plays (ARD 18%; ZDF 12%), a category which was 
totally absent on the private channels (p.556). The amount of time 
devoted to series on the public channels was about the same as on RTL 
Plus and SAT 1 (ARD 16%; ZDF 10%) (p.556). ARD and ZDF also devoted 
significant proportions of time to light entertainment (15% and 11% 
respectively), matched only by RTL Plus's contribution of 13% compared 
to a 1.5% level of light entertainment on SAT 1 (p.556).
As RTL Plus and SAT 1 devote a large chunk of their schedules to 
fiction and entertainment, the proportion of time devoted to 
information (SAT 1 27%; RTL Plus 16%) was less than either ARD (36%) 
or ZDF (46%) (Kruger, 1987, p.556). There were also qualitative 
differences in the type of information offered. Whereas SAT 1 and RTL 
Plus concentrated on news (18% and 12% respectively), the information 
programmes of ARD and ZDF were much more broad-based, incorporating 
news (16% and 17%), current affairs (16% and 14%), and cultural 
information (3% and 9%) (p.556).
Differences in programming philosophies can also be shown by 
comparing peak time schedules, in this case those of ZDF and SAT 1 
(see Fig. 4.1). SAT l's schedule is fairly rigid, and based on a 
stripping system where the same type of programmes, mainly series and 
feature films, are broadcast at the same time each day. These are 
interspersed by short news bulletins. Information programmes are 
relegated to the late margins. By contrast, a typical ZDF schedule is 
both more varied and less rigid, incorporating information and
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cultural programmes at peak time, programme categories, which are 
almost absent in SAT l's peak time schedule. ZDF's schedule only 
becomes more akin to SAT 1 at weekends, a time usually devoted to 
more populist output. However, here too, there is a difference, because 
a substantial part of the evening on ZDF is devoted to sport.
Fig. 4.1
ZDF SCHEDULE 3rd-9th OCTOBER 1987 
19.00 20.00 21.00 22.00 23.00 24.00
Sat R ♦ Info ♦ Film *R* Sp * LE
Sun R ♦Info* LE * Series * Series *R* LE *
Mon R ♦ Film *1* I * R * Info * Info *
Tues R ♦ Info ♦ Film *1* R ♦ Play * Series
Wed R ♦ LE ♦ Info fSeriest R ♦Info^ Info ♦ Film
Thur R ♦ LE ♦ Info ♦ R ♦ Info ♦ Sp ♦ Film
Fri R ♦ Info ♦ Info ♦ LE * R * Info * Sp ♦
SAT 1 SCHEDULE 3rd-9th OCTOBER 1987
19.00 20. 00 21.00 22.00 23.00 24. 00
Sat S^Rt Series fR^ Film ♦ Series *R ♦ Film
Sun StLEfR* Series^Rt Film ♦ Series tR ♦ Series
Mon StLEfRf SeriestR^- Series tRt Film ♦R ♦ Info
Tues StLEtRt SeriestRt Series fR^ Film ♦R ♦ Info
Wed S^LE*Rt SeriestR* Series tR^ Film ♦R * Info
Thur StLEtRt Series*R* Series *R* Film *R * Info
Fri LE *R^ Series*R* Series fRt Film ♦R * Film
Key: R/Rews, 1/Info/Information, Sp/Sport, LE/Light
Entertainment, S/Series (Source - Horzu, 25.9.1987).
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Public broadcasters, not surprisingly, have generally been 
dismissive about the programmes of their private rivals. Manfred 
Buchwald, Chefredakteur at HR, writes: "Es ist ja hochst bezeichnend, 
daB tiber die Programme kommerzieller Veranstalter niemand spricht. 
Ihnen fehlt jede dialog-fordende Qualitat" (Buchwald, 19Q7a, p.6). 
Referring to commercial rivals Hans Bausch, SDR Intendant, has said: 
”Es fehlt an Phantasie und es fehlt an Erfahrung. . .An Geld fehlt es 
nicht. Es fehlt an Geld, wenn ich verdienen will” (Interview,
29.7.1987).
Yet, there are strong indications that private broadcasters want to 
shift some of their emphasis away from imported series and films in 
favour of domestically produced programmes, once it becomes 
economically viable to do so. They are already beginning to invest 
more time and money into domestically produced entertainment and 
drama, primarily from independent production companies. According to 
Andreas Schardt, Justiziar at SAT 1, this is a necessity, because: 
"Eigenproduktion die Identitat des Senders viel starker pragt als 
Sendungen von Serien und alten Spielfilmen" (Interview, 5.8.1988). 
However, private broadcasting's dependence on advertising revenue and 
large audiences, a fact acknowledged by the Constitutional Court, 
means that minority programmes, especially at peak time, are unlikely 
ever to be broadcast on a large scale (see Lahnstein, 1987, p.3). As 
Alois Schardt, ZDF Programmdirektor> points out: "Der offentlich-
rechtliche Rundfunk will gefallen; das Privatfernsehen muB gefalien, 
weil es urn die Amortisation hoher Investitionen geht" (Schardt, 1984, 
p.917).
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The extent to which private television has made inroads into the 
audience figures of the ARD network and ZDF is revealed in the viewing 
behaviour of cabled households in 1987 (see Darsch in/Frank, 1988, 
pp.214pp). These findings also give some indication of future trends 
once private television becomes more widely available. Nationally, 
where cable is only available to 12% of all TV households, the public 
broadcasters are still holding their ground. In cabled households the 
story is dramatically different. Here the ARD network's 41% national 
share of the audience drops to 29%, and ZDF's 41% share falls to 26% 
(Darschin/Frank, 1988, p.224>. The ARD third channels in sum maintain 
an 11% share of the cable audience, with Eins Plus and 3SAT, making 
little impact, with shares of 1% and 3% respectively (p.224).
The losses sustained by the ARD network and ZDF in cabled
households, have clearly benefited SAT 1 and RTL Plus, with SAT 1 
making a better impression than its commercial rival. SAT 1
accounted for 15% of all viewing in cabled households in 1987 
compared to the 10% share of RTL Plus (Darschin/Frank, 1988, p.224).
Figures for the first quarter of 1988 show that SAT 1 has increased
this share still further to 21.5%, following programme reforms which 
placed more emphasis on entertainment (see SAT 1 holt auf in der 
Zuschauergunst, FR 21.4.1988, p.26). ZDF's share then dropped to 22.8% 
and the ARD network share fell to 26%. RTL Plus could only maintain a 
9.2% share of the cable audience (p.26).
It is of course important not only to establish that ARD and ZDF 
are losing viewers to SAT 1 and RTL Plus, but also to note which
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programmes are losing viewers. The most popular programmes on ARD 
and ZDF have lost viewers, but are still the most widely viewed 
programmes in cabled homes. The programmes which have lost most are 
those devoted to information and culture (Darschin/Frank, 1988, 
pp.224pp). This gives credence to the view that, given a choice 
between information and entertainment, viewers will tend to skirt 
around serious programmes (see Stolte, 1985, p.167).
For instance, nationally the early evening news bulletins of ARD 
and ZDF enjoy a 27% and 23% share respectively. In cabled homes this 
share drops to 21% and 18% (Darschin/Frank, 1988, p.225). The later 
and longer news bulletins fare even worse, nationally these reach 16% 
(ARD) and 18% (ZDF) of all TV households. In cabled homes the ARD 
late news drops to 10%, with ZDF decreasing to 11%, a loss of 
approximately one third (p.225). This drop in audience share for news 
is not compensated by SAT 1 and RTL Plus, whose news programmes 
enjoy only a 4% to 6% share of the cable audience. The decline in 
viewers for news programmes is echoed by a loss of viewers for other 
ARD and ZDF information programmes, which have lost between 30% and 
40% of their share of the audience in cabled homes, with some 
programmes even losing half their audience (Darschin/Frank, 1988, 
p.226). These losses are worrying for public broadcasters, and the 
situation is likely to become more acute following- greater availability 
of private channels via terrestrial frequencies. However, ARD and ZDF 
cannot abandon this type of output in favour of more populist 
programming, because Grundversorgung obliges them to keep information 
and culture as part of a well-balanced schedule.
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4.2 Commercialisation or public service - reactions to private.
competition
ARD and ZDF have been anticipating private competition for some 
time, and have altered their programme strategies accordingly. 
Private channels, like SAT 1 and RTL Plus, are already seen as fully 
fledged competitors, although they are not yet fully established as 
powerful rivals to the public service system (see Schwarzkopf, 198b, 
p.62). This stance is confirmed by Hans Bausch, SDR Intendazit; “Die 
ARD und ZDF versuchen jetzt schon Platze zu besetzen, damit die 
Privaten gar keine groBe Chancen haben, und sie (ARD and ZDF) 
versuchen natiirlich auch die Gewohnheiten der Zuschauer zu pragen" 
(Interview, 29.7.1987).
However, while acknowledging that changes are taking place, public
broadcasters have been careful to point out that there have been no
substantial shifts of emphasis in the amount of transmission time
devoted to entertainment, education, and information (see Schwarzkopf,
1985, p.62; Bolesch/Schardt, 1986, p.78; Schwarzkopf, 1987, p.4).
Answering fears expressed about shifts in emphasis, Alois Schardt, ZDF
Programmdirektor, told me:
Es gibt bei ARD und ZDF keine wesentlichen Veranderungen des 
Programmangebotes im Hinblick auf das Verhaltnis von 
Prozentsatzzahlen von Unterhaltung und Information und Sport. . .Das 
ist im Prinzip das Gleiche noch. (Interview, 11,8.1987)
Similar views were expressed to me by Hans Bausch, SDR lDtendanti but
he added that nothing will be given away to private channels:
Sie (ARD and ZDF, J.P.) werden sich nicht grundlegend andern, aber 
sie werden natiirlich auf die Herausforderungen der Privaten
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reagieren. . .wenn die Privaten um 19 Uhr etwas machen, werden wir
um 19 Uhr was dagegen setzen. (Interview, 29.7.1987)
The public broadcasters argue that any changes in programme policy 
relate to shifts of emphasis within individual programme categories, 
not to the amount of time devoted to information, entertainment, and 
education (Bausch, Interview, 29.7.1987; Schardt, Interview, 11.8.1987). 
This strategy is prudent given the obligations of Grundversorgung. 
Yet in meeting the commercial challenge, the public broadcasters walk 
a tightrope (see Konrad, 1985, p.150). On the one hand they must not 
be seen to neglect traditional public service concerns, which mark 
them out as the distinctive national system of broadcasting. They 
must maintain both the quality of their programmes and their 
universal appeal by broadcasting something of interest to all. Any 
attempt to simulate their commercial rivals by concentrating purely on 
mass entertainment would signify a loss of identity and legitimacy. 
It has to be remembered that the Constitutional Court justified the 
licence fee on the grounds that public broadcasters should transmit 
programmes which are substantially different in nature to private 
channels. Ratings will undoubtedly play a larger role in public 
broadcasting's future, but they must not become the sole criterion of 
success.
On the other hand, the public broadcasters cannot afford to stick 
rigidly to past traditions and successes, which might render them less 
competitive, because any drastic reductions in viewing figures would 
also result in questions about the future of the licence fee. The
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dilemma facing public broadcasting is neatly summed up by Dietrich
Schwarzkopf, Frogrammdirektor of the ARD network, when he writes:
Vir diirfen nicht kommerzieller sein als die Kommerzieilen, auch 
nicht so kommerziell wie die Kommerzieilen, aber wir mussen auf 
eine mit ihnen nicht verwechselbare Veise so attraktiv sein wie 
sie. (1984, p.920>
For Schwarzkopf, a solution to this dilemma lies in the application of 
a programme policy which is both both flexible and adaptable to future 
developments (1985, p.62; 1987, p.3).
In spite of reassurances from the public broadcasters about their
continued commitment to public service principles, concern has been
voiced about commercialisation in public broadcasting (see Hoffmann-
Riem, 1984, pp.38-40; Stock, 1986, p.5). Matthias Greffrath, an editor
at SFB radio, writes:
Venn der offentlich-rechtliche Rundfunk mit dem siegt, wovor er uns 
bewahren soli, mit einem schwachen Sinnsbrei aus alten Movies und 
entertainenden News - dann ist letztlich egal, wer siegt, mit 
"gedankenloser Massenabspeisung". (1986, p.14)
Politicians, too, have been moved to criticise what they see as a
downward trend in public broadcasting. Edmund Stoiber (CSU), head of
the Bavarian state chancellory, has noticed a stronger emphasis on
entertainment at the expense of culture, information and education,
which, in his opinion, constitutes not only a threat to private
broadcasting, but an affront to the licence fee-paying public (cit. in
Schwarzkopf, 1985, p.62). Dietrich Schwarzkopf, ARD Programmdirektor,
counters this view by pointing out its inconsistency with earlier
arguments put forward by the CDU/CSU, which stated that private
competition would stimulate public broadcasting, forcing it to respond
to public demands for more entertainment (1985, p.62; see also Kedien
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von Morgen. Medienpolitische Grundsatze der CDU/CSUi MP 10a/1984, 
p.845).
The academic Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem detects a gradual tendency 
towards commercialisation in public broadcasting, but puts this in 
context by referring to the greater extent of commercialisation in 
private broadcasting (1984, p.38). Commercialism is not yet the sole 
determining factor in public television precisely because its aims are 
substantially different to those of private channels. Public 
broadcasting systems exist to make programmes, not earn profits from 
the sale of advertising space.
Schwarzkopf, Programmdirektor of the ARD network, sees this 
criticism of public broadcasting in terms of a "thematischer 
Schwerpunkt" <1987, p.3). In his view, changes in thematic emphasis 
are determined by many factors, but also by fashion, "eine Art Mode" 
(p.3). He points out that ARD and ZDF used to be attacked for being 
"elitar, arrogant, publikumsunfreundlich. . .verknochert, verkalkt, 
unbeweglich, vollig unfahig, den Interessen - und nicht zuletzt den 
legitimen Unterhaltungsinteressen - des Publikums gerecht zu werden" 
(Schwarzkopf, 1987, p.3; see also Barsig, 1981, pp.27-28). Now 
fashion has changed to assert exactly the opposite, namely, 
"Verflachung, gezielte Niveaum inderung, Trivialisierung, Popularitats- 
hascherei, Verdrangung der Kultur" (Schwarzkopf, 1987, p.3).
Schwarzkopf categorises the criticism of ARD and ZDF according to 
different groups with different motives (1987, p.3). First, there are
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the concerned supporters of public service broadcasting, who wish to 
maintain the high quality of existing programmes. Second, there are 
the station employees, who want to secure their own positions. Third, 
there are those within the stations who hanker after old times, and 
would like to see the past partially restored, by narrowing programme 
range at the expense of entertainment. Finally, the private stations 
accuse public broadcasting of commercialisation, because they hope 
that this will strengthen their bargaining power with the political 
parties (1987, p.3).
The public broadcasters are bound to attract criticism in their 
attempts to shape up to private competition. This criticism is
inevitable, intentional, and sometimes justified. ARD and ZDF know
that they have advantages over their private competitors, and it would 
be unrealistic to expect them not to use these advantages while they 
still can. The existing situation is summed up by Hans Bausch, SDR 
Intendant, who, in rebutting accusations of commercialisation, said to 
me:
Das ist auch keine Anpassung. Das ist einfach eine Kalkulation, 
wie verhalte ich mich, wenn ich einen Konkurrenten bekomme. Sie 
sind ein Einzelkind in der Familie. Die Eltern erfullen Ihnen jeden 
Vunsch. Nun kriegen sie ein Briiderchen. . .das will auch. So wie
in der Familie, ist es bei uns auch so. (Interview, 29.7.1987)
4.3 The search for identity - components of public service profile
Conscious of the need to retain public support in a competitive 
environment, many public broadcasters have spoken of the need to 
maintain, refine, and distinguish the profile or identity of ARD and
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ZDF as the national instruments of broadcasting (see Schardt, 19S4;
Schwarzkopf, 1984; Stolte, 1984, p.29). To some extent this would
appear to be an exercise in public relations rather than a change in
programming philosophy. Manfred Buchwald, Chefredakteur at HR, argues
that channel profile begins with station identification (1987a, p.b).
He refers to the pioneer role of ZDF in this field and to ZDF's
"unverwechselbares ZDF-GesichtM (p.5). ARD has followed ZDF by paying
more attention to continuity announcements and the use of graphics for
its new emblem 'EIMS' (1987, p.5). Andreas Schardt, Justiziar at SAT
1, sees these changes as a reaction to new forms of presentation on
private television, and told me:
Vom Erscheinungsbild her wird man sicher sagen konnen, daB die 
Rundfunkanstalten, alien voran das ZDF, sich bemiihen in einer 
Veise, die vorher jedenfalls nicht so zu verzeichnen war, ihr
Programm ausgiebig zu prasentieren. . .Man versucht also jetzt, das 
Programm kompakter und lockerer zu prasentieren, a Is es bisher der 
Fall war, dieser Verkiindungscharakter, dieser steife, Kathedralen- 
Aspekt. Da behaupte ich mal einfach, daB sie das bei den Privaten 
abgekuckt haben. (Interview, 5.8.1987)
Apart from the optical illusions of station identification, priority 
has been given to the development of programme content. However, if 
channel profile is to be emphasised, what are its principal 
components? In the past, profile was gauged by reference to past 
achievements, by ideas about the ideal nature of public service, and by 
competition between the ARD network and ZDF. Mow another criterion 
of comparison has to be added - private broadcasting. However, Alois 
Schardt and Dietrich Schwarzkopf argue that any comparison between 
the programmes of private and public channels can only be made for 
certain programme categories, most obviously news and entertainment
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(Schardt 1984, p.914; Schwarzkopf 1984, p.919). In their view, even 
the comparison of entertainment output has to be qualified, because 
private channels like SAT 1 and RTL Plus transmit mainly foreign 
feature films and series broadcast on public channels many years 
before (see Schardt 1984, p.914; Schwarzkopf 1984, p.919; Bausch,
Interview, 29.7.1987; Schardt, Interview, 11.8.1987). Any comparison of 
public and private broadcasting would therefore seem to depend to a 
large extent on public broadcasting's continued attention to those 
programmes which are missing or marginal on private channels.
Given the deficiencies of private broadcasting, public 
broadcasting's integrative role, its ability to cater for both 
majorities and minorities, is regarded as a prime component in the 
maintenance of channel profile (Schardt 1984, p.915; Schardt, 1984a, 
p.55; Stolte 1984a, p.294). For Alois Schardt, ZDF's Programme! irektor, 
any comparison with private channels should include an examination of 
the whole programme palette in all its breadth and diversity, for it 
is individual programme categories which determine profile (1984, 
pp.914-915; see also Schwarzkopf, 1984, p.921; Schneider, 1985, p.247). 
In this sense the public broadcasters have an advantage over their 
commercial rivals, because they are less dependent on advertising 
income. This means that they can be more flexible and patient in 
terms of experimentation, and attention to the needs of minorities, 
which are not always profitable target audiences for the private 
sector (see Lehr, 1985, pp.235-236). However, the idea of public 
service broadcasting concentrating on those programmes which private 
channels are unable or unwilling to provide, is rejected by top public
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broadcasters (see Schardt, 1984, p.916; Schwarzkopf, 1984, p.921).
Alois Schardt, ZDF Programmed irektor has said:
Ich will also nicht bloS das machen, was die anderen nicht machen, 
sondern ich muB auch das machen, was die anderen jetzt 
hauptsachlich machen. . .Wir haben ein "Lebensmittelgeschaft", in 
dem a lies vorhanden ist, auch Kase. Ilebenan wird ein neues 
Geschaft eroffnet, und zwar ein Kaseladen, das sind die Privaten.
Deswegen muB ich nicht aus meinem Laden den Kase herausnehmen.
. (cit. in Bolesch/Schardt, 1986, p.86)
Domestic production is seen as a further element in maintaining 
public broadcasting's identity and integrative role in society 
(Schwarzkopf, 1985, p.62), Commitment to domestic production is shown 
by statistics on the sources of transmitted programmes on the ARD 
network and ZDF. In-house productions, those programmes produced 
solely by the public stations, account for almost half of all first 
transmissions (see Figure 4.2). Domestic production is further 
enhanced by programmes commissioned from independent Vest German 
producers, and co-productions undertaken either with European 
broadcasters or with other partners.
The dominance of domestic production in public broadcasting is 
regarded as vital, if the public are to recognise their own culture, 
and the authenticity of programmes in relation to their own lives and 
personal experiences (see Schardt, 1984, p.915). The nature of public 
broadcasting is seen to be determined by domestic production, 
particularly in those areas not catered for by private channels, which 
include plays, documentaries, foreign news coverage, educational, and 
children's programmes (see Schwarzkopf, 1984, p.921; Stolte, 1984, p.27;
Schwarzkopf, 1987, p.4). The public broadcasters are also keen to
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all transmissions. This figure includes first transmissions (18%) and 
repeats (10.5%) (ZDF Jahrbuch, 1987, p.144). On the ARD network, first 
showings of purchased programmes account for 14.5% of all 
transmissions, and are likely to account for at least half of repeated 
programmes, giving a total of about 25% purchased programme 
transmissions (see ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, p.353). What these figures fail 
to reveal is the split between European content and American content, 
because high levels of the latter are undoubtedly a greater worry to 
concerned observers of public service broadcasting than the former. 
The fact that commercial channels are heavily reliant on cheap foreign 
films and series, usually of American origin, places the public 
stations under pressure to limit their reliance on foreign programming 
and maintain significant amounts of German-language programming.
Some of the hostility shown towards imported programmes like 
series arises from fears that these set international standards which 
threaten the survival of national culture (see Schardt, 1984a, p.51; 
Schuchardt, 1985, p.22; Wiesand, 1985, p.199). Hoffmann-Riem argues 
that the commercial criteria which determine these productions taint 
the non-commercial character of public service broadcasting 
(Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.39). He adds that commercialisation and
reliance on cheap foreign programmes could be encouraged if the public 
stations are not sufficiently funded, or lack the creative potential to 
invest in domestic production (Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.39).
ARD Frogrammdirektor, Schwarzkopf, rejects quotas as a means of 
combating imports and of maintaining levels of German production. He
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points out that the dominance of foreign programmes in some genres 
has acted as a stimulus to similar Vest German oroductions. and he 
fears that quotas for individual programme categories could affect the 
flexibility of public broadcasting (1984, p.921). Alois Schardt, ZDF 
Programme! irektor, argues for recognition of the cultural value of 
foreign programmes: "denn wir diirfen uns nicht auf die Wirklichkeit 
und kulturelle Dimension unseres Lebenbereichs beschranken" <1984a, 
p.53). Other reasons put forward against quotas include a possible 
increase in state intervention, the ineffectiveness of quotas in an 
environment where foreign satellite channels are widely available, and 
financial and scheduling constraints which force reliance on cheap 
imports (see Viesand, 1985, p. 197).
Of course, any attempts by the public broadcasting sector to 
maintain channel profile are also dependent on factors over which they 
have little influence. Continued innovation in programming is 
dependent on the award of an adequate licence fee and continued access 
to advertising income. Efforts to reform may also be hindered if 
substantial numbers of employees or artists are lost to the commercial 
sector because of frustration or lower wages (see Schwarzkopf, 1984, 
p.922). This problem could be partially countered by exclusive 
contracts for top broadcasters and entertainers (see Schardt, 1984, 
p.918). A further problem is the use of exclusive contracts for 
events, in particular sport (see Stolte, 1984a, p.293). Finally,
profile is dependent on political consensus about the future existence 
of public broadcasting. As Klaus Berg, NDR's Justiziart points out:
Ob es zu dieser Profilierung oder zum Vettrennen kommt, liegt
weithin an den Rundfunkanstalten selbst, aber auch daran, ob sich
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der Gesetzgeber auch in Zukunft zu seiner gestaitenaen 
Kernverantwortung im Rundfunk bekennt. (1985, p.10)
4.4 Entertainment; the decisive factor
Entertainment programmes are one important component in ZDF and 
ARD's strategy against commercial competition. According to Hans 
Bausch, SDR Intendant, both ARD and ZDF "haben sich auf die Konkurrenz 
jetzt schon eingestellt und haben ihre Programme ausgeweitet, auch jene 
Elemente starker betont als friiher, die popular sind" (Interview,
29.7.1987). This strategy is logical given that popular entertainment 
constitutes the "Lebenselixir" of private broadcasting, and the key 
meeting point between public and private broadcasting in the battle 
for viewers (see Schwarzkopf, 1987, p.6>.
But what is entertainment? The viewing public may have a 
completely different idea about what constitutes an entertaining 
programme to those actually involved in the production process. In 
practice there is no precise definition, because entertainment covers a 
multitude of different types of programmes, and many different ideas 
about what constitutes an entertaining programme (see von Riiden, 1979, 
p.169). For the purpose of this study, two major categories have been 
distinguished. In the first instance there are those programmes which 
follow a dramatic script; series, serials, mini-series, plays, and 
feature films. In the second instance, there are those programmes 
grouped under the label of light entertainment; variety shows, game 
shows, chat shows, and popular music programmes.
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promote domestic production because they realise that these 
programmes are generally more popular than their foreign counterparts. 
This factor was emphasised to me by Alois Schardt, ZDF's 
Programmdirekton
Das, was wir selber herstellen, wird in Deutschland hbher 
akzeptiert in der Einschaltquote als das, was wir kaufen, und zwar 
auch in dem gleichen Genre, . .Venn ich eine Unterhaltung mache, und 
ich kaufe sie egal wo, kommt sie nicht so intensiv an, als wenn ich 
sie selber mache. Aus dieser Erfahrung der letzen Jahre, habe ich 
die Lehre gezogen, daB wir starker auf Eigenproduktion setzen 
sollten, was teuerer ist, und daB wir in der Unterhaltung auf Serien 
setzen. Also ZDF ist in Deutschland der Seriensender. (Interview,
11.8.1987)
Fig. 4.2
SOURCES OF TRAXSXITTED PROGRAXXES IX 1987 (%>
ARD ZDF
In-house production 45.7 46.4
Co-productions 10.8 1.0
Independent commissions 5.5 11.0
Programme purchases 14.5 18.0
Relays 4.3 4.2
Repeats 21.2 19.4
(Source: ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, p.356; ZDF Jahrbuch, 1987, p.144)
Co-productions, especially with other European public stations, are 
seen as a solution to the increasing costs of programme production, 
particularly of high quality drama, and feature films (see Schardt 
1984, p.917: Schwaderlapp, 1984, p.163; Xaier, 1986, p.49; Ungureit, 
1987, p.54; see also Chapter 6). Co-productions are likely to increase 
at the expense of in-house production, but Heinz Ungureit argues that
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resources may then be redistributed to traditional in-house areas such 
as information (1987, p.61). An example of this type of collaborative 
effort is the European production cooperative, established in 1985 by 
seven European public broadcasting organisations: ZDF, QRF (Austria), 
SRG (Switzerland), RAI (Italy), Antenne 2 (France), TVE (Spain), and 
Britain’s Channel 4. This has a budget of DM157 million over three 
years, and aims to encourage the production and worldwide distribution 
of European drama (see Stolte, 1985a, p.31; Ungureit, 1987, p.60). It 
is also hoped that such agreements will free European broadcasters 
from dependence on the international, in particular the American 
market for programming (see Ungureit, 1987, p.60).
The public stations’ commitment to domestic production is also 
vitally important to independent German producers, who are unlikely to 
find substantial support from private channels for many years 
(Schwaderlapp, 1984, p. 163; Schwarzkopf, 1987, p.4>. ZDF has a special 
role in this respect, as it devotes more of its transmission time to 
independent productions than ARD (see Fig. 4.2). In 1985 alone, ZDF 
spent DM200 million on programmes commissioned from 60 independent 
German producers (Stolte, 1985a, p.30). By 1988, expenditure on
independent production at ZDF was budgeted at DM270m for about 35,000 
hours of programmes (ZDF, 1988, p.104). ZDF's stronger reliance on 
independent production is historical. At its inception it had few in- 
house production facilities, and chronic shortages of funds forced it 
to look to independent producers, many of whom came from the flagging 
German film industry. This approach has generally been viewed as a 
success, summed up by former ZDF Intendant, Karl Holzamer:
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Aus dieser notgeborenen Haltung wurde dann geradezu eine Tugend, 
die auch die Pluraiitat kiinstlerischer Krafte auf dem Bildschirm 
gegeniiber der immer als Monopol gekennzeichneten Struktur der 
Rundfunkanstalten darstellt. (cit. in Fischer, 1979)
Independent producers are involved mainly in drama and light
entertainment production, but are also dependent on Studio Hamburg and
Bavaria Atelier, Vest Germany’s two major independent production and
facilities houses. Studio Hamburg is a wholly owned subsidiary of
MDR. VDR and HR have majority stakes in Bavaria Atelier,
Broadcasting's topicality and its ability "dabeizusein” as a live 
participatory experience is seen as a further element in this profile- 
building strategy (Schardt 1984, p.916; Schwarzkopf, 1987, p.5). Alois 
Schardt, ZDF Programmdirektor, referring to ZDF policy in this area, 
told me:
Die Strategie heiBt. . ,mehr Live-Sendungen. Das heiBt, daB ich auch 
kulturell lieber eine Oper aus der Metro in Mew York oder aus 
Covent Garden ubernehme, als daB ich eine sehr teuer 
selbstproduzierte aus der Konserve spiele, was wir friiher gemacht 
haben. (Interview, 11,8.1987)
In spite of statements about public broadcasting's commitment to 
domestic production, there has been concern about levels of foreign 
programming on public channels (see Deutscher Kulturrat, 1984, p.793; 
Wiesand, 1985, p,191pp). Existing legislation on public service
broadcasting contains nothing about quotas on levels of foreign and 
domestic programmes. ARD Programmdirektor Schwarzkopf estimates that 
foreign programmes account for 20% of transmissions on the ARD 
network (1984, p.921). At ZDF, purchased programmes, which are likely 
to be mainly foreign serials and feature films, account for 28.5% of
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all transmissions. This figure includes first transmissions (18%) and 
repeats (10.5%) (ZDF Jahrbuch, 1987, p.144). On the ARD network, first 
showings of purchased programmes account for 14.5% of all 
transmissions, and are likely to account for at least half of repeated 
programmes, giving a total of about 25% purchased programme 
transmissions (see ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, p.353). What these figures fail 
to reveal is the split between European content and American content, 
because high levels of the latter are undoubtedly a greater worry to 
concerned observers of public service broadcasting than the former. 
The fact that commercial channels are heavily reliant on cheap foreign 
films and series, usually of American origin, places the public 
stations under pressure to limit their reliance on foreign programming 
and maintain significant amounts of German-language programming.
Some of the hostility shown towards imported programmes like 
series arises from fears that these set international standards which 
threaten the survival of national culture (see Schardt, 1984a, p.51; 
Schuchardt, 1985, p.22; Viesand, 1985, p.199). Hoffmann-Riem argues 
that the commercial criteria which determine these productions taint 
the non-commercial character of public service broadcasting 
(Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.39). He adds that commercialisation and
reliance on cheap foreign programmes could be encouraged if the public 
stations are not sufficiently funded, or lack the creative potential to 
invest in domestic production (Hoffmann-Riem, 1984, p.39).
ARD Frogrammdirektort Schwarzkopf, rejects quotas as a means of 
combating imports and of maintaining levels of German production. He
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points out that the dominance of foreign programmes in some genres 
has acted as a stimulus to similar Vest German productions, and he
4 1
fears that quotas for individual programme categories could affect the 
flexibility of public broadcasting (1984, p.921). Alois Schardt, ZDF 
Programmdirektor, argues for recognition of the cultural value of 
foreign programmes: "denn wir diirfen uns nicht auf die Wirklichkeit 
und kulturelle Dimension unseres Lebenbereichs beschranken" (1984a, 
p.53). Other reasons put forward against quotas include a possible 
increase in state intervention, the ineffectiveness of quotas in an 
environment where foreign satellite channels are widely available, and 
financial and scheduling constraints which force reliance on cheap 
imports (see Viesand, 1985, p. 197).
Of course, any attempts by the public broadcasting sector to 
maintain channel profile are also dependent on factors over which they 
have little influence. Continued innovation in programming is 
dependent on the award of an adequate licence fee and continued access 
to advertising income. Efforts to reform may also be hindered if 
substantial numbers of employees or artists are lost to the commercial 
sector because of frustration or lower wages (see Schwarzkopf, 1984, 
p.922). This problem could be partially countered by exclusive 
contracts for top broadcasters and entertainers (see Schardt, 1984, 
p.918). A further problem is the use of exclusive contracts for 
events, in particular sport (see Stolte, 1984a, p.293). Finally,
profile is dependent on political consensus about the future existence 
of public broadcasting. As Klaus Berg, UDR's Justiziart points out:
Ob es zu dieser Profilierung oder zum Vettrennen kommt, iiegt
weithin an den Rundfunkanstalten selbst, aber auch daran, ob sich
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der Gesetzgeber auch in Zukunft zu seiner gestaitenaen 
Kernverantwortung im Rundfunk bekennt. (1985, p.10)
4.4 Entertainment; the decisive factor
Entertainment programmes are one important component in ZDF and 
ARD's strategy against commercial competition. According to Hans 
Bausch, SDR Intendant, both ARD and ZDF "haben sich auf die Konkurrenz 
jetzt schon eingestellt und haben ihre Programme ausgeweitet, auch jene 
Elemente starker betont als friiher, die popular sind” (Interview,
29.7.1987). This strategy is logical given that popular entertainment 
constitutes the "Lebenselixir" of private broadcasting, and the key 
meeting point between public and private broadcasting in the battle 
for viewers (see Schwarzkopf, 1987, p.6>.
But what is entertainment? The viewing public may have a 
completely different idea about what constitutes an entertaining 
programme to those actually involved in the production process. In 
practice there is no precise definition, because entertainment covers a 
multitude of different types of programmes, and many different ideas 
about what constitutes an entertaining programme (see von Riiden, 1979, 
p.169). For the purpose of this study, two major categories have been 
distinguished. In the first instance there are those programmes which 
follow a dramatic script; series, serials, mini-series, plays, and 
feature films. In the second instance, there are those programmes 
grouped under the label of light entertainment; variety shows, game 
shows, chat shows, and popular music programmes.
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The importance of entertainment is recognised by many public 
broadcasters. Wolfgang Penk, the head of entertainment at ZDF, 
believes that entertainment programmes are "imagepragend" (1985, p.55). 
Dietrich Schwarzkopf, ARD Programmdirektor, calls entertainment an 
"unverzichtbarer Bestandteil" of public service broadcasting (1987, 
p.3).
Given the important role of entertainment in meeting commercial
competition, attention will undoubtedly become more focused on ratings.
This carries a danger with it, because judging programmes purely on
the strength of audience size could inhibit experimentation and force
reliance on old trusted formulae. The problem of finding a balance
between the need for high ratings, and the need to show something new
and innovative is highlighted by Willibald Hilf, Intendant of SWF, who
states that in a future competitive environment of increased
entertainment offerings:
wird die ARD sich in der ungewohnten Lage zwischen Programmauftrag 
und Konkurrenzdruck auch zu fragen haben, wie differenziert das 
Kriterium "Publikumserfolg" auszulegen ist. . .Wir durfen den 
Sehgewohnheiten der Zuschauer nicht hinterherlaufen, wir miissen 
auch versuchen, sie mit unseren Programmen zu pragen. (1987, p.7)
In recognition of its duty to undertake Grundversorgung, public 
broadcasting has to pursue a double strategy. On the one hand it must 
pursue popularity and ratings (see Schwarzkopf, 1987, p.4). On the 
other hand, it must not neglect to cultivate those programmes which 
its commercial rivals are unable or unwilling to provide. 
Entertainment programmes cannot therefore be allowed to become the
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sole determining factor of public service broadcasting's output (see 
Dietrich Schwarzkopf, 1987, p.4; see also Braun, 1985, p.67).
Both ARD and ZDF are trying to reform their entertainment output, 
but are faced with considerable difficulties, even internal opposition. 
ARD is particularly keen to make changes; ZDF, by contrast, has 
always been considered the better entertainment channel (see 
Schwarzkopf, 1987; Schardt, Interview, 11.8.1987). Dietrich
Schwarzkopf, ARD Frogrammdirektor, has called entertainment a 
"gefahrdete Gattung", a term more usually applied to serious drama and 
arts programming (1987, p.6). In his view there are some within the 
stations who do not consider entertainment to be part of 
broadcasting's classical function t.o inform, educate, and entertain 
(1985, p.62; 1987, p.6). Underlying this wish is the idea that
commercial channels are better at satisfying the audience's 
entertainment needs anyway (see Schwarzkopf, 1987, p.6). He opposes 
this standpoint, and calls entertainment a legitimate and necessary 
part of public service broadcasting's obligations which requires 
continuous strengthening in terms of originality, quality, and public 
acceptance (1984, p.920; 1987 p.3; see also Hilf, 1987, p.7). He points 
out that few of ARD's programmes reach 50% of the audience, and would 
even appear to be questioning the willingness of broadcasters to cater 
for the needs of the majority, having stated: "Konnen wir nicht,
wollen wir nicht, oder trauen wir uns nicht, gezielte Sendungen mit 
einer Erfolgschance von iiber 50% zu produzieren" (1987, p.6). Bernd- 
Peter Arnold, deputy Chefredakteur at HR, also justifies entertainment, 
referring to its integral role in the provision of Grundversorgung:
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Venn man zur Grundversorgung auch die Unterhaltung zahlt, dann 
kann man Unterhaltung im Fernsehen. , .nicht als Selbstkommer- 
zialisierung oder vorweggenommene Kommerzialisierung bezeichnen, 
sondern dann ist das Teil der Grundversorgung. (Interview,
26.8.1987)
Unlike British television, Vest German public stations have never 
really had a good international reputation for entertainment. This is 
partly due to language barriers which militate against the export of 
German-language programmes in a market dominated by the English 
language (see Wenig Chancen fur ARD/ZDF auf dem Weltmarkt, FS 
24.4.1988). There are of course notable export exceptions in drama - 
Heimat, Das Boot, Schwarzwaldklinik, However, some of the blame for 
the low standing of popular entertainment in Vest German public 
television has to be attached to lack of innovation in the past, 
although more attention is now being focused on popular drama. There 
are few domestic sitcoms on Vest German television, and very little 
stand-up comedy in spite of a strong historical tradition of cabaret. 
In light entertainment there seems to be a tendency to rely on the 
same format of lengthy variety and game shows hosted by the same 
small group of show business personalities (see Schwarzkopf, 1987, 
p.6). Dietrich Schwarzkopf feels that light entertainment especially, 
is suffering problems of form, and questions the future of lengthy 
variety shows lasting 90 minutes or more (1987, p.6).
Part of the reason for the low standing of entertainment 
programmes in Vest Germany can be attributed to academic criticism of 
popular culture, which has affected both broadcasters and public 
debate. Much of this criticism is based on the theories of the
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Frankfurt School, which were very influential in academic circles in 
the 1960s and early 1970s (see Hofer, 1978, pp.4-6). Horkheimer and 
Adorno, two of the most influential Vest German practitioners of 
cultural criticism, argued that mass-produced commercialised culture 
was one of the main supports of a monopolistic capitalist system, 
because of its emphasis on consumerism, short-term gratification, 
technology, and "classlessness" (see Hofer, 1978, p.4). According to
these arguments, culture marketed as a commodity loses its critical 
potential and so reinforces the power of the existing order (see 
Horkheimer/Adorno, 1969, p.348; Adorno, 1985, pp.476-483). Others have 
argued that popular programmes are escapist, stereotypical, ignore the 
real world, and so reinforce popular prejudice (see Holzer, 1969, p.52; 
Holzer, 1971).
Siegfried Braun, head of series at ZDF, believes that the absolute
assumptions of these views are now encountering opposition with a
corresponding rehabilitation of entertainment (1985, p.70). This has
resulted in a resurrection of the social and ethical dimension of
entertainment, and the presentation of popular family series in
particular as a "ruhender Pol” in a changing world:
Sie dienen damit - jenseits aller kulturkritischen Bedenken - der 
Festigung allgemein anerkannter Werte, der Vergewisserung der 
Lebenswirklichkeit des Zuschauers und nicht zuletzt der nationalen 
Identitat, wobei einheimische Schauspieler eine besondere Rolle 
spielen. (Braun, 1985, p.72)
One might also argue that renewed interest in entertainment is more
the result of competition from private broadcasters. Wolfgang Penk,
the head of entertainment at ZDF, is less optimistic when he argues:
Doch hat Unterhaltung speziell im Fernsehen, wie iiberhaupt 
Unterhaltung, in unserem Lande kein Ansehen, zumindest von
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intellektuellen MaBstaben aus betrachtet. . .Unterhaltung und
ShowbusineB gehoren bei uns eben nicht zur Kultur. (1985, p.55)
]tore recently academic debate has been influenced by the American 
media researcher Neil Postman (1985; 1986, p.10). Postman argues that 
broadcasting's tendency to trivialise everything it touches, makes 
censorship unnecessary, because people are gradually losing the
ability to think for themselves (1986, p.10). Postman believes that 
entertainment programmes are not the central issue. More serious, in 
his view, is television's tendency to treat even serious culture and 
information according to populist values. In this atmosphere, pictures 
and images become more important than ideas and debate even for
serious political topics (1986, p.10).
Gerd Bauer, from ZDF's entertainment department, traces part of the 
disdain for entertainment to those involved in production (1985, p.61). 
According to him, those embarking on a broadcasting career have often 
been influenced by ideas at university which militate against 
entertainment (1985, p.61). Even if they are graduates of the two 
colleges for film and television (the Deutsche Film- und 
Fernsehakademie, Berlin and the Hochschule fur Fernsehen und Film, 
Munich), they have not followed courses on entertainment. According 
to Bauer, young broadcasters believe it to be more socially 
prestigious to concentrate their efforts on serious programmes, which 
in turn heighten their own prestige rather than on entertainment 
(1985, p.61).
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Those within the stations who support greater attention paid to
entertainment appear to be winning the battle, but the essential
problem facing public broadcasting still lies in the ability to achieve
a balance between the serious and light components of entertainment.
Outlining this need for balance Alois Schardt draws an analogy to
literature stating that, "Triviales und anspruchvoiles Schrifttum sind
koexistent" (1985, p.51). This broad concept of entertainment in
literature should, in his view, also apply to television entertainment:
Unterhaltung ist nicht nur legitim, sondern der Vunsch danach auch 
zeitlos. Unterhaltung enthait die ganze Bandbreite vom Trivialen 
bis zum Anspruchsvollen. (1985, p.51)
A broad concept of entertainment has been missing in Vest Germany.
Light entertainment and popular drama are frequently described as 
trivial, with serious entertainment (plays, opera, ballet), seemingly 
extricated from the genre and elevated onto an altogether higher 
plane. If entertainment were viewed as a whole in both its light and
serious aspects, its low standing might become a thing of the past.
The pigeon-holing of entertainment is ultimately detrimental to the 
whole of public broadcasting's output, because it implies that 
information programmes, documentaries, and cultural offerings are
incapable of "entertaining", or of holding the audience's attention.
4.4.1 The growing importance of popular drama
Drama is a standard component in the schedules of both the ARD 
stations and ZDF. On the ARD network, drama accounts for 19.1% of all 
transmissions, excluding feature films and detective series, which
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account for a further 15.6% of transmissions (ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, 
p.355). At ZDF, drama and feature films account for 20.2% of all 
transmissions, with early evening serials and series accounting for an 
additional 5.7% of transmissions (ZDF Jahrbuch, 1987, p.141).
However, drama is expensive to produce. It is widely acknowledged 
that it is cheaper to buy this type of programming from abroad, 
rather than show domestically produced programmes. Furthermore, it 
has been established that serials (serializations of the same story 
resulting in a set number of programmes) and series (programmes with 
the same characters and settings in different stories), whether 
domestic or foreign, are much more likely to achieve high ratings than 
one-off plays (Bausch, Interview, 29.7.1987). Consequently, the two 
major issues dominating the debate about drama on Vest German public 
television are the status of domestic drama against foreign imports, 
and the status of one-off dramas and cultural events against serials 
or series (see Fechner, 1985, p.7; Janssen, 1986). In particular there 
are worries that serious cultural events and drama may eventually be 
relegated to late night spots where they will only be encountered by a 
very small audience (see Hirsch, 1985, p.90).
Popular drama in the form of serials, series, and mini-series are 
now a familiar feature on public service television, but this has not 
always been the case (see Der Spiegel, 30.1.1978, pp.154-6). Some 
believe that their increasing importance since the late seventies is a 
reaction to accusations that ARD and ZDF were not transmitting what 
the public wanted (see Durzak, 1979, p.72). Alternatively, they have
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been viewed as an alibi to combat accusations of political bias (see
Durzak, 1979, p.72). Regardless of any ideological view, series
especially, undoubtedly constitute an important element in the fight
against commercial competition because their regularity and popularity
attract huge audiences. Schwarzkopf argues that increased emphasis on
series is not purely a result of economic considerations or of
attempts to achieve high ratings. It has also been brought about by a
growing number of producers who want to make series and mini-series
(1987, p.8). He adds that the proportion of series as a share of
total output has not increased. This is echoed by Alois Schardt,
Programmdirektor at ZDF, who explained to me:
Vir haben die (series, J.P) iiberhaupt nicht vermehrt, sondern wir 
haben unsere Eigenen etwas starker herausgehoben. Ich nenne das 
eine hohere Auffalligkeit. . .Es geht nicht darum, das zu vermehren, 
(Interview, 11.8.1987)
However, Schardt admits that the emphasis on series at ZDF has come
at the expense of mini-series and one-off dramas (Interview,
11.8.1987).
Alois Schardt justified ZDF's increased emphasis on series to me as
television's equivalent of popular literature:
Die Serien sind zu einem groBten Teil Trivialliteratur. . .Ich 
personlich bezwinge mich dazu: zu jeder guten Bibliothek gehort
auch eine Abteilung Trivialliteratur. Ich kann nicht jeden Abend 
Kant oder Dickens lesen. (Interview, 11.8.1987)
In his view drama series fulfil an ever present human need for stories
which are simple enough to be understood by all (see Schardt, 1984,
p.916;1985, p.52; see also Braun, 1985, p.68; Penk, 1985, p.59). It may
of course be difficult to serialize Kant, because his work is pure
philosophy. Some might also argue that Dickens originally appeared in
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serialized form, and is far from being highbrow because his books 
still have an enormous readership worldwide, and are frequently 
televised.
Siegfried Braun, head of series at ZDF, distinguishes two types of 
the genre. Konigsdramen like the American series Dallas and Dynasty 
explore the secrets of the rich and powerful; Vest German series tend 
to revolve around "blirgerliche Miniaturen", the life and experiences of 
"ordinary" people (1985, p.69). In the battle between foreign imports 
and domestic productions, Vest German public broadcasters are keen to 
point out the benefits of their own productions.
It is claimed that the audience can easily identify with the 
characters and plots of domestically-produced family series like ZDF's 
Diese Drombuschs and Ich heirate eine Familie or ARD's LlndenstraSe 
(see Bauer, 1985, p.63; Braun, 1985, p.69; Schwarzkopf, 1985, p.62). It 
is also argued that domestic series are increasingly more popular with 
the audience than their American counterparts (Penk, 1985, p.58). This 
fact has resulted in more emphasis on the production of German series, 
often in cooperation with independent producers (Schardt, Interview,
11.8.1987). To a certain extent policy appears to have been fashioned 
by the experience of foreign broadcasters, in particular British 
television. Dietrich Schwarzkopf, ARD Programmdlrektort admits this 
when he writes: "Venn es ein Vorbild gibt, dann ist das eher die 
englische Dauerserie 'Coronation Street', die seit 25 Jahren zweimal in 
der Voche gesendet wird" (1985, p.62).
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In addition to series, emphasis has also been placed on high 
quality mini-series, often produced by independent producers or in 
cooperation with others (Schwarzkopf, 1987, p.8>. Some of these mini­
series, like Heimat, Das Boot, Buddenbrooks and Vater und Sohne have 
achieved great international success (see Schardt, 1984, p.915; Lehr, 
1985; Schwarzkopf, 1985, p.62).
Although series are hugely popular with the audience, they have 
received little positive echo from professional critics. Gerd Bauer, 
from ZDF's entertainment section, recounts the tale of the first 
reactions to ZDF's Schwarzwaldklinik> a hospital drama which began in 
October 1985 (1985, p.60). This series is regularly seen by 60% of 
the viewing audience. According to Bauer, the new series was 
condemned almost universally at the Kainzer Tage der Fernsehkritlk, 
although only one participant had bothered to view the series. In 
criticising the programme, many were moved to cite Neil Postman's 
book, Vir amusieren uns zu Tode. Bauer argues that in doing so they 
failed to understand the substance of Postman's argument, which states 
that entertainment, which is ideally suited to television, is not a 
danger to society. The threat of triviality comes from television's 
attempts to deal with things which are culturally important, in its 
attempts to present itself as a purveyor of important cultural 
messages (Bauer, 1985, p.60; see also Fetscher, 1985, pp.13-14; Piper, 
1985, p.74). Bauer views the bias of intellectuals against
entertainment as a sign of intolerance: "Verdammt wird grundsatziich,
was emotional und spontan ist, was Verstandlichkeit und Leichtigkeit 
besitzt und keinen anderen Zweck als die Unterhaltung auBert" (1985,
p.60). He criticises attempts to add. something more to
entertainment's primary role of entertaining and argues that:
Unterhaltung soilte man vor allem an ihrer erklarten Absicht 
messen: zu unterhaiten. Man sollte ihr nicht andere Ziele
unterstelien und dann deren Nichterreichen einklagen. (1985, p.63)
However, increased emphasis on series has led to concern about the 
future of the serious one-off drama, and the transmission of live
cultural events like opera, ballet, and theatre (see Klagelleder in 
Sachen Kultur. Zum Hearing der Westberliner Akademie der Kiinste iiber 
Rundfunkprobleme, FR 30.10.1985; see Abgeschoben an die Peripherie des 
Programms, FR 23.9.1986). This concern is likely to grow with the
knowledge that commercial television is unlikely to provide this type 
of programming because it is not popular enough to attract audiences 
and advertising revenue. Too much emphasis on papular programmes 
could rob television of its ability to contribute to a common cultural 
identity, and ignores the possibility that today's minorities can 
easily become tomorrow's majorities . In this sense broadcasting can 
help to break down barriers, by providing access to certain aspects of 
culture like classical music, which were previously only accessible to 
elites (see Schardt, 1984a, p.51, 54).
The problem of achieving a balance between what is regarded as 
serious drama and popular drama requires attention to scheduling and 
perhaps a broader definition of culture, but it is not always easy to 
find this balance between the serious and the popular nor to fill the 
programming gap between highbrow and lowbrow content. In terms of 
scheduling, those within ARD and ZDF argue that serious cultural
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programmes are more likely to succeed if they are regularly placed
within a framework of more popular material (see Schardt, 1984, p.916;
Schwaderlapp, 1984, p.161; Stolte, 1984, p.28). On this subject ZDF
Programmdirektor Schardt writes:
Hier gibt es eine Programmmischung, ein diffiziles Ausbalancieren 
von Popularem und Anspruchvollem, bei dem ein publikumsfreundlicher 
Ausgleich nur durch den Imperativ eines Jtehrheitsprogramms im 
Umfeld eines Zielprogramms auch bei Beachtung der Interessen von 
Minderheiten moglich ist. (Schardt, 1984a, p.51)
In this sense popular programmes are seen as a necessary complement
to more serious output, offering the audience an opportunity to become
acquainted with subject matter they would not normally encounter.
This, according to Schardt is necessary because, "Qhne ein
ausgewogenes interessantes Programmumfeld wird Kultur nur noch denen
im Fernsehen begegnen, die sich ohnehin dafiir interessieren" (1984,
p.916>.
Dietrich Schwarzkopf, Programmdirektor of the ARD network, denies 
that plays are being threatened by sports coverage, films, and series. 
If or does he believe that the themes covered by drama have become 
tame, that plays have become shorter in duration, or been banished to 
late night viewing slots (1987, p.8). He points out that the play 
occupies a fixed weekly slot on the ARD network, and that experimental 
plays are broadcast on the third television channels or late at night 
on the first channel (1987, p.8; see also Engagierte Hilfe fiir eine 
"bedrohte Art" - Der VDR entwickelte neues Konzept fiir das 
Femsehspiel in seinem Dritten Frogrammen, FR 17.3.87). In his view, 
the play is a necessary component of public broadcasting which is 
unlikely to be copied by the commercial broadcasters (Schwarzkopf,
1987, p,8). However, as shown later in this chapter, the amount of 
plays broadcast on ARD has decreased in recent years, so 
contradicting Schwarzkopf's statements about the healthy state of this 
type of programming.
At ZDF, experimental and innovatory drama is been encouraged by a
special department, Das Kleine Fernsehspiel. These plays occupy a
regular slot on Wednesday evenings. Das Kleine Fernsehspiel provides
an opportunity to cooperate with the film industry, universities,
foreign broadcasters and third world institutions (Stein, 1985, p.84),
According to Eckart Stein, the head of this department, those who
produce these plays are aware of their limited appeal to the majority
of viewers, but recognise the advantages of television in approaching
a wider audience. Stein writes:
Wir sind uns im Kleinen Fernsehspiel dariiber im Klaren, daB wir 
eine okologische Nische bewirtschaften. . .Wir brauchen den Kontakt 
zu anderen Programmen. Eine Alternative kann nur da fruchtbar 
sein, wo sie in der Gegeniiberstellung, in der Reibung mit dem 
Uormalprogramm in der Mitte lebendig bleibt. (Stein, 1985, p.86>
4.4.2 Light, entertainment - the danger of excess
Light entertainment, in the form of shows, quiz programmes, stand- 
up comedy, and chat shows, is popular with audiences. For instance, a 
satirical programme like, Sudis Tagesschau, on the ARD network, which 
has been modelled on the BBC's Not the Nine 0 'Clock News, has been 
known to reach 52% of all television households (Traumquote fur "jRudis 
Tagesschau"} FR 24.2.1987).
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According to Peter von Riiden, variety shows and popular music 
programmes make up the majority of light entertainment output, but the 
core is composed of regularly transmitted quiz and game shows (see 
von Ruden, 1979, p.170). On the ARD network light entertainment 
accounted for 9.9% of all transmissions in 1987 CAED Jahrbuch, 1988, 
p.355). Unfortunately, it is difficult to draw direct comparisons 
between levels of light entertainment on ZDF and the ARD network, 
because the ARD figures do not distinguish between separate 
categories. Moreover, the ARD figures do not include the regional opt- 
outs broadcast from 18.00 to 20.00. During this period light 
entertainment accounts for 51.6% of output (ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, p.360). 
At ZDF the statistics apply to the whole of channel output with the 
exception of morning transmissions, undertaken jointly with ARD. Here 
light entertainment accounted for 8% of all transmissions in 1987 (ZDF 
Jahrbuch, 1987, p.141). Unlike the ARD statistics, there is a
breakdown of the individual components of light entertainment. Quiz 
shows and game shows account for approximately 31% of all light 
entertainment output, followed closely by chat shows and features 
(although some German chat shows are decidedly weighty in content) 
with about 29%, and popular music programmes (chart shows, variety 
shows, and folk music) with about 24%. By contrast, satire and comedy 
together only accounted for about 9% or 30 hours of all light 
entertainment output in 1987 (see ZDF Jahrbuch, 1987, p.145). A 
further 7% of light entertainment output was not categorised.
The lack of comedy in Vest German television, may be an endemic 
cultural phenomenon. Vhat works in British television is not
-284 -
necessarily pleasing to Vest German viewers. Furthermore, these types 
of programmes cannot be easily imported, because humour does not
always travel well. However, the small amount of time devoted to 
satire may also be due to fear of external criticism. For instance, 
Scheibenwischer, a satirical programme on the ARD network, was 
dropped by BR for one episode in May 1986 in accordance with the 
right of every ARD station to drop out of the network (see Die
Gremienvorsitzenden zum "Scheibenwischer*', FR 9.7.1986). Vest German 
television's sensitivity about upsetting those political figures it 
pillories in its programmes would even appear to have been recognised 
by other foreign powers. Vhereas portrayals of Iran's Ayatollah
Khomeini appear to go unnoticed in British programmes like Spitting 
Image, a sketch involving the same religious leader on Fudis
Tagesschau almost resulted in a breakdown of diplomatic relations.
According to ARD Programmdirektor Schwarzkopf, satire should have a 
fixed place in ARD's schedules, but he argues, in my view mistakenly, 
that the genre has problems in recruiting new talent (1987, p.8).
At ZDF, Herbert Knopp writes that scriptwriters were in the past 
not very interested in comedy (1985, p.78>. He believes that this can 
partly be explained by the experiences of the Rational Socialist
period, and the fact that Germany has no great tradition of film
comedy (1985, p.78). However, he also argues that this is not the
only reason for the vacuum since 1945. Ror, in his view, can the 
lack of home-grown comedy be attributed to a German "uberschuB an 
Tiefsinn", because foreign comedies are popular (1985, p.78). However, 
Knopp has sensed a rediscovery of the genre by young scriptwriters,
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who are less inhibited by intellectualism, and less arrogant about the 
limitations of television (1985, p.80).
In addition to traditional variety and music shows, the public 
stations have also been giving more emphasis to a new type of light 
entertainment show, incorporating music, and elements of chat show and 
game shows formats. These are markedly different from their
predecessors, and often based on American models. The changes appear 
to have been led by the two largest ARD stations, VDR and BR.
These new shows have not met with universal acclaim. In a piece 
entitled “Inferno der guten Laune“, Der Spiegel criticised this trend 
(Der Spiegel, 25.5.87). It called these types of programmes
simplistic, and argued that they were encouraging "ein Drang zu 
ungenierter Blodheit und infantilem Spielbetrieb" (p.251). Der Spiegel 
accused the producers of these programmes of turning participants 
into objects of ridicule, and detected a sense of maliciousness or 
"Schadenfreude" amongst the new generation of comperes at the expense 
of contestants. It aimed its attacks at BR and VDR, which are
responsible for the bulk of this type of programme, but omitted ZDF,
which is generally regarded as the more entertainment-orientated 
channel. In the same article Frank Elstner, one of ZDF’s most eminent 
comperes, was quoted as saying: "Es ist das Ende guter Unterhaltung, 
wenn man Kandidaten zu Opfern macht" (Der Spiegel, 25.5.1987, p.252).
Dietrich Schwarzkopf, ARD network Programmdirektor, is aware of the
problems of ridicule in some shows, and has stated:
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Vie weit diirfen sich Spieie an der Neigung der Zuschauer zur 
Schadenfreude orientieren?. . .Schadenfreude angesichts geplanter 
oder einkalkulierter MiBgeschicke der Teilnehmer dari' nicht die 
maSgebende Freude sein. (1987, p.7)
At ZDF, Wolfgang Penk, the head of entertainment, argues that some
changes are necessary, because public taste changes, but he adds that
innovation without reference to public taste would constitute an insult
to the audience (1985, p.57). Penk regards some of the changes as a
good thing (1985, p.58). In particular he points to the integration of
journalistic and live elements into light entertainment, which proves
that entertainment can be informative as well as entertaining (Penk,
1985, p.59). A prime example of this type of show is Na Sowas> a very
popular mixture of chat show, game show, and variety show.
4.4.3 Films - a commodity in short supply
Attractive feature films constitute an important element in the 
programme schedules of most television channels. However, films and 
other imports, such as mini-series and series, are very likely to be 
in short supply as more channels chase the same product. The
increase in the number of television channels in Europe is already 
putting inflationary pressure on a limited supply of feature films. 
Schrape estimates that the cost of acquiring feature films, live shows, 
sport, and television series is rising at a rate of 10% to 15% per 
annum (see Schrape, 1987, pp .345-353). With more channels, the
inflationary spiral is likely to accelerate, because the producers of 
new feature films cannot keep up with demand.
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In Vest Germany the problem of securing an adequate supply of 
feature films is especially acute, because the distribution market for 
television rights to acquired material is dominated by the Kirch 
Group, owned by media entrepreneur, Leo Kirch (see NMM 30.3.1988, 
p.12). Over the years Kirch has secured exclusive rights with most of 
the American major film companies and now has a library estimated to 
contain about 15,000 feature films and 50,000 hours of serials, mini- 
series, and documentaries OTMM 30.3.1988, p.13).
Kirch's near monopoly of feature film distribution has serious 
implications for ARD and ZDF, because he is not only a supplier of 
programmes, but also a competitor. Kirch holds a 51% controlling 
interest in PKS, which in turn holds a 40% share of SAT 1. He also 
holds a 26% share in the Axel-Springer Verlag, which in turn has a 
15% share of SAT 1. Kirch is believed to supply SAT 1 with 
approximately 60% of its programme needs. Kirch's other TV interests 
include 100% ownership of the Teleclub pay movie channel, and an 
indirect interest in Pro Sieben (formally Eureka), where his son, 
Thomas, has a a 49% shareholding. For the moment Kirch appears to be 
supplying the public broadcasters, and above all ZDF, with the best 
feature films available, but this situation could change if SAT 1, in 
particular, becomes more popular than either public channel.
Both ARD and ZDF have made concerted efforts to acquire film 
rights over a long period in anticipation of future competitive 
battles with private broadcasters. Andreas Schardt, Justiziar at SAT
- 288 -
1 told me why he thought ARD and ZDF had recently purchased so many
feature film rights:
Das beriiht, meines Erachtens, auf dem Bestreben, das Pulver trocken 
zu halten, bis die Schlacht losgeht, bis die Reichweiten so sind, 
daB auch die Filmiizenzanbieter sich uberlegen, wem gabe ich die 
Rechte. Bis zu diesem Datum werden die Schatze gehortet, und erst 
dann kommen die guten Sachen aus dem Keller, und dann fangt 
wirklich der Kampf urn die Reichweiten an. Das dauert noch eine 
Veile, drei, vier Jahre. (Interview, 5.8.1988)
However, only ARD through its purchasing subsidiary Degeto, has made
any concerted attempts to acquire films from other sources other than
from the Kirch Group. ZDF remains precariously dependent on Kirch.
In February 1984 Degeto secured the exclusive right to select 1350 
films from Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer/United Artists' (MGM/UA) archive of 
3000 films (see von Sell, 1985, p.29; EMM, 20.7.1988, p.14). The deal 
also included access to 70 series, to Varner Brother feature films 
produced before 1948, and to all new films acquired by MGM/UA over 
the next 15 years (see von Sell, 1985, p.29; EMM, 20.7.1988, p.14). The 
package, which also included all past and future James Bond films, was 
secured at a price of $80 million (von Sell, 1985, p.29). The German 
language rights were acquired for a period of 15 years and include 
cable and satellite rights, but not pay television rights (von Sell, 
1985, p.29).
Friedrich Vilhelm von Sell, the former chairman of Degeto and 
Intendant of VDR, justified the purchase as a way of guaranteeing the 
future supply of feature films and of combating inflation (von Sell, 
1985, p.29). He argued that the purchase would enable ARD to invest 
future savings into in-house production (von Sell, 1985, p.30). ARD's
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purchase was the first time that it had dealt directly with an 
American major, much to the annoyance of Leo Kirch (see NMM,
30.3.1988, p.14), However, the purchase was not agreed unanimously 
amongst the ARD stations. BR decided not to participate, and 
continues to buy feature films for its third channel and other
material from Kirch (see Neuer Einkauf bei Kirch, FR 11.12.85; NMM,
20.7.1988, p.15). Degeto, which is responsible for purchasing feature 
films and series for the ARD network, has arranged a special exchange 
deal to allow BR to transmit films from the MGM/UA package (see NMM,
20.7.1988, p.15).
In 1987, ARD's deal with MGM/UA ran into difficulties, following the 
purchase of MGM/UA by Ted Turner. The American major was now keen to 
renegotiate the package by reducing the duration of the licence period 
and restricting access to new releases (see Kowottny findet KGK/UA- 
Haltung "mehr als argerlich", KuR 18.7.1987; Degeto; Filmpaket der ARD 
nicht gefahrdety FR 20.7.1987; NMM 20.7.1988, p.14).
The problem was compounded by an investigation launched by the EC
Commission. The Commission was concerned that the exclusivity clause 
and the duration of the licences contravened European anti-trust 
legislation at the expense of other broadcasters (see NMM 20.7.1988, 
p.14). ARD argued that the anti-trust laws deal with trade and not 
with broadcasting, and pointed out that the Taurus Group has a much 
stronger hold over feature films than ARD (see Nowottny findet 
KGK/UA-Haltung Hinehr als argerlich", KuR 18.7.87; Schiirt die ARD ihr 
Filmpaket auft FR 17.5,88).
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The problem may be resolved by ARD's willingness to drop total 
exclusivity to allow sub-licensing to other television channels, in 
particular to RTL Plus (see SchUrt die ARD ihr Filmpaket auf?, FR
17.5.88; NMM 20.7.1988, p.14). RTL Plus has had difficulties in
acquiring rights to attractive feature films and series, because of
Taurus’s close links with SAT 1, and because of the public channels' 
greater purchasing power (see NMM, 20.7.1988, p.14). BR, which did not 
participate in the MGM/UA deal, is opposed to any sub-licensing, and 
has been applying pressure on the other ARD stations to reject it 
(NMM 20.7.1988, p.14). RTL Plus, however, has one advantage. One of
its shareholders, the Ufa Film- und Fernsehgesellschaft holds the 
transmission rights to the Vest German football league, and ARD might 
well agree to a compromise in order to acquire access to further
football coverage (see NMM 20.7.1988).
ZDF, however, remains predominantly dependent on Taurus. In
February 1984, ZDF acquired rights to 1264 feature films, including 
651 American productions and 251 German productions from 12 separate 
suppliers (see ZDF erwirbt 1264 international und deutsche Spielfilme, 
MP 3/84). 750 of these films were purchased from Taurus, and a
further 345 were purchased from MGM/UA and Varner Brothers (see MP 
3/84; Neuer Einkauf bei Kirch, FR 11.12.1985). The German-language 
rights were secured for a period of 12 to 15 years, and included cable 
and satellite rights for the vast majority (MP 3/1984). ZDF paid for
the purchase by getting approval for a DM258 million supplementary
budget from its Verwaltungsrat (MP 3/1984).
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ZDF claimed that the films had been carefully selected, that 
European films dominated, and that two-thirds of its feature film 
requirements were now satisfied until the year 2000 (Neuer Einkauf bei 
Kircht FR 11.12.85, p.8). However, Taurus still held the rights to a 
number of blockbusters including Doctor Zhivago. The rights to a 
further 178 feature films were acquired by ZDF from Beta Taurus in 
December 1985 at a price of DM44 million (see Neues ZDF-Filmpaket fur 
44 Killionen DXt FR 19.12.1985, p.14).
ARD and ZDF’s attempts to secure the rights to many feature films 
has led to a certain amount of criticism, because these purchases do 
not give credence to the stations' demands for more licence fee 
revenue (see Funfter Bericht der Kommission zur Ermittlung des 
Finanzbedarfs der Rundfunkanstalten (KEF) - Vesentliche Ergebnisse, MP 
1/1986, p.32; Fechner, 1985, p.7). This tactic is also seen as an 
attempt to block the advance of private broadcasting (see Neuer 
Einkauf bei Kircht FR 11.12.85, p.8).
This criticism ignores the fact that bath ARD and ZDF are the 
largest sources of financial support for Vest Germany's domestic film 
industry through co-production and a special agreement with the film 
industry, the Filmforderungsabkommen (in ARD Jahrbuch, 1986, p.424; 
see also Blaney, 1987). The last agreement was signed in March 1986 
and runs until the end of 1988. Both ARD and ZDF agreed to invest 
DM24 million into joint productions with the film industry over a two 
year period. A further DM2 million has been set aside to encourage 
new talent and experimental films. ARD and ZDF also provide some
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financial support for the Filmforderungsanstalt (see Friccius, 1986,
pp.249-53).
4.5 Sport - a special case
Sport is another key meeting point for public and private
broadcasters in the battle for viewers, because popular sporting
events like football and tennis attract large audiences, and are
comparatively cheap and easy to record. Jurgen Doetz, managing 
director of SAT 1 has stated that, “Sport ist das Schlachtfeld, urn 
Zuschauer zu gewinnen" (cit. in Die Zeit 14.4.87). At the same time, 
ARD and ZDF are not prepared to let private broadcasters beat them in 
gaining access to the most important sporting events. Hans Bausch, 
SDR Intendant, underlines this by saying: “Die offentiich-rechtlichen 
werden sich bemiihen, die wichtigsten Sportereignisse in ihrem 
Programm zu haben, sie nicht den Privaten zu uberlassen" (Interview,
29.7.1987).
The importance of sport is revealed by the substantial proportion 
of time it occupies in the schedules of both the ARD network and ZDF. 
In 1987 it accounted for 8.9% of ARD network transmissions, and 8.5% 
of all ZDF transmissions, although this is often exceeded to 
accommodate important events like the Olympics or the Vorld Cup (ARD 
Jahrbuch, 1988, p.353: ZDF Jahrbuch, 1987, p.141; see also Schwarzkopf, 
1987, p.8). According to Dahms, the proportion of sport transmitted 
by ARD and ZDF has remained fairly constant over the last three 
years, but Alois Schardt, ZDF Programmdirektor> believes that sport is
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one of the few programme categories to have undergone expansion in
recent years (Schardt, Interview, 11.8.1987; see Dahms, 1988, p.238).
Schardt traces increased emphasis on sports coverage, in particular
live sport, back to the new competitive environment, when he says:
. . .die Privaten konnen nur an zwei Stellen einsteigen, weil sie 
wenig Geld noch haben. . .Die Chance selbst einzusteigen mit eigenen 
Leistungen, ist der Sport, bei dem sie das Odium der Privaten los 
werden konnen, daB sie nur Konserve spielen. . .Und insofern ist der 
Sport in der Tat Prozentual verandert worden in den Programmen von 
ARD und ZDF, seit es die Privaten gibt, wahrend die anderen Dinge 
seitdem nicht oder nur geringfiigig geandert sind, prozentual. 
(Interview, 11.8.1987)
In spite of ARD and ZDF's commitment to sports coverage, recent 
events have shown that they will increasingly have to pay more for 
less or non-exclusive coverage. This is especially the case for 
football, because the Vest German football federation, the Deutscher 
FuBballbund (DFB), is keen to exploit private television's interest in 
broadcasting football (see Tanz urns Goldene Kalb, FR 27.7.1985, p.10).
The battle for football rights underwent a major change in 1985, 
when the DFB appointed a rights agent, Hans R. Beierlein's Montana- 
Media GmbH, to market the transmission rights to cup and 
international matches instead of dealing directly with ARD and ZDF 
(see ARD/ZDF: mit Beierlein keine Verhandlungen, FR 20.8.1985, p.8). 
This was clearly an attempt by the DFB to deprive the traditional 
broadcasters of their historical dominance in rights acquisition, 
because the appointment of a rights agent allows greater commercial 
exploitation of sports rights, by splitting cable and satellite rights 
for use by private television from terrestrial rights (see ARD/ZDF:
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mit Baierlein keine Verhandlungen, FR 20.8.1985, p.8 ; Poker um TV- 
Rechte geht munter weiter, FR 4.3.1986, p.8 ; NMM, 16.3.1988, p.17).
Tlie most serious blow occurred in May 1988, when the DFB accepted 
an offer of DM135 million from the Ufa Film- und Fernseh GmbH, a 
subsidiary of the Bertelsmann publishing group, which owns 38.9% of 
RTL Plus, for a three-year deal for the exclusive television rights to 
football league matches (see FuBballbund verkauft Fernsehrechte an 
UFA, FR 26.5.1988, pp.1-2; NMM 8.6.1988, p.17). ARD and ZDF had only 
offered DM67.5 million (FR 26.5.1988). Ufa intends to act as an agent 
for the other channels. As compensation, the DFB accepted DM25 
million from ARD and ZDF for the right to transmit five of the nine 
weekly league matches for a period of a year (see NMM 26.6.1988). 
Thereafter ARD and ZDF will have to negotiate directly with Ufa for 
coverage (see Schachem um FuBball geht weiter, FR 27.5.1988).
The loss of exclusive coverage of the football league was a severe
blow to the public stations, and a campaign was launched to establish
legislative recognition for the constitutional right to provide
coverage to a whole range of political, social, and sporting events 
regardless of whether exclusive rights were held or not (see Schreiben 
von ARD und ZDF an die Xinisterprasiden ten der Lander zur freien 
Berichterstattung des Rundfunks Ciber offentliche Ereignissef in MP 
9/1988, pp.594-598>. This, it was argued, was compatible with the 
constitutional right of broadcasting freedom, enshrined in the Basic 
Law, which safeguards broadcasting’s right to report (p.594; see also 
Hilf, 1987, p,6 >. ARD and ZDF also justified their demands by
referring to the obligation of Grundversorgung, of which the provision 
of comprehensive information is an integral part (p.597).
ARD and ZDF's campaign was aimed not only at exclusive contracts, 
but also at the sale of rights at high prices, which effectively 
prevented coverage by other stations (see MP 9/1983, p.594). ARD and 
ZDF asked for a legal right to transmit short excerpts of between 
three and four minutes for events of legitimate public interest free 
of charge (p.598; see also Rechtsgrundiage fur FuBballubertragung, FR
20.5.1988). It was argued that events of particular interest should be 
allowed to be transmitted in full in return for an appropriate fee 
payable to the rights holder (p.598; FR 20.5.1988, p.20).
The campaign found some political support, especially as it was 
feared that a large section of the population might be deprived of 
football, if the broadcasters were unable to secure football coverage 
(see Rechtsgrundlage fur FuBballii bertragung^ FR 20.5.1988). Bavaria 
and Bremen drafted legislation which would clarify the right of ARD 
and ZDF to cover sports and news events, but the Land of Rhineland- 
Palatinate believed existing legislation to be adequate in this respect 
(see NMK 17.8.1988, p.16). As is often the case in Vest German media 
policy, disunity amongst the Lander constituted the major barrier to 
the public stations' efforts.
ARD and ZDF's attempts to establish a constitutional right to 
provide news coverage of all events of legitimate public interest 
suffered a serious blow in August 1988. The case arose because
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excerpts from all football league matches had been broadcast on HR's 
third television channel (see HUM 17.8.1988, p.15). Adjudicating on a 
case brought by the DFB, a court in Wiesbaden rejected ARD's claim 
that it was constitutionally entitled to show clips from all football 
matches, regardless of whether it held the rights or not (see NMM 
17.8.1988, p.15).
In July 1988 the Berlin monopolies court delivered a further blow 
by ruling that ARD and ZDF's exclusive contract for coverage of 
minority sports contravened anti-trust laws (see RMM 17.8.1988, p.15). 
This agreement, the so called Globalvertrag, had been concluded by 
ARD/ZDF and the the West German sports federation, the Deutscher 
Sportbund (DSB) in August 1985 at a cost of DK38 million (see KuR
1.3.1986, p.7; FR 25.7.1985, p.10). The court objected to the size and 
length of the five-year contract, which gives ARD and ZDF the 
exclusive right to have first choice of a range of domestic sporting 
events, with the exception of football, motor racing, ice hockey, golf, 
and horse racing.
Public service broadcasting's monopoly on football has effectively 
been broken, but the implications of the battle for exclusive rights 
goes much further than just sporting events. It concerns the right to 
report freely about all events of legitimate public interest (see 
Stolte, 1984a, pp.290-94; Hilf, 1987, p.6 ). It is unlikely that the 
public stations will let the setbacks they have suffered in the courts 
deter them further from trying to establish a constitutional rignt to 
report. As far as full coverage of sport is concerned, it is clear
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that the public stations will have to reconcile themselves in future 
to less coverage at a higher price.
4.6 Information - the flagship
The provision of news and current affairs is an important part of 
public broadcasting's output, and is generally regarded as the flagship 
of all its broadcasting activities. For this reason information, in a 
broad sense, accounts for a substantial proportion of both ARD network 
and ZDF schedules, usually in excess of 40%.
This is in stark contrast to the low priority given to information 
on the private channels. Kruger estimates that 26.8% and 16.5% 
respectively of all transmissions on SAT 1 and RTL Plus between 19.00 
and 23.00 consist of information programmes (Kruger, 1987, p.556). 
This compares to 35.9% on the ARD network and 46.1 % on ZDF (1987, 
p.556>. Furthermore, the overwhelming bulk of private television's 
informational output consists of news (SAT 1, 17.8%; RTL Plus, 11.5%), 
compared to only 17% on ZDF and 16% on the ARD network (Kruger, 1987, 
p.56; see also Nachtrichtlich auf Null, Der Spiegel 25.5.1987, pp.90- 
92). Whereas ARD and ZDF devote 16% and 14.3% respectively to current 
affairs, this accounts for only 3.5% of SAT 1 output and 2% of RTL 
Plus output (p.56).
Information is likely to continue to play an important role in ARD 
and ZDF schedules, because of the importance attached to it by the 
Constitutional Court, as part of Grundversorgung. The Court ruled:
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Im Zeichen der Erweiterung des Rundfunkangebots um privat 
veranstaltete und europaische Programme kommt es darauf an zu 
gewahrleisten, daB der kiassische Auftrag des Rundfunks erfiiilt 
wird, der neben seiner Roile fur die Meinungs- und politische 
Villensbildung, neben Unterbaltung und iiber laufende 
Berichterstattung hinausgehender Information seine kulturelle 
Verantwortung umfaBt. iUrteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vow
4.11.1986, in FKD 7.11.1986, p.19)
The lower demands placed by the Court on private broadcasting in
respect of information are only acceptable if public broadcasting
fully satisfies its classical role of providing a comprehensive and
pluralistic range of information. This role has been fully
acknowledged by the public broadcasters. The former chairman of ARD,
Willibald Hilf, who is also Intendant at SWF, writes, referring to the
deficits of private broadcasting:
Deshalb werden die Programme der Landesrundfunkanstalten, in denen 
lokale und regionaie Ereignisse in landerbezogene, landeriiber- 
greifende und internationale Zusammenhange eingebunden werden, 
verstarkt zur Komplementation der Defizite eines inxernationali- 
sierten Oder lokal zersplitterten Kommunikationsmarktes heran- 
gezogen werden mussen. (Hilf, 1987, p.5)
Dieter Schwarzkopf, Programmdirektor at ARD, believes that information
will be play an "eher noch verstarkt vorrangige und vornehmsxe
Aufgabe" than before (1987, p.4).
However, concern has arisen that with a future environment of many 
competing channels, news and current affairs might lose their central 
role. Research undertaken in cabled households has already shown that 
the information programmes of ARD and ZDF have suffered most in the 
competitive battle with private channels for viewers, because given a 
choice between information and entertainment, viewers will often skirt 
around information (see 4.1; Dehm, 1984, p.209; Darschin/Frank, 1987, 
pp.225-226). In the past, many of these programmes were protected by
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a system of complementary scheduling by ARD and ZDF, but the arrival 
of private television means that these programmes will no longer have 
a captive audience (see Hall, 1979, p.308). Although the public 
stations will have to accept smaller audiences for their information 
output, they cannot afford to ignore this part of their activities, 
either constitutionally or politically. If private channels continue 
to give only limited attention to current affairs, it will be up to the 
public stations to provide depth of analysis and a public platform for 
debate (see Hilf, 1987, p.5). For without this willingness to stage a 
dialogue between different sections of society, public culture might be 
impoverished (see Hilf, 1987, p.5).
According to Dietrich Schwarzkopf, ARD Programmdirektor, every 
evening, with the exception of Saturdays, should include at least one 
information-based programme in addition to the news (1984, p.920). 
This complements his belief in the need for greater explanation in 
current affairs, and a strengthening of broadcasting's advisory role 
(1987, pp.4-5). For Schwarzkopf, programmes which convey "das 
Dabeisein, Miter leben oder Racherleben" are also an important 
component of information (1987, p.5).
Schwarzkopf's ideas are reminisent of recent discussions about 
current affairs output at the BBC. He opposes "zersplitterte, 
fragmentierxe, bruchstuckhaftige Information" and feels that more use 
should be made of background programmes like Tagesthemen, a nightly 
news programme representing a cross between the 9 O' Clock News on 
BBC 1 and Newsnight on BBC 2 (1987, p.4). He rejects lengthier news
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bulletins, and opposes language which impedes access to information,
arguing that many Vest German journalists are too prone to using the
specialist vocabulary of politicians and experts, rather than language
which can be understood by all (1987, pp.4-5). These views are echoed
by Janssen, who writes:
Und Information wird nicht informativer je angeblich unterhaltender 
man sie aufbereitet, statt sie durch klare Sprache, konturenreiche 
Darstellungen, aussagekraftige Bilder und ihre gekonnte Montage, 
durch begriindete und in ihren Griinden belegte Meinungen "spannend" 
darzubieten. (1986, p.l)
Concern about the presentation of news programmes in particular 
has led to reforms. Both ARD and ZDF now use two presenters for 
their main evening news, and have adopted a more informal approach to 
presentation (see Siepman, 1985, p. 15; ZDF intensiviert Auslands- 
berichte, FR 27.9.1985, p.20>. According to Andreas Schardt, SAT 1's 
Justiziar, these attempts to become "ein biBchen aufgeiockerter" in the 
presentation of news are a direct result of new presentational 
techniques employed by private television (Interview, 5.8.1987). The 
changes clearly represent an attempt to give identity to public 
broadcasting's current affairs output, so that it can be identified 
clearly amongst the plethora of competing offerings on commercial 
channels. According to Heiko Engeikes, the number two at ARD~Aktuell% 
ARD news is now more fluent, better visually, and places more emphasis 
on the day's major stories, live features, sport, and culture (cit. in 
Siepman, 1985, p.15). However, with obvious reference to the news of 
SAT 1 and RTL Pius, he denies that ARD will concentrate more on 
entertaining news and features (cit. in Siepmann, 1985, p.15).
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However, changes in presentation are only one aspect of attempts to 
reform public broadcasting’s information output. For many observers 
of broadcasting, political interference represents a far greater threat 
to public broadcasting's role as a medium and factor in the formation 
of public opinion (see Buchwald, 1987, p.9). This threat occurs not 
only from outside, but also from within; from politicisation within 
the supervisory bodies of public broadcasting and from the political 
allegiances of individual journalists and producers (see Schwarzkopf,
1984, p.921; Buchwald, 1987, p.6 ; Hilf, 1987, p.5). Such fears are not 
new, and have long been a source of public debate about television 
(see Barsig, 1980, p.39ff), for politicization is evident in Vest 
German broadcasting, and was probably one of the main reasons for the 
political impetus to introduce private television.
Political bias on Vest German television has been widely 
researched, with widely differing results (see B'oelle-Neumann, 1976, 
p.7; Rundfunkjournalisten als Vahlhelfer, in KP 1/1977, pp.1-10; Merten,
1985, p.9; Kepplinger, 1985, p.22). Although the evidence put forward 
to support bias or impartiality varies considerably, it cannot be 
denied that there is a considerable degree of politicisation within 
Vest German broadcasting. Dagobert Lindlau, editor-in-chief at BR, 
refers to the problems of "Verlautbarungsjournaiismus", uncritical 
reporting of political events and its opposite, "Gesinnungs- 
journalismus", which he calls a "parteipolitischen Umweltverschmutzung" 
(1984, p.10). He further suspects that the political parties try to 
subordinate the media by encouraging the careers of those who are
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sympathetic to their political line; in return they expect some form 
of political payment (1984, p.10)
Dietrich Schwarzkopf, ARD Programmdirektor, rejects the accusation 
that the current affairs output of ARD or ZDF is too narrow or at
worst outright biased. However, he criticises "eine meinungsbedingte
Themen- und Sichtverengung" which leads to only one view, and asks 
whether ARD's regular current affairs magazines, which he calls
"Richtungsmagazine", have outlived their day (1987, p.5; see also 
Kocher, 1986, p.49pp>. He also opposes "die gezielte Emotionalisierung 
von Themen", and calls for stronger attention to research (1987, p.5).
The regular current affairs magazines such as Panorama (IfDR),
Report Baden-Baden (SWF), Report Miinchen (BR), Monitor (VDR), and ZDF- 
Magazin have always encouraged party-political criticism, more so than 
the news, whose less analytical content is generally considered to be 
less controversial (see Hall, 1979, pp.306pp, p.312; Dietrich, 1987, p.4; 
Bausch, Interview, 29.7.1987). The controversy has been heightened by 
attempts to balance the magazines politically, but according to Bausch: 
"Auseinandersetzungen iiber das Programm gibt es immer. Venn man neun 
Partner hat, die das Gemeinschaftsprogramm machen, ware es wirklich 
widernatiirlich, wenn die alle immer wieder einig werden" (Interview,
29.7.1987). ARD's magazine slot is filled regularly by programmes 
made at different ARD stations on a four week cycle. Two are 
considered to be more biased towards the right of the political 
spectrum and two to the left (see Hall, 1979, p.311). ZDF-Magazin is
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generally considered to be more right-wing and a counterweight to 
NDR's Panorama (see Hall, 1979, p.311>.
Concern at ARD about the future of its political magazines resulted 
in an examination by the ARD-Programmbeiratt which established bias 
in the selection of themes and in the presentation of a . quarter of all 
contributions to these programmes (Bericht des ARD-Programmbeirats 
vom 24.6.1987t FKD 3.7.1987, pp.1-7; Bausch, Interview, 29.7.1987). The 
main problem was seen to be the attempt to mould opinion rather than 
to inform it (p.6 ). Others suspect that the most recent attacks on 
the magazine concept are the result of a wish to reform the magazines 
to combat falling ratings (see FR, 19.2.1987; Dietrich, 1987, p.3). 
While some, like SVF Intendantt Willibald Hilf, have favoured a central 
editorial department for ARD's magazines, others, such as SDR's 
Intendant, Hans Bausch, maintain that less damage is done by splitting 
production into four separate centres (Interview, 29.7.1987). Bausch 
also believes that a lot of the problems of the magazine programmes 
are due to "star" presenters like Franz Alt at Report Baden-Baden who 
thrive on adverse publicity, but he denies that the magazines have 
become fewer in quantity or weaker in quality in recent years 
(Interview, 29.7.1987).
Manfred Buchwald, editor-in-chief at HR, in spite of criticising 
party political polarisation within broadcasting which turns it into a 
"Medium and Faktor politischer Strategien des Machterwerbs uno 
Machterhaits", feels that there could be a positive aspect to the 
introduction of commercial competition (1987, p.8 ). He admits that the
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political parties are trying to use broadcasting through the 
broadcasting councils, and that the commercial stations have an 
advantage, because they are seen as apolitical (1987, p.9). However, 
in a situation of many competing channels, politicians might 
ironically need public service broadcasting, because there is little 
opportunity for them to reach the public on the commercial channels, 
which are predominantly concerned with transmitting entertainment 
(Buchwald, 1987a, p.4).
4.7 Tensions between ARD and ZDF
The appearance of commercial broadcasting not only has 
implications for public service broadcasting as a whole. It also has 
implications for the competitive relationship existing between ARD and 
ZDF. For they are competing not only with private channels, but also 
with each other for audiences and advertising revenue, and there are 
increasing signs that commercial competition is placing a strain on 
this relationship.
Competition between ARD and ZDF has been controlled by an 
obligation to coordinate evening schedules in such a way that the 
viewer has a chance to choose between different types of programmes 
(see AFD/ZDF-Frogrammschema, ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, pp.386-7; see
Bullinger, 1987, p.19). Coordination has also been used to proxect 
information programmes and news from too much competition from 
entertainment programmes. This obligation is enshrined in Paragrapn 
22, Clause 3 of the ZDF-Staatsvertrag, which states:
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Der Intendant hat durch Zusammenarbeit mit den fur das Erste 
Fernsehprogramm Verantwort lichen darauf hinzuwirken, dafi die 
Fernsehteilnehmer der Bundesrepublik zwischen zwei inhaltlich 
verschiedenen Programmen wahlen konnen.
This arrangement worked fairly well in the past, but has been 
subject to increased tension as ARD and ZDF have sought to reform 
their schedules in anticipation of commercial competition (see 
Schwarzkopf, 1984, p.921; Hilf, 1987, p.7; ARD-Schema bleibt fast 
unverandert, FR 26.6.1987; ARD setzt auf Konkurrenzfah igkei t, FR
7.12.1987). Doubts have even been raised about the value of 
coordination in its present form, given that programmes of narrower 
appeal will no longer be protected from the popular competition of an 
increasing number of television channels (see Stolte: Koordinierung 
praktisch unmoglich, FR 23.6.1986).
Some believe that the present approach towards coordination is 
encouraging self-commercialisation and the marginalisation of minority 
programmes, as both public networks attempt to maximise their peak­
time audiences (see Buchwald, 1987, p.10). Stammler argues that ARD 
and ZDF should cooperate more in their attempts to combat commercial 
competition, rather than resort to confrontation which could exhaust 
the resources of both systems (1986, p.5).
The notion of cooperation instead of confrontation has been echoed 
by those within the stations, who have emphasised the mutual benefit 
of placing public broadcasting's outstanding in-house productions in 
the forefront of schedules (see Schardt, 1984, p.917; Schwarzkopf,
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The programmes shown by individual ARD stations between 17.30 and 
20.00 are a source of controversy, because this is the only time when 
advertising is allowed on public television. Changes in the type of 
programmes transmitted during this period, which lead to any increase 
in audiences, automatically result in protests from ZDF. For the 
ability of ARD and ZDF to maximise advertising revenue during this 
period will be crucial, if revenue from the licence fee continues to 
stagnate, and if advertising revenue is subject to competition from 
private broadcasting channels.
Traditionally the ARD stations have always broadcast regional 
programmes during this period. However, the need to maximise 
advertising revenue, and concern about a drop in audiences, has led to 
reforms. In order to increase ratings VDR, SWF, SDR, and HR have 
moved their regional programmes to the third television channels, and 
replaced them with light entertainment and series (see Unterhaltung 
soil Zuschauerschwund stoppen, FR 2.12.1985; Auch HR andert Vorabend- 
programm, FR 3.12.1985). At BR, regional news has been moved forward 
to accommodate more entertainment between 18.55 and 19.50, and access 
programmes have been put on BR's third channel (see BR setzt Serien 
gegen ZDF-Konkurrenz, FR 18.11.1985, p.20).
The transferral of regional programming to the third channels has 
been accompanied by an earlier start for the opt-outs from 18.00 to 
17.25 in order to accommodate an increase in popular transmissions. A 
larger area for advertising gives the ARD stations a better chance of 
reducing the length of their advertising blocks and of distributing
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1984, p.921; Schardt: ARD und ZDF sollten Gemeinsamkeiten betonen,
NMNL 1.12.1984; Schwarzkopf cit. in ARD will Kooperation mit ZDF
gegeniiber privat-TV, NMML 12.1.1985; Stoite cit. in N3UTL, 9.2.1985,
p.ll). Alois Schardt, Prograjnmdirektor at ZDF, told me:
In einem sind wir uns einig, ARD und ZDF. Wir beide glauben, daS 
wir die Konkurrenz mit den privaten Anbietern am besten bestehen 
konnen, wenn wir mehr Eigenleistungen herausteiien. (Interview,
11,8.1987)
This policy was partially implemented in 1986 when ZDF agreed to swap 
its evening schedules on Monday and Tuesday evenings so that ARD- 
produced series on Monday evenings did not have to compete with a 
feature film on ZDF (see Koordinierungsgesprache von ARD/ZDF beendet, 
FR 10.7.1985, p.10). However, the following year ZDF tried to reverse 
its concession, arguing that ARD had broken the agreement by 
transmitting an increasing number of foreign, instead of domestic 
series, on Monday evenings (see Nur geringe knderungen am 
Femsehschemat FR 4,7,1986). ZDF’s attempt to revert to its earlier 
decision was a reaction to the loss in ratings it had incurred from 
the success of ARD's series (see Unterhaltungsstrategie auf leisen 
Sohlen, FR 24.3.1987).
However, the arguments surrounding the coordination of peak-time 
schedules are only one aspect of the dispute between ARD and ZDF. 
Most of the tension between the two has arisen not from the 
scheduling of peak-time programmes, but from the scheduling of those 
programmes which are not subject to the coordination agreement. These 
include the regional opt-outs on the ARD network between 17.30 and 
20.00, and the regionally-based ARD third television channels.
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them more effectively (see ARD verlangert ihr Vora bendprogra mm, FR 
23.7.1987; ARD erweitert 1983 ihre Fernsehprogramme, FR 1.10.1987).
These changes have led to protests from ZDF, which used to have an 
advantage over the ARD stations during this period, because it is 
under no obligation to transmit regional programmes and could devote 
itself entirely to programmes of mass appeal, aimed at attracting 
large audiences and ultimately advertising revenue. ZDF Intendant, 
Dieter Stolte saw the changes as a "Beeintrachtigung und langfristige 
Existenzgefahrdung" for ZDF, which is much more dependent on 
advertising revenue than ARD (cit. in FR 19.7.1985, p.16; see also 
Schwaderlapp, 1984, p.160; Stolte, 1985a, p.32; Konrad, 1985, p.150; 
Stolte cit. in Rechtsgutachten soil klaren - ZDF ist Uber 
Programmpolitik von ARD-Anstalten besorgt> FR 17.12.1985; Stolte cit. 
in Auf dem IVeg von der Vielfalt zur Einfaltt FR 15.1.1988).
Advertising accounts far approximately 40% of ZDF revenue as opposed 
to less than 20% of ARD revenue.
Reforms of some of the regionally-based ARD third television
channels have further strained the relationship between ARD and ZDF 
(see Schwaderlapp, 1984, p.160; Stolte, 1985a, p.32). The changes 
initiated here are primarily connected with national distribution by 
satellite, and a transformation of channels traditionally characterised
by minority and regional programming, into generic channels
comparable to the ARD network and ZDF (see Kosmus, 1985, p.l75pp). BR 
and VDR, the two largest ARD stations, have been the prime instigators 
of these changes, and their third channels, Vest III and Bayern 3, are
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now distributed nationally into cable systems by satellite (see 
Wiirgegriff des Konopols, Virtschaftswoche 24.1.1986, p.30).
The impetus for these initiatives appears to be partly poiixicai 
(see Pitzer, 1986, p.63). In Bavaria, governed by the CSU and 
therefore further to the right on the political spectrum, the national 
presence of BR's third channel has widely been regarded as a 
counterweight to what is seen as the left-wing bias of other ARD 
stations, in particular VDR (see Pitzer, 1986, p.61, p.63). By
comparison the national distribution of VDR, which is based in the 
SPD-governed Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, is seen as a more left- 
wing corrective to the more conservatively-orientated private channels 
and to BR (see Pitzer, 1986, p.61).
Attempts to implement the most far-reaching reforms occurred at 
BR. In 1985 BR put forward a proposal to impose an extra DM6 monthly 
payment on Bavarian licence-fee payers to pay for satellite 
distribution and reforms aimed at changing the third channel into a 
fully-fledged generalist programme service (see Konkurrenz zu ARD und 
ZDF aus Bayern?, FR 22.7.1985; Pitzer, 1986, p.63). The plans were 
heavily criticised by the Bavarian SPD, which saw an attempt to 
"telemissionieren" "auf bayerisch*' at the expense of the Bavarian 
licence-fee payer (see FR 29.7.1985, p.18). The plan was eventually 
rejected because of the high costs of DM200 million a year, but it was 
agreed that the third channel should be distributed nationally by 
satellite from 1987 at a cost of DM50 million a year (Ein bdses 
Erwachen aus den Satelllten-Traumen, FR 4,10.1985).
- 310 -
ZDF has criticised the transformation of the third channels into
generalist services as a distortion of the competitive relationship
between ARD and ZDF and as a threat to the structure of public
broadcasting (see Schwaderlapp, 1984, p.160; Stolte, 1985a, p.32; ZDF-
Intendani in Sorge iiber dritte Programme, FR 19.7.1985, p.16; Pitzer,
1986, p.62). The main concern is that populist programming on the
third channels draws attention away from ZDF's output, and therefore
makes coordination of the ARD network service and ZDF superfluous.
ZDF also resents the scheduling advantages offered by the third
channels, because the ARD stations can move minority and regional
output to these services, allowing the network to concentrate on
popular programming. ZDF, which is confined to one nationally
available channel, does not possess these advantages, and is
particularly vulnerable during the period when it transmits
advertising. Alois Schardt, ZDF Programmdirektor told me:
Das ZDF ist gegeniiber der ARD eigentlich strenger bei seiner alten 
ttischung geblieben als die ARD. Das hatte einen Grund. Die ARD 
kann einen Teil ihres kulturellen Auftrages in die dritten 
Programme tun. Wir konnen das nicht, weil wir keine Dritten
Programme haben. Insofern sind wir hinsichtlich dieser Frage in 
einem Nachteil, weil wir nicht den Anteil an Unterhaltungsprogramme 
erhohen konnen. Im Filmsektor kann man deutlich feststeilen, daB 
die ARD viel mehr Filme ausstrahlt als wir. (Interview, 11.8.1987)
Hans Bausch denies that ZDF is disadvantaged, but admits that the
third television channels are used as a contrast to the network
(Interview, 29.7.1989). For example if an opera is transmitted on the
network, a more popular programme might be shown on the third
channels (Interview, 29.7.1987). ZDF also fears the financial
implications of reforming the third channels which might affect the
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division of licence fee revenue between ARD and ZDF (see Stolte cit. in
Pitzer, 1986, p.62).
Concern about ARD's activities resulted in ZDF instigating a report 
to examine whether it was still bound by the coordination agreement 
(RecJhtsgutachten soil klaren - ZDF ist Uber Programmpolitik von ARD- 
Anstalten besorgtt FR 17.12.1985). The report by Professor Martin 
Bullinger confirmed ZDF's belief that changes in the profile of the 
third channels were affecting the obligation to coordinate programmes 
("Begrenzte FlexibilitaV Martin Bullingers Gutachten zur 
Koordinationspflicht: Zusammenfassung, KuR 26.8.1987, pp. 18-20; see
also ZDF-Rechtsgutachten: Dritte Programme beein-trachtigen
Koordination, Gutachter Martin Bulliner schlagt "Anpassung, Ablosung 
Oder Erganzung" vort KuR 26.8.1987, pp.6-7). To solve the problem 
Bullinger put forward three solutions. The first proposal involved 
concentration by the third channels on regional concerns and
distribution within a clearly defined regional transmission area. 
Alternatively, the competitive solution could be reduced by banning
advertising on the third channels, and by refusing to include the 
costs of national distribution by satellite in the next licence fee
increase. Lastly, he proposed extending the coordination agreement to
the third channels. If this was not possible, the precise obligations 
of the third channels could be fixed in an inter-Land agreement.
Changes initiated by VDR and BR to their third channels have not 
found universal approval from the other ARD stations either, because 
increased emphasis on these services is regarded by some as a threat
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to the ARD networked, service, in terms of both competition and
commitment (see Pitzer, 1986, p.60). Dieter Stammier sums up these
concerns when he writes:
Die foderalistische Struktur unseres Rundfunksystems, die in all 
ihren Starken und Schwachen in der ARD ihren typischen Ausdruck 
findet, steht und fallt mit der Bereitschaft zum taglichen 
KompromiB zwischen unterschiedlichen Interessen und Anschauungen 
und zur Solidarityt zwischen Starken und Schwachen, deren 
wichtigste Auspragung der Finanzausgleich bildet. Venn einzelne 
Anstalten, die sich allein stark genug wahnen, aus diesem Verbund - 
wenn auch nur partiell - ausscheren und Alleingange unternehmen, 
setzen sie zentrifugale Krafte frei, die eine kaum zu 
kontrollierende Eigendynamik entfalten. (1986, p,4)
At a press conference to mark a meeting of the ARD Intendanten, 
the ARD chairman, Friedrich Vilhelm Rauker, warned that these reforms 
must not undermine joint obligations to the ARD network (Ein boses 
Erwachen aus den Satelliten-Traumen?, FR 4.10.1985, p.26). This
follows from fears that some stations may become less committed in 
their support of the ARD network once they start investing their 
financial and human resources in the third channels (see Janssen, 
1986, p.2). If the programmes of the ARD network deteriorated as a 
result, questions might be raised about the future existence of ARD. 
Large stations like BR and VDR could cope with this eventuality, 
because they have enough resources to transmit their own television 
services, but the small ARD stations can only participate in 
television by cooperating with other stations (.Ein boses Erwachen aus 
den Satelliten-Traumen?, FR 4.10.1985).
Stammier argues that attempts to change the third channels into 
generalist services would require giving them a profile which
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distinguishes them from the ARD network. Stammier distinguishes
between two solutions. In the first, the third channels would act as 
a nationally distributed generalist alternative to the ASD netware, and 
would provide a framework for regional programming. In the second, 
the third channels would become narrowcast services, acting as a 
supplement to the ARD network (1986, p.5>.
Others, such as Herbert Janssen, saw advertising, introduced to HR's 
third channel, as a threat to the third channels. In his view 
advertising could undermine the complementary character of the third 
channels. According to Janssen this complementary character had to 
be retained:
Das gilt auch heute noch nicht nur wegen der gefahrdeten Balance 
zwischen ZDF und ARD, die politische Auswirkungen zum Schaaen des 
offentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks haben konnte, es gilt auch 
angesichts des Aufkommens privater Programme bei der 
gleichzeitigen Mbglichkeit, die Dritten Programme bundesweit zu 
verbreiten. (1986, p.l).
Janssen supported the national distribution of the third channels, but
rejected any attempts to change them into imitations of ARD and ZDF,
arguing that they should retain their regional and alternative
character. In his view, this was also in the interest of ARD
generally:
Denn warum sollte die ARD ihrem Gemeinschaftsprogramm selbst 
Konkurrenz machen und weiter deswegen mit dem ZDF im Clinch 
liegen, statt fur die Zuschauer und den offentlichen Rundfunk 
forderliche alternative Programme anzubieten? (1986, p.2 )
The Inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting, 
signed by the prime ministers of the Lander, might halt any further 
changes to the third channels (see Staatsvertrag zur Neuordnung des
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Rundfunkwesens, in FK 27.3.1987, pp.18-26). Advertising on rhe third 
channels was effectively blocked, although exceptionally HR can 
continue to pursue this course until 1991, when it will have been 
granted sufficient licence fee revenue to support its new fourrh radio 
network (p,20). Furthermore, a note attached to the agreement 
confirms that the costs of national distribution by satellite will not 
be included in future licence fee increases, and that the regional 
character of the third channels should be retained.
4.8 Shifts in emphasis
From the previous discussion it is clear that ARD and ZDF are 
responding vigorously to the challenge of commercial competition. The 
statements of the broadcasters and the debate about the future 
direction of public broadcasting continuously assert that there will 
be no change in the balance between information and entertainment 
programmes, and that domestic production, both in-house, and 
commissioned material, will continue to play the dominant role in the 
output of ARD and ZDF. Information programmes will still occupy the 
same important position as before, but changes of emphasis are 
occurring within drama, light entertainment, and sport in the attempt 
to compete with commercial broadcasters. In drama the trend is away 
from one-off dramas towards series, and in particular domestic series. 
Light entertainment and sport are supposed to be increasing in 
significance.
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To test some of these assumptions an analysis was undertaken oi 
ASD network and ZDF schedules over a two week period (1-7 October ana 
12-21 October) in each year from 1982 to 1987 (see Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 
4.4). This time-span was chosen because the period from 1982 to 1987 
offered an opportunity to study schedules immediately before the 
advent of private television. The month of October was chosen, 
because this is a standard month which does not include major 
sporting events, festive schedules, or large amounts of repeats, which 
are characteristic of the summer holiday months. In the case of the 
ARD network, broadcasts within the transmission area of HR were taken 
as a typical example for the whole of the ARD network, particularly 
where they related to the regional opt-out period before 8pm.
Schedules were taken from copies of Horzu, the most comprehensive 
Vest German listings magazine available. The period studied was 6pm 
to 11pm, the peak time period, because this is the time when most 
viewers are watching, and when the public channels are in most direct 
competition with private broadcasters. The choice of peak time also 
allowed better comparison in terms of minutes broadcast, which 
totalled 4200 minutes for each channel over a two week period.
Six main categories were differentiated: information, fiction, light 
entertainment, sport, childrens' programmes, and other.
The category of information includes news, current affairs, local 
news, and documentaries/culture. The sub-category of news refers to 
national news bulletins only, as distinct from local news, which also
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includes local news magazines and features. The sub-category current 
affairs includes only those programmes which deal with current
political, social, and economic affairs, like the business programme
WISOt and the current affairs magazine Panorama. It also includes
political discussion programmes and programmes about current 
international events. The category documentaries/culture covers
information programmes dealing with history, society, the arts ana 
religion, as well as various advice programmes.
The category of fiction covers all programmes which follow a 
dramatic script and is divided into feature films, television plays, 
series/serials, and recorded cultural events such as theatre plays, 
operas, and ballet. As fiction is most likely to be imported the sub­
categories of feature films and series/serials were sub-divided into 
countries of origin (German, American, European, Other). As the vast
majority of one-off plays are German productions, this was not sub­
divided into countries of origin.
The category of light entertainment covers quizzes and shows, 
satire, chat shows, and popular music programmes. The sub-category 
quiz and shows includes those programmes with a competitive element, 
or programmes with a mixture of entertaining features. Popular music 
programmes include pop, jazz, folk music, and variety shows, where
music predominates.
Sport was sub-divided into regular sport, such as sports magazines, 
and live sport. This was felt to be necessary, because the
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transmission of one football match during the peak time period would 
otherwise substantially alter the proportion of sport transmitted.
The category of children's programmes may be subject to 
inaccuracies, because these programmes are generally shown during the 
same period as advertising, and the listings magazine did not give 
clear indications about when advertising was being transmitted. The 
"other" category includes continuity announcements, lotteries, and 
advertising where it could be clearly distinguished.
Looking at the category of information it is clear that the amount 
transmitted by ARD has decreased substantially over the five-year 
period (43.6% to 33.4%), compared to a slight increase at ZDF (36% to 
39.6%). In ARD's case the amount of information has dropped because 
of the removal of local news to the third channels, although the 
amount of time devoted to current affairs has also decreased slightly 
by (8.5% to 5.6%), At ZDF there appears to have been a slight 
increase in information output due to more concentration on 
documentaries and culture, and a slight increase in news output. On 
ARD the amount of time devoted to news has remained about the same 
over the five-year period.
The decrease in the amount of time devoted to local information at 
ARD (removed to the third channels) has quite clearly been 
compensated for by an increase in the amount of time for fiction 
(38.7% to 46.2%) and in particular serials/series (21% to 32.6%). The 
number of feature films on ARD and ZDF appears to have remained
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Fig. 4.2
ARD NETWORK TRANSMISSIONS 1982-1987 (%>
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
INFORMATION 43.6 43.7 42,8 42.1 35.4 33.4
News 13.2 13.1 13.0 13.2 13.2 13.2
Current affairs 8.5 7.7 7.3 7.1 5.8 5.6
Local news 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.8 4.8 4.8
Documentaries/ 8.6 9.6 9.2 8.0 11.6 9.8
Culture/Other
FICTION 38.7 39.4 32.7 37.1 47.9 46.2
1. Films 5.0 6.4 8.6 12.3 8.1 4.8
-German ------ ------ ------ 4.4 --- ---
-American 2.1 3.9 3.6 5.6 ------- 2.3
-European 2.0 2.5 5.0 2.3 8.1 2.5
-Other 0.9 - - - ------ — ------ -----
2 . P'iavs 12.5 7.7 3.0 4.9 6.6 2.6
3. Series 21.0 21.5 20.8 18.5 32.2 32.6
-German 8.8 11.9 10.7 6.5 16.2 13.1
-American 10.9 3.6 6.9 8.1 8.9 16.2
-European 1.3 6.0 3.2 3.3 7.1 3.3
-Other ------ --- --- 0.6 ------- ------
4. Theatre/ ------- 3.8 ------ 1.4 1.0 6.2
Opera/Ballet
ENTERTAINMENT 9.2 8.5 10.7 9.8 6.7 11.1
-Quiz/shows 5.0 3.9 5.7 3.6 2.5 7.9
-Satire 0.7 ------ ------- 0.7 0.7 ------
-Talkshows ------ ------- 2.5 ------ ------- 1.1
-Music 3.5 4.6 2.5 5.5 3.5 2.1
SPORT 6.5 5.8 9.1 5.3 7.8 4.5
-Regular 5.8 5.8 • 5.8 5.3 4.5 4.5
-Live 0.7 3.3 ------ 3.3
CHILDREN 1.5 1.9 4.3 5.0 1.2 3.8
OTHER 0,7 0.7 0.7 0.7 . 1 „Q 1 .0_
100 100 100 100 100 100.0
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Fig. 4.3
ZDF TRANSMISSIONS 1982-1987 <%>
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 198?
INFORMATION 36.0 33.2 36.4 38.4 39.0 39.6
News 12.0 11.9 12.0 12.0 11.7 13.2
Current affairs 6.7 6.7 10.2 8.9 8.9 8.8
Local news ------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Documentaries/ 17.3 14.6 14.2 17.5 18.4 17.6
Culture *
FICTION 45.7 43.7 39.3 38.0 35.2 40.8
1. Films 5.5 16.4 8.1 16.9 5.1 8.7
-German -------------- 1.2 3.5 2.5 ------------- 4.2
-American 5.0 10.6 4.6 2.7 1 • X -------------
-European 0.5 4.6 ------------- 9.9 ------------- 4.5
-Other --- -------------- “---------- 1.8 ------------- ------— —
2 . Flays 13.8 12.3 9.0 5.2 7.5 6.1
3. Series 21.8 15.0 19.6 15.8 21.3 25.5
-German 10.1 6.9 14.4 7.7 14.4 14.2
-American 11.7 6.0 --- 8.1 2.7 6.8
-European --- --- 5.2 --- 4.2 4.5
-Other --- 2.1 --- --- --- ---
4. Theatre/ 4.6 --- 2.6 1.3 1.3 0.5
Opera/Ballet
ENTERTAINMENT 10.2 11.8 14.2 11.3 15.3 10.7
-Quiz/shows 5.5 6.1 5.1 5.2 7.3 7.1
-Satire --- 1.1 --- --- --- ---
-Talkshows 1.1 --- 1.1 --- 0.7 ---
-Music 3.6 4.6 8.0 6.1 7.8 3.6
SPORT 3.1 4.6 4.3 4.2 3.9 5.2
-regular 3.1 3.5 • 4.3 4.0 3.9 4.0
-live --- 1.1 --- 0.2 --- 1.2
CHILDREN 1.9 2.3 2.6 3.0 2.0 ___
OTHER 3 . 1 ... . 4.4 3.2 3.9 4.1 3.7
100 100 100 100 100 100
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constant apart from an aberration in 1985. This may have been aue to 
large film purchases in 1984/1985. American feature films predominate 
in most years, but there are also significant amounts of European 
feature films. Both channels have decreased their showings of one-off 
plays (down from 12.5% to 2.6% at ARD and from 13.8% to 6.1% at ZDF), 
thus confirming statements that the one-off play is no longer so 
important, because of its inability to maintain audience share. The
biggest changes can be observed in the larger amount of time devotee 
to series and serials. At ZDF (an increase from 21.8% to 25.5%) this 
appears to have come at the expense of one-off plays, and perhaps to
a lesser extent from transmissions of live cultural events such as
opera, ballet and the theatre (down from 4.6% to 0.5%). The most 
striking thing about series and serials on ZDF is the increase in the 
amount of German content (up from 10.1% to 14.5%), with American 
content seemingly on the decline (down from 11.7% to 6 .8%). At ARD 
there has also been an increase in series/serials, but although German 
content has maintained a steady, if not increasing share (up 8 .8% to 
13.1%), American content has also increased its share particularly in 
the most recent years (up 10.9% to 16.2%).
In spite of ARD and ZDF’s statements about the importance of light 
entertainment, there appear to have been no significant changes in the 
amount transmitted, at about 10% of all transmissions. Quizzes, shows 
and music shows continue to make up the bulk of these type of
programmes. Satire and talkshows continue to account for only a very 
small proportion of transmission time, usually less than one per cent, 
if they register at all.
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Contrary to statements about the increase in the number of sports 
transmissions, the amount of time devoted to regular sports 
programmes appears to have remained relatively stable. At ARD, these 
type of programmes may even have suffered a slight, decline.
4.9 Review
ARD and ZDF are undoubtedly reviewing their programme policies 
with a view to private competition. It may be too early to determine 
exactly where they are going, as future developments are still being 
discussed internally. Popular content, especially series are 
undoubtedly being seen as more important both in terms of scheduling 
and increased share of total transmission time. Their growing 
importance is backed up by statistical analysis, but here a 
distinction has to be made between ZDF and ARD. ZDF is concentrating 
more effort on domestic series, but ARD, while not neglecting this 
area, is becoming increasingly reliant on imported series also. 
Increased attention to series/serials is certainly coming at the 
expense of one-dramas, both on the ARD network and ZDF, and this is 
confirmed both by the statements of the broadcasters and by 
statistical analysis. The debate about feature films may be 
overvalued, because the amount of time they occupy in the schedules 
does not correspond to the huge amounts spent on acquiring rights.
Apart from the removal of regional output to the ARD third 
channels, levels of information seem to be fairly constant on both ARD 
and ZDF, with the split between news and more analytical content
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(documentaries, current affairs) maintained. The public broadcasters' 
assertions about the continued importance of information therefore 
rings true, but this may not be the central issue. The most worrying 
aspect of information output is the hold of the political parties over 
the stations, and an increasing tendency for viewers to skirt around 
information if offered the alternative of popular programming on 
private television.
Light entertainment (shows, quizzes, chat shows, comedy) continues 
to be a poorly served area in spite of public service broadcasters* 
assertions to the contrary. This may turn out to be a lost 
opportunity because the private broadcasters do not cater well for 
this area either, in spite of the huge popularity of many light 
entertainment programmes (see Fig. 4.1, p.254).
The disputes surrounding sports transmissions are by no means 
concluded, and are likely to be extended to other areas besides 
football. In the event of inflated prices for sports rights, ARD and 
ZDF may well have to compromise and offer less coverage in the 
interest of maintaining their other programme obligations.
Vhether the route taken by the ARD and ZDF, which seems 
predominantly to be fashioned by popular taste, is right, has yet to 
be seen. In concentrating on more populist output, particularly 
popular drama, they may well keep the attention of the audience, but 
they also run the risk of losing some of their status as public 
service institutions. One worrying aspect is the emphasis on populist
drama, which ignores the fact that highbrow drama too, can attract 
large audiences and offer viewers of all classes a great deal of 
satisfaction. This gap between overtly populist output and very 
highbrow content has still to be bridged. The continued high status 
of information output offers some consolation in this respect.
ARD and ZDF must undoubtedly cater for the needs of their 
audiences, but they must not give the political parties any reason to 
attack them as a result of changes in programming policy. This is 
vitally important, because continued financial support via the licence 
fee is dependent on the goodwill of politicians who grant it. in 
spite of Constitutional Court pronouncements about the Lander’s duty 
to provide ARD and ZDF with adequate financial support to enable them 
to carry out Grundversorgung, quality programming is notoriously 
difficult to value, and this gives politicians great scope to limit the 
activities of the broadcasters. The implications of this are covered 
in Chapter G.
CHAPTER FIVE
PUBLIC SERVICE EXPANSION - A GUARANTEE FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
In the political battles leading up to the signing of tne inter-
Land agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting in March 1987,
ARD and ZDF constantly emphasised their need for a guarantee of
further development, in addition to a guarantee of existence, if they
were not to stagnate and become superfluous in a future environment of
many competing broadcasting channels (see Stuttgartar Erklarung der
ARD zur Kedienpolitik 30,11.83, MP 11/1983, p.801; Erklarung dar
Gremienvorsitzenden der ARD vom 19.10.1983 zur Position der
offentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten in der kiinftigen
Medienlandschaft, MP 11/1983, p.803; Stolte, 1984a, p.291>. This aspect
was clearly brought out in a conversation I had with Bernd-Peter
Arnold, head of radio regionalisation at HR, who distinguishes between
the limits of a guarantee of existence and the greater security
offered by a guarantee of further development:
Bestandsgarantie wiirde Ruckschritt bedeuten, denn wenn der 
offentlich-rechtliche Rundfunk auf seinen jetzigen Stand eingefroren 
wiirde, wiirde das bedeuten in 10 Jahren, liegt er weit zuriick. Man 
kann ein Rundfunksystem nicht auf dem Stand von jetzt lassen, 
sondern ein Rundfunksystem muB jeden Tag weiterentwickelt werden, 
sonst ist es sehr bald tot, Oder zumindest so steif und 
unbeweglich, dafi kein Mensch es mehr auf Dauer will. (Interview
26.8.1987)
The disputes surrounding ARD's cultural satellite channel, Eins 
Plus, which have already been discussed in Chapter 3, revealed the 
depth of controversy surrounding the extent to which public service
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broadcasting should be allowed to embark upon new areas of activity. 
As a result of complaints by private broadcasters, the CDU/CSU Lander 
tried to block attempts by public broadcasters to become involved in 
satellite television and sub-regional radio. The Bund Deutscher 
Zeitungsverleger (BDZV), the newspaper publishers* organisation, many 
of whose members are involved in private broadcasting, accused the 
public broadcasters of pursuing "einen offensiven Expansionskurs" and 
claimed that the public broadcasters were practising "eine vorbeugende 
Verdrangungsstrategie" against private broadcasting (BDZV, 198b, 
p.770). Their attacks were aimed at the national distribution by
satellite of some of the ARD third channels, and at new satellite 
services, ZDF's 3SAT and ARD's Eins Plus. It was argued that these 
activities prevented private channels from reaching sufficiently large 
audiences to attract advertising revenue, on which they are financially 
dependent (BDZV, 1985, p.770; see also Harnischfeger, 1986, p.17).
These attacks were repeated by the Bundesverband Kabel und Satellit 
(BKS), which represents the interests of private broadcasters in West
Germany, and accused the ARD stations and ZDF of establishing facts
)
without legislative approval (.BKS attackiert offentlich-rechtlichen 
"Expans 1 onskurs", KuR 22.1.86, p.8 ).
Any doubts about public broadcasting's right of access to new 
forms of broadcasting have since been partially resolved by the
passage of the inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation of 
broadcasting (Staatsvertrag zur Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesens, in KuR
25.4.1987, pp.18-26). The agreement not only guarantees ARD and ZDF 
access to the new technologies of cable and satellite, but it also
- 326 -
obliges both to provide one culturally-orientated satellite channel 
each. This constitutes the political seal of approval for Eins Pius 
and 3SAT. However, additional national public channels will only be 
allowed on the basis of an inter-Land agreement, and this effectively 
blocks any further initiatives by ARD and ZDF. Furthermore, in the 
interest of private channels, neither Eins Plus nor 3SAT are allowed 
to carry advertising. This means that they will have to be funded 
from existing licence fee and advertising revenues. The inter-Land 
agreement states that the funding of Eins Plus and 3SAT will be taken 
into account when the licence fee is set, but the political 
machinations of the licence fee procedure, to be discussed in Chapter 
6 , offer little prospect of sufficient increases to fund all of ARD and 
ZDF's ambitions for these channels.
The Constitutional Court’s fifth broadcasting judgement in March 
1987, discussed in Chapter 3, was a further boost to public 
broadcasting's expansionary policies (in BeschluB des Ersten Senats 
des Bundesverfassungsgerlchts iiber die Verfassungsbeschwerden des SDF 
und des SVF gegen das Landesmediengesetz Baden-Viirttemberg vom 24. 
Marz 1987, in FKD 12.6.1987, pp.1-40). This had dealt with legislative 
attempts to exclude ARD and ZDF from certain areas of broadcasting 
(local broadcasting, specialist narrowcast channels, and pay services), 
and so improve the chances of private broadcasting. The Court ruled 
that in the interests of free formulation of opinion, public 
broadcasting could not be excluded from any areas of broadcasting, 
even if these were not part of its constitutionally defined role of 
Grundversorgung. Grundversorgung, according to the Court, was:
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nicht eine Mindestversorgung, auf die der bffentiich-rechtiche 
Rundfunk beschrankt ist oder ohne Folgen fur die an privaten 
Rundfunk zu steilenden Anforderungen reduziert werden konnte. 
Ebensowenig handeit es sich urn eine Grenzziehung oder 
Aufgabenteilung zwischen offentlich-rechtlichem und privatera 
Rundfunk, etwa in dem Sinne, daB Programme oder Sendungen, die der 
Grundversorgung zuzurechnen sind, dem offentlich-rechtlichen, alle 
iibrigen dem privaten Rundfunk vorbehalten sind oder vorbehalten 
werden konnten. Cp.19)
Grundversorgung, according to the Court, was determined by three
factors; a technology which allowed reception by all - currently
terrestrial; programme content and safeguards to ensure the portrayal
of plurality of opinion (p.19). Although the Court upheld a ban on
advertising in sub-regional radio in the economic interests of private
broadcasting, it also stated that the legislator must secure
alternative means of funding, so that public broadcasting would not be
indirectly excluded from new areas of activity.
The Constitutional Court judgement of March 1987 combined with the
inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting clarified
the legal status of Eins Plus and 3SAT and offered some scope for new
developments in other areas of broadcasting. However, practically
there are limits, clearly recognised by the public broadcasters, and
focused on the thorny issue of broadcasting finance. Even if the
legislator is obliged to secure alternative sources of funding for
additional services, there is no guarantee that these will be adequate
or even forthcoming, given the political nature of the licence fee
procedure. As Hans Bausch, SDR Intendant, pointed out to me:
In dem MaBe, in dem kein Geld daftir da ist, wird es nicht 
geschehen. . .Ich sehe keine wesentliche Expansion des offentlich- 
rechtlichen Rundfunks in den nachsten Jahren aus finanziellen 
Grunden. (Interview 29.7.1987)
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This view is supported by Alois Schardt, Frogrammdirektor at ZDF, who 
said to me:
Die Fortentwicklungsgarantie ist in der Form nicht gegeben, sie ist 
nur, wenn sie so wollen, in der Bestandsgarantie immanent. In dem 
Rundfunkstaatsvertrag steht drin, daB sich alle zwei Jahre die 
ttinisterprasidenten vergewissern, ob wir eine Gebiihrenerhohung 
brauchen. Sie haben nicht gesagt, wir werden Ihnen einen geben. 
(Interview 11.8.1987)
The financial limits of the licence fee are made even more stringent
by the freeze on advertising on public channels, and by the
constitutionally sanctioned ban on advertising for additional services.
Limits to further expansion are also to be found in the danger of
spreading existing resources too thinly. This aspect was taken up by
Dieter Stammler, who saw a threat of distintegration from within if
public broadcasting continued to expand its activities (Stammler,
1986, pp.3-5). He writes:
Velchen Sinn hat angesichts knapper werdender Ressourcen eine 
Entwicklungsplanung, die darauf gerichtet ist auf alien neuen
vbertragungsmedien moglichst viele Platze zu besetzen? Ware es 
nicht sinnvoller, sich auf weniger wichtige Schwerpunktaufgaben zu 
konzentrieren, statt die Krafte zu verzetteln?. . .Ware es unter
diesen Pramissen nicht auch verniinf tiger, sich bei der
Satellitenplanung auf ein gegenseitig abgestimmtes Programmkonzept 
zu verstandigen, statt in Konkurrenz zueinander weitgehend 
gleichartige Programmplanungen zu verfolgen? (Stammler, 1986, p.4)
In Stammler's opinion, public broadcasters would have been better
advised to examine their own internal structures with a view to the
future, instead of pursuing "kurzatmigen Aktivismus" (Stammler, 1986,
p.5).
The expansion which has taken place is mainly concentrated on new 
satellite services; ARD's Eins Plus, and ZDF's 3SAT. These come in
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addition to the national distribution by satellite of WDR and BR's 
regionally-based third television channels. Public service
broadcasting's involvement in cable is less significant, but it is 
still important, because the Dortmund cable pilot project was the only 
one of four cable experiments to be run by a public broadcasting 
station, WDR. Although sub-regional radio does not constitute the 
utilisation of new technologies, the additional radio services offered 
by many of the ARD stations are an attempt to expand and to open up a 
new field of broadcasting, and are therefore examined in this light.
These expansionary policies show that in spite of the prospect of 
falling audiences and financial stringency, ARD and ZDF are not 
prepared to leave any new areas of activity solely to their commercial 
competitors. Furthermore, their insistence that they be allowed to 
embark upon new activities revealed that this was more than just an 
issue of programme policy. The unity of ARD in the face of strong 
opposition against Eins Plus and sub-regional radio proved that 
matters of principle were at stake. These centred on the right of 
public broadcasting stations, subject to approval from their 
supervisory bodies, to pursue programme policies independently of 
state and political interests. The victories in the courts, although 
not absolute in all respects, gave the public stations a new sense of 
confidence to pursue their future plans.
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5.1 Public service broadcasting enters Jt'hesatellite era
ARD and ZDF examined the possibility of satellite television long 
before private broadcasting became a reality. Their attention was 
attracted by an agreement to manufacture direct broadcasting 
satellites (DBS) signed by the French and West German governments in 
April 1980 (in Ring, 1981, F II.2). Direct broadcasting satellites 
allow individual reception with a small dish aerial. Tele­
communications satellites, like the ECS satellite used by SAT 1, are 
dependent on cable for individual reception.
ARD announced plans for a regional channel and a European- 
orientated channel on the Vest German DBS satellite, TV-Sat, in March 
1981 (see Friedebold/Schmidt, 1984, p.19). ZDF's plans, published in 
March 1981, were more detailed and put forward a proposal for a 
European-orientated channel (ZDF, 1981). The emphasis on Europe was 
in recognition of the cultural and political implications of a 
technology which transcends national boundaries (ZDF, 1981, p.9, p. 19; 
see also Stolte, cit. in von Hagen, 1984, p.112). ZDF saw satellite 
television as a way of breaking the confines of a single off-air 
channel and of accommodating a greater range of programmes (see ZDF, 
1981, p.10). However, an additional channel was also seen as a useful 
competitive tool against future private competitors and ARD, whose 
scheduling of the third channels has long been a thorn in ZDF's side 
(see Stolte, 1984, p.29; see also Stolte, 1984a, p.291).
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ZDF was quicker at realising its satellite plans than ARD, whose 
federal structure acts as a brake on fast policy decisions. When an 
experimental cable project was launched in Ludwigshafen on 1st January 
1984, ZDF introduced a new channel, ZDF2, made up of time-shifted 
material from its existing terrestrial service. This gave it useful 
experience for future initiatives (see Hall, 1984, pp.13-19). On 1st 
December the time-shifted service was replaced by 3SAT. 3SAT began 
as a three-year experiment. It was nationally distributed into cable 
systems from an ECS satellite transponder, awarded to ZDF by the 
Lander prime ministers on 23rd February 1984 (see Vorlaufiges 
Ergebnisprotokoll der Besprechung der Ministerprasidenten der Lander, 
MP 2/1984, p.152). However, the new channel was ultimately destined 
for distribution on TV-Sat.
3SAT is a joint undertaking, involving the Swiss public 
broadcasting station, SRG, and the Austrian public service broadcaster, 
ORF. Overall responsibility for the channel is held by ZDF (see
Konrad, 1985a, p.875). Rot only does this sort of cooperation benefit 
the cultural similarities of three German-speaking countries, it also 
helps to keep costs down. Compared to a 1987 programming budget of 
DM527 million for 4077 hours on ZDF's terrestrial service, programme 
expenditure for 3SAT only amounted to DM18 million for about 2500 
hours in 1987 (ZDF, 1988, p.51). This is divided between production
costs of DM4.5 million and expenditure on repeat transmission rights
of DM13.5 million (ZDF, 1988, p.57). ORF and SRG supply their 41% 
share of total transmissions free of charge (ZDF, 1988, p.53). The
cost of satellite distribution was budgeted at DM20.3 million in 1987
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(ZDF, 1988, p.51). In 1987 3SAT accounted for approximately 5% of 
ZDF's total budget for programme expenditure of DM768 million (see 
ZDF, 1988, p.51). 3SAT does not have its own production
infrastructure, and relies on existing production departments within 
ZDF for its original productions (von Hagen, 1984, p. 114).
A concept for Eins Plus was first announced by ARD in November 
1983 (Eins Plus - ein deutschsprachiges Kulturprogramm fur Europat MP 
2/1984, pp.152-155). Eins Plus began broadcasting from the Intelsat V 
telecommunications satellite on 29th March 1986, over a year after 
3SAT, although it, too, was intended for eventual distribution by TV- 
SAT. The channel is governed by an ARD administrative agreement 
signed by the Intendanten on 12th February 1986 (Verwaltungsabkommen 
der ARD Landesrundfunkanstalten fur das Satellitenprogramm "Eins Plus" 
vom 3. Dezember, 1935, ARD Jahrbuch, 1986, p.405). Transmission and 
presentation takes place at SWF's headquarters in Baden-Baden. Eins 
Plus is coordinated by the ARD Standige Programmkonferenz, based in 
Munich (p.405). The individual ARD stations are obliged to contribute
the same amounts of programming as they do for the network, and are
individually responsible for any costs incurred (p.405). Additionally, 
the Swiss public broadcaster, SRG, contributes 18 "Swiss" days of
programming to Eins Plus each year.
Both Eins Plus and 3SAT are available only in cabled households. 
These numbered about 3.2 million households at the end of 1987 or
12.3% of all Vest German TV households (see ZDF, Jahrbuch, 1987, p.210;
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ARD, Jahrbuch, 1988, p.133). Cabled households in Austria and
Switzerland can also receive Eins Plus and 3SAT.
A discussion of public service broadcasting's involvement in 
satellite television would be incomplete without brief reference to 
ARD's participation in the now defunct Europa channel. The concept of 
Europa fitted in well with ARD's strategy for the promotion of 
European and cultural content, but ARD's commitment to Eins Pius, and 
the political controversies surrounding this channel, may have dulled 
its enthusiasm for Europa (see Europa-TV Finanzspritze von der EG, FR
1.11.1986).
Europa began transmitting from the ECS 1 telecommunications 
satellite in October 1985. It was encouraged by the European 
Broadcasting Union (EBU) and involved the Dutch broadcaster, NOS, the 
Irish broadcaster, RTE, RAI from Italy, RTP from Portugal, and ARD.
The EBU, an organisation representing the interests of national 
broadcasting stations in Europe, saw Europa as a chance for small
nations to participate in satellite broadcasting, instead of being 
swamped by their larger neighbours (see Schwarzkopf, 1986, p.78). 
Europa was not an ARD channel like Eins Plus, but a foreign one to 
which ARD contributed programmes totalling 3te hours a week, and an 
annual loan of 7.5 million Swiss francs (Schwarzkopf, 1986, p.80). It 
was hoped that the channel would eventually become self-supporting 
from advertising (Schwarzkopf, 1986, p.79). Conscious of the need not 
to upset politicians at home, ARD insisted that its contributions be 
uninterrupted by advertising, and it did not share in any advertising
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revenue (see Schwarzkopf, 1986, p.79). Europa finally collapsed in 
November 1986 because of insoluble financial problems and lack of 
support from those involved (see "Europa TV" stellte seinen 
Sendebetrieb ein, FR 1.12.1986).
5.1.1 Alternatives - public broadcasting's policy for satellite
channels.
The programme strategies adopted for Eins Plus and 3SAT provide a 
complete contrast, not only to private satellite channels, but also to 
existing public service channels. The two basic elements of both are 
summed up by Valter Konrad, the Koordinator of 3SAT, who referring to 
3SAT states: "Es soli ein Programm mit kulturellem Schwerpunkt und mit 
internationalen Partnern sein" (Interview 24.8.87).
The choice of cooperative partners for both channels reveals a 
clear commitment to the German-speaking territories of Europe. 
However, ARD seems to have drawn the short straw in this respect, 
because SRG only provided 2.3% of Eins Plus output in 1986 in the 
form of 18 "Swiss" days a year and the occasional series (see Pitzer, 
1987, p.30; see also Schwarzkopf, 1986, p.75). In contrast SRG's 
contribution to 3SAT totalled 12.9% in 1987 compared to only 11% in 
1986 (see ZDF, Jahrbuch 1987, p.142). ZDF provided 46.8% of output, 
and ORF a further 30.9% (see ZDF, Jahrbuch, 1987, p.142). ZDF also 
contributed to presentation and continuity, totalling 9.4% of output 
(ZDF, Jahrbuch, 1987, p.142). The commitment of ZDF's partners is also 
underlined by their willingness to shoulder more responsibility for
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programming. In 1985 ZDF contributed a far greater proportion of the 
programming total (65%), with ORF and SRG contributing 27% and 8% 
respectively (see Konrad, 1985a, p.875).
What were the motives behind a cultural programming concept which 
is clearly not aimed at the mass audience? Was it a conscious
attempt to provide a real alternative to existing public channels and
private competitors? Or was the cultural emphasis based on the
realisation that a channel similar in character to existing public 
channels was unacceptable to those political interests which support 
private broadcasting? It should also be remembered that ARD and ZDF
are now legally bound by the Inter-Land agreement on the
reorganisation of broadcasting to provide culturally-orientated 
satellite channels. They can no longer change their minds about this 
programme concept, or alter it in favour of more populist programming.
An insight into ZDF's strategy for 3SAT, was revealed to me by
Walter Konrad, 3SAT's Koordlnator. In an interview, he explained that
ZDF's ideas for a cultural channel went back as far as 1978, long
before politicians had given any thought to a possible concept for a
second ZDF service (Interview 24.8.87). In the first instance, the
nature of 3SAT was determined by a sense of common culture amongst
German speakers. According to Konrad:
Bei 3SAT haben wir vorher gesagt, das soli ein Programm des 
deutschen Sprachraums sein, und soil vor allem das gemeinsame
kulturelle Erbe den Zuschauern vorstellen, und da das gemeinsame
kulturelle Erbe, ja nicht aus Unterhaltung nun besteht, also vor
allem aus kulturtrachtigen Inhalten, war damit automatisch die 
Farbe dieses Programms vorgegeben. (Interview 24.8.87)
Entertainment in the commonly accepted sense was therefore rejected as 
being unrepresentative of German language culture.
The second reason for the cultural emphasis was, according to
Konrad, influenced by the realities of a developing competitive
broadcasting market. He explained to me:
Zum zweiten sehen wir auch fur ein solches Angebot eine echte 
Marktchance, denn wir wissen, unsere beiden Hauptprograrame haben 
durchaus einen relativ hohen Unterhaltungsanteil. Alle privaten 
Vettbewerber stutzen sich fast ausnahmslos auf Unterhaltung, also 
es wird mehr oder minder sieben bis zehn mehr unterhaltende 
Angebote geben, von daher hatte es auch unter Marktgesichtspunkten 
an sich keinen besonderen Sinn "more of the same” zu machen, 
sondern es war interessanter, einen klaren Kontrast dagegen zu 
setzen, (Interview 24.8.87)
Culture was therefore considered to be the most realistic opening for
3SAT, given the fact that a further general entertainment channel
would be last amongst countless other entertainment offerings from
both the public and the private sector.
In an article for Media Perspektiven, Konrad lists further reasons 
for the choice of a cultural channel. These include compatibility with 
existing public service obligations, the relationship between 
programme expenditure and viewing figures, and the effects of an extra 
service on ZDF's existing terrestrial service (1985a, p.874). One has 
to assume that the last reason played a reasonably large factor in the 
decision to pick a highbrow programme concept, because ZDF would be 
unlikely to create competition for its mainstream channel, which rakes 
in about 40% of its income from advertising, and which is forced to 
reach large audiences, in order to justify its share of the licence 
fee. The need to maintain the popularity of ZDF's premier channel is
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especially important, given that 3SAT, which contains no advertising, 
will never earn ZDF any money. As Volker von Hagen, the former 3SAT 
Koordinator has stated: "Das Privatfernsehen braucht ein Programm, urn 
Geld zu machen; 3SAT braucht Geld, urn ein Programm zu machen" (von 
Hagen, 1985, p.146). Similar concerns are certain to have influenced 
the concept for Eins Plus, which has been described by ARD as "eine 
Programm-Visitenkarte des deutschsprachigen Rundfunks zum Auftakt des 
Satellitenrundfunks" (Eins Plus - Ein deutschsprachiges Kulturprogramm 
fur Europat MP 2/1984, pp. 152-155; see also Schwarzkopf 1986, p.74).
Eins Plus and 3SAT are regarded as complementary to mainstream 
public service channels, and as a contrast to the predominantly 
entertainment-orientated private channels (see MP 2/1984, pp.152-155; 
Konrad, 1985a, p.875). This contrast is particularly evident on 
Saturdays, which are usually devoted to light entertainment on the 
mainstream public channels. At 3SAT, Saturday evenings are devoted to 
opera, theatre plays, or ballet (see 3SAT Programmschema, in Konrad, 
1985a, p.877). At Eins Plus the emphasis is on serious literary films 
(see Eins Plus-Programmscheina, in Schwarzkopf, 1986a, p.23). This 
approach is clearly seen as a way of bridging the programme deficits 
of existing public service channels. Konrad says of 3SAT: "Wir
versuchen vor allem, die Programme und die Farben und die Ereignisse 
zu beriicksichtigen, die in dem Hauptprogramm zu kurz kommen" 
(Interview, 24.8.87). Both 3SAT and Eins Plus are also viewed as a 
field for experiment which can contribute to the development of the 
terrestrial channels (see Konrad cit. in Erfrischend anders Pr-ogramm> 
FR 2.4.1987). At Eins Plus, for example, programmes are frequently
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premiered, prior to transmission on the ARD network (Schwarzkopf, 
1986, p.76).
In the context of 3SAT's and Eins Plus’s main orientation, culture 
is meant in the broadest sense. Dietrich Schwarzkopf, writing about 
Eins Plus, states that the emphasis on culture is not supposed to be 
elitist or stereotyped (1986, p.76). Instead, he claims that it is 
meant to be comprehensive in nature, covering a wide variety of topics 
which are accessible to a broadly defined audience (Schwarzkopf 1986, 
p.76: Schwarzkopf, 1986a, p.19). At Eins Plus there has been no 
attempt to split the audience into target groups. Schwarzkopf 
asserts: "Jeder Zuschauer soil sich vom ganzen Programm angesprochen 
fiihlen und aus dem ganzen Programm auswahlen konnen” (1986, p.76). 
Programmes at Eins Plus are divided into distinct programming bands. 
These start at 19.00 with the band Nachbar Europa, a magazine slot 
covering a wide range of topics - gastronomy, art, literature, science, 
and religion - with a European slant, which changes its emphasis 
every day (see Eins Plus-Programmschema, in Schwarzkopf, 1986a, p.23). 
After the news, taken directly from the ARD network, the programming 
band ...und abends zu Eins Plus, adopts a different theme each day, 
drawing from series, plays, films, and concerts. For instance, on 
Tuesdays the slot Akzente durch BUndelung, concentrates on the work of 
a particular author, director or actor (p.23). After ...und abends zu 
Eins Plus, serious films are broadcast from Tuesdays to Fridays, and 
the pick of ARD's chat shows are broadcast at the weekend (p.23).
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Similarly at 3SAT, ZDF claims that there is no attempt to
narrowcast to the elite, but to provide a range of programmes covering
all aspects of culture (see von Hagen, 1984, p.114; Konrad, 1985a,
p.875). The major difference with ZDF's terrestrial services is the
time when these programmes are broadcast. Waiter Konrad, 3SAT
Koordinator, told me:
Der kulturelle Schwerpunkt driickt sich im Programm dadurch aus, 
daB Sendungen, die im weitesten Sinne dem Kulturbereich zuzurechnen 
sind, einen sehr viel groBeren Raum einnehmen und vor allem bessere 
Sendeplatze auch in der Primezeit erhalten. (Interview, 24.8.87)
Konrad writes about a "Differenzierungsprinzip" that aims to satisfy
those needs, which distinguish large minority interests from the
majority (1985a, p.875). The provision of culture and information also
shows a willingness to perservere and experiment. As Konrad points
out: "Gerade anspruchsvollere Programme brauchen eine gewisse
Anlaufzeit, urn sich beim Zuschauer durchzusetzen (1985a, p.878)H.
The emphasis on German language and culture in both channels is 
reflected in a high proportion of German-language productions (Konrad, 
1985a, p.875; Schwarzkopf 1986, p.76). With the exception of films,
most programmes are in-house, co- or independent productions. Neither 
channel broadcasts foreign, in particular American, entertainment 
series (see Konrad, 1985a, p.875; Schwarzkopf 1986, p.76; Schwarzkopf, 
1986a, p.21). Although films provide the bulk of foreign material,
emphasis has been placed on serious cinematic output. At 3SAT, films 
have two regular scheduled slots; Mondays are dedicated to mainstream 
films, with Thursdays given over to "der kiinstlerisch anspruchsvolle 
Film" which has no regular place on ZDF's off-air service (Konrad,
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Interview, 24.8.1987). Eins Plus broadcasts a greater proportion of 
films than 3SAT, but these are almost exclusively highbrow (see Eins 
Plus-Frogrammschema, in Schwarzkopf, 1986a, p.23)
The emphasis on culture in both channels could be interpreted
sceptically, as it gives rise to the suspicion that these types of
programmes might eventually be concentrated exclusively on Eins Plus
and 3SAT, If this were to happen, the public terrestrial channels
would be free to compete with commercial broadcasters by broadcasting
programmes solely of mass appeal. Ultimately, this would result in
less real choice for the viewer, because the majority of homes, which
have no access to cable, cannot receive Eins Plus or 3SAT.
Theoretically, constitutional judgements concerning the basic provision
of services militate against such a development. When I questioned
Walter Konrad about fears that ZDF might be using 3SAT to remove
programmes of narrower appeal from its mainstream service, in order
to allow more competitiveness with private television, he strenuously
denied that this would ever be the case, and referred to the unchanged
composition of the terrestrial service:
Von dieser Gefahr wird haufiger gesprochen, aber sie findet in der 
Realitat also keine Entsprechung, denn das Schema des 
Hauptprogramms hat sich nicht geandert. Also wir haben nach wie 
vor die kulturellen Elemente im Hauptprogramm, die wir sie in den 
zuriickliegenden Jahren gehabt haben. Es hat keine Abschiebung 
solcher Sendungen in 3SAT stattgefunden. 3SAT macht sehr viel 
eigenstandig und verstarkt insgesamt natiirlich das Angebot an 
solchen Sendungen, aber es hat nicht zu einer Entlastung von 
solchen Sendungen im Hauptprogramm gefuhrt. (Interview, 22.8.87)
Writing in a similar vein, Dietrich Schwarzkopf attempts to reassure
that Eins Plus will not become a cultural ghetto, with popular
programmes concentrated on the terrestrial network:
Die Grundelemente des Programmauftrags gehoren jedoch zur 
Grundausstattung eines jeden Vollprogramms. Das Erste Programm 
darf nicbt etwa auf Kultur verzichten, weil Eins Plus als 
Kulturprogramm ausgewiesen ist. (1987, p.4)
Live programmes represent a further component in tbe programme 
strategies of Eins Plus and 3SAT. Eins Plus and 3SAT offer an 
opportunity to accommodate those events which, because of their 
length, cannot be accommodated fully on the terrestrial channels 
(Schwarzkopf, 1986, p.76). This is particularly the case for 3SAT, 
which has adopted a flexible approach in accommodating live events. 
Valter Konrad, 3SAT Koordinator, explained to me: "Uebenbei versteht
sich 3SAT aber auch als Ereigniskanal. Wir versuchen zunehmend Live- 
Veranstaltungen in der Lange und zu dem Zeitpunkt, in dem sie 
stattfinden, ins Programm zu nehmen" (Interview, 24.8.87; see also von 
Hagen, 1985, p.146). In Konrad’s view, the transmission of sports 
events in full gives 3SAT ample opportunties to develop into an 
"Ereigniskanal", and in the same interview he cited examples of a 24- 
hour motor-racing event from the Bfiirburgring, yachting regattas, and 
athletics (Interview, 24.8,1987). At Eins Plus, there is no regular 
scheduled spot for sport, but schedules are sometimes adapted to 
accommodate events which cannot be covered in full on the ARD 
terrestrial network (e*g* the World Ice Hockey championships) 
(Schwarzkopf, 1986, p.77).
When asked about passible competition from private broadcasters 
for the rights to show live sports, Konrad stated that he saw no 
threat from private competitors. He argued that the private channels
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lack sufficient production capacity to show events in full, and that
they are only interested in the most popular sports, which are not
always of interest to 3SAT. He added:
Wir machen etwas, was die Privaten an sich bisher kaum machen. 
Wir fahren mit unserem ubertragungswagen zum Ereignis selbst und 
bleiben dabei und zeigen es vom Anfang bis Ende auf. uber diese 
Kapazitaten verfiigen die Privaten bisher nicht. (Interview 24.8.87)
At 3SAT the policy of showing events in full, and at peaktime, is
also applied to the arts. Konrad states:
Es ist bei uns selbstverstandlich, daB auch groBe Konzerte wie zum 
Beispiel die ubertragungen vom Schleswig-Holsteiner Musikfestivai 
in dieser Woche, aber auch andere Konzerte, daB Operniibertragungen, 
daB Balletauffuhrungen, daB Schauspielauffuhrungen einen Platz zur 
besten Sendezeit erhalten. (24.8.1987)
For financial reasons, repeats take up a large proportion of 
transmissions on both channels. In 1985 repeats made up 46% of 3SAT 
transmissions, followed by first runs (feature films, sport, and 
continuity) with 21%, and 19% taken directly from terrestrial 
channels, mainly in the form of news (Konrad, 1985a, p.876). Only 12% 
of programmes were specifically produced for 3SAT in 1985 (Konrad, 
1985a, p.875). By 1987, ZDF was planning to devote approximately 50% 
of 3SAT transmissions to repeats, 40% to programmes taken directly 
from other channels, and about 10% to original first-run programmes 
produced specifically for 3SAT (in-house, co-productions and 
independent productions) (see ZDF, 1988, p,58). The level of repeat 
transmissions on Eins Plus is substantially higher than on 3SAT, 
because of a greater concentration on drama, and the lack of 
contributions from other partners, in ZDF's case ORF and SRG.
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Although ARD and ZDF would like to increase levels of first-runs on 
3SAT and Eins Plus, attempts have been made to emphasise the positive 
aspect of repeats. Schwarzkopf, writing about Eins Plus, claims that 
they offer "die interessante Chance zur Aktivierung des 
Programmvermogens" (1986a, p.20). In this respect 3SAT has a clear 
advantage over Eins Plus because of the extensive involvement of GRP 
and SRG. As Konrad points out: "Das sind dann fur die Bundesrepubiik
betrachtet im keinen Fall Viederholungen, sondern das sind originare 
Programme" (Interview 24.8.1987).
In both cases there are plans to increase levels of first-run 
programming (see Schwarzkopf, 1986a, p.19). At Eins Plus, programmes 
are sometimes premiered prior to transmission on the ARD network (see 
Schwarzkopf, 1986, p.76). However, ZDF seems to be making more 
concerted efforts to increase levels of first runs. According to 
Schwarzkopf: "Neuproduktionen fur Eins Plus kommen erst nach einer 
Gebiihrenerhohung in Frage (cit. in Pitzer, 1987, p.30)". Once
continuity and presentation are excluded, original 3SAT productions of 
live sport and culture take up 5% of output (see Pitzer, 1987, p.29). 
There are now plans to increase these by 5% a year until a level of 
25% is reached in the early 1990s (see Pitzer, 1987, p.29; Konrad, 
Interview 24.8.1987). According to Schardt, ZDF Programmdirector, the 
figure of 5% was chosen, because this is what ZDF can afford 
(Interview, 11.8.1987). The increases will concentrate on the 
categories of culture and information, as there are no plans to 
produce drama or entertainment specifically for 3SAT because of the
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high costs of these productions (Konrad, Interview, 24.8.1987). These
will continue to be mainly repeat showings. Valter Konrad told me:
Wir werden allerdings sicher in keinem Zeitpunkt eigene 
Fernsehspiele tun oder grofie Unterhaltungsschauen machen. Das ist 
nicht unsere Aufgabe. Hier werden wir nach wie vor die Programme 
der Mutterhauser ubernehmen, aber da die vom ersten Mai wegen der 
starkeren Konkurrenz auch immer weniger Zuschauer finden werden, 
ist es sicher ein interessantes Angebot auch bei der zweiten 
Ausstrahlung. (Interview 24.8.1987)
Although both channels are broadly culturally orientated, both 
stress different types of programming. As Figure 5.1 shows, while 
3SAT transmits more information and sport, Eins Plus places more 
emphasis on culture, films and entertainment. 3SAT's emphasis on 
information and Eins Plus's emphasis on drama and films is also shown 
by comparing schedules (see Figure 5.2).
Fig. 5.1




and sport 28.9 6.8
Entertainment 
and films 23.6 39.1
Continuity 9.1 1,8
(Source: Pitzer, 1987, p. 30).
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Fig. 5.2
3SAT SCHEDULE 3rd-9th OCTOBER 1987
19.00 20.00 21.00 22.00 23.00 24.00
Sat If *1* Opera * Info * Music *
Sun H* 1*1* Film * Chat show * Info * If
Mon If *1* LE * Info * Info *I*S* If * Film
Tues If *1* Drama * Info *Info*I*S* If * Info * N
Wed H Film * Info *I*S* N * Info * N
Thur If *1* Drama * Info * Info*I*S* If * Chat show
Frid If *1* Drama * Info * Info *I*S* If * Film *
EIJTS PLUS SCHEDULE 3rd-9th OCTOBER 1987
19. 00 2 0 . 00 2 1 . 00 2 2 . 00 23.00 2^
Sat Info* Info* If *I Drama * Drama* Info
Sun Info * I * If * Drama * Film * Film
Mon Info * I * If * Drama *Chat show* Music * If
Tues Info * I * If * Film * Film * If
Wed Info * I * N * Drama * Info * Film
Thurs Info * N * Film * Film * If
Frid Info * I * If * Concert * Film * H
Key: I/Info/Information, M/Hews, S/Sport, LE/Light Entertainment
(Source: Horzu, 25.9.1987)
In a more detailed two-week analysis of programmes undertaken in 
February 1987, Kruger established that information accounted for 41% 
of transmissions on 3SAT compared to 33% on Eins Plus. Fiction and 
light entertainment took up 36% of 3SAT's transmission time compared 
to 59% on Eins Plus (Kruger, 1987, p.551). At Eins Plus feature films
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and television drama constituted 29% and 20% of transmissions 
respectively, compared to only 11% and 8% on 3SAT. Eins Plus's 
reliance on feature films was also reflected by a higher proportion of 
purchased programmes, 33%, compared to 17% at 3SAT (Kruger, 1987, 
p.557).
Both channels devote a high proportion of information output to 
non-political information, usually reflecting European and cultural 
aspects. At 3SAT these totalled 15.3%, compared to 13.3% at Eins Plus 
(Kruger, 1987, p.551). At Eins Plus there has been an increase in the 
amount of current affairs. In a study conducted in 1986 such 
programmes did not register at all, but in 1987 they accounted for 7% 
of all transmissions (Kruger, 1987, p.551). Current affairs had been 
poorly represented on Eins Plus in 1986, apparently because it is more 
difficult to coordinate the contributions of nine stations (see Pitzer, 
1987, p.30). The greater proportion of information on 3SAT is a 
reflection of the commitment of its partners, DRF and SRG, who provide 
much of this type of material, including news broadcasts. 3SAT's 
claim to be an "Ereigniskanal" seems justified by a 7.4% proportion of 
transmission time devoted to sport (see Kruger, 1987, p.551). During 
the period of investigation, this programme category did not appear on 
Eins Plus (see Kruger, 1987, p.551). Furthermore, the proportion of 
sport an 3SAT was almost double the amount shown on ZDF's terrestrial 
service during peak time transmissions (see Kruger, 1987, p.556).
3SAT was also used by ZDF as a test of cooperation with the local 
press. The so-called Network-System entailed ZDF providing a framing
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programme for a local opt-out provided by local publishers and was
seen as Meine komplementare Kooperationsform" (Stolte, 1984a, p.291).
The reasons proposed by Alois Schardt, ZDF Frogrammdirektor, for this
type of cooperative venture appear quite altruistic:
Es war der Versuch, der seinerzeit in der Politik eine grofcie Rolie 
spielte, da8 namlich auch ein kleiner Verleger Oder ein Verbund 
kleinerer Zeitungsverleger die Moglichkeit hat, sich in dem neuen 
Medium Fernsehen zu etablieren. (Schardt interview, 11.8.87; see 
also Stolte, 1984a, p.291)
More sceptically, it can be viewed as an attempt to absorD demands
for private broadcasting, while still maintaining ZDF's autonomy and
supremacy (see Stolte, 1984a, p.291). In the event this "Meilenstein
in der medienpolitischen Entwicklung" (Stolte cit. in EPF hat
Kooperation mit dem ZDF gekundigtt FR 25.7.1986) was only taken up by
the Erste Private Fernsehgesellschaft (EPF), run by the Rheinpfaiz
Verlag as part of a cable pilot experiment in Ludwighafen. EPF ended
the cooperation in July 1986, prior to the conclusion of a similar
agreement with the private broadcaster, SAT 1 (FR 25.7.1986).
Valter Konrad, 3SAT Koordinator, denied that the Network-System 
had ever been seen as a future strategy. In his opinion it was a 
"eine mogliche Zukunftsstrategie" to test the workability of 
cooperation (Interview, 24.8.1987). He maintained that the experiment 
had worked successfully for three years, but was overtaken by 
political developments, namely the availability of terrestrial 
frequencies for the private channel, SAT 1, which gave EPF the chance 
of reaching a greater audience than was possible with 3SAT (Interview, 
24.8.1987; also Schardt, Interview, 11.8.1987). In Schardt's opinion 
the idea of cooperation is not dead, because small private programme
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providers might eventually find that 3SAT is a better option than SAT
1, which operates along strictly commercial lines. He speculated: "Hs
konnte leicht vorkommen, daB sich dann kleinere Verleger oder
Verlegergruppen uberlegen ob nicht, dafi was wir raai angeboten haben,
eine Chance ist'* (Interview, 11.8.1987). Similar thoughts were
expressed to me by Valter Konrad when referring to EPF's new
cooperative deal with SAT 1:
Ob das auf die Dauer eine Existenzgrundlage bietet, muB man
abwarten, denn die Sorgen oder die Existenzschwierigkeiten, die die 
EPF vorher gehabt hat, hat sie nach wie vor. . .es ist nicht
ausgeschlossen, daB im irgendeinem spateren Zeitpunkt doch einmai 
auf diese Moglichkeiten zuruckkommt, wenn andere Hoffnungen
enttauscht sind. Also theoretisch steht dieses Angebot nach wie
vor. (Interview 24.8.1987)
5.1.2 Limits to further development
Viewing figures for both channels have not been impressive, but
this is mainly determined by the nature of the programmes, which do
not have mass appeal. Growth in audiences has also been hindered by 
dependence on cable. In cabled households 3SAT is watched for a total 
of six minutes a day; Eins Plus only manages three minutes (see
Darschin/Frank, 1988, p.224). This constitutes a 3% and 1% respective 
share of television consumption in cabled households (see
Darschin/Frank, 1988, p.224). The ARD third channels, which are
closest to Eins Plus and 3SAT in content, manage an 11% viewing share
of cabled households (Darschin/Frank, 1988, p.224). Given the low
viewing share of both, the failure of TV-Sat, described in Chapter 4,
must have been a disappointment as it offered "die Moglichkeit, die
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bisherigen Begrenzungen des Kabels zu springen" (Interview, Konraa,
24.8.1987).
ARD and ZDF are committed to their satellite ventures, but Eins 
Plus is clearly the less popular of the two (see Nach dem Ende von 
'Europa TV' dann das Aus fur Eins Plus: ein Programm nicht popular
genug, urn gegen die private Konkurrenz zu bestehen; nicht Programm 
genug, urn eine Alternative zu den Dritten Programmen oder zu 3SAT zu 
seint KuR 13.12.1986). 3SAT would appear to have a clearer profile, 
based on information and live programmes, compared to the emphasis on 
repeat drama at Eins Plus. The stronger profile of 3SAT may be due 
to ZDF's centralised structure, which aids quick policy decisions, and 
the involvement of ORF and SRG in providing programmes. By contrast, 
ARD has found it difficult to maintain unity, and some ARD stations, 
in particular BR, are more committed to developing their third 
channels than Eins Plus (see Ein boses Erwachen aus den Satelliten- 
Traumen?t FR 4.10.1985, p.26; Pitzer, 1987, p.30). Although
contributions by individual stations to Eins Plus are based on the
same key as contributions to the ARD network, some ARD stations have
lagged behind in their support (see Pitzer, 1987, p.30). 3SAT also had 
the advantage of a year's head start over Eins Plus, and was not 
hampered by the same degree of political controversy which dogged
ARD's efforts. Some maintain that greater political support for 3SAT 
is tied to the fact that several prominent CDU politicians sit on 
ZDF's supervisory bodies (see Hall, 1984b, p.144).
Leaving political wrangles aside, both channels clearly provide a
chance to show those programmes which are marginalised on terrestrial
channels, and in this sense they offer the viewer a real alternative
to private satellite channels and mainstream public television.
However, whether Eins Plus and 3SAT can develop, in terms of more
original programming, depends on continued financial support. Neither
carries advertising, which makes them dependent on the licence fee set
by the Lander, and on the continued willingness of ARD and ZDF to
invest. According to Alois Schardt, ZDF Programmdirektor, the
innovative aspect of 3SAT should play a role in convincing the Lander
to consider both channels when raising the licence fee: "Ich meine
die Innovationsleistung, die damit erbracht wird, muB ja nun auch den
Gesetzgeber etwas wert sein" (Schardt 11.8.1987). Valter Konrad, 3SAT
Koordlnator, sees an advantage in the lack of advertising on 3SAT,
because it allows experimentation, but ultimately he admits that the
future of 3SAT is closely tied to ZDF's financial position. He says:
Wir bekommen, vorausgesetzt dem ZDF selbst geht es insgesamt 
finanziell, unsere Finanzbedurfnisse finanziert vom ZDF, und wir 
miissen deshalb nicht unbedingt nach den Einschaltquoten urn jeden 
Preis schielen. Das heiSt, wir konnen das Programm machen, das 
wir fur richtig und notwendig halten, unabhangig von den 
Einschaltquoten, auch wenn wir die natiirlich nicht vollig auBer 
Acht lassen. (Interview 24.8.87)
Konrad is aware that ZDF's advertising revenue, on which it is 
almost 50% dependent, may be reduced with private competition, but he
points out that whatever happens, ARD and ZDF are obliged to continue
with 3SAT and Eins Pius by the inter-Laud agreement on the
reorganisation of broadcasting. The public satellite channels are 
"nicht nur eine Xoglichkeit, sondern eine Verpfiichtung" (Interview,
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24.8.1987). SSAT's future is therefore inextricably interwoven with
the ability of ZDF’s terrestrial service to provide popular programmes
which attract large audiences and advertising revenue. Konrad argues:
Es (ZDF) wird sich allerdings im Hauptprogramm sich so star-c 
machen mussen in der werbeentscheidender Zeit zwischen 18 und 20 
Uhr, daB es auch in Zukunft versucht, fast die Halite Ger 
Gesamteinnahmen auf zubr ingen, die die Werbung bisher einbringt, 
also dieses Program muB urn jeden Preis attraktiv gehalten weraen, 
auch im Sinne von hoher Zuschauerzahl. (Interview 24.8.1987)
However, ultimately the success and future of both satellite
channels depend on their ability to offer programmes which are not
generally available at peak time on other programme cnanneis, be they
private or public. This also affects the financial security of the
mainstream public stations. As Konrad points out:
Im iibrigen miissen wir die Gesellschaft davon uberzeugen, daB wir 
unseren Auftrag auch tatsachlich wahrnehmen, das heifit, daB wir 
auch ein Programm mit kulturellem Schwerpunkt machen, denn unsere 
Chancen, eine Gebiihrenerhohung auch in der Zukunft zu bekommen, 
werden sicher geringer sein, wenn wir uns von unserem Auftrag 
entfernen. Dann werden wir erst recht keine Gebiihrenerhohung 
bekommen. (Interview, 24.8.1987)
5.2 The involvement of public service stations in cable
Although ARD and ZDF's involvement in cable has been less 
significant than their involvement in satellite television, it still 
forms part of their demand to be allowed to participate in new 
technological developments. As the ARD supervisory committees pointed 
out, "Keine Programmgattung darf ihm (public service broadcasting - 
JP) rechtlich oder tatsachlich (wirtschaftlich) versagt sein" 
(Erklarung der Gremienvorsitzenden der ARD vom 19.10.1983 zur Position
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der offentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten in der kunftigen 
Medlenlandschaft, MP 11/1983, p.802).
Public broadcasting's involvement in cable came about as a result 
of the instigation of four experimental cable pilot projects. These 
had been proposed in 1976 by a commission appointed by central 
government, the Kommission fur den Ausbau des technischen 
Kommunikationssystems (KtK) (see Chapter 3; KtK, 1976, pp.4-38). The 
pilots were originally intended as a means of testing the acceptance, 
effects, and viability of cable, prior to a permanent decision on its 
introduction (see KtK, 1976, pp.13-15). However, as the prospect oi 
private broadcasting became a reality, any semblance of their 
reversibility or experimental nature was jettisoned. All the projects, 
with the exception of the Dortmund project, were used to pursue a 
media policy aimed at breaking the public service monopoly by 
introducing more television channels.
Limited to clearly defined local areas the pilot projects were 
supposed to encourage local communication. Instead, they became a 
launching pad for nationally distributed commercial television. 
Private local television stations found that the small audiences 
available to them within the cable projects were not large enough to 
attract sufficient advertising revenue (see Lokal-TV: Pleiten im Kanaly 
Wirtschaftswoche 14.8.1987, pp.64-65). Plagued by financial
difficulties incurred by high costs and lack of revenue, several 
stopped their operations altogether (see Virtschaftswoche 14.8.1987, 
p.64; see also Suddeutscher Verlag beendet TV-Kooperationy FR
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16.4.1987). A major problem was the inability to find sufficient 
material to fill a broadcasting slot. Some local commercial 
broadcasters see a solution to their problems in the availability of 
local terrestrial frequencies (see Schardt, Interview, 11.08.1987; 
Konrad, Interview, 24.8.1987). This frees them from dependency on 
cable, and allows them to operate as local opt-outs within an 
attractive framing programme, such as SAT 1.
With the exception of the Dortmund pilot project, where WDR 
undertook a number of local programming initiatives, there were few 
new public programme channels specifically designed for the cable 
projects. ZDF used the Ludwigshafen project to initiate ZDF2, its 
time-shifted repeat service, later to become the culturally-orientated 
satellite channel, 3SAT. These services were used as a framing 
channel for the now defunct commercial, local broadcaster, Erstes 
Privates Fernsehen (EPF), owned by a local newspaper publisher, the 
Rheinpfalz Verlag (see Stolte cit. in Hall, 1984, p. 13). The 90 minute 
opt-out ended when EPF transferred its attentions to SAT 1 in order 
to gain access to local terrestrial frequencies (see EPF hat 
Kooperatlon alt dem ZDF gekiindigt, FR 25.7.1986). ZDF also launched 
the Muslkkanal, a specialist channel, which broadcasts different 
genres of music each day to each of the four cable projects (see von 
Holleben, 1985, pp.153-156). SWF, the local public station in the 
Rhineland-Palatinate, provided an educational television service, the 
Schlauer Kanal. However, this did not survive the end of the 
Ludwighafen project in December 1986.
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Public service involvement in the Ludwigshafen, Munich, and Berlin 
pilot projects was limited by a number of other factors. Legislation 
for the Ludwigshafen pilot project did not allow ZDP and SWF, the 
indigenous ARD station, to provide more than one extra service each 
(Landesgesetz iiber einen Versuch mit Breitbandkabel vom 4. Dezember 
1980, in Bauer, Detjen, Muller-Romer, 18.4.2, Paragraph 15). They were 
not permitted to provide regional or local channels, or to broadcast 
advertising aimed at the local or regional market (see Paragraph 15, 
Clause 2). Additional services were only possible if there was 
sufficient capacity, and if further public channels offered no threat 
to the chances of “free*' programme providers (see Paragraph 15, Clause 
2). The limitations on the involvement of public channels in 
Ludwigshafen were clearly aimed at protecting new private channels 
(see BegrUndung des Gesetzes, in MP 5/1980, pp.311-322, p.318>.
In Munich, BR and ZDF were initially responsible, albeit nominally, 
for the coordination of all new broadcasting channels, because the 
Bavarian constitution stipulates that broadcasting must operate under 
public supervision (see Paragraph 2, Grundvertrag fur das 
Kabelpllotprojekt Munchen, 16. Juli 1982, in Bauer, Detjen, Muller- 
Romer, 18.5.2). However, private broadcasting channels could still 
operate much as they did in Ludwigshafen. The ambiguity of BR's and 
ZDF's role was removed with the passage of the Medienerprobungs-und- 
entwlcklungsgesetz (MEG) on 15th November 1984 (in MPD, 1/1985, pp.l- 
10). This placed the supervision and coordination of private 
broadcasting in Bavaria in the hands of a new public authority, the 
Bayerische Landeszentrale fur neue Medien. In Berlin, the local ARD
station SFB was involved in neither supervision nor new programme 
initiatives. It decided against the introduction of new services, 
arguing that it lacked sufficient financial resources (.see M&ldung, MP 
10/1984).
This leaves Dortmund, a project in which WDR initiated a numoer of
new broadcasting experiments, and for which is was ultimately
responsible. According to Patzold, Dortmund constituted
ein Testfall fur die Einlosung dieses Anspruchs des offentiich- 
rechtlichen Rundfunks auf Entfaitungsfreiheit, ein Testfall fur 
seine Evolutionsfahigkeit unter den besonderen Pramissen aer 
gesellschaft lichen Verantwortung und des kulturellen Auftrags. 
(1983, p.849)
WDR worked out new concepts for Dortmund, which went beyond using 
cable just as a new means of distributing television. Its ideas were 
shaped by the local character of the pilot, which only encompassed
10,000 homes. The emphasis on local concerns was something totally 
new for public broadcasting, and it had to find ways of addressing
the local public in a more direct way (see Patzold, 1983, p.849).
Dortmund was the most experimental of all the pilot projects. Its 
legacy is not in the increased commercialisation of broadcasting, but 
in the practice of alternative forms of local communication.
5.2.1 Dortmund - the alternative
Originally, private broadcasting channels were to have been 
excluded from the Dortmund cable pilot project (see Paragraph 5,
Gesetz iiber die Durcbfiihrung eines Modellversuchs mit Breitbandkabel,
in MP 12/1983, pp.886-891). As the only project taking place in an
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S?D Land, North Rhine-Westphalia, the exclusion of private channels 
would have provided an opportunity to demonstrate that cable ana a 
non-profit approach under public control, as championed by the SPD, 
were not incompatible. However, political events elsewhere meant that 
the exclusion of private broadcasting was dropped even before tne 
start of the pilot project on 1st June 1985. In 1984 the SPD agreed 
to tolerate private broadcasting (see Medienpolitisches 
Aktionsprogramm 1984 der SPD-Medienkommission, in M? 2/1984, pp.149- 
151). In February 1984, the SPD Lander agreed to allow the award of a 
transponder on the ECS 1 telecommunications satellite to a private 
programme provider (see Gemeinsames Satelliten-Nutzungskonzept der 
Lander. Vorlauflges Ergebnisprotokoll der Besprechung der
Ministerprasidenten der Lander, in MP 2/1984, p.152). The existence of 
a nationally distributed private satellite channel made it difficult to 
justify the exclusion of private channels in Dortmund. This changed 
on 12th March 1985 when a provisional law was passed by the North- 
Rhine Westphalian parliament. This allowed the reception of satellite 
channels from other Lander in North Rhine-Westphalian cable networks 
(see Gesetz iiber die vorlaufige Veiterverbreitung von 
Rundfunkprogrammen in Kabelanlagen-LandesrundfunkausschuB, Vorschalt- 
gesetZy in MPD 11/1985, pp. 103-4).
Some believed that the introduction of private satellite channels 
in Dortmund would distort the character of the project (see Gronwald, 
1985, p.38; Patzold, 1985, pp.450-52), It certainly placed WDK's
experimental services under strong competition from private 
entertainment-orientated channels. Erdmann Linde, the project leader
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in Dortmund, felt that WDR's new local offerings were strong enough to 
compete with commercial satellite channels, but he felt than VDR's 
subscription services might suffer against ostensibly free commercial 
services {journalist-Interview in, journalist 5/1985, p. 16).
In spite of the changes, Dortmund was clearly a success in terms 
of its original aim: the encouragement of local communication.
However, Linde regrets that the other ARD stations have failed to 
recognise Dortmund as ARD's contribution to the cable pilot projects 
(cit. in Grefe, 1986, p.3). Claims about Dortmund as a future strategy 
for public broadcasting were not received enthusiastically by the 
public broadcasters. At the launch on 1st June 1985, Johannes Rau, 
prime minister of Eorth Rhine-Westphalia called the project an 
important test of public service broadcasting's "Reformfahigkeit" in 
the face of private competition iKabelpilotprojekt Dortmund gestartet, 
FR 3.6.1985, p.20). This view was contradicted by representatives from 
the public stations, and is perhaps indicative of their lack of long­
term commitment. Both von Friedrich Vilhelm von Sell, Intendant of 
WDR, and Dieter Stolte, Intendant of ZDF, underlined the significance 
of the project's concentration on local programming (FR 3.6.1985, 
p.20). However, Stolte felt that strategic questions for the future 
were unlikely to be answered by isolated cable projects. He believed 
the future lay in traditional terrestrial channels, which could be used 
to improve local profile, foreign reporting, and the production of 
improved domestic entertainment programmes (FR 3.6.1985, p.20). Von 
Sell said that there could be no talk of strategy as long as "die
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Valuta der Konkurrenten noch keineswegs erwiesen ist" (cit. in FR 
3.6.1985, p.20).
Many supporters of public broadcasting bad hoped that Dortmund 
would provide an opportunity for public broadcasting to justify its 
further existence, and to experiment with new types of programme and 
production techniques (see Gronwald, 1985, p.39; Patzold, 1985, pp.451- 
2; Patzold 1986, p.433). This may have been over-stated in terms of 
the future of public broadcasting, as it is likely to remain 
predominantly concerned with national and supra-regional programming, 
but the local initiatives did focus on alternative ways of introducing 
local communication without undue reliance on commercial consortia 
(see Patzold, 1985, p.451).
Given the nature of the project, it is not surprising that it 
received critical appraisal from academic publications, especially when 
compared to the commercial anathema of Munich, Vest Berlin, and 
Ludwigshafen (see Hymmen, 1984, p.51; Grefe, 1985, p.3pp). However, 
when the project began, it received far less press attention than 
either Munich or Ludwigshafen. This was due to the nature of the 
project, which unlike the others was not intended as a gateway for 
commercial broadcasting and was therefore less obviously newsworthy 
(see Patzold, 1985, p.451>.
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5.2.2 The structure of the Dortmund pilot prolect
The Dortmund pilot project was established for a period of three 
years by a cable pilot law, passed by the North Rhine-Westphaiian 
parliament on 20th December 1983 (Gesetz iiber die DurchfUhrung des 
ModelIversuchs mit Breitbandkabelt in MP 12/1983, p.886-891). VDk, 
which was responsible for the project, set up a project headquarters 
in Dortmund, the Projektstelle, to administer the project and produce 
the new channels (Paragraph 6, p.887). A Projektleiter was appointed 
by WDR to run the headquarters (Paragraph 7, p.888). Supervision of 
the project was undertaken by a project council,the Projektrat, 
composed of 27 members, drawn from various local groups and 
institutions (Paragraph 8, p.888). The members of the council had to 
be residents of Dortmund, whose knowledge and experience of local 
affairs would benefit the project (Paragraph 8.5, p.888). Six members 
were chosen by the WDR broadcasting council to represent the 
individual interests of Dortmunders (Paragraph 8.2, p.888). The
council’s duties included advising the project management and WDR on 
all questions associated with the pilot, and decisions on finance, 
staffing, administration, and general programme policy (Paragraph 9, 
p.889).
The project covered an area of 40,000 households in one part of 
Dortmund. It had a budget of DM101.7 million for three years (see 
Patzold, 1985, p.453). Approximately two-thirds of this, DM64 
million, was provided by WDR, with DM2.7 million given by the Land of 
North Rhine-Westphalia (Patzold, 1985, p.453). The remaining DM35
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million was raised from a proportion of the licence fee, wh ich had 
awarded to fund all four pilot projects (see Patzold, 196b, p.453; 
Kleemann, 1987, p.230). Those who took part in the project paid 
DM7.50 a month to receive the new channels. DM2.50 was paid to ZDF 
for its new channels. DM8.50 a month, was paid to the Bundespost (see 
Bauer, Detjen, Muller-Romer, 18,3.1, p.2).
5.2.3 A programme policy for Dortmund
The new services offered by WDR included a local radio channel, a
local television channel, a cable text service, and six specialist pay-
TV channels. These services were not allowed to contain advertising
(see Paragraph 1.5, p.886). WDR also provided the facilities and
technical expertise for access channels in both radio and television
(see Paragraph 10, p.889). Of all the new programme initiatives, those
concerned with local broadcasting were the undisputed success and
focal point of the project. The local character of the project was
clearly set down in programme policy guidelines approved by the WDR
Rundfunkrat, which stated that:
Die Programmangebote des lokalen Horfunks und Fernsehens sollen 
die gesellschaftliche, politische, bkonomische und kulturelle 
Vielfalt der Stadt Dortmund und ihres unmittelbaren Einzugsgebietes 
widerspiegeln. Dariiber hinaus sind allgemeine Entwicklungen und 
Vorgange in ihren Auswirkungen fiir Dortmund darzustelien. 
(.Richtlinien fur die Programmrahmenplanung vom 28. August 1984, in 
Bauer, Detjen, Miiller-Rbmer, 18.3.8, Paragraph 2.1, p.l)
The access channels gave Dortmunders an opportunity to produce 
their own programmes free of charge. Unlike the Munich or Ludwigs­
hafen experiments, only local residents were allowed to use them,
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making them a genuine local medium (see Paragraph 10.1, p.889). This 
prevented a monopolisation by video enthusiasms and students of 
journalism, as had been the case in Ludwigshafen (see Kieemann, 1987, 
p.235). The Dortmund access channels generally received more critical 
appraisal than their counterparts in the other projects (see Bohmer, 
1987, pp.81-89). In Ludwigshafen they had had to compete for 
attention with other privately run local channels (see Bohmer, 1987, 
p.81). In Dortmund the only local competitors were WDR's own local 
offerings in radio and television.
The six special interest channels included Gestern (a repeat 
service), a sport and information channel, an educational service (Die 
kluge Sieben), a cultural channel, a family channel ana an 
entertainment channel (see Grefe, 1986, pp.7-8). Gestern and the sport 
and information service were free of charge. The remaining four were 
offered as pay services, costing between DM0.25 and DM0.50 extra a 
week (see Satzung des IVestdeutschen Rundfunks Kdln 'Kabelpilotprojekt 
Dortmund' 28.8.84, in Bauer, Detjen, Muller-Romer, 18.3.7., p.4). 
Payments were metered by a converter on top of the television set, a 
Fernsteuerbare, adressierbare Teinehmerkonvertersystem (FAT). The 
converter also provided a two-way link with the cable headquarters 
(Kieemann, 1987, p.235). To fill programme requirements of 75 hours a 
day, programmes were acquired from the other ARD stations which had 
previously been broadcast on other channels (Kieemann, 1987, p.23). 
Dne has to assume that the number of households using the 
subscription channels did not justify their financial costs, because 
they ceased to exist when the project came to an end in June 1988.
Radio Dortmund, a local radio channel, initiated by VDR, was 
clearly the outstanding success of the whole project (.see Grefe, ±986; 
Patzold, 1986, p.434). Part of its success can be attributed to the 
fact that it was made available on PM radio to a much wider potential 
audience of 2 million listeners, thus liberating it from distribution 
by cable alone (see Kieemann, 1987, p.230).
In contrast to commercial efforts at radio, which have concentrated 
on popular music (see Teichert, 1987, pp.275-293), the emphasis at 
Radio Dortmund, was clearly placed on journalism. There was aiso a 
conscious effort to distinguish the channel from other VDR radio 
stations by concentrating on local life, news, culture, and business 
(see Patzold, 1986, pp.434-5). National and international news was 
taken from WDR, but attempts were made to relate the significance of 
these events to life in Dortmund (Kieemann, 1987). The daily schedule, 
as detailed in Figure 5.3, consisted of topical local information, 
music, phone-ins and tips about local events.
Radio Dortmund appears to have filled a gap in local information to 
which other local media, in particular the local press, were not paying 
sufficient attention (see Grefe, 1986, p.4). It was particularly 
successful in bringing local scandals to the fore (see Grefe, 1986, 
p.4). According to Grefe, this engendered a certain amount of 




PROGRAMME SCHEDULE RADIO DQRTMU39D - KOSDAY TO FRIDAY
05.00 Friihschlcht, an early morning news and current: affairs 
programme
08.45 Zeitfunk
09.45 Kusikpavillon, taken from VDR 4
12.05 Funkbude, local music, culture and information
13.05 Hit-Club, a music request show
14.05 Trallafitti, music and information for young listeners
16.30 Stadtgesprach, a local discussion programme
17.30 Durchwahl, a phone-in programme
18.30 Echo des Tages, taken from VDR
19.00 Spieluhr, for children
19,10 Abendstudio, magazine covering music, literature, and the arts
20.15 Dabei in Dortmund, the transmission of local events in 
conjunction with the project’s local television channel
(Source - Patzold, 1986, p.435; see also Fur viele der liebste Sender, 
FR, 10.6.1986, p.10)
Radio Dortmund gave VDR a chance to test new types of working 
practices. The seven journalists on the editorial team did not 
specialise in certain subject areas, and fulfiled a number of tasks not 
generally associated with journalism, including presentation, 
production, and direction (see Kieemann, 1987, p.231). Sews was
gathered by twelve reporters who worked for both Radio Dortmund and 
the project’s local television channel. VDR’s decision to pool 
resources in this way was connected with a test of the limits of bi- 
mediality, and its usefulness in reducing costs (see Kieemann, 1987,
p.231>. Costs were also kept down by relying on contributions from 
between 80 and 100 freelance journalists, many of whom were stuaents 
(see Patzold, 1986, p.435). Direct costs per minute, excluding the 
cost of personnel, were about DM25 for editorial content and D'M2 for 
musical content, compared to DM108 per minute for radio undertaken by 
the ARD stations (see iWas sonst auBer Verbung, Jingles und Musik?, PR 
6.4.1987).
The local radio channel was clearly popular with listeners. A 
telephone survey of 146 people undertaken in June 1986, revealed that 
85% knew of Radio Dortmund's existence (see Patzold, 1986, pp.433-443, 
p.438). 80% had listened, and of these, 56% listened regularly or
occasionally and 26% were regular listeners (Patzold, 1986, p.438). 
This showed that the channel was as popular as VDR2, the most popular 
radio station in the area (Patzold, 1986, p.438). A further survey 
undertaken for VDR in April 1987, revealed that 28.7% of Dortmunders 
listened to Radio Dortmund during the week, a higher proportion than 
either VDR2 or WDR4 (see Kieemann, 1987, p.236; Was sonst auBer 
Werbung, Jingles und Musik?, FR 6.4.87).
VDR's local television channel in Dortmund had no public service 
forerunners. Apart from Saturdays, when there was no local news, it 
broadcast 1 hr 45 minutes of original local programming daily beween
19.15 and 21.15. The service was padded out by repeats later in the 
evening and the next morning, and by regional programmes taken from 
VDR's third channel, and news taken from the ARD network. Figure 5.4 
shows the programme schedule.
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Fig. 5.4
PROGRAMME SCHEDULE - LOCAL TELEVISION IN DORTMUND
09.15-10.00 Repeat of local news and Stadtjournai
12.15-13.00 Repeat of Dabei in Dortmund
13.15-14.00 Repeat of local news and Stadtjournai
18.50-19.10 North Rhine-Westphaiian regional news taken from VDR's
third television channel.
19.15-19.40 Monday to Friday: Local news (first showing)
Sunday: 19.15-19.20 Local news, then local sport
19.40-20.00 Monday to Friday: Stadtjournai, Lokales Feature,
Stippvisite, Gesprache der Voche (first showing)
20.00-20.15 National news taken from the ARD network
20.15-21.15 Monday, Wednesday to Friday: Lokale Brennpunktthemen
- Dabei in Dortmund, local entertainment.
Sundays: Regional news taken from VDR's third channel
22.00-23.45 Repeats of 19.15-20.00 and 20.15-21.15 
(Source: Patzold, 1988, p.6)
On weekdays at 19.40 different programme formats were broadcast on 
separate days (Kieemann, 1987, p.232). Stadtjournai, transmitted on 
Mondays and Wednesdays, looked at local culture, history, and 
entertainment. On Tuesdays, programmes concentrated on topics viewed 
from a local perspective. The areas covered included local sport, 
trade unions, homosexuality, local art, and the Jewish community in 
Dortmund. Stippvisite on Thursdays, took a look at local institutions, 
businesses, and museums. Gesprach der Voche on Thursdays was a local 
discussion programme. Dabei in Dortmund at 20.15 provided an hour of 
coverage on local events, culture and entertainment (See Kieemann, 
1987, p.233). Parts of this programme were broadcast on Radio
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Dortmund as part of the test on bi-mediality (see Patzold, 1985, p.453; 
Fur viele der liebste Sender, PR 10.6.1986, p.10; Kieemann, 1987, p.233). 
The direct costs of programmes, excluding staffing or technical costs, 
were low at about DM200 an hour (Kieemann, 1987, p.233).
In spite of competition from 20 other channels, the local
television channel achieved a 20% rating, which was quite considerable 
considering the technical and personnel resources available to it. 
According to research, undertaken in the spring of 1987, the channel
had a 15% share of the audience in the early evening (see Glanzstuck
\
wurde das lokale Radioprogramm, FR 19.5.1987). This placed it just
behind ZDF, on the same level as SAT 1 and higher than either the ARD
network or RTL Plus. It also had twice as many viewers as the third 
television channels, which broadcast regional programmes during this 
period (see FR 19.5.1987).
5.2.4 Beyond the pilot, project
As the experiment drew to its close in June 1988, increasing 
thought was given to its future. It was clear that the project would 
not continue in its entirety, but the success of Radio Dortmund and 
the local television channel could not be ignored either (see 
Glanzstiick wurde das lokale Radioprogramm t FR 19.5.1987).
The Dortmund Frojektkommission, which had been set up to research 
the project, recommended that the local television channel and Radio 
Dortmund should continue after the project had ceased (see
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Lokalprogramme Dortmund, KuR 1.7.1987, p.11). They clearly regarded 
both as a future model for local broadcasting in North Rhine- 
Westphalia when they described them as a "Quaiitatsparameter fur 
andere Lokalsender bei der Herstellung loKaler offentlichReit" (KuR
1.7.1987, p.11).
The WDR management was not pleased about these recommendations, 
and in this respect WDR appears to have been a victim of its own 
success. The WDR Intendant, Friedrich Nowottny, wanted the WDR 
Rundfunkrat to delay a decision about the future of both channels 
prior to cancellation (see KuR 1.7.1987, p.ll; Lokalfunk des WDR in 
Dortmund bleibt, FR 6.7.1987, p.6). His opposition to their continued 
existence was based on concern about WDR's diminishing financial 
resources, coupled with uncertainty about the next licence fee increase 
(see KuR, 1.7.1987, p.ll). He added that a redistribution of resources 
to programmes which were not available to all those living in North 
Rhine-Westphalia might affect WDR's other programme activities, which 
are available to all (see KuR 1.7.1987, p.12). It was his view that 
closing the channels and re-deployment of those involved offered the 
cheapest and best solution (.Lokalfunk des WDR in Dortmund bleibt, FR
6.7.1987, p.6).
The Frojektkommission had recommended that the local television 
channel continue until 1990 as part of WDR's third television channel, 
which is broadcast both terrestrially and on cable (see KuR 1.7.1987, 
p.ll). It estimated that a daily 30 to 40-minute programme with one 
repeat would cost between DK10 and DM11 million a year. The
- 368 -
continuation of the channel was regarded as a chance to experiment, 
and to test the quality and innovative capability of public service 
broadcasting (see KuR 1.7.1987, p.ll). It also gave VDR the option of 
becoming involved in local television at a later date (see KuR
1.7.1987, p.ll). The commission recommended that Radio Dortmund 
continue for an unspecified period. It was estimated that this would 
cost DM6 million a year. Gaps in programme provision could be 
rectified by using another another WDR radio channel as a framing 
programme (see KuR 1.7.1987).
In July 1987, against the wishes of Intendant Nowottny, the VDR 
broadcasting council decided to adopt the proposals of the 
Projektkommission (see Lokalfunk des VDR in Dortmund bleibt, FR
6.7.1987, p.6). It was decided to continue Radio Dortmund for an 
unspecified period, and provisionally to incorporate the local 
television channel into WDR's third television service until the end of 
1990 (see Patzold, 1988, p.2). The Rundfunkrat's decision stated: “Auch 
fur das Fernsehen gelten die Erwartungen an den experimentellen und 
innovativen Charakter des Programms. Es soil sowohl terrestrisch als 
auch in Kabelanlagen eingespeist werden" (cit. in Patzold, 1988, p.2).
It was also decided that the project's access channels would no 
longer be administered by VDR, although technical assistance would be 
given at the beginning (see Lokalfunk des VDR in Dortmund bleibt, FR
6.7.1987, p.6). Rejecting WDR Intendant Nowottny's opposition to the 
continuation of the local Dortmund experiments, Reinhard Graxz, the 
chairman of the VDR broadcasting council, pointed out that Nowottny's
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alternative proposal to extend VDR's sub-regionalisation policy to tne 
Dortmund area would also have required considerable financia^ 
resources (FR 6.7.1987, p.6). He was also concerned that an ena to -cue 
Dortmund project might release VDR from any further involvement in 
local broadcasting (see FR 6.7.1987, p.6). The decision to continue 
Radio Dortmund also effectively put an end to any plans by the local 
press to become involved in local radio in Dortmund (see FR 6.7.1987).
VDR's right to continue its projects in Dortmund was established in 
a new WDR broadcasting law (Bekanntfassung der Neufassung tie s 
Gesetzes tiber den "Westdeutschen Rundfunk Koln" vom 11. Januar 1983, 
in MPD 11/1988, pp.157-168, Paragraph 56a). Dortmund had not oniy 
demonstrated alternatives for local broadcasting, but may also have 
provided a future model for non-commercial local radio in North-Rhine 
Westphalia. It has generally been viewed as the most successful 
project in terms of innovative programming, and the success of local 
radio and television in Dortmund revealed public demand for 
programming of this type. The project also provided a sharp contrast 
to commercial radio and television in other Lander (see Teichert, 
1987).
5.3 Closer to the public - sub-regionalisation in radio
Many of the ARD stations have been pursuing a policy of sub- 
regionalisation, particularly in radio. This involves splitting 
existing Land-wide networks to enable the insertion of programmes 
aimed at sub-sections of the audience within one transmission area.
- 370 -
Sub-regionalisation is not entirely new, because BR and SDR started 
oiffering sub-regional insertions in the 1960‘s and early 1970's 
respectively (see Halefeldt, 1983, p.73). These activities do not 
appear to have inspired political controversy at the time, because the 
debate for alternatives was centred on private television, with radio 
largely excluded from the debate about new technologies and private 
competition (see Montag, 1978). 2for was the level of interest in 
radio raised with the introduction of the cable pilot projects, which 
lacked sufficient reach to provide a viable economic option for 
private interests.
The situation altered dramatically once new FM frequencies became 
available in accordance with agreements worked out by the World 
Administrative Radio Conference in Geneva (see Roigas, 1983, p.553; ARD 
Jahrbuch, 1985, p.177). In 1984 each Land was awarded frequencies to 
undertake two Land-wide networks each (see Roper, 1985, p.522). This 
removed dependency on cable or satellite, and made commercial radio a 
more attractive proposition for private interests.
When radio was added to the debate about private broadcasting, 
some Lander tried to stop the expansion of public service broadcasting 
into sub-regional radio, in order to leave frequencies free for the 
introduction of commercial radio. In Baden-Wurttemberg a media law 
was passed which prevented SDR and SWF from embarking on any further 
sub-regional activities (see Landesmediengesetz Baden-Vurttemberg vom 
16. Dezember 1985, in Bauer, Detjen, Muller-Romer, 17.1.2). SDR was 
forced to apply to the Constitutional Court for an injunction against
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the law so that it could continue to pursue existing plans for sub- 
regionalisation (see Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum 
Paragraph 13 Absatz 2 Satz 2 des Landesmediengesetzes Baden- 
VUrttemberg vom 3. Januar 1985f in ARD Jahrbuch, 1986, p.419-420).
Attempts to limit public broadcasting's involvement in suo-regionai 
broadcasting found ample support amongst commercial broadcasters, and 
in particular the press (see BDZV, 1985, p.770). The press has always 
been suspicious of local or sub-regional broadcasting, regarding it as 
an infringement upon the traditional press role of local news 
provision (see Konneberger, 1978, p.196; Lerg, 1982 p.16). In 
particular, the print media had expressed fears about loss of 
advertising revenue, an argument advanced since the 1960s, and 
rejected on several occasions, most notably by the Michel-Kommission 
in 1967 (see Montag, 1978, p.192; Prodoehl, 1987, p.231; Head, 1988, 
pp.44-46).
The public broadcasting stations' right to participate in local and 
regional broadcasting was finally recognised in the Constitutional 
Court's fifth broadcasting judgement in June 1987, described in 
Chapter 3. The Court ruled that public broadcasters could not be 
excluded from local or regional broadcasting, because such exclusion 
contradicted constitutional demands for diversity of opinion and 
plurality in broadcasting (in FKD, 12.6.1987, pp.1-40). The decision 
represented a substantial victory for the public broadcasting 
stations, giving security to existing sub-regional initiatives, and 
encouragement to future plans.
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5.3.1 Commercial in-roads into radio
Competing with public broadcasting's radio services at sub-regional 
level are West Germany's new commercial radio stations, which mainly 
offer a diet of popular music aimed at young audiences (see
Klingler/Walendy, 1986, p.454; Schnibben, 1986, p.87; Volf Thomas, 1986, 
p.553; Teichert, 1987, p.276 ). Press involvement is extensive, and is 
likely to increase as the larger press concerns take on a greater 
role, especially in the provision of framing programmes for local 
channels (see Roper, 1985, p.529; Wolf Thomas, 1986, pp.550-551;
Teichert, 1987, pp.275-276; Voigt, 1987, pp.3-6). The press have
justified their involvement on the grounds that new radio channels
will affect their circulation and advertising income (see Teichert, 
1987, p.276; see also Antrag der Radio Hamburg GmbH & Co KG auf 
Erteilung einer Horfunklizenz gemaB $16 des Hamburglschen 
Mediengesetzes vom 3.12,1985, pp. 331-338, in MP 5/1987, here p.332).
However, distinct differences have emerged in the way in which 
commercial radio has been approached. Most Lander have passed 
legislation allowing the introduction of commercial radio, but 
different models have emerged in the north, south, and west of the 
country, which reflect different aims and concerns.
Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony in the north, only allow Land- 
wide radio stations with Land-wide advertising in deference to the 
local press (see Prodoehl, 1987, p.231; see also Rundfunkgesatz fur das 
Land Schleswig-Holstein vom 27. November 1984> Paragraph 5, in MPD
- 373 -
1/1985; Miedersachsisches Landesrundfunkgesetz in der Fassung vom lo. 
Marz 1987> Paragraph 6, in FKD 27.3.1987, pp.11-20). The two licensee 
stations, Radio Schleswig-Holstein (RSH) and ffn (Funic und Fernsehen 
Nordwestdeutschiand) in Lower Saxony, include large national and 
regional press concerns amongst their shareholders (see Teichert, 
1987, pp.275-276).
Since their launch RSH, ffn, and a further station, Radio Hamburg 
(RHH), have achieved substantial success in attracting a young 
audience with a predominantly music-based output (see Vertreter im 
Ather, Virtschaftswoche, 14.8.1987, p.68; see also Kramer, 1987, p.8; 
Teichert, 1987, pp.278pp>. Unlike their public service counterparts, 
the new commercial stations appear to avoid large chunks of 
journalistic output, with ffn actually claiming to avoid "iangatmige 
und ermiidende Wortbeitrage" (cit. in Kramer, 1987, p.9). The emphasis 
on music with a minimum of information, ignores promises made in the 
original licence applications (see Teichert, 1987, p.278; Funk t
Fernsehen Nordwest-deutschland & Co KG. Antrag auf Erlaubnis zur 
Veranstaltung elnes Horfunk-Vollprogramms, in MP 5/1987, pp.317-340; 
Antrag der Radio Hamburg GmbH & Co KG auf Erteilung einer 
Horfunklizenz gemaB $16 des Hamburgischen Mediengesetzes vom 
3.12.1985, in MP 5/1987, pp.331-338).
All three of the northern stations will probably reach 
profitability in the near future (see Vertreter im Ather, Virtschafts­
woche 14.8.1987, p.68). The popular profile of the three combined 
attracted gross advertising revenue of DM75.5 million in 1987 (see
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Steinbach, 1988, p.198). This has been achievea at tne expense of 
NDR2, NDR's most popular radio station. S'DR's net advertising
turnover for radio fell by 8.7% from DM62.4 million in 1986 to DM57
million in 1987 Csee Steinbach, 1988, p.203).
Research has also shown that more listeners are tuning in to the 
private stations. Figures revealed that 1.09 million people listened
to the private stations between 6.00 and 18.00, compared to only
856,000 for NDR2 (see Privatradios erreichen mehr Hdrer als 1IDR2, FR 
29.6.1987; Virtschaftswoche 14.8.1987, p.68). These developments have 
prompted serious thinking about the future profile of a DR's radio 
channels (see NDR-Horfunk soil mehr an Zielgruppen ausgerichtet 
werden, KuR 5.7.1986; Kramer, 1987, p.11; Virtschaftswoche 14.8.1987, 
p.58). However, attempts to limit journalistic content in favour of 
more music in the ARD radio stations have prompted concern and 
scepticism from some observers (see Schnibben, 1986, p.87; Musik 
machen und moglichst wenig reden?, FR 19.2.1988).
In contrast to developments in the north of the country, the 
southern states of Bavaria and Baden-Viirttemberg have opted for a 
system of local and regional radio stations. Bavaria aims to 
introduce 92 local stations by the end of the 1980s (.Vertreter im 
Ather, Virtschaftswoche 14.8.1987, p.68). These will compete with a 
Lan<f-wide network, Bayernradio, involving the major print concerns
(see Drei Hedi enkonzern e dominieren heim neuen Bayern-Radio, FR 
25.6.1986). Five radio stations are planned for the larger cities of 
Munich and Nuremberg (see Virtschaftswoche 14.8.1987, p.70). In
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Baden-Viirttemberg, there are plans to introduce four regional networks 
based in the major cities, and a greater number of local stations (see 
Voigt, 1987, p.4). As is the case in the Uorth, press and publishing 
participation is extensive at all levels, and there is a strong 
possibility that the major print concerns will dominate both Land-wide 
or regional framing programmes and local insertions (see Voigt, 1987, 
p.4).
Doubts have been raised about the economic viability of the 
Bavarian and Baden-Viirttemberg concepts, because of the large number 
of individual projects, and the lack of advertising in local areas (see 
Vertreter im Ather, Virtschaftswoche 14.8.1987, p.70; Viiliams, 1988, 
pp.32-33). In the north, commercial radio has only to compete with 
SDR, whose radio advertising is limited to 42 minutes a day. In the 
south, commercial stations have to compete with the more populist 
public radio stations of SDR, SVF, and BR (see Klingier/Valendy, 1986, 
p.454; Vertreter im Ather, Virtschaftswoche 14.8.1987, p.68). These 
also broadcast much more advertising than their northern colleague, 
SDR, generally over 80 minutes a day. Some commercial stations in the 
south are now seeking to solve their problems by cutting costs 
through shared facilities and programme exchanges (see Vertreter im 
Ather, Virtschaftswoche 14.8.1987, p.70).
In the Rhineland-Palatinate, a Land-wide network, Radio 4, has been 
licensed (see Klingier/Valendy, 1986, pp.444-466). Radio 4 involved 
four different private consortia using the same frequency (see 
Populares in alien Schattierungan, FR 29.4.1986). It has not proved a
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successful solution because of squabbles between and within individual 
consortia, and the lack of profile engendered by the consortia! 
solution (see Klingier/Valendy, 1986, pp.454; Radio 4 wit Start- 
problement FR 29.4.1986). A similiar solution has been adopted in 
Vest Berlin (see Lukrativer Lachreiz, Virtschaftswoche 14.8.1987, p.58).
In North Rhine-Vestphalia a different solution again has been 
chosen. Here, a law has been passed which aims to establish 50 local 
radio stations (see Bekanntmachung der Neufassung des 
Rundfunkgesetzes fur das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen vom 11.1.1988, in 
MPD 11/1988, pp.137-155; see also Vertreter im Ather, Virtschaftswoche
14.8.1987, p.70). The law seeks to safeguard the economic existence of 
the local press, but also promote diversity of opinion by preventing 
the dominance of the local press over local broadcasting content (see 
Jakob, 1987, p.3; Prodoehl, 1987, p.231). The solution adopted is the 
so-called Zwei-Saulen-Modell. Vithin this framework, responsibility 
for programming lies with Veranstaltergemeinschaften, made up of 
various local interests, including the press (see $24-$25, MPD, p.144). 
The local press is allowed to take up a 75% shareholding in the 
Betriebsgesellschaften^(.S>29, MPD, p.146). These are responsible for 
providing technical and production facilities to the 
Veranstaltergemeinschaft ($29, MPD, p.146). The economic existence of 
the press is safeguarded by the fact that the Betriebsgesellschaft is 
responsible for acquiring advertising, but press dominance over 
programme content is prevented by a clause which states that the 
Betriebsgesellschaft is not allowed to influence the programme policy 
of the Veranstaltergemeinschaft ($29, $25, MPD, p.144, p.146).
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The law in North Rhine-Vestphalia represents an important attempt 
to break the press monopoly over local information. However, doubts 
have been raised about the ability to separate economic and programme 
interests (see also Lange, 1980, p.82). If a local radio station is to 
survive economically, the Veranstaltergemeinschaft will have to take 
account of the economic interests of the Betriebsgesellschaft, and this 
could indirectly influence programme policy (see Jakob, 1987, p.4; 
Prodoehl, 1987, p.233). It also seems likely that the press will reach 
an agreement with VDR to provide a jointly administered framing
programme into which local programmes can be inserted (.Vertreter im 
Ather> Virtschaftswoche 14.8.1987, p.70). This would help to raise the 
economic viability of local radio.
Apart from North Rhine-Vestphalia, it is clear that most 
commercial radio initiatives in Vest Germany, whether Land-wide or
local, are in the main dominated by press interests, and orientated 
towards popular music for a youth audience. The sub-regionai
initiatives undertaken by the public stations are substantially 
different in character and aims.
5.3.2 The origins of sub-regionalisation
Some regard sub-regionalisation as an opportunity for public 
broadcasters to occupy an area of broadcasting ahead of other
aspirants (see Janke, 1986, p.5). In fact, sub-regionalisation is not 
purely a reaction to private competition, but has deej)er historical 
roots. The regional tradition of Vest German broadcasting goes back
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to the birth of broadcasting in the 1920s, when regionalism provided a 
solution to technical and financial obstacles (see Bausch, 1966, p.17; 
Lerg, 1980). Decentralised broadcasting was re-established after the 
years of centralisation under the National Socialists, but was often 
shaped by the geography of Allied zonal division, rather than 
traditional historical boundaries (see Schutte, 1975, pp.227pp). For 
example, NWDR, established by the British, failed to reflect the 
different regional interests of the areas covered (see Hoffmann, 1975, 
p.48; Bausch, 1980, p.204). This was one of the reasons why North 
Rhine-Vestphalia established its own station, VDR, in 1954.
The regional interests of the separate Lander are reflected in a 
number of ways. The ARD stations provide a variety of regional 
services, including the third television channels, regional opt-outs on 
the ARD network, and three or four regionally-based radio channels 
each. Some broadcasting laws, like that of BR and NDR, require their 
local stations to reflect the political and cultural characteristics of 
their transmission area in programming (see Gesetz iiber die 
Errichtung und die Aufgaben einer Anstalt des offentlichen Rechts "Der 
Bayerische Rundfunk", Art.4, in Ring, C.IV 1.1.1; Staatsvertrag iiber 
den Norddeutschen Rundfunk vom 20. August 1980, $5, in Ring, C.IV 
1.3.1). However, the pressures of advertising in the regional opt- 
outs, which have led to regional programming being moved to the third 
channels and to the transformation of the third television channels 
into generic channels, may render regional content less significant in 
future (see Chapter 4). At SVF and NDR, the two multi -Land stations, 
special provision is made for the broadcasting needs of the different
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Lander involved. The SWF broadcasting law obliges SWF to maintain 
studios in both the Rhineland-Paiatinate and Baden-Viirttemberg (see 
Staatsvertrag Liber den Sudwestfunk vom 27. August 1951, S3, in Ring C- 
IV 1.8.1). The IBS Staatsvertrag, passed in 1980, requires IBS to 
establish broadcasting studios in each of the participant Lander, ana 
to produce separate radio and television programmes for each 
participant Land (see Staatsvertrag iiber den Norddeutschen Rundfunk 
vom 20. August 1980, $2 and $3, in Sing, C.IV, 1.3.1; see also
Drengberg/Sust, 1986, p.312).
However, all these activities only cater for whole Lander\ and
ignore the sometimes very different historical, cultural, and political
characteristics existing within each individual Land (see Honneberger,
1980, p.200; Halefeldt, 1983, p.72). These differences are underlined
by SDR Intendanty Hans Bausch, who explained to me the situation
existing in the SDS transmission area:
Da gab es regional einen erkennbaren Bedarf. Wenn sie also von 
Hand des Sendegebiets des SDS nehmen, das ein relativ kieines 
Sendegebiet ist, sind das ganz verschiedene Jtenschen, die 
verschiedene Sprachen sprechen. Im alten Baden, da wird also 
Rhein-Main-Frankisch gesprochen. Im alten Wiirttemberg wird 
Ostfrankisch gesprochen. Im Suden Baden- Vlirttembergs wird 
Allemannisch gesprochen, wie die Schweizer, und in Sudbaden. Das 
sind vollig verschiedene Historien. (Interview, 29.7.1987)
Sub-regionalisation is clearly something quite different. It is not 
local broadcasting in the strictest sense. Sub-regionalism refers to 
programmes aimed at a large homogeneous area within one Landt for 
example lorth Hesse, with its urban focal point, the city of Kassel, or 
Radio Stuttgart (SDR), which broadcasts programmes to the city and
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its immediate surrounds. Local broadcasting, which the public 
broadcasters profess not to undertake, would cater for smaller units 
like a small town and its environs (Bausch, Interview, 29.7.1987). 
Hans Bausch sees practical problems relating to funding and content 
which militate against the introduction of local broadcasting, when he 
states: "So’oaid es urn lokale Sender geht, ware es ja garnicht mehr zu
kontrollieren. . .Wo soil der Stoff herkommen. Soviel passiert in 
unseren Stadtchen nicht" (Interview, 29.7.1987).
In reality there appears to be no clear definition of region, nor a 
consensus about what constitutes the essence of regional broadcasting 
(see Ronneberger, 1980, p.196; Teichert, 1981, p.lll). Some definitions 
refer to cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity. Others refer to the 
the replacement of old local communities by areas of social 
communication (see Gericke, 1980, p.544; Teichert, 1981). According to 
Teichert, the conditions necessary for sub-regionalisation include a 
diverse employment market, a satisfactory standard of living, ample 
opportunities for leisure, a population of at least 500,000, a focal 
point, and an area no larger than it would take to cross by car within 
90 minutes (Teichert, 1979, p.193).
Sub-regionalisation has chiefly taken place within radio, and aims 
to improve the social penetration of the medium (see Lerg, 1982, p.14). 
Frequencies carrying Land- wide radio networks are split to allow 
separate sub-regional insertions (Halefelt, 1983, p.70). There has 
been little attempt to introduce sub-regionalisation on television, 
because of the expense involved, although BR offers separate
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programmes on its third channel ior Franconia ana Upper Bavaria 
(Halefeldt, 1983, p.73). Radio, however, offers a cheaper alternative,
because it does not require so much technical support, nor aoes it 
require expensive visual material.
What then are the reasons behind public broadcasting's interest in 
sub-regional radio? One of the most obvious reasons would appear to 
have been the debate surrounding the cable pilot projects, which 
allowed private broadcasting and forced public broadcasters to rethink 
their regional policies as a form of self-defence (see Teichert, 1981, 
p.112). Second, there is the factor of party-political influence, 
especially in the case of NDR, where the regional coverage of public 
broadcasting was criticised (see Teichert, 1981, p.112). However, 
according to Teichert, the reasons behind sub-regionalisation go much 
further and are connected with changes in society itself (see Teichert, 
1979, 1981).
The origins of the debate for more regionalism in broadcasting are
to be found in the early 1970s, when concern was expressed about
growing centralisation in society and the increase in power of central
government and bureaucracy at the expense of local government (see
Ronneberger, 1980, p.189; Teichert, 1979, pp.185-186; Teichert, 1981,
p.113). Referring to this concern Halefeldt writes:
Zweifel regten sich, ob die Veit wirklich uberschaubarer geworden 
sei, ob nicht vielmehr die Abhangigkeit des Einzelnen von immer 
unpersonlicheren, immer unundurchschaubareren Apparaten und 
Mechanismen gewachsen sei. Apparaten und ttechanismen, die das 
Leben des Einzelnen bestimmen, ohne daB er noch in der Lage ware, 
sie zu beherrschen. (Halefeldt, 1983, p.62)
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The diminuation of function in local government left individuals 
powerless against group politics and leads directly to the second 
reason for the emergence of regionalism as a topic of debate. The 
individual no longer felt represented by parties and groups in the 
region (see Teichert, 1981, p.117).
The debate about centralisation in society left its mark on the 
media. The press, the traditional local and regional medium, was 
found to exhibit substantial failings in the provision of local and 
regional information. This was shown by a lack of critical 
journalism, reinforced by close links with local institutions on whom 
the press is dependent for information (Teichert, 1979, p.187; 
Teichert, 1981, p. 118). Similar criticisms were directed at the press. 
Large stations like WDR and NDR were accused of metropolitanism 
(Gericke, 1980, p.545). At NDR neglect of regional concerns was one of 
the reasons which drove Prime Minister Stoltenberg of Schleswig- 
Holstein to cancel the NDR Staatsvertrag, an action which almost 
resulted in the break-up of the station before a compromise was 
reached in 1980 with the passage of a new Staatsvertrag, which gave 
greater consideration to regional Land- based concerns (see 
Drengberg/Rust, 1986, p.312).
The debate for greater reflection of regional concerns was 
encouraged by several other factors. In 1970 the Michel-Kommissim, 
which investigated the state of broadcasting in south-west Germany 
called for more "regionale Nestwarme" as a counterweight to increasing 
press concentration which was affecting diversity of opinion in local
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and regional areas (see Ronneberger, 1980, p.203). Calls for a greater 
reflection of regional issues were reinforced by instances 01 
regionalisation abroad, including the introduction of BBC local raaio 
in 1967 (see Halefeldt, 1983, p.75). The possibility of cable 
television further strenghthened calls for more regionalisaxion in 
broadcasting (see Halefeldt, 1983, p.75).
After consultations with the Bund Deutscher Zeitungsverleger 
(BDZV), the newspaper publishers' organisation, ARD announced in 
January 1972 that it would not enter the local and regional domain of 
the press. It also undertook not to transmit local advertising (see 
ARD-Kommunique: Auffassung zur Einfuhrung lokaler Rundfunksendungen,
in MP 1/1972, p.43). According to Halefeldt, this position still holds 
(1983, p.62). Given that the press are prone to criticise the
broadcasters for impinging on their area of activity, this gives rise 
to an interesting question of reciprocity. If the press decides to 
enter broadcasting and compete in the public broadcasters' domain, 
should not the public broadcasters be allowed to compete in sub­
regional or local broadcasting (see Prodoehl, 1987, p.230>?
Aware that regional broadcasting constituted an issue of 
legitimacy, several ARD stations began to implement improvements to 
their regional coverage by introducing sub-regional radio (see 
Teichert, 1979, p. 190; Halefeldt, 1983, p.63). Studies by the public 
broadcasters in the 1970s showed substantial public support for sub- 
regionalisation (see Gericke, 1980, p.345; Halefeldt, 1983, p.78).
Experiments in sub-regional radio were introduced at a number of
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trade fairs with considerable success (see Gericke, i960, p.345). One 
of the pioneers of these experiments was SDK, whose Studio
Heidelberg/Mannheim, a six-month experiment in 1975, at the Federal
Garden Exhibition in Mannheim, reached 30% of its target audience 
regularly after only six weeks (Gericke, 1980, p.345).
5.3.3 A diversion - failed cooperation with the press
Sub-regional radio has usually come about on the initiative of the
individual ARD stations, but SWF and SDR did become involved in a 
cooperative local radio venture with local newspaper publishers. This 
was part of the Monrepcs agreement, encouraged by the Baden- 
Wurttemberg government, and agreed between SDR, SWF, ZDF, and local 
print concerns in 1983 (Vereinbarung iiber Versuche mit lokalem
Rundfunk in Baden-Viirttemberg Monrepos-Rahmen vertrag, MP 5/1983, 
pp.356-7). The Monrepos projects occurred as a result of' Baden- 
Viirttemberg's decision to withdraw from the cable pilot projects, and 
institute its own commission in 1979, the Expertenkommission Neue 
Medien (EKM), which drew up an alternative route to the introduction 
of the new media and private broadcasting in Baden-Wiirttemberg (see 
Kabelpilotprojekt Mannheim/Ludwigsha fen. Aus der Regierungserklarung 
des baden-vriirttembergischen Ministerprasidenten Lothar Spath zum 
Thema "Chancen und Risiken der neuen Medien" in MP 12/1979, p.828-834; 
Leitsatze des EKM-SchluBberichtes, in MP 2/1981, pp.124-147). The 
experiments in local broadcasting engendered by Monrepos, were a 
reflection of the EKM's findings, and were aimed at acquiring 
experience of local broadcasting.
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Under the Monrepos agreement, it was decided that local newspaper 
publishers and the public broadcasters should set up three local 
broadcasting experiments. SWF and SDR set up joint local radio 
ventures with the press in Freiburg and U'im respectively. A planned 
experiment in local television involving the press and ZDF in Mannheim 
never got off the ground. All the experiments took place under the 
supervision of SWF and SDR, with the public broadcasters providing 
two-thirds of the necessary funding.
Stadtradio Freiburg ran for two years, and ended in October 1986; 
Stadtradio Ulm began on 1st January 1985 and closed on 30th September 
1986 (see Meldung, MP 10/1984). In both cases the local press 
provided editorial content for sub-regional insertions, about three 
hours daily, with framing programmes provided by the public 
broadcasters (see Cyrus, 1984, p.21>. Although the experiments proved 
popular with the public, they did not attract sufficient advertising 
revenue, and for this reason Stadtradio Freiburg was closed down (see 
Stadtradio Freiburg stellte Betrieb eint FR 3.10.1986).
According to Cyrus, the trials were never aimed at gaining
experience for future legislation, but at establishing press
involvement in broadcasting (1984, p.20). Cyrus states:
So macht das Stadtradio mit vorwiegend offentlich-rechtlichem Geld 
Propaganda fur eine kommerzialisierte Medienzukunft. Das Stadt­
radio is nicht mehr als ein Episode, die den Verlegern den Einstieg 
ind die elektronischen Medien erleichtern und dafiir werben soli. 
(Cyrus, 1984, p.23)
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Cooperation with the press had not been easy for SDR and SWF, and 
their involvement was more a result of political pressure than any 
willingness to cooperate with the press (see Stadtradio Freiburg kein 
Kartell-VerstoB, FR 28.2.1985, p.20). The experiments also detracted 
from their own individual endeavours at establishing sub-regional 
broadcasting. Although both projects had achieved some success in 
programming terms, their destiny was sealed by a new Baden- 
WUrttemberg media law, which froze public broadcasting's involvement 
in local broadcasting as of December 1985.- As a result, SDR decided 
to conclude its Ulm project before the end of the two-year trial 
period. The experience of cooperation with the press proved that the 
public broadcasting were more in favour of pursuing their own 
initiatives in sub-regional radio.
5.3.4 Sub-regionalisation in practice
Sot all ARD stations have pursued a policy of sub-regionalisation 
in radio. SDR and BR are undoubtedly the pioneers of sub-regional 
radio, but HR is the only station to have completed its sub- 
regionalisation programme.
The BR transmission area has been split into six regions, including 
the region of Munich, for the purpose of transmitting sub-regional 
opt-outs on the second and fourth BR radio networks (Teichert, 1981, 
p.lll). These are broadcast at midday during the week and last 
approximately an hour, (see Teichert 1979, p.190; Gericke, 1980, p.547; 
Halefeldt, 1983, p.78, p.66). On Saturdays separate local sports
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programming is transmitted for the north and south of the region (see 
Halefeldt, 1983, p.66). BR is currently the only public station to
implement some form of sub-regionalisation in television, offering a 
separate half hour of programmes for Franconia and for Bavaria ana 
Swabia on its third television channel.
Sub-regionalisation began in earnest at SDR in 1979 with the 
introduction of the three year experiment, Kurpfalz-Radio. This is 
broadcast on SDR's fourth network, and serves a potential audience of 
two million listeners in the towns of Mannheim, Ludwigshafen, and
Heidelberg (Teichert, 1979, p.191; Gericke, 1980, p.547; Teichert, 1981, 
p.lll). Up to four hours of extended regional programmes are
broadcast daily, with local sports programming broadcast on Sundays 
(see Teichert, 1979, p.191). Broadcasts include an early morning 
magazine, and sub-regional news bulletins (see Gericke, 1980, p.547; 
Halefeldt, 1983, p.68). After one year, 17% of those living in the
Kurpfalz had listened to the early morning programme at least once 
(see Gericke, 1980, p.547). A further 39% of listeners listened daily 
or several times a week (see Gericke, 1980, p.547).
Kurpfalz-Radio has since been joined by four further sub-regional 
opt-outs. Radio Stuttgart began in March 1981 on SDR's fourth 
network, offering a diet of sub-regional news and current affairs in 
the mornings and early evenings to a potential audience of 2.2 million 
listeners (see Halefeldt, 1983). Schwabenradio, based in Ulm, began 
broadcasting on the fourth network in September 1984, and serves a 
population of 650,000 in the Donau-Iller and Qst-Viirttemberg regions.
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Frankenradio, based in Heiibronn, began broadcasting on F'M and medium 
wave on 26 th May 1966. Plans to establish Radio Karlsruhe were 
delayed by the 1985 version of the Baden-Viirttemberg Landesmedien- 
gesetz, which froze further expansion by public stations into sub­
regional broadcasting to the levels existing on 31st December 1984. 
This has now been altered because of the Constitutional Court's ruling 
in June 1987, and SDR is likely to continue with its existing plans,
SDR's neighbour, SWF, was particularly affected by Baden- 
Viirttemberg 's attempts to prevent expansion into sub-regional radio, 
because this is an area where it has invested few resources. The ban 
on further sub-regional activity would have effectively excluded SWF 
from all sub-regional broadcasting. This would have created a 
disparity between the north of Baden-Viirttemberg, served by SDR with
sub-regional opt-outs, and the south, served by SVF. Following the
Constitutional Court's ruling in June 1987, SWF announced plans to
restart sub-regionalisation of its first radio network, and implement 
separate sub-regional opt-outs for five separate areas (see FR, 
24.6.87). Plans for sub-regionalisation had been announced in 1983, 
but were halted after the passage of the Baden-Viirttemberg 
Landesmediengesetz in 1985 (see FR 24.6.87). SVF now plans to
introduce separate transmissions in the morning for the Baden area, 
centred around Freiburg, and for the Viirttemberg area, centered around 
Tubingen. There are also plans to regionalise early morning 
transmissions in the Rhineland-Palatinate (see FR, 24.6.87).
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The only obstacles facing SWF and SDR are nhe availability of 
frequencies. SWF's claims to extra frequencies were rejected by Helmut 
G. Bauer, the director of the Rhineland-Palatinate Landeszentraie fur 
private Rundfunkveranstalter (LPR), the authority responsible for 
licensing and supervising private broadcasting in the Rhineland- 
Palatinate. According to Bauer, the Constitutional Court decision in 
June 1987 had ruled that public broadcasters only had a right to 
additional frequencies for the pursuit of local or regional 
broadcasting if they were unable to split their existing frequencies. 
In his view, any remaining frequencies in the Rhineland-Palatinate 
should be awarded to private channels. He added that the cost of sub- 
regionalisation would lead to SVF claiming more licence-fee funding, 
and that the Constitutional Court had not opened a "Selbstbedienungs- 
laden" for public stations (LPR: Kelne zusatzlichen Frequenzen fur den 
SWF, FR 3.7.1987). SWF Justlziar Jorg Ruggeberg wrote to Bauer, 
pointing out that SWF had not yet made any demands for further 
frequency allocations, and that even if they had, the decision had to 
be made by the Rhineland-Palatinate government, not the LPR. In his 
opinion, the Constitutional Court had only demanded split frequencies 
where this was technically feasible, and where it did not affect 
existing public service channels (SWF weist Kritik an Reglonalisierung 
zuruck, FR 9.7.1987),
The ARD station in Hesse, HR, is the only station to have completed 
its sub-regionalisation programme, and provides the clearest idea of 
the aims of sub-regionalisation. The completion of sub-
regionalisation in 1987 was made possible by the introduction of a
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fourth radio network, HR4, in October 1986 (Interview, Arnold, 
26.8.1987). HR4 consists of three programming components: popular
music (evergreens, operetta, middle of the road) aimed at the over-30s 
age-group, sub-regional insertions, and programmes for immigrant 
workers (see Arnold, Interview, 26.8.1987; Die Region spielt eine 
dominierende Rolle, FR 1.10.1986, p.26). However, it is the five
separate sub-regional insertions which form the basis of the channel's 
existence. The five regions are:
- North Hesse, centred around Kassel
- East Hesse, centred around Fulda
- South-East Hesse, centred around Wetzlar
- South Hesse centred on Bensheim and Darmstadt
- the Rhine-Main area centred around Frankfurt (Arnold, Interview,
26.8.1987).
The five sub-regions vary in size, averaging 1.2 million listeners 
each, with the Rhine-Main area forming the biggest sub-section. 
According to Bernd-Peter Arnold, head of radio sub-regionalisation at 
HR, any attempts to broadcast to areas with less than 1.2 million 
listeners would mean embarking upon local broadcasting. In his view, 
local broadcasting only makes economic sense in the cities, and is one 
of the reasons why private broadcasters are so keen to introduce 
radio to these areas (Interview, 26.8.1987). The sub-regional 
insertions are broadcast for lte hours in the morning, & hour at 
midday and 1 hour in the afternoons (Interview, 26.8.1987).
- 391 -
Arnold rejects accusations that the introduction of the fourth 
radio network was purely a means of occupying frequencies ahead of 
commercial radio aspirants. Instead, he points out that the sub­
regional concept for HR 4 had first been worked out in 1978, and that 
the first sub-regional inserts had been introduced in 1980, long 
before private programming became a possibility (Interview, 26.8.1987; 
see also Halefeldt, 1983). He claims that HR had known for 12 years 
that the public wanted sub-regional programming, but research had also 
revealed that "regionale Programme nur einen Sinn haben, wenn sie auf 
Dauer in einem eigenen Programm liegen" (Arnold, Interview, 26.8.1987). 
The regional opt-outs used to be incorporated across the other three 
networks, but here they had been "Fremdkorper" (Arnold, Interview, 
26.8.1987; see also 4. HR-Programm 1st beschlossene Sache, FR 
22.10.1985). This was the reason behind the introduction of the 
fourth network as a framing programme. The channel contains no 
advertising at present, and is therefore not an economic threat to 
commercial radio, but this policy may change, if the decision is taken 
to spread HR radio advertising across four channels (Arnold, 
Interview, 26.8.1987).
HR's efforts at sub-regionalisation give some idea of the 
relationship between existing regional radio stations and sub-regional 
radio. Referring to radio generally, Arnold believes that: "eine
offentlich-rechtliche Rundfunkanstalt, die die Grunaversorgung sehr 
sehr ernst nimmt, vier Programme braucht, und zwar vier Programme, die 
sich untereinander unterscheiden" (Interview 26.8.87). He explains 
that these four networks can be divided into so-called
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Einschaltprogramme> which are used by the listener for the reception 
of specific programmes, which are listened to attentively, ana so- 
called Begleitprogramme, which provide background for other activities. 
The term Einschaltprogramm covers HR's first radio network, which 
concentrates on information and serious entertainment, similar to the 
first networks of the other ARD stations, and HR2, which concentrates 
on cultural programming and on serious music. The term 
Begleitprogramm can be applied to HR3, which broadcasts mainly 
papular music to an audience under 30 years of age, and to HR4 which 
broadcasts popular music to the over-30 age-group. Both HR3 and HR4 
contain news, information, and some cultural programming, but to a 
lesser extent than either HR1 or HR2. The novelty of HR4 is that it 
caters for the popular needs of the older age group, which Arnold
feels have been neglected in the past (Interview, 26.8.1987). Arnold 
believes that this constitutes a real alternative to private radio 
initiatives, which have sought to attract young listeners, although the 
over-30s as a "finanzkraftige Zielgruppe" would appear to offer 
greater commercial opportunities in respect of spending power (Arnold, 
Interview, 26.8.1987). HR4 does not claim to be a generic channel, but 
a contrast and complement to HR’s existing radio networks (see 
Henning Wicht, Programmdirektor, cit. in Die Region spielt eine
dominierende Rollet FR 1.10.1986, p.26).
HR4 had been accused of lacking profile, and of pandering to 
populism, in order to ruin the chances of commercial radio. Arnold 
denies that this is the case, underlining the status of the sub­
regional opt-outs as the central core of the channel. He admits,
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however, that more attention has been given to presentation ana
content, in order to make "che channel "formal attraktiver" (Interview,
26.8.1987). He explained to me:
Das ist sicherlich eine vorweggenommene Reaktion auf kommerzielie
Anbieter, denn kommerzielie Anbieter werden sich urn attraktive 
Vermittlungsformen bemiihen, aber das hat mit den Inhalten nichts 
zu tun. Das ist rein formal zu sehen. (Interview, 26.8.1987)
HR, BR, SWF, and SDR, are not the only stations to have given more 
attention to sub-regional broadcasting, but these are the stations
which have gone furthest in their stated aims. The essential 
difference to commercial broadcasting, however, is the emphasis on 
journalistic output and on the reflection of regional concerns, rather 
than on popular music aimed at a youth audience.
5.3.5 The future of sub-regionalisation
Sub-regionalisation has undoubtedly made strides within the West
German broadcasting environment, but doubts have been raised about 
whether the public broadcasting stations are structurally suited to 
fulfil the requirements of sub-regional provision (see Lerg, 1982, 
p.20). Citing the deficiencies of public broadcasting in this area, 
Lerg points to the search for identity and integration amongst some 
local groups which has resulted in the introduction of an alternative 
local press and, sometimes, of illegal local radio stations (1982, 
p.l4pp, p.17). For the essence of sub-regionalisation lies in content, 
not organisation, and should ideally lead to better communication by 
opening up local politics and culture, so allowing individual
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participation at a local or sub-regional level (see Teichert, 1981, 
p.120-21; see also Janke cit. in Halefeidt, 1983, p.63).
Teichert points out that the way public broadcasting is run
militates against sub-regionalisation, because its structure tends to
reinforce existing power structures, rather than opening up new
sources of dialogue. He states;
Geradezu gegenlaui'ig zu dieser Zielsetzung haben sich vornehmiich 
Horfunk und Fernsehen zu Anbietern von hochstandisierten, universal 
orientierten Informationen entwickelt, die die Uniiberschaubarkeit 
der sozialen Umwelt und die Distanz zu den machtvoilen 
Institutionen und Organisationen eher verfestigen (Teichert, 1979, 
p.185; see also Lerg, 1982, p.21).
According to Teichert, the tendency to hide conflict rather then reveal
it, can be explained by the degree of power which Land institutions
and political parties wield over public broadcasting's supervisory
bodies (1979, p.188). This leads to politicisation, because journalists
have to satisfy party political and state interests, rather than those
of the public (Teichert, 1979, p.189). The centralist and bureaucratic
tendencies of public administration are therefore reflected in the
media. The "Burgerferne der Verwaltung" is accompanied by a
"Publikumsferne der Medien", with neither satisfying the expectations
and needs of the individual, who is dependent on both, but powerless
to combat the deficiencies of each (Teichert, 1979, p.189, p.198).
However, in spite of the deficits of public broadcasting, Teichert 
does believe that the public stations have a central role in the 
provision of information for the region (Teichert, 1979, p.198; 
Teichert, 1981, p.121). He points out that public service broadcasting
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has the legal and material resources to discuss local and regional 
problems even against the opposition of organised groups (1979, 
p.198). In this way it can help publicise and thematicize conflicts, 
raising awareness, and giving the public a basis to organise their 
response (Teichert, 1979, p.198). As a result broadcasting comes 
closer to fulfilling its classical function as a forum and facxor in 
the formation of public opinion.
Janke paints to the practical dangers of sub-regionaiisation, which 
may occur if resources are invested at the expense of other public 
service output, and he criticises the false competition engendered by 
too much activity on the part of the public broadcasters in this field 
(1986, p.5). In his view, information provided by such services needs 
to be of good quality, but this is not automatic, and by splitting 
personnel, financial and production resources, central structures can 
be weakened (1986, p.5). He also points out that the time audiences 
spend using the media cannot be increased at will (1986, p.5). He 
argues that the public broadcasters would be better advised to 
concentrate their resources on existing output, rather than diverting 
audiences and resources to new areas. Janke also criticises the 
programme policy of sub-regionalisation, with its reliance on magazine 
formats, which lack originality, and doubts whether there is sufficient 
material of local interest to fill these opt-outs without eventual 
recourse to pop music (1986, pp.5-6).
However, there are advantages of such local provision. Local 
stations can serve as sources of information for the network as a
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whole, thus bringing important local concerns to the attention of a 
broader audience. Local and regional politics can be examined more 
closely, and public service broadcasting can use the opportunity 
further to define its identity as the "Sender unseres Landes" (see 
Janke, 1986, p.5-6; see also Teichert, 1979, p.196). Public
broadcasting's activity in this area can also help to extend access to 
non-organised groups, and help break the monopoly of the local press 
(Teichert, 1979, pp.196-197).
As can be seen, Vest German broadcasting is already highly 
regionalised, both sub-regionally and in the traditional area of 
federalism. However, although the ARD stations have devoted a 
considerable amount of energy and resources to regional concerns, they 
are, as with most of their expansionary policies, limited to how much 
they can do. The emergence of the new media and competition from 
private channels are a challenge, but the ARD stations' response is 
hindered if they are denied sufficient licence fee increases and if 
their applications for new frequencies are disputed in the interests 
of others (Arnold, Interview, 26.8.1987; see also Halefeldt, 1983, p.79). 
In addition to the financial and frequency restraints on sub­
regional isat ion, there are also restraints connected with content and 
the lack of sufficient material of interest to fill a sub-regional 
channel (Arnold, Interview, 26.8.1987).
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5.4 Review
The expansionary policies of ARD and ZDF are not only confined to 
satellite television, cable, and sub-regional radio. They also include 
deliberations about the introduction of breakfast television, the 
expansion of transmission time, and national distribution of the third 
television channels. The reasons for expansion are varied. In the 
case of satellite, expansion is clearly connected to the desire not to 
be left behind in new technological developments, which might render 
public broadcasting less competitive than private broadcasting. 
Although initiatives in satellite began before the introduction of 
private broadcasting, it was felt necessary to embark on this route in 
anticipation of private competition. Sub-regional broadcasting is 
somewhat different. Here, the initial impetus came from perceived 
deficits in local communication. However, more recently the impact of 
commercial radio has also played a role, but sub-regional radio 
remains substantially different in nature to its commercial 
counterparts. Cable, as shown by the experiments in Dortmund, is more 
difficult to gauge. Here, public service interest has been less 
evident, and high costs and low audiences have made the public service 
broadcaster wary of too much involvement.
Whether expansion actually helps the case for public service 
broadcasting is disputable. Expansion quickly leads to accusations of 
empire-building, and it may in the long term be detrimental to ARD and 
ZDF's core activities in television and radio if resources are 
stretched, and if their financial situation worsens because of
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inadequate licence fee increases or falling advertising revenue. 
Justification for expansion ultimately rests with ARD and ZDF's 
continued ability to offer something which is different from their 
commercial competitors, and something which fills gaps in existing 
programme provision. The cultural emphasis of Eins Plus and 3SAT, the 
concentration on sub-regional concerns in radio, and the local 
initiatives of the Dortmund cable pilot project, show that the public 
broadcasters are willing to provide programme content which is 
different. It now rests with the Lander to recognise this fact and to 




THE ACHILLES HEEL: THE FUNDING OF PUBLIC SERVICE
BROADCASTING IN VEST GERM AS Y
Broadcasting finance is not purely a matter of funding and 
economics. It is in fact closely entwined with the structures of 
broadcasting, because different types of funding affect the extent of 
broadcasting's independence, programme content, future development, and 
society's expectations of broadcasting. The methods chosen to fund 
broadcasting organisations are also a reflection of social structures 
and the priorities which societies set themselves, and in this sense 
funding is an essentially political issue. Bearing this in mind, 1 
have concentrated on the nature of broadcasting finance rather than 
than on the economics of broadcasting. In particular, I have 
concentrated on the significance of funding structures for ARD and ZDF 
in a dual system of private and public service broadcasting.
The structural significance of funding for broadcasting in West 
Germany constitutes an essential component of the concept of 
Grundversorgung by public service broadcasting as first defined in the 
Constitutional Court's fourth broadcasting judgement in November 1986 
(.Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 4. November 1986 <Viertes 
Fernsehurteil), in FKD 7.11.1986, pp.1-42). The Court ruled that if 
public service broadcasting was to be in a position to carry out 
Grundversorgung, and so contribute to the formation of public opinion, 
its funding had to be guaranteed in law (p.20; see also A. Schmitz,
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1986, p.457). It concluded that the system of public service 
broadcasting and licence-fee funding was legitimated by the fulfilment 
of this classical function, which public broadcasters are capable of 
satisfying, because they are not so dependent on advertising revenue 
as private broadcasters (pp.19-20). The latter are forced to rely on 
popular, less balanced programming to attract large audiences (pp. 18- 
20). The Court's recognition of the economic prerogatives of private 
broadcasting resulted in the stipulation of less stringent
requirements for private broadcasting channels in respect of breadth 
of programming (p.20).
In its fifth judgement in March 1987, the Court did not specify any 
particular method of funding for public service broadcasting, 
(although it ruled that a ban on advertising for local broadcasting 
and a ban on pay-TV was constitutional in the economic interests of 
private broadcasting), but it pointed out that even if ARD and ZDF 
undertook services which were not part of Grundversorgung, the Lander- 
still had to ensure that adequate funding was secured to enable the 
public stations to compete with private broadcasting in the process of 
opinion formation iBeschluB des Ersten Senats des Bundesverfassungs- 
gerichts iiber die Verfassungsbeschwerden des SDR und des SVF gegen 
das Landesmediengesetz Baden-Viirttemberg von 24, Marz 1987, in FKD
12.6.1987, pp.1-40, p.23, p.28; see also Steimer, 1985, p,14). In doing 
this, the Court reaffirmed the principle that constitutional demands 
connected with broadcasting's contribution to political culture have 
priority over commercial considerations (p.25; see also Lange, 1985, 
p.185, p.188).
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In constitutional terms, the funding of ARD and ZDF is secure and
linked to their continued adherence to the public service tradition.
However, ARD and ZDF wish to develop their activities still further, as
shown by their attempts to reform existing TV output and introduce
new services, not only as a natural evolution of their activities, but
also in response to private competition (see Chapters 4 & 5). The
funding of new activities, even if they are not part of
Grundversorgung, has also been guaranteed by the Constitutional Court.
However, the extent to which ARD and ZDF can evolve and extend their
activities depends ultimately on political recognition of their
financial requirements, requirements which are notoriously difficult to
assess either in quantitative or qualitative terms. Andreas Schardt,
Justiziar at SAT 1 sees political opposition as the main barrier to
further expansion by the public service broadcasters and he told me::
Ich warte wirklich auf den Tag, wo wir die erste Alimentationsklage 
eines offentlich-rechtlichen Senders vor uns haben, der dann nur 
darzulegen braucht, daB sein zustandiges Aufsichtsgremium der 
Installation eines neues, was weifi ich, Satelliten-Horfunkprogramms 
oder einer neuen lokalen, regionalen Sendekette zugestimmt hat.
(Interview, 5.8.1987)
Political involvement in the funding procedures of public
broadcasting is already showing increased signs of politicisation, 
because the CDU/CSU is keen to promote the interests of private
broadcasting. This party-political threat to funding comes in 
addition to the threefold commercial threat to ARD and ZDF of lower 
audiences, less advertising revenue, and less public acceptance of the 
licence fee because of the introduction of "free", advertising-
supported, commercial broadcasting stations.
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It will be shown that the problems which afflict ARD and ZDF in 
financial matters have not been alleviated either by Constitutional 
Court decisions or by the inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation 
of broadcasting. Existing problems are too deeply rooted, and would 
require an almost total rethink of the existing model of broadcasting 
finance to offer any long-term solution. In this sense, the method of 
funding public service broadcasting in Vest Germany, as in many other 
European countries, continues to be its Achilles heel.
6.1 Methods of broadcasting finance
Broadcasting, in common with other service institutions, does not
normally finance itself directly by marketing its products and
services. It is usually funded by specially devised methods, all of
which have some disadvantages (see Smith, 1972, p.43; Riihl, 1984,
p.589; Schmitz, 1986, p.457). According to Anthony Smith:
Television is financed, not paid for. Each method of finance 
carries with it certain risks - moral, practical, fiscal, political 
some of which are worth taking in some societies, but not in 
others. It all depends on the nature and state and stability of 
the society concerned. So method of funding is sacred, let alone 
good - all are worse, (1972, p.43)
State subsidies have to be discounted in the case of Vest Germany, 
because the Basic Law demands that broadcasting be independent of the 
state (see Riihl, 1984, p.589; Rombach, 1985, p.54; Steimer, 1985, p. 15; 
Schmitz, 1986, p.457). In spite of the lack of similar constitutional 
barriers, successive British governments have rejected government
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grants-in-aid for similar reasons relating to broaccasting's 
independence (see Smith, 1972, p.42).
The licence fee, a form of tax levied on owners of television and 
radio receivers, is the traditional form of funding public service 
broadcasting. It may constitute the sole source of finance (as is the 
case with the BBC), but more usually it is combined with a secondary 
source of income, advertising revenues from the sale of airtime to 
advertisers for the promotion of goods and services. This is the case 
in Vest Germany.
More recently, attention has been been focused on more direct ways 
of funding broadcasting, in the form of pay or subscription 
television. According to this method, the viewer/consumer pays 
directly for the channel or programme he/she intends to view. This is 
one of the alternatives being considered in Britain for the funding of 
the BBC, and already forms the financial basis of several new private 
programme initiatives, usually feature-film channels like Sky Movies 
in the United Kingdom, and Teleclub in Vest Germany. Another option 
involves the funding of broadcasting by sponsorship from individuals, 
commercial enterprises, and institutions, but this is usually only a 
supplementary form of funding (see Tempest, 1986, p.148). The sale of 
TV programmes, publishing activities, and merchandising (the sale of 
records, clothes, etc.) are normally peripheral activities.
Unlike Britain, which until recently has stuck to the principle of 
separate sources of finance for broadcasting channels in order to
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enhance competition of content rather than competition for revenue, 
(see Smith, 1972, p.44), both ARD and ZDF are funded by a mixture of 
licence fee revenue and advertising income. In 1987, the ARD stations 
had a total income of close to DM5.lbn. About 70% of this came from 
licence fee revenues, and 18% from advertising. A further 12% was 
earned from other sources, including programme sales and co-proauction 
finance (ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, p.127, p.308). At ZDF, total income came 
close to DM1.6bn in 1987. About 55% of this came from the licence 
fee, and 39% from advertising, with - 6% from other sources (ZDF 
Jahrbuch, 1988, p.205).
Competition for revenue is generally seen as bad for programming 
diversity, because broadcasters tend to screen the same type of 
programmes at the same times in order to maximise audiences and so 
justify support from their financiers (see Broadcasting Research Unit, 
1985, p.15). When ARD and ZDF were the only broadcasters in Vest 
Germany, this problem was partly alleviated by coordinating their 
programme schedules in order to enhance pluralism of content (see 
ARD/ZDF-Programmschema> ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, pp .386-7). Mow that 
advertising-funded private broadcasting has been introduced, programme 
diversity is under threat, because private broadcasters are likely to 
schedule competitively, and ARD and ZDF, in spite of obligations 
concerning balanced output, are clearly embarking on a more populist 
course of action against both private broadcasters and against each 
other (see Chapter 4).
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6.2 The licence fee
In Vest Germany, the licence fee is divided into a basic fee which 
goes entirely to the ARD stations, and a television supplement. Thirty 
per cent of the television supplement is awarded to ZDF. There is no 
extra charge for colour television, and the basic fee must still be 
paid even if a television only is owned. The fee bears no 
relationship to the amount of programmes viewed or heard, ana neither 
fee is used specifically for TV or radio (see Ruh'i, 1984, pp.692-593; 
Schmitz, 1986, p.458). The fee is in fact contributory in nature and
meant as a device for funding the institution of broadcasting as a 
whole, rather than as a payment for specific services, in this case 
programmes (see Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 27,7.1971, in 
MP 7-8, 1971, p.220). This view is supported by the way one uniform 
licence fee is used to cross-subsidize ZDF, the smaller ARD stations, 
and the supply of broadcasting to less heavily populated areas which 
could not afford broadcasting services on their licence fee payments 
alone (see Ruhl, 1984, p.593).
Since January 1988, the monthly licence fee has stood at DM5.16 for 
the basic fee and DM11.44 for the TV supplement. This last increase 
occurred as a result of the inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation 
of broadcasting in March 1987, which awarded 2% of both licence fees 
to fund private broadcasting's independent supervisory bodies, access 
channels, and the extension of terrestrial frequencies for the 
reception of private broadcasting (.Staatsvertrag zur Neuordnung des
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Rundfunkwesenst in KuR 25.4.1987, p.20). A further increase was due to 
be announced in January 1989.
ARD and ZDF are jointly responsible for the collection of the 
licence fee, and this is undertaken through a licence fee collection 
centre, the Gebilbreneinzugszentrale (GEZ), based in Cologne (see 
Satzung der Rundfunkanstalten iiber das Verfahren zur Leistung von 
Rundfunkgebilbren zum 1.1,1976, ARD Jahrbuch, 1976, pp.278-9). Prior to 
1976, collection was undertaken by the Bundespost, but this proved 
unsatisfactory, and in an effort to increase efficiency and cut costs, 
the stations decided to undertake collection themselves (see Vagner, 
1974, p.303; Lehmann, 1977, p.73; Bausch, 1980, pp.680-682).
Fig. 6.1
LICESCE FEE INCREASES SI BCE 1970
Duration Basic fee DM TV Sup]
1924-69 2. 00 5. 00
1970-73 2.50 6. 00
1974-78 3.00 7.50
1979-July 83 3.80 9.20
1.7.1983. 5.05 11.20
1.1.1988 5.16 11.44
The level of the licence fee is set down in inter-
ratified by the Lander parliaments. The last proper increase, apart 
from the 2% increase brought about by the inter-Land agreement on the 
reorganisation of broadcasting in 1987, occurred in 1983 (Staats-
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vertrag der Lander Liber die Hohe der Rundfunkgebiihren und zur 
jinderung des Staatsvertrags Liber einen Finanzausgleich zwischen den 
Rundfunkanstalten, 6.7.1982 and 26.10.1982, ARD Jahrbuch, 1983, pp.399- 
400). The conditions of payment and a definition of broadcasting 
removing any ambiguity over what is being paid, are set down in a 
further inter-Land agreement which was signed in 1974 {Staatsvertrag 
der Lander Liber die Regelung des Rundfunkgebiihrenwesens, 5.12.1974, 
ARD Jahrbuch, 1975, pp.340pp>. The first ever licence fee increase 
occurred in 1970 C Staatsvertrag der Lander Uber die Hohe der 
Rundfunkgebiihr, in ARD Jahrbuch, 1970, p.302). Prior to this, the 
basic fee had been held at DM2 since 1924, but there have since been 
six increases (see Figure 6.1).
The reason why it took so long to achieve the first licence fee 
increase was partly due to the unpopularity of such a measure, and 
partly due to uncertainty about the Lander's legal right to raise the 
licence fee (see Williams, 1976, p.53; Bausch, 1980, p.662). This 
uncertainty arose, because the Bundespost continued to interpret the 
licence fee as an administrative fee paid for the right to own and run 
a broadcasting receiver according to a law passed in 1928, the 
Femmeldeanlagengesetz (see Scharf, 1969, p.51; Riihl, 1984, p.591), in 
spite of the Constitutional Court's 1961 ruling about Lander 
responsibility for broadcasting. However, by 1970 it was clear that a 
rise had become necessary because of increased expenditure on 
technology, and the introduction of new or extended broadcasting 
services (see Maier, 1971, p.22). Legal clarity on this issue had been 
reached on 15th March 1968, when the Federal Administrative Court
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ruled that the Lander were responsible for fixing the licence fee 
(.Urteil des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts vom 15.3,1968, in ARD Jahrbuch, 
1969, pp.319-21; see also Bausch, 1980, pp.671-672). The Court ruled 
that the licence fee was not a payment for the right to own a 
receiving set, but a fee paid to the broadcasting stations for whose 
sole use it is intended (see also Ibsen, 1958, p.79; Steimer, 1985, 
p.26)). Strengthened by this decision, the Lander ratified the first 
agreement regulating the mechanism by which the licence fee was to be 
raised in October 1968 (Staatsvertrag der Lander ilber die Regelung des 
Rundfunkgebilhrenwesens vom 31.10.1968, ARD Jahrbuch, 1970, pp.299- 
301).
The legal status of the licence fee was further clarified in the 
Constitutional Court's 1971 judgement iUrteil des Bundesverfassungs- 
gerichts vom 27.7.1971 - Mehrwertsteuerurteil, in M.P 7-8/1971, pp.207- 
235). The Court ruled that broadcasting was part of the public 
sphere, and that the broadcasting stations undertook an integrative 
function for the state as a whole by contributing to the process of 
opinion formation (p.207). As such, their activities were not 
commercial, but social, and by extension the licence fee was not a 
price paid for programmes, but a means of funding the institution of 
broadcasting (p.207, p.220).
For many years, licence fee revenue grew as more households 
acquired television sets and radios. However, levels of set ownership 
have now reached saturation level, and as a result more frequent 
increases have become necessary (see Maier, 1986, p.37). Slower
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growth in the licence fee has been accompanied by ever increasing 
costs brought about by the tendency of ARD and ZDF to extend their 
operations in terms of technology, personnel, new channels, and 
transmission time (see Maier, 1971, p.25; Flottau, 1978, p.74; Maier, 
1986, pp.35-42). Hans Bausch, SDR Intendant, told me:
Programm entsteht nur in dem MaBe indem Geld da ist. . .Die groBten
Kosten entstehen sicherlich fur die Fernsehinfrastruktur, fur
Leitungen und Satelliten. . .das kostet ein Heidengeld. (29.7.1987)
Personnel costs alone accounted for about 40% of ARD's total 
expenditure of DM5.6bn in 1987, and 25% of ZDF's total expenditure of 
DM1.5bn (ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, p.282; ZDF, 1988, p.34). ZDF has lower 
personnel costs because it is centralised (as opposed to ARD's federal 
structure), concentrates on TV only, and because it commissions a 
greater proportion of its programming from independent producers. In 
addition to the increasing costs of in-house production, the costs of 
acquired programmes, in particular feature films, and of sports rights 
have also risen, fuelled by the appearance of private television 
channels (see Maier, 1986, p.51; Chapter 4).
The purchasing power of the licence fee is reduced not only by 
saturation in television and radio ownership, expansion in 
broadcasting, and broadcasting inflation (necessitating more frequent 
licence fee increases). It is also diminished by certain obligations 
imposed on ARD and ZDF in return for public support from the licence 
fee. Ruhl believes that these conditions have turned the licence fee 
into a "ein wohlfahrtstaatlicher Preis" (1984, p.590; Funfgeld, 1985, 
p.83). Some of these conditions are compatible with the obligations 
of public service broadcasting, and aim to enhance social equality ana
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the integrational function of broadcasting. They induce the provision 
of regional programmes, minority output, a broad range of programming 
across different genres, and universal geographic coverage (see Maier, 
1986, p.32). However, minority and cultural programming, news, ana 
sport are expensive because they have to be produced in-house and 
cannot easily be bought "off-the-shelf" (see Haselmayr, 1982, p.26; 
Funfgeld, 1985, p.87). Geographic universality has cost implications 
too, because transmitters have to be erected in outlying areas which 
are not always economically viable in terms of the number of 
households reached (see Broadcasting Research Unit, 1985, p.l; Maier, 
1986, p.32). Yet, eventhough these obligations incur more expense for 
the broadcasters, they are accepted as part of the public service 
tradition. Other obligations derived from licence fee funding, such as 
funding licence fee exemptions and experimental cable pilot projects 
(described later in this section), are more controversial.
The regional presence of the ARD stations also has cost 
implications, as it is far more expensive to maintain nine stations 
than a centralised organisation like ZDF (see Maier, 1986, p.38). To 
counter this disadvantage the ARD stations cooperate in the provision 
of the national television network, Erstes Deutsches Fernsehen. 
Cooperation also takes the form of a financial subsidy from the larger 
stations to the three smallest stations (SFB, RB, and SR), which are 
unable to support themselves from licence fee revenues and advertising 
alone. Financial equalisation is regulated by an agreement between 
the ARD stations (ARD-Vereinbarung Finanzausgleich vom 29. November- 
1983, in ARD Jahrbuch, 1984, pp.386-7), but it has been made legally
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binding by an inter-Land agreement (.Staatsvertrag der Lander Liber 
einen Finanzausgleich zwischen den Rundfunkanstalten, 20.9.1973, in ARD 
Jahrbuch, 1974, pp.317-318; Anderung des Staatsvertrags uber einen 
Finanzausgleich zwischen den Rundfunkanstalten, in ARD Jahrbuch, 1983, 
pp.399-400). Although equalisation is a burden in financial terms it 
has undoubtedly contributed to the regional and cultural diversity of 
West German broadcasting, and helped to maintain the principle of a 
uniform licence fee throughout the country (see Bausch, 1980, pp.?lbpp; 
Seidel, 1985, p.432). Under the present ARD equalisation agreement the 
three smallest stations receive DM148,5m. A contribution of DM52.1m 
is also made to the external services radio network, Deutschlandfunk 
(DLF) (Staatsvertrag Uber die Hohe der RundfunkgebUhr vom 
6.Juli/26.0ktober 1982, in ARD Jahrbuch, 1983, p.399).
In addition to the official form of equalisation, there is also an 
indirect form of cross-subsidisation because the larger stations 
shoulder a greater proportion of television output both in terms of 
amount and value (see Seidel, 1985, p.435). For example, WDR
contributes not only 25% of the output of the national TV network, but 
also 35% of direct programming costs (see Seidel, 1985, p.433; 
Verwaltungsvereinbarung der Landesrundfunkanstalten uber die 
Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet des Fernsehens {Fernseh vert rag) vom 27. 
Harz 1953, in der Fassung vom 2.Juli 1964, in Ring, 1980, C-V, p. 2). 
The larger ARD stations also take on programme responsibilities for 
the whole ARD network; WDR is responsible for network sports 
coverage, and network news production is based at NDR.
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The organisational features detailed above seem compatible with ARD 
and ZDF's status as public service broadcasters, and the price for 
their maintenance by licence-fee funding. However, other limitations 
on the way the licence fee is used appear to be purely a means of
burdening public service stations with obligations which should 
ideally rest with the state or other agencies.
Licence-fee exemptions on social grounds for the disabled and those
on low incomes are a major and growing drain on ARD and ZDF's
resources, because the costs of exemption are borne entirely by ARD
and ZDF (see Verordnung uber die Gebiihrenbefreiung vom 5.5.1980, in
ARD Jahrbuch, 1981; see also Scharf, 1970, p.298; Wittig-Terhardt, 1976,
p.277; Maier, 1971, p.23). Such exemptions are compatible with the
social and political role of broadcasting, which deems that all should
have adequate access to an important source of information and
education, but some commentators believe that the costs of exemption
should rest with the state rather than with the broadcasting stations,
and indirectly with other licence-fee payers (see Riihi, 1984, pp.599-
600; Maier, 1986, p.45). This also the view held by Hans Bausch, SDR
Intendant, but he doubts whether the situation will change because of
party-political opposition, He told me:
Das ist natiirlich eine MaBnahme der Sozialpolitik. Ware es ganz 
korrekt, miiBten Gebuhreneinahmen, die der Rundfunk dadurch veriiert, 
vom Staat ersetzt werden. . .Sie (the politicians) sagen "Machen wir 
nicht, weil wir keine Mehrheit im Par lament dafur kriegen". 
(Interview, 29.7.1987)
Since 1970 the number of exemptions for basic licence-fee holders 
and TV supplement holders has risen from 2.3% and 0.5% to 8.2% and
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7.5% respectively (Maier, 1971, p.23; ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, p.306). In 
1987, ARD lost DM129.6m in basic licence revenue and DM162.5m 3:ram 
the television supplement. ZDF lost DM69,7m in 1987, bringing a total 
loss of DM361.8m from total ARD/ZDF licence fee income of DM4.4bn.
An even more controversial use of the licence fee was the Lander 
decision in 1979 to use it to subsidise four experimental cable pilot 
projects (see BeschluB der Ministerprasidenten der Lander betr. 
Gemeinschaftliche Finanzierung der Filotprojekte "Kabelfernsehen" durch 
die Lander, in Bauer, Detjen, Muller-Romer, 18.1.2). This decision was 
widely seen as a way of subsidising the introduction of private 
broadcasting, because it was decided to add DM0.20 to each licence fee 
to fund the technical and investment costs of the experiments. Each 
project was awarded DM35m over three years (Staatsvertrag zur 
Anderung des Staatsvertrags uber einen Finanzausgleich zwischen den 
Rundfunkanstalten vom 6.Juli/26.0ktober 1982,in ARD Jahrbuch, pp.399- 
400). Doubts about the legality of the subsidy have been rebutted by 
the courts. The Berlin Administrative Court rejected a case brought 
by 11 Berliners who had argued that they should not be forced to pay 
the subsidy because they did not use cable. The Court ruled that the 
cable pilot project subsidy was not an additional fee, but a sum for 
experiments which benefited all licence-fee payers in the long term 
(see Erneut Klage abgelehnt gegen nKabelgroschenn, FR 3.11.1986, p.18; 
Der Kabelgroschen muB vorerst bezahlt werden, FR 10.7.1987, p.l).
Once the pilot projects were concluded, the Lander prime ministers 
decided to continue the idea of diverting some of the licence fee to
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other broadcasting initiatives. As mentioned previously, the inter­
land agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting demands that 2% 
of the licence fee be used to fund private broadcasting's regional 
supervisory authorities, access channels, and improvements to 
terrestrial reception for private broadcasting channels <Staatsvertrag 
zur Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesens, in KuR 24.4.1987, p.26). Although 
the licence fee will not be used to subsidise private television and 
radio directly, the decision to use it to improve the terrestrial 
reception of private broadcasting constitutes an indirect subsidy, 
because it will give private broadcasters a greater potential audience, 
so making them more attractive to advertisers. This use of the 
licence fee is regarded by some as a "Zweckentfremdung" or abuse of 
the licence fee's status as a means of funding the institution of 
public service broadcasting (see Berg, 1985, p.10; see also Schmidt, 
1986, pp.162-172). It would also appear to conflict with the idea 
that private broadcasting should be financially self-sufficient and 
not rely on state funding.
It is therefore clear that on the whole the licence fee is a 
privileged source of funding awarded to public service broadcasting in 
return for the fulfilment of its constitutional obligations. Funding 
by the licence fee brings with it certain limitations which affect 
expenditure. Some of these are commensurate with the idea of public 
service (for example pluralistic programming, universality, and the 
maintenance of federalism), and some are less justifiable (primarily 
the use of the licence fee to improve the terrestrial reach of private 
broadcasting).
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6.2.1 The politicisation of the licence fee
The licence fee was a central issue in the debate about the extent 
of a guarantee of existence and further development for public service 
broadcasting in negotiations for an inter-.Land agreement on the 
reorganisation of broadcasting. It was important for ABD and ZDF to 
clarify the issue of funding, because their ability to compete with 
commercial broadcasters and institute reforms and expansion depends 
on sufficient funding. During the course of these negotiations, it was 
obvious that the politics of broadcasting finance are more important 
in determining the future of AHD and ZDF than the actual economics of 
broadcasting finance.
The inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting 
reaffirmed the licence fee as the main source of income for ARD and 
ZDF (.Staatsvertrag zur Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesenst in KuR
24.4.1987, pp.18-26), It stated that the procedure for setting the 
licence fee should proceed with a high degree of objectivity, taking 
into account existing and new channels, participation in the new 
media, inflation, and developments in advertising (p.20).
In practice, the procedure for determining licence-fee increases, 
involving parliaments and Land government representatives, is more 
complex, and continues to be characterised by a high degree of 
politicisation. The Land parliaments and governments have no direct 
control over how the licence fee is spent by the broadcasters. 
However, when the broadcasters ask for a licence fee increase, tney
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become more politically vulnerable and less anxious to offend their 
political paymasters. As Hans Bausch, SDR Intendant, rightly points 
out: "Die Unabhangigkeit der Rundfunkanstalten endet ietztiich genau
an dem Punkt, an dem es urn die materielle Existenz geht" (Bausch, 
1983, p.228). This recognition of public service broadcasting's
dependence on the state in respect of the licence fee is not confined 
to West German experience alone, as experience of BBC funding in the 
United Kingdom shows (see Hood, 1972, pp.410-411; Smith, 1972, p.42).
Eventhough the licence fee renders public broadcasters more 
politically vulnerable and anxious not to annoy politicians when they 
need a licence fee increase, the licence fee has traditionally been 
viewed as a pillar in the maintenance of public service broadcasting’s 
editorial and institutional independence of the state and governments, 
as well as of party-political and commercial interests (see Scharf, 
1969, p.50; Seidel, 1985, pp.429-30). The level of the fee is fixed by 
the Lander, but the broadcasters are free to spend licence-fee income 
as they see fit, subject to the obligations imposed on them by the 
public service tradition (see Seidel, 1985, p.430). Autonomy over 
expenditure also constitutes the cornerstone of public service 
broadcasting's independence, because it allows broadcasters to pursue 
a policy of diverse programming in the interests of all, including 
minorities, rather than just pursuing mass audiences with mass-appeal 
programming to satisfy commercial interests (see Lange, '1985, p. 185; 
Seidel, 1985, p.430; Maier, 1986, p.32). Programming, not profit, is 
the central tenet of public service broadcasting, and this is bolstered 
by licence-fee funding.
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The argument about the link between diverse programming and 
licence-fee funding loses some of its force once competitive 
commercial broadcasting is introduced. For example, the BBC was
forced to adopt a more populist, conformist profile in the 1960s 
because of competition from ITV (see Hood, 1972, p.411>. This pursuit 
of ratings came about because the BBC felt that it had to maintain a 
significant share of the audience, in order to convince the Government 
that licence fee funding was justified (see Hood, 1972, p.411). In 
Vest Germany, the battle for audiences with commercial stations has 
only just begun. Yet there are already signs that ABD and ZDF are 
adopting a more populist programming philosophy in order to maintain 
audience share and so convince their political paymasters of the 
legitimacy of licence-fee funding and the need to increase it at 
regular intervals (see Chapter 5). However, the most worrying aspect 
of licence fee funding is the way it is set and the political
infringements which the procedure encourages. These infringements are 
difficult to reconcile with the institutional and editorial autonomy
claimed by public service broadcasting.
In Vest Germany, the procedure for determining the level of the 
licence fee is highly politicised and complex, because it involves 
discussions by all the Land prime ministers, followed by the unanimous 
consent of eleven Land parliaments with different parliamentary 
majorities (see Scharf, 1969, p.51; Schmitz, 1986, p.461>. Neither ABD 
nor ZDF play any direct role in setting the level of the licence fee. 
They submit their financial requirements, and these are examined by
the Land chancellories, who are advised by an independent specialist
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standing commission, the KEF (Kommission zur Ermittlung des 
Finanzbedarf der Rundfunkanstalten). Once the Lander prime ministers 
have negotiated the timing and level of the licence-fee increase, and 
the issue of subsidies for the smaller ARD stations has been settled 
with ARD, the resulting inter-Land agreement is sent to the Land 
parliaments for ratification. Only then does the new licence-fee 
agreement come into force (see Bausch, 1980, p.663; Schmitz, 1986, 
p.459pp). In theory the Land parliaments are supposed to make the 
final decision, but in practice it is reached behind closed doors by 
the prime ministers and their advisors (see Bausch, 1980, p.664; 
Biihringer, 1985, p.l; Rombach, 1985, p.62). On a practical level, the 
present procedure is time-consuming, and involves too many different 
actors. The 1982 licence-fee agreement alone took 20 months to 
negotiate, adding to ARD and ZDF's financial insecurity (see Seidel 
1985, p.431; Biihringer, 1985).
The need for unanimity amongst the Land parliaments heightens the 
fragility of the procedure. Until now a compromise solution has 
always been found, but a rejection of the licence-fee agreement by just 
one parliament could throw the whole process into turmoil and 
endanger the principle of a uniform licence fee with implications for 
the equalisation agreement, the funding of ZDF, and indeed for ARD 
itself (see Bausch 1980, pp.663-664; Biihringer, 1985, p.3; Hilf, 1985, 
p.35; Schardt, Interview, 11.8.1987). The threat of a split licence fee 
has already been used as a political weapon against ARD and ZDF. The 
CDU/CSU Lander used it in December 1986 as a way of pressurising the 
SPD Lander into signing the inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation
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of broadcasting (Gebiihrenstaats vert rag: Kiindigungsplan cler Unions- 
lander - Ergebnis-protokoll einer Besprechung der Staats- und Senats- 
kanzleichefs, KuE 10.12.1986t p.19). The SPD Lander countered by 
announcing their intention of concluding separate licence-fee and 
equalisation agreements if the CDU/CSU carried out their threat (.A- 
Lander: separater Finanzausgleich gegen Drohung mit "Gebiihrenkniippel",
KuR 13.12.1986, p.8; see also Chapter 3).
The level of the licence fee is decided according to political 
rather than objective criteria, which are themselves not adequately 
defined (see Biihringer, 1985, p.2; Seidel, 1985, p.431; Schmitz, 1986, 
pp.461-462). The licence fee, according to Hans Bausch, is "der 
schwachste Punkt" and always requires political and economic 
concessions. The need for compromise amongst the Lander reinforces 
demands for conditions attached to licence-fee awards which infringe 
ARD and ZDF's institutional autonomy, and are not always directly 
related to the funding of broadcasting (see Synopse zur Diskussion um 
die EundfunkgebUhren und den Finanzausgleich der Eund-funkanstalten in 
den Landtagent MP 11/1983, pp.794-801; Biihringer, 1985, p.3; Schmitz, 
1986, p.461). Conditions attached to licence fee awards in the past 
have included improvements to regional and educational broadcasting, 
and cooperation in the provision of the third television channels (see 
Maier, 1971, pp.23-24; Bausch, 1980, p.698; Riihl, 1984, pp.598pp).
Perhaps more serious than the conditions attached to licence-fee 
increases are the accusations of attempts by governments to force 
good behaviour from the broadcasters on the occasion of a licence-fee
increase (see Seidel, 1985, p.430). Bernd-Peter Arnold, head of radio
sub-regionalisation and Chefredakteur at HP, told me:
Ein Rundfunksystem ist urn so unabhangiger, je gesicherter seine 
Finanzierung ist. . .man muB aber sehen - das sage ich jetzt mal 
ganz kritisch und aus Erfahrung - daB die Rundfunkgebiihr in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland ein politischer Preis geworden isz. Das 
war sie friiher nicht. Das ist sie geworden. Jede Gebiihrenerhbhung 
in den zuriickliegenden Jahren, und es gab nur sehr wenige, war 
immer begleitet von harten politischen Auseinandersetzungen, und. 
die nachste Gebiihrenerhbhung wird es wieder sein. Ich sage mai 
etwas salopp, daB Politiker immer wieder versucht haben, sich das 
Vohlverhaiten des Rundfunks zu erkaufen, in dem sie Druck uber die 
Gebuhren gemacht haben. (Interview, 28.8.1987)
This view is repeated by Martin Neuffer, a former Intendant of ftDR:
In vielen Programmuberlegungen innerhalb der Anstalten fiieBt heute 
durchaus schon die Uebenerwagung ein, ob es sich denn "iohnt", die 
zu verargern, die iiber die Einnahmen des Rundfunks letziich 
entscheiden. (cit. in Fischer, 1979, p.83; see also Hoffmann, 197b, 
p.39)
If the substance of these allegations is correct, there are serious 
implications for public service broadcasting's independence because in 
its role as a “Medium" and "Faktor" in the process of opinion 
formation, it has to be in a position to report critically about its 
political paymasters (see Bausch, 1980, p.744).
The problems associated with the state's proximity to the licence- 
fee procedure have always existed (see Bausch, 1980, pp.684pp).
Although the editorial and institutional independence of broadcasting 
is guaranteed in the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court has never 
ruled about the constitutionality of the state's involvement in 
determining the level of the licence fee, with the exception of a 
dissenting vote in the Constitutional Court ruling of 1971 UJrteil des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 27. Juli 1971, in MP 7-8/1971, pp.207- 
236). Three judges justified Lander involvement on the grounds that
ARD and ZDF have a monopoly which renders it against the public 
interest for them to determine their own licence-fee increases (p.231). 
They argued that L&nder- involvement was compatible with 
broadcasting’s independence from the state, provided that no influence 
was exerted over programming, and provided that sufficient licence-fee 
income was awarded to enable ARD and ZDF to carry out their 
constitutional obligations (p.231; see also Rombach, 1985, p,54).
The politicisation of the licence-fee procedure is unlikely to
decrease with the emergence of private broadcasting, because the
disappearance of the public service monopoly reduces the force of ARD
and ZDF's appeals for licence-fee increases. The contradiction between
ARD and ZDF’s constitutionally guaranteed autonomy in day-to-day
running, and the state's role in determining the main source of their
income is summed up by Hans Bausch, when he writes:
Die Unabhangigkeit des Rundfunks vom Staat ist in dem MaBe 
Fiktion, in dem die Politiker nach pragmatischen und politischen 
MaBstaben die Hohe der Rundfunkgebiihr festsetzen und sie damit als 
eine "politische Gebiihr" bewerten (1980, p.760). . .An diesem Punkt 
findet die Unabhangigkeit des Rundfunks vom Staat ihre 
unuberwindbare Grenze. (1980, p.761)
6.2.2 The Role of the KEF
To reduce politicisation of the licence-fee procedure and to aid 
them in their deliberations about the licence fee, the Lander prime 
ministers set up a standing commission, the KEF, (Kommission zur 
Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs der Rundfunkanstalten) in February 1985 
(see Bausch, 1977, p.291; Haselmayr, 1982a, p.446; Rombach, 1985, pp.58-
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59). The KEF investigates the economic efficiency ana funding 
requirements of the ARD stations and ZDF, and puts forward proposals 
to the prime ministers on the timing and amount of the nexx licence 
fee increase (see Hymmen, 1986, p.5). The KEF reports every two 
years, and since 1975 there have been six reports (1977, 1979, 1981, 
1983, 1985, 1987). The twelve-member commission consists of four
representatives from the Lander chancellories, four from tne Lander 
auditing offices and four individuals versed in economics, management 
and the law (see Rombach, 1985, p.55).
Although the committee's reports have attracted a lot of attention, 
the Lander prime ministers have never followed its recommendations on 
the level of licence-fee increase. The Lander have always awarded 
higher increases than those recommended by the KEF, except after the 
first report in 1977, when they awarded the same amount of increase, 
but differed in the proportions given to the basic fee and the 
television supplement (see Zitate aus dew KEF-Berichtt ARD Jahrbuch, 
1977, p.293). For example, in 1983 the KEF recommended a DM2.25 rise 
from January 1984, but the Lander instead approved a DM3.25 rise from 
July 1983 to take account of the cable pilot projects, efforts to 
improve terrestrial reception, and innovations in programming and 
technology (see Rede vom Ministerprasident Holger Borner zum Thema 
Staatsvertrag iiber die Hbhe der Rundfunkgebiihr, MP 5/1983, pp.353- 
355).
The KEF's most lasting influence has been in highlighting the way 
ARD and ZDF run their financial affairs. Areas singled out for
- 423 -
regular criticism include overmanning, pensions, excessive wages, the 
lack of uniformity in wage scales, production costs, and budgeting by 
individual stations (see Zitate aus dem KEF Bericht, ARD Jahrbuch, 
1977, pp,292-294; Zitate aus dem KEF-Bericht, ARD Jahrbuch, 1980, 
p.317-321; FUnfter Bericht der Kommission zur Ermitting des 
Finanzbedarfs der Rundfunkanstalten - Auszug: IVesentliche Ergebnisse, 
in MP 1/1986, p.32; see also Rombach, 1985, pp.58-59). In contrast to 
the losses calculated by ARD and ZDF, the KEF has regularly forecast 
financial surpluses, so bolstering its arguments against further 
licence fee increases in favour of lower increases than ARD and ZDF 
have been demanding (see Stellungnahme der Landesrundfunkanstalten 
vom 1.8.1977 zum Ersten Bericht der KEF vom 23.6.1977, ARD Jahrbuch, 
1977, p.294).
Responding to the KEF's finding, ARD in particular has accused the 
commission of treating it like one organisation, so ignoring 
differences between the stations of size, location, income, and 
programming obligations, which together determine expenditure (see 
Stellungnahme der Landesrundfunkanstalten vom 1.8.1977 zum Ersten 
Bericht der KEF vom 23.6.1977, ARD Jahrbuch, 1977, p.295; Stellungnahme 
der Landesrundfunkanstalten vom 30.1.1980, ARD Jahrbuch, 1980, pp.320- 
321; Stellungnahme der ARD-Vorsitzenden zum Fiinften Bericht der 
Kommission zur Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs der Rundfunkanstalten, MP 
1/1986, pp,33-35). The KEF has also been accused of failing to take 
sufficiently into account wage and pension agreements agreed with the 
trade unions, and also broadcasting inflation (see Stellungnahme der 
Landesrundfunkanstalten vom 30.1.1980, ARD Jahrbuch, 1979, pp.320-321;
Erklarungen der Landesrundfunkanstalten zum Dritten Bericht des KEFs, 
in MP 12/1981, pp.872-881).
In highlighting these areas of financial concern, the KHF walks a 
tightrope, as it must not be seen to interfere in the institutional and 
editorial autonomy of ARD and ZDF (see Rombach, 1985, p.59). This is 
virtually impossible, because in examining the financial requirements 
of the broadcasters the KHF is bound to ask questions about the 
extent of ARD and ZDF's activities, and this leads to accusations of 
interference (see Lehmann, 1983, p.767). For example, in 1985 the KHF 
was accused of trying to impose a financial framework on ARD and ZDF, 
guided by party-political motives which worked in favour of private 
broadcasting (see Funfter Bericht der Kommission zur Ermittlung des 
Finanzbedarfs der Rundfunkanstalten, MP 1/1986, p.32; Stellungnahme 
der ARD-Vorsitzenden zum Fun f ten Bericht der Kommission zur 
Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs der Rundfunkanstalten, MP 1/1986, p.33- 
35; see also Seidel, 1985, p.432; Hymmen, 1986, p.5). The main
criticism concerned the KEF's decision to ignore ARD and ZDF's plans 
for Eins Plus and 3SAT in their conclusions, because the Lander prime 
ministers had not yet given their approval to these channels (Funfter 
Bericht der Kommission zur Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs der 
Rundfunkanstalten, MP 1/1986, p.32). This was condemned by ARD and 
ZDF as an infringement of their autonomy in decisions relating to 
programming (.Stellungnahme der ARD-Vorsitzenden zum Funften Bericht 
der Kommission zur Ermittlung des Finanzbedarfs der Rundfunkanstalten, 
MP 1/1986, pp.33-35; Hymmen, 1986, p.6).
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The question of the extent to which ARD and ZDF can embark on new 
programming initiatives is a thorny issue involving the degree to 
which public service broadcasting is publicly accountable in matters 
of expenditure, and the degree to which the Lander*s undoubted powers 
in determining the organisational framework of broadcasting extend to 
allowing new channels without impinging on public service broad­
casting's institutional and editorial autonomy. In this respect, the 
KEF deserves some sympathy, as its task is not an easy one, but there 
is strong evidence that party-political forces within the KEF itself 
are leading to more overt politically-motivated conclusions about the 
state of public service broadcasting's finances (membership of the KEF 
generally reflects the party political divisions amongst the Lander) 
(see Hymmen, 1985, p.5; Biihringer, 1986). This is disputed by those 
within the KEF, who argue that the commission's decisions are reached 
by a two-thirds majority which acts as a barrier to politically- 
motivated decisions (see Rombach 1985, pp.57-58; Schleyer, 1985).
However, suspicions about the composition of the commission are given 
credence by the fact that the Lander prime ministers have promised to 
review this issue (.Staatsvertrag zur Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesens - 
Protokollerklarung, in KuR 24.4.1987, p.26).
The KEF's activities also reveal the difficulty of measuring the 
economic value of what are primarily unique cultural goods with a 
social value: programmes (see Haselmayr, 1982, p.17; see also
Haselmayr, 1982a, pp.447-448). It is already constitutionally accepted 
that broadcasting's social function, implicit in its programme 
obligations, means that issues of economic efficiency, although
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important, have to play a secondary role to the fulfilment of these 
obligations (see Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 27, Juli 
1971, in MP 7-8/1971, p.220; Lehr, 1983, p.367; Riihl 1984, p.b92). 
Public service broadcasting's main social goal continues to be its 
contribution to the process of opinion formation, and its programme 
activities are still its main pursuit (see Lange 198b, p.231; Maier, 
1986, pp.30-31). However, there is little consensus about the exact 
nature of public service broadcasting's social aims and the extent of 
its contribution to political culture, and still less any means of 
measuring its social efficiency in terms of funding (see Lehr, 1983, 
p.366). Until a value can be placed on its contribution to society, 
(an unlikely event given the differing opinions about its social and 
political obligations) the economic value of ARD and ZDF's programmes 
will continue to be a source of dispute.
Lehr argues that in spite of the need to act responsibly with 
their income, broadcasters cannot be judged by economic criteria alone, 
because they often undertake socially and culturally valuable 
programmes and activities which are not always cost-effective (Lehr, 
1983, pp.369-370). These include the promotion of serious drama, 
financial support for the West German film industry, the upkeep of 
orchestras, and the maintenance of federalism (Lehr, 1983, p.370pp). 
The risks they take are creative not financial, because the programmes 
they transmit are not supposed to affect their funding, and this 
allows them to take innovative creative risks in their programming 
policies to the benefit of all viewers, not just the majority (see also 
Maier, 1986, p.31).
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The politicised nature of the licence-fee procedure was reconfirmed 
by events in the latter half of 1987. ARD and ZDF asked for a DM20 
monthly licence fee to replace the present fee of DM16.25 (Intendanten 
halten 2QDM fur angemessen, FR 6.10.85). This demand was widely 
criticised by both the CDU/CSU and private broadcasters as a threat 
to the dual system of broadcasting and an over-interpretation of what 
was capable of being funded within the concept of Grundversorgung 
(Gebiihrenforderung als Uberhoht kritisiert, FR 7.10.1987; Private 
slgnalisieren Dialogbereitschaftt FR 3.11.1987). Given ARD and ZDF's 
demands, the sixth KEF report in November 1987 must have come as a 
shock. The KEF recommended a rise from DM16.25 to DM18.60 from 
January 1989 (including 2% for the funding of the supervisory bodies 
of private broadcasting) (see Damit offentlich-rechtliche Baume nicht 
in den Himmel wachsen, FR 30.11.1987). Once again the KEF was accused 
of interfering in ARD and ZDF's institutional autonomy, and of failing 
to take account of new obligations, especially satellite channels and 
broadcasting inflation (see FR 30.11.1987). ARD and ZDF had 
calculated that they would need DM1.5bn and DM630m respectively by 
the end of 1990 to fund new programme initiatives and participation 
in the new media (videotext, improvements to Eins Plus and 3SAT, 
Breakfast TV), but the KEF recognised a sum of only DM800m for both, 
because it considered some of these proposals to lack "Planungsreife" 
(Die Expertenrechnungen sind mitunter scbon recht eigenwillig, FR 
9.12.1987). By March 1988, the issue of the next licence-fee increase 
was still unresolved, and had been further complicated by a squabble 
within ARD about contributions to the equalisation fund (see Den einen 
zuwenig, den anderen zuviel, FR 16.3.1988).
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In summary, ARD and ZDF have little influence over the amount of 
licence fee income awarded to them, and the Lander have only limited 
influence on how this income is spent. ARD and ZDF's programme 
obligations are situated between these two factors, but they are not 
exactly defined either in terms of quantity or quality. In this 
situation tensions are bound to arise between the Lander and the 
broadcasters about the conflicting aims of broadcasting as a
contributor to national culture on the one hand and the goal of 
economic efficiency on the other.
6.2.3 Alternative proposals
Recognition of the defects of the present system for determining 
licence-fee increases has resulted in alternative proposals to reduce 
the problems of party-political interference. The two most widely 
discussed proposals have been the institution of an independent 
commission to determine the level of the licence fee and of indexation 
to remove the licence fee from the political arena.
The chairmen of the ARD • supervisory committees proposed an
independent commission consisting of members elected jointly by the 
Land parliaments and the broadcasting supervisory committees, and 
also including the chairmen of the Land auditing offices (see
Biihringer, 1985, p.l). The commission would have determined the
amount and duration of the licence fee in place of the Lander 
(Biihringer, 1985, p.l). The idea was not new, and the involvement of 
the broadcasters, in the form of the supervisory committees, has
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parallels with the Bundespost and the Bundesbahn, where the 
administrative boards determine their own price increases (see DAG 
fordert unabhangige Kommission zur Fortsetzung der RundfunkgebUhren, 
MP 6/1982, p.424; see also Bausch, 1983, p.231). Claims for public 
service broadcasting's involvement in the procedure for aetermining 
the licence fee were justified on the grounds that editorial autonomy 
and autonomy over expenditure went hand-in-hand with some form of 
autonomy in determining the level of the licence fee (see Biihringer, 
1985, p.2; Schmitz, 1986, p.462).
Under the ARD proposal the Lander would have retained overall
reponsibility for the licence fee, but would have given an independent 
commission whose members were elected with a two-thirds parliamentary 
majority a "Zustandigkeit auf Zeit" (Biihringer, 1985, p.3). In addition 
to the right to elect members to the commission, the Lander
parliaments would have retained the ultimate sanction of being able to 
cancel any agreement (Biihringer, 1985, p.3).
The proposal was severly criticised by Hanns-Eberhard Schleyer 
(CDU), the KEF chairman and state secretary at the Rhineland-
Palatinate chancellory (1985, pp.355pp). He accused the broadcasting 
committee chairmen of wanting to go beyond their powers of 
broadcasting supervision, and disputed their right to determine the 
level of the licence fee in contravention of democratically elected
Lander parliaments (1985, p.355). Schleyer rejected criticisms of the 
existing procedure, claiming that the KEF is both politically 
independent and balanced in its composition, and that parliamentary
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debate of the licence fee offered a welcome opportunity to examine the 
broadcasters' finances (1985, p.357). Sot only do these arguments 
show the antagonism between the KE? and the broadcasting stations, 
they also reveal the unwillingness of the Lander to give up the power 
they have over broadcasting through finance (see Schleyer, 198b, p.356; 
Seidel, 1985, p.431; Maier, 1986, p.47).
Schleyer's objections to broadcasting stations' playing some role 
in determining licence-fee increases are not totally without 
foundation. A balance has to be struck between the broadcasters' 
right of autonomy in programming decisions and public accountability 
in matters of funding. Parliamentary involvement offers some means of 
public control over funding, for if ARD and ZDF became too closely 
involved in determining their own finances, they might be more 
inclined to be wasteful (see Rombach, 1985, p.64; Schmitz, 1986, p.463, 
p,465>. According to this argument, parliamentary supervision of 
funding is justified because the public have no opportunity to avoid 
payment of the licence fee if they want to watch TV or listen to the 
radio (see Schmitz, 1986, p.465). The present system offers a 
framework for accountability, but, as explained in the previous 
section, it also offers opportunities for party-political and state 
intervention in broadcasting's internal affairs. However, an 
independent commission with too much party-political representation 
would not rectify this situation either (see Rombach, 1985, p.65; 
Schmitz, 1986, p.465).
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Furthermore, an independent commission would only be effective if 
it was given a sufficient degree of autonomy to fix the level of the 
licence fee. Once again, this issue impinges on the financial control 
of parliaments. Alfred Schmitz suggests that this could be alleviated 
by unanimous Lander veto or individual Land veto, but this would push 
the commission into a purely advisory role (1986, p.464). A second 
alternative might involve parliaments only ratifying a licence fee 
increase previously recommended by a commission (Schmitz, 1986, 
p.464). This, according to Schmitz, would leave parliamentary powers 
intact, yet give a commission more than just an advisory role ('1986, 
p.465).
To be effective, a commission would also require a firm legal 
basis and procedural rules grounded in the constitutional guarantees 
of broadcasting independence (Schmitz, 1986, p.684). This, according 
to Schmitz, is necessary because a commission would not remove the 
threat of political interference: it would merely shift responsibility
for setting the licence fee from democratically elected and legitimate 
parliaments to an indirectly legitimated commission (1986, p.464). 
Moreover, the decision to fund new satellite channels, sub- 
regionalisation, and pay TV are not licence fee issues, but complex and 
difficult political issues about the extent of public service 
broadcasting's activities. These would have to be confirmed by the 
legislature before any commision could take up its duties (see 
Schmitz, 1986, p.466).
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Indexation of the licence fee provides another alternative for
removing the licence fee from the political arena (see Ruhi, 1984,
p.602). This is the solution supported by Bernd-Peter Arnold, deputy
Chefredakteur and head of sub-regionalisation at HR who told me:
Es gibt eine Inflationsrate, die bestimmt wird. Es gibt ein 
Preissteigerungsindex. Es gibt viele andere Jtogiichkeiten die 
Rundfunkgebiihr zu koppeln und damit auch zu automat is ieren. Das 
heiBt wenn die Kosten insgesamt nicht steigen, steigt auch die
Rundfunkgebiihr nicht. . .denn man darf ja eines nicht vergessen: ein 
offentlich-rechtliches Rundfunksystem macht auf der Kostenseite 
jede Preissteigerung mit. Zum Beispiei, wenn Autos teuerer weraen, 
miissen wir fur unsere Autos, die wir auch brauchen, mehr Geld
bezahlen. (Interview, 26.8.1987)
Indexation to the cost of living was the temporary solution adopxed by
the British government in 1987 for funding the BBC prior to the
introduction of subscription finance, probably after 1992. Indexation
can help to depoliticise the licence-fee issue, and also offers the
broadcasters more security because they know how much funding they
will be getting. In the case of Vest Germany, the Lander could still
play a role in making the broadcasters publicly accountable, because
they could determine the level of the licence fee in the first year
and the factors which would determine its future development in their
choice of index (see Schmitz, 1986 p.467).
In 1982, the ARD stations proposed a two-stage model of indexation
(see Stolte, 1984a, p.292; Maier, 1986, p.46). The first step would 
have entailed automatic indexation to a general index like the cost of 
living. The second stage would have meant the award of an extra sum, 
to be determined by the KEF, to pay for new developments ana 
obligations (see Maier, 1986, p.46).
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However, indexation is not without problems. First, there is the 
problem of finding an appropriate index (see Rombach, 1985, p.63). 
The ARD proposal already implies that a general index would not be
sufficient to deal with broadcasting inflation specifically, unless 
there was a procedure to take account of new developments, either in 
the form of regular reviews of the index, or additional sums to take 
account of rising costs or stagnating advertising revenue (see 
Schmitz, 1986, p.470). It is generally accepted that broadcasting 
inflation is higher than normal inflation, and indexing could lead to 
a fall in income in real terms (see Hilf, 1985, p.37; Schmitz, 1986,
p.472). The choice of an index would also have to take account not
only of the quantitative value of broadcasting, but also of its
qualitatative value, expressed in its public service obligations and 
social goals. The choice of criteria to measure this value would rest 
ultimately with the Lander, something which once again would offer the 
threat of political intervention in public service broadcasting's 
editorial autonomy (see Schmitz, 1986, p.468).
Schmitz sees indexation as an option only when the broadcasting 
environment has settled (1986, p.472). Bernd-Peter Arnold sees more 
practical barriers to the implementation of indexed funding, namely 
Lander politics: "Ich bin ziemlich sicher, das wird nicht geandert, 
weil die Politiker hier einen Hebei zu haben glauben, indirekten 
EinfluB auf die Rundfunkanstalten zu nehmen" (Interview, 26.8.1987). 
The introduction of an independent commission to fix the level of the 
licence fee seems equally unlikely for similar reasons. The present 
system for fixing the level of the fee will probably continue, because
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the Lander show little incentive to change it, preferring instead the 
hold they have over broadcasting through the present procedure.
6.3 Advertising - limits to further growth
Advertising on public service broadcasting, was first introduced, to 
Vest German radio on 16th November 1949 and to television on 3rd 
November 1956, in both instances by BR (see Aecherle, 1972, p.24). A 
small amount of advertising had even been broadcast during the Veimar 
Republic before it was stopped by the Ministry of Propaganda in 1936 
(see Aecherle, 1972, p.24). In 1987, advertising accounted for about 
18% (DM908.6m) of ARD's total revenue of DM5.lbn (see ARD Jahrbuch, 
1988, p.127). At ZDF, advertising accounted for about 38.5% (DM605m) 
of total income in 1987 (DM1.6bn) (see ZDF Jahrbuch, 1988, p.205).
The reason for the larger proportion of revenue accruing from 
advertising at ZDF is historical. Vhen ZDF was established in 1963 
there was insufficient licence-fee revenue to fund two public service 
broadcasting organisations. As a result, the Lander prime ministers 
agreed that ZDF should be allowed to use advertising as a substitute 
for income which was not available from the licence fee (see 
Staatsvertrag iiber die Errichtung der Anstalt des offentlichen Rechts 
"Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen" vom 6. Juni 1961, in Ring, C-1V 3.1, 
Paragraph 23.2, p.9; see also Buckwitz, 1985, p.37; Steimer, 1985, p.l)
Television advertising on the ARD television network and on ZDF is 
broadcast between 17.30 and 20.00. At ARD, advertising is transmitted
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during the regional opt-out periods on the ARD network. Rules 
governing the transmission of television advertising on the ARD
network and ZDF are contained within the ZDF-Staatsvertrag and a 
supplementary document which also makes them applicable to the ARD 
television network (see Ring, C-IV 3.1, Paragraph 22.3, p.8; 
SchluBprotokoll zu dem Staatsvertrag der Lander Liber die Errichtung 
der Anstalt des dffentlichen Rechts "Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen", in 
Ring, C-IV 3.1, p.10). They are as follows:
a daily limit of twenty minutes a day with 25 minutes maximum 
to make up for slack periods in the summer; 
no advertising after 8pm;
no advertising on Sundays or public holidays;
no advertising breaks within programmes, only block
advertising;
no influence by advertisers on programme content (see also 
Aecherle, 1972, p.25; Buckwitz, 1985, p.36).
The rules on advertising seem to have been fixed in an arbitrary
manner and this was underlined to me by SDR Intendant, Hans Bausch,
who described a conversation he had with the then Prime Minister of 
the Rhineland-Palatinate, Peter Altmeier, prior to the passage of the 
ZD?-Staatsvertrag in 1961:
Da rief er mich eines Tages an und sagte:
“Also, wir haben uns uberlegt, wir sind gerade da'bei, das 
Gesetz fur das ZDF herauszuarbeiten. Wir haben uns uberlegt, 
die Werbung muB irgendwie beschrankt werden".
"Ja,M sagte ich, ”das sehe ich vollig ein. Wir wollen das auch, 
wenn wir genug Gebiihr kriegen, aber auf die andere Seite sagt 
die Wirtschaft, zu einem freien marktwirtschaftlichen System 
gehort noch Werbung. Also miissen wir zu einer Konzession".
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"Also, was schlagen sie dann vor?"
"Ja," sagte ich "wir woilen unser Abendprograram nicht zerstoren 
lassen".
Wir waren damals so eingebildet. Werbung im Abendprograram, in
unserem heiligen Abendprograram, kam ja nicht in Frage. Also sagte
ich,
"Werbung nur vor 20 Uhr".
"Naja," sagte er, "es muB ja auch begrenzt werden. Was sch'iagen
Sie denn vor?"
"Jetzt haben wir 12 Minuten Werbung" sagte ich "Schreioen Sie 
15 Minuten".
lachsten Tag lese ich in der Zeitung, daB die Ministerprasiaenxen
20 Minuten beschlassen haben. Ich rufe den wieder an und sage,
"Wieso 20 Minuten? Ich habe mich mit 15 Minuten einversxanden 
erklart".
“Ja," sagte er, "da ist mein Kollege aus Saarbrucken gekoramen, 
und er hat gesagt, daB sie schon 16 Minuten haben. Dann haben 
wir halt 20 gesagt".
Und die Differenz zwischen 15 und 20 Minuten das sind ein
Werbeaufkommen von DM500 Million im Jahr, haben oder nicht haben.
(Interview, 29.7.1987)
The inter-land agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting has 
brought some changes to existing advertising rules (.Staatsvertrag zur 
Neuordnung des RuDdfunkwesensf in KuR 25.4.1987, pp.18-26). ARD and 
ZDF are now allowed to insert one advertising break within programmes 
longer than 60 minutes with the possibility of further exceptions for 
live sports transmissions (p.18). This brings ARD and ZDF on a par 
with private broadcasters. The inter-Land agreement also leaves open 
the option of public channels transmitting advertising on Sundays and 
public holidays if it does not lead to an increase in advertising 
revenue (p.20). This constitutes a safeguard against advertising 
revenues falling on account of commercial competition. The changes 
still leave ARD and ZDF a long way behind their private competitors. 
Legislation on private broadcasting and the inter-Land agreement allow 
an advertising proportion of 20% spread throughout the day on private 
television channels (p.21).
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At ARD, responsibility for the sale of advertising on radio ana 
television, and for the television programming which surrounds 
advertising, belongs to subsidiary companies wholly owned by the 
individual ARD broadcasting stations. Although the subsidiaries are 
responsible for some TV programming, the Intendant is ultimately 
responsible for content (see Aecherle, 1972, pp.24-35; tfauersberger, 
1974, p.75; Kleinsteuber, 1982, p.37). Unlike their parent
organisations, the subsidiaries are profit-making, but transfer their 
profits to their parent organisations (see ftauersberger, 1977, p.74; 
Kleinsteuber, 1982, p.37>. Since January 1961, the subsidiaries have 
cooperated within the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Rundfunkwerbung (ARV), 
modelled on the cooperative system for the ARD network. Cooperation 
allows economies of scale by ensuring the maintenance of a suitable 
pool of framing programmes which can be used by all Gfcauersberger, 
1974, p.75; Kleinsteuber, 1982, p.37). At ZDF, the sale of advertising 
is undertaken internally (see Buckwitz, 1985, pp.36-38).
6.3.1 Advertising at ARD and ZDF - a source of controversy
The introduction of advertising by the ARD stations was not done 
out of economic necessity, but to satisfy demand from’ advertisers, and 
to stifle calls for commercial broadcasting (see Montag, 1978, pp.85- 
86; Kleinsteuber, 1982, p.63). However, this concession to advertising 
interests did not prevent further calls for the introduction of 
private broadcasting, as witnessed by the numerous attempts to break 
the public service monopoly (see Montag, 1978, pp.76pp). In fact, the 
issue of advertising on public channels has always been controversial
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amongst the opponents of public broadcasting, and even within ARD ana 
ZDF there is no unanimous view.
The attitudes of public service broadcasters towards advertising 
can best be described as mixed. These mixed feelings stem from the 
conflict between broadcasting as a medium of social communication and 
as a factor in the formation of public opinion on the one hand, and on 
the other hand advertising, whose aim of promoting goods and services 
can conflict and inhibit broadcasting's social and political function 
(see Kiefer, 1981, p.328; Saxer, 1981, p.88). However, generally it is
recognised that advertising affords some independence from party- 
political forces which fix the level of the licence fee, and that the 
pressures of advertising are infinitely preferable to political 
interference (see Kiefer, 1981, p.330; Lange, 1985, p.193; Schmitz, 
1985, p.26; Scharf cit. in Tempest, 1986, p.150). Advertising helps to 
keep the price of the licence fee down, and unlike the press, public 
service broadcasting invests the financial rewards of advertising back 
into programmes which benefit all viewers, rather than paying some of 
it as dividends to a few shareholders (see Pfifferling, 1980, pp.649- 
650; Kiefer, 1981, p.330).
Some public service broadcasters have called for an extension of 
the advertising threshold beyond 8pm to enhance public service 
broadcasting's financial position, but this view is not shared by all 
broadcasters (see Lehr, 1984, p.l 1; ARD: Verbetreff: Lehr pladiert fur 
Aufhebung der 20-Uhr~TV-Werbegrenzey in KuR 26.4.1986, p.8). Bernd- 
Peter Arnold, head of sub-regionalisation at HR, thinks that
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advertising should not be extended beyond 8pm "damit die
Abendprogramme, die groBen Programme werbefrei bleiben. . .weii das
automatisch zu unterbrochenen Sendungen fuhrt". However, in spite of
strong reservations about advertising he told me:
Venn es darum geht, wie wir das erforderliche Geld in die Kasse 
kriegen, dann bin ich schon der Meinung, daB wir auch nach 20 Uhr 
werben sollten Ich bin nur der Auffassung, man muB als offentlich- 
rechtliches System glaubwiirdig bleiben, und die Glaubwiirdigkeit des 
offentlich-rechtlichen Systems besteht unter anderem darin, daB man 
Sendungen nicht mit Verbung unterbricht, sondern daB man zwischen 
den Sendungen Verbung macht. (Interview, 26.8.1987)
Wow that the inter- Land agreement on the reorganisation of
broadcasting has been agreed, which effectively freezes levels of
advertising on the public channels, any relaxation of the 8pm rule
seems unlikely.
The broadcasters claim that advertisers have little opportunity to
influence programme content, because demand for advertising far
exceeds supply (see Mauersberger, 1977, p.75; Lange, 1985, p. 193; 
Schmitz, 1985, p.26; Seidel, 1985, p.430). Undue influence by
advertisers over programming is also hindered by the separation of 
advertising activities from programme production, and by the
maintenance of the licence fee as the main source of income (see
Seidel, 1985, p.430). However, ARD and ZDF are not totally immune to 
the pressures of advertising, because they need the revenue. In their 
attempts to maximise this revenue potential, they are helped by the 
fact that the ARD/ZDF coordination agreements which aim to give
viewers a choice of different television programmes, do not apply to 
the period when advertising is transmitted. At these times ARD and 
ZDF are in direct competition for viewers, and they screen similar
types of programmes, mainly entertainment-oriented, in oraer to 
maximise their audiences and advertising revenue. This type of
competition has become particularly intense with the advenx of private 
television and financial difficulties which have forcea ARD, in
particular, to utilise its advertising space more effectively (see 
Chapter 4).
The press, represented by its trade organisation, the BDZV (Bund 
Deutscher Zeitungsverleger), has always been a major opponent of
advertising on ARD and ZDF, arguing that press advertising revenues 
are at risk. To protect the local/regional press the public 
broadcasters have voluntarily refrained from transmitting local or
regional advertising, but this has not stifled press protests (see 
Aecherle, 1972). The argument about distorted competition in 
advertising formed the basis of the BDZV's unsuccessful attempt in
1964 to push through the idea of ZDF as a purely advertising- 
supported station run by press interests (see Montag, 1978, pp.l42pp; 
Bausch, 1979, p.596). Hostility to TV advertising also resulted in 
BDZV pressure to have advertising banned on public TV channels in
1965 (see Bausch, 1979, p.596).
In 1967 the press campaign suffered a severe blow with the 
publication of the Michel-Kommission report, a report instigated by
central government in Bonn to investigate press claims of unfair
competition from TV advertising (Bericht der Kommission zur
Untersuchung der 1Vettbewerbsgleicheit von Fresse, Funk/Fernsehen und 
Film, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache V/2120, 28.9.1967). The report
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established that television advertising had not affected press 
advertising revenues (see Montag, 1978, p.152; Head, 1988, pp.44-461.
These views were reinforced by the Giinther-Kommission in 1968
(.SchluBbericht der Kommission zur Untersuchung der wirtschaft'lichen 
Bxistenz von Presseunternehmen und der Folgen der Konzentration fur 
die Meinungsfreiheit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Deutscher 
Bundestag, Drucksache V/3122). This report stated that the problems 
of the press were more a result of concentration and increased 
competition within the print sector than of competition for
advertising from television and radio (see Montag, 1978, p.156; 
Pfifferling, 1980, p.651).
In spite of arguments to the contrary, the press has continued to 
argue- that its economic existence is threatened by the advertising 
activities of ARD and ZDF. Following the introduction of advertising 
to NDR's radio services for the first time in 1980, the BDZV stated: 
“Dadurch ist in der Bundesrepublik eine Art kommerzieller Rundfunk 
unter offentlich-rechtlichem Deckmantel entstanden, der die Existenz- 
grundlage der privatwirtschaftlichen Presse schmalert” (BDZV, 1980, 
p.2). Such arguments are rejected by advertisers, who regard 
extensions to available advertising time as a valuable addition to a 
restricted market (see Horfunkwerbung im NDR muB auch nach 1983 
fortgesetzt werden, AKW Arbeitskreis Verbefernsehen der deutschen
Wirtschaft, Newsletter, 29.6.1982). According to Wolfgang Schmitz, 
advertisers express no preference for private or public broadcasting 
to satisfy their advertising requirements (1985, p.27). They just want 
more availability of advertising space at the right price (see Kiefer,
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1981, p.330; Der Verbemarkt hat Platz fur alle. Stellungnahme des 
Arbeitskreises Verbefernsehen zu der "Dokumentation iiber die 
Auswirkungen der Horfunkwerbung auf das Anzeigegeschait der 
norddeutschen Zeitungen", MP 12/82, pp.789-90; Schmitz, 1985, p.27).
According to Hans Kleinsteuber, large press concerns like Springer, 
Bauer, Burda, Bertelsmann are less concerned about falling press 
advertising revenue than about the need to find new investment 
opportunities, because anti-trust laws have put a break on their 
attempts to acquire further print objects (1982, p.60). To some extent 
new investment opportunities have been found in private television and 
radio (Head, 1988, pp.47-48). This means that ARD and ZDF have to 
compete for advertising with the major press concerns on two levels - 
as print concerns and as broadcasters. The involvement of the major 
press concerns in broadcasting also has implications for the local and 
regional press. Recent studies point out the dangers to small second 
and third rank local newspapers if broadcasting is extended to sub­
regional and local areas (see Kiefer, 1984, pp.758-761). Ironically, 
small local press concerns would be most at risk from their larger 
counterparts' press and broadcasting activities.
Press opposition to advertising on ARD and ZDF has become more 
vocal with its involvement in private broadcasting. In October 1985, 
both the BDZV and SAT 1 protested against what they saw as ARD and 
ZDF's aggressive advertising activities, and demanded a freeze on 
advertising on ARD and ZDF broadcasting services in the interest of 
private broadcasting's economic survival (SAT 1, 1985, p.765; BDZV,
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1985, p.770). Their protests were especially aimed at the introduction 
of advertising on HR's third television channel. These concerns were 
taken up by the CDU/CSU in negotiations for an inner -Land agreement 
on the reorganisation of broadcasting (see Vogel, 1985, p.19). The 
disputes surrounding advertising on VDR radio and HR's third 
television channel revealed the intensity of the debate, and were 
regularly cited as the reason for breakdowns in negotiations (see 
Chapter 3). The CDU/CSU Lander sought to implement a freeze on 
advertising on ARD and ZDF in terms of amount, scope, placing, and 
transmission area.
Apart from minor concessions on advertising for the public 
channels, referred to earlier, the inter-Land agreement on the 
reorganisation of broadcasting has effectively blocked further 
extension of advertising on ARD and ZDF. Private broadcasting has 
been guaranteed "angemessene Einnahmequellen", in this case 
advertising, on the assumption that it, unlike ARD and ZDF, is 
disadvantaged in terms of reach and dependence on advertising revenue 
(Staatsvertrag zur Neuordnung des Fundfunkwesens, in FK, 27.3.1987., 
pp.18-26). The contentious issue of advertising on HR's third 
television channel was solved by allowing HR, exceptionally, to 
continue this practice until it has been given sufficient licence-fee 
income to finance its new fourth radio network (p.20). The problem of 
WDR radio advertising was solved by allowing each ARD station an 
average of 90 minutes of radio advertising daily (p.20). This gave 
some ARD stations (BR, SVF, HR) an advantage, because their existing 
levels of radio advertising already exceeded 90 minutes a day. In
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November 1987, VDR, tlie last ARD station to do so, introduced 40 
minutes of advertising to its first radio network, and a furtner 20 
minutes to its second network (.VDR-Rundfunkrat definiert Rahmen der 
Radiowerbung, KuS 4.4.87, p.ll; WDR-Horfunkwerbung; Nachfrage grdRer 
als das zeitlicher Angebot, KuS 22.7.1987).
6.3.2 The impact ..of, cQmmeECial -gorapatitifliL.PR-adY.ei^sin&
Although it is difficult to make any forecasts, the introduction of 
commercial, advertiser-supported broadcasting channels will 
undoubtedly affect the advertising income of ARD and 2DF, who prior to 
1984 had a monopoly of broadcast advertising. As private channels 
increase their reach, they will become a more attractive alternative to 
advertisers. The existence of more advertising-supported channels 
means an increase in available advertising time, and ARD and ZDF may 
have to become more flexible in their pricing policies to remain 
competitive with their rivals, where previously they had been able to 
charge high prices for a limited resource. Furthermore, within a dual 
system the private broadcasters would appear to have competitive 
advantages, with less restrictive advertising stipulations and the 
opportunity of using more attractive framing programmes because they 
are subject to fewer programme obligations, especially those relating 
to the provision of information, culture, and minority programmes.
Previous confidence in advertising as a source of income for public 
broadcasting has been based on the experience of what has been until 
now a very controlled and restricted market with demand far exceeding
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supply (see Buckwitz, 1985, p.37; Schmitz, 1985, p.27). Even nhe 
argument about the. limited influence of advertisers on programme 
content is becoming more tenuous. Stagnation in the growth of the 
licence fee and the prospect of commercial competition is also 
affecting the competitive relationship between ARD and ZDF. Both nave 
endeavoured to popularise the programming content which surrounds 
their TV advertising slots, and this has increased tension between 
them (see chapter 4). Similar tendencies have been observed amongst 
the ARD radio stations, where popular music is being extended az the 
expense of other contributions to increase the attractiveness of 
programmes to advertisers. Massive increases in ARD and ZDF's 
advertising revenue are unlikely to occur in future, because they can 
only increase their advertising revenue by increasing their 
advertising rates, not by increasing the amount of advertising time 
they transmit (Steinbach, 1988, p.200).
In 1987, radio took a 7.5% share and television a 17.3% share of 
gross advertising expenditure of D3tll.9bn in the classical media 
(press, magazines and broadcasting only) (see Steinbach, 1988, p.199). 
By contrast, the print sector, excluding the free press, accounted for 
75.2% of gross advertising expenditure (Steinbach, 1988, p.199). These 
shares have remained relatively constant since 1982 in spite of 
continued growth in advertising expenditure, lending support to the 
argument that the print sector has not suffered unduly from the 
introduction of more advertising on public and private TV and raaio 
(see Steinbach, 1987, p.169; Steinbach, 1988, p.199). Similarly, when 
television advertising was first introduced to Vest Germany, it was
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integrated quite easily, with only a slight decline in revenue for the 
film and press sector and with an increase in revenue for direct; ana 
magazine advertising (see Tonnemacher, 1986, p.139).
Growth in radio's share of advertising, an increase of 18.2% in 
1987, was particularly high because of the introduction of three 
commercial radio stations in North Germany, which together managed a 
joint gross advertising turnover of DM75.5m (Steinbach, 1988, p.198). 
Growth in radio advertising was also enhanced by the introduction of 
advertising to VDR's second and fourth radio networks in November 
1986, the income from which totalled DM23m (Steinbach, 1988, p.198). 
In television the advertising revenue of SAT 1 and RTL plus combined 
in 1987, DM127m, accounted for half of the advertising growth (8.7%) 
in television (Steinbach, 1988, p.198). In spite of increases in the 
revenue of commercial television broadcasters, their market share of 
net advertising expenditure in television is still small, totalling 
about 5.3%, compared to the 94.7% share taken by television 
advertising on ARD and ZDF (see Steinbach, 1988, p.202).
In radio, however, NDR, which is only allowed to transmit 42 
minutes of radio advertising daily compared to 100 minutes plus at 
other ARD radio stations, is losing advertising revenue because of 
competition from three new rivals: Radio Hamburg, ffn (Lower Saxony) 
and Radio Schleswig-Holstein. With advertisers flocking to the new 
radio stations in North Germany, NDR suffered an 8.7% drop in radio 
advertising income from DM62.4m to DM57m in 1987, compared to 
increases in revenue at all the other ARD stations (Steinbach, 1988,
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p.203). The success of Radio Hamburg, ffn (Lower Saxony), and Radio 
Schleswig-Holstein, which market their advertising sales jointly is 
due to terrestrial reach throughout North Germany, the limited amount 
of advertising allowed on NDR radio, and popularity amongst younger 
listeners (see Vertreter im Ather, Virtschaftswoche, 14.8.1987, pp.68- 
70). By contrast, commercial radio stations in the south of the 
country have a much harder task, because of the greater number of 
public radio stations (BR, SDR, SWF, and SR), which transmit in excess 
of 100 minutes of advertising daily on their services and which are 
markedly more populist in profile than NDR. In television, the impact 
of commercial competition is less clear. SAT 1 and RTL Plus have 
more than doubled their advertising income in 1988, but this has not 
led to a fall in ARD or ZDF's advertising revenue, yet (see Steinbach, 
1988, p.203>.
Compared to the United Kingdom, where TV advertising accounts for 
about a third of all advertising expenditure (see Tempest, 1986), the 
proportion of expenditure on TV advertising in Vest Germany is small, 
less than 10% of the total (see Head, 1988, p.42). This imbalance, 
compared to other developed countries, would seem to imply that there 
is room for growth in television advertising. However, any growth 
would probably come at the expense of the print sector, which 
currently takes about two-thirds of advertising expenditure (see 
Tempest, 1986; Tonnemacher, 1986).
It is unlikely that ARD and ZDF will be able to increase their 
advertising revenues to the extent they have done in the past.
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Greater reach by private broadcasting, its more flexible advertising 
rules, and its attractive framework of entertainment programmes wi'JJ 
lead to a drop in demand for ARD and ZDF’s advertising slots and a 
subsequent fall in advertising rates.
6.4 Product.placement and sponsorship
There are undoubtedly legislative and competitive barriers to 
further growth in public service broadcasting’s advertising revenue. 
However, there are ways of circumventing existing restrictions on 
advertising, which offer not only ARD and ZDF, but also private 
broadcasters, substantial financial benefits. Traditionally advertising 
has been broadcast in blocks, clearly separated from editorial content. 
However, new forms of advertising, which are integrated within the 
programmes themselves threaten this principle of separation.
Product placement, commonly called Schleichwerbung by its 
detractors, has become more prevalent on both ARD and ZDF. Some 
commentators seek to draw a distinction between product placement and 
Schleichwerbung (see Limmer, 1986, p.21; Scheele, 1986, pp.27-28; Head, 
1988, p.50). According to this interpretation, product placement
involves reference to products or services which are essential to 
programme content (see Limmer, 1986, p.21). Scheichwerbung, by
contrast, refers to the positioning of products or services which are 
not essential to programme content, and are only introduced to achieve 
an advertising effect (see Limmer, 1986, pp.l3pp). This distinction 
may be difficult to prove in practice, because it is sometimes
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impossible to make a qualitative distinction between what is 
dramatically necessary and what is not.
There are many different types of product placement (see Limmer,
1986, p.l3pp; Gottschalk/Scheele, 1986, p.25; Sack, 1987, pp.l04pp). It 
can be actively encouraged by broadcasters, because the use of 
commercial products and services helps to reduce production costs. 
Examples include the positioning of brand-name products like cars and 
household goods in popular series or the promotion of goods and 
services in consumer programmes (see Gottschalk/Scheele, 1986, p.2b; 
Sack, 1987, pp,105pp; Head, 1988, pp.50-51). The prominent dispiayal 
of prizes in quiz shows is one of the oldest forms of product 
placement (see Limmer, 1986, p.14). Other forms of product placement 
are less subject to control by the broadcasting stations. For 
example, broadcasters can do little either about advertising hoardings 
at sporting events or sponsors' names on football kits (see Sack, 
1987). Acquired programmes like Dallas or the James Bond feature 
films also include products, for whose dispiayal private interests 
have paid handsomely (see Limmer, 1986, p.14; Scheeie, 1986, p.26; Sack,
1987, p.105).
However, unlike their American counterparts, West German 
broadcasters are not allowed to accept direct payment for product 
placement (see Limmer, 1986, p.13). Although the broadcasting stations 
are not paid directly for the visual portrayal of products, there are 
benefits in the form of no fee for guest appearances, cheaper acquired
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programmes, or reduced production costs (see Geriach, 1984, p.lib; 
Scheele, 1986, p.26).
Merchandising, unlike product placement, forms a direcx, and
increasingly important source of income for both ARD and ZDF. It
involves the sale of secondary rights to private enterprises to market 
products, usually books, records, and tapes, associated with television 
programmes (see Geriach, 1982, p.51; Geriach, 1984, p.116; Limmer, 1986, 
p.20). Agencies like Montanamedia owned by Hans R. Beierlein, and 
Merchandising Miinchen KG, owned by the Taurus Group, market the
products on behalf of ARD and ZDF (see Geriach, 1982, p.54; Limmer, 
1986, pp.20-21). Accusations of circumventing rules on the separation 
of advertising from editorial content are minimised by giving a 
proportion of the income earned through record sales to charity
appeals (see Geriach, 1984, p.114; Limmer, 1986, p.20).
Opportunities for sponsored programmes are limited on ARD and ZDF. 
However, Ernst Fuhr, Justiziar at ZDF, sees some scope for
"nichtgestaltete Sponsorwerbung" (cit. in Limmer, 1986, p.21).
"tfichtgestaltete Sponsorwerbung" occurs when there is no direct 
relationship between the business interests of the sponsor and 
programme content (see Sack, 1987, p.107). The sponsor is merely 
credited at the beginning or the end of the transmission (see Geriach, 
1984, p.115; Limmer, 1986, p.21). Some commentators see a future for 
this type of sponsorship for sporting or cultural events, which may 
become too expensive to fund by other means (see Geriach, 1984, p.116; 
Beierlein, 1987, p.23). By contrast, "Gestaltete Sponsorwerbung" gives
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the sponsor unlimited influence over editorial content. As such, it 
is not allowed under legislation on either public service broaacasting 
or private broadcasting in Vest Germany because it conflicts with the 
principle of broadcasting's independence.
Some distinction has to be made between sponsored programmes, 
described above, and sponsored events (see Sack, 1987, p.104). 
Sponsored events are only transmitted by the broadcasters, and they 
derive no direct financial benefit from the transmission (see Limmer, 
1986, p.20>. However, the cost of acquiring transmission rights to a 
sporting event, like football, can be kept down if the event is 
sponsored, because the sponsors are keen to reach a national audience 
(Gottschalk/Scheele, 1986, p.25).
6.4.1 The logic behind product placement and sponsorship
All the activities described in the previous section have one 
predominant feature in common. They all avoid existing rules on the 
separation of advertising from editorial content, and this makes them 
attractive to both broadcasters and advertisers. Rules on the 
separation of programming and advertising are contained in the ZDF- 
Staatsvertrag together with a closely related principle: that
advertisers should not exert any influence over editorial content 
(ZDF-Staatsvertrag, in Ring, 1980, C-IV 3, Paragraph 22). These rules 
were reaffirmed in the inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation of 
broadcasting of 1987 and are also applicable to private broadcasting
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(Staatsvertrag zur Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesens, in KuS 2b.4.1987, 
pp.18-26, Artikel 3, Artikel 7).
Product placement, sponsorship, ana reference to merchanaisea 
products during transmission, are all forms of advertising, but do not 
appear to be covered by the rules described above. Unlike traditional 
block advertising they are not subject to the 8pm advertising 
threshold or the ban on advertising on Sundays or public holidays. As 
such they are becoming an increasingly lucrative, market with product 
placement alone estimated to be worth between Dft40-50m a year (see 
Limmer, 1986, p.13). ARD and ZDF are often accused of self­
commercialisation in pursuing this form of financial support, but in 
view of stagnating income from traditional advertising and the licence 
fee, and increased competition, these activities are gaining increased 
legitimacy (see Geriach, 1984, p.113; Head, 1988, p.51). This reveals a 
a deep change in attitude from previous practice exemplified in the 
words of former WDR Intendant, Klaus von Bismarck, who stated:
Soweit irgendmoglich, muB vermieden werden, daS durch das Benennen 
oder Zeigen von Firmenbezeichnungen Markennaraen oder auf ahniiche 
Veise im allgemeinen redaktionellen Prograram einzelnen Firmen 
Vettbewerbsvorteile entstehen konnen. (cit. in Limmer, 1986 p.19)
Cooperation with commercial interests in the form of of product 
placement, merchandising and sponsorship is justified by the 
broadcasters on several counts. Primarily, cooperation is seen as a 
way of reducing ever increasing production costs (see Geriach, 1982, 
p.52). According to Peter Geriach, the former head of ZDF‘s department 
"Kooperation mit Dritten", production costs of DM5m for Traumschiff, a
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popular series, would have been DM2-3m higher if a shipping company- 
had not provided a ship free of charge and if merchandising rights 
had not been sold to third parties (1984, p.114). Geriach claims that 
outside interference is not a problem, because cooperation only takes 
place if ZDF's editorial integrity remains intact, and because the idea 
for a programme always precedes any involvement with third parties 
(1982, p.52; 1984, p.112, p.114).
It is claimed that outside influence is kept to a minimum, because 
the financial benefits of cooperation are small (less than one per 
cent of total public service broadcasting revenues) compared to 
licence fee and advertising revenues (see Geriach, 1984, p. 113; Seidel, 
1985, p.429). Income from cooperation is seen as a useful additional 
source of income which ultimately benefits the licence-fee payer 
because this income is taken into account by the KEF when it assesses 
the level of the licence fee (Fuhr cit. in Limmer, 1986, p.19). In a 
trial period from 1981 to the first quarter of 1984, ZDF is estimated 
to have earned DM20m with DM9.2m from cooperation with the record 
industry and DM10.1m from cooperation with private firms and 
institutions compared to a total annual income of DM1.4bn (see 
Geriach, 1984, p.116; Limmer, 1986, p.19).
Vithin ARD and ZDF views are divided about cooperation with third 
parties. According to Klaus Berg, 3ffDR Justiziar, product placement is 
a "selbstverstandliche Versuchung*' which must be resisted if the 
principle of separation of advertising and editorial content is to be 
maintained (cit. in Scheithauer, 1987). Others, such as SWF Intendant
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Willibald Hilf, would like to see more flexibility in both traditional 
and new forms of advertising (see Scheithauer, 1987).
Attempts to integrate advertising within editorial content are also 
influenced by the requirements of the advertising industry. Since 
1984 the number of available TV channels has increased more than 
threefold, and this threatens to fragment the audience and reduce the 
advertisers' ability to reach viewers by the traditional method of 
block advertising. Pay channels, which generally contain no 
advertising at all, pose an even greater threat. Comparisons are made 
with the United States, where the emergence of cable television and 
pay channels has resulted in an annual market for produce placement 
of $2-3 billion (see Limmer, 1986, p.13). The effectiveness of 
traditional advertising methods is further reduced by the viewers's 
tendency to switch over or off during advertising breaks, somexhing 
made easier by remote control units (see Limmer, 1986, p.14; Head, 
1988, p.49). This is called "zapping" and is believed to occur at a 
rate of between 30-50% (see Limmer, 1986, p.19). The use of video 
recorders for taping television programmes, and then fast-forwarding 
advertising slots is also damaging the effectiveness of traditional 
block advertising (Limmer, 1986, p.14). The portrayal of products 
within programmes can help to combat these tendencies.
Advertisers are also considering the cost benefits of product 
placement and sponsorship over traditional advertising blocks (see 
Head, 1988, p.50). For example, in 1986 the average cost of a minute 
of advertising on ARD was about DM84,000 compared to DM60,000 a
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minute on ZDF (Limmer, 1986, p.19). By comparison, DM60,000 spent on 
product placement in one episode of a popular series with an '18 
million audience gives a cost per minute per thousand viewer contacts 
of DM3.34 compared to DM19.25 at ARD and DM15.19 at ZDF for a minute 
of block advertising (Limmer, 1986, p,19), A further advantage of 
product placement is that it can be used to promote products which 
are prohibited in block advertising, for example tobacco products (see 
Schleichwerbung: WDR erwagt Schnitte bei Venders' "Paris, Texas", KuR
1.1.1987, p.8; Schleichwerbung: Schnitte bei Film "Paris, Texas"?, FS 
20.1.87).
6.4.2 Legislative turm oil
Existing advertising rules are clearly not adequate to aeal with 
new forms of advertising, because when they were first drawn up 
legislators were only thinking of block advertising (see Scheele, 1986, 
p.22). In spite of attempts to justify new modes of advertising, there 
have been problems, largely due to legal definitions which lack 
clarity, and occasions when advertisers and broadcasters have 
overstepped the bounds of what is permissible.
Rules on the separation of advertising and programme content exist 
not only to preserve broadcasting's independence from commercial 
interests, but also to safeguard broadcasting's competitive neutrality 
(see Scheele, 1986, p.22; Sack, 1987, p.114). Favouring some
commercial enterprises above others in programmes would be in 
contravention of legislation on unfair (unlauter) competition
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(Gottschalk/Scheele, 1986, p.26). Unfair competition can occur, because 
there is only a limited amount of transmission time available ana 
because the broadcasters tend to favour the requirements of large 
commercial concerns (see Gottschalk/Scheele, 1986, p.26). To avoid 
these accusations, the public broadcasters vary the type of products 
shown. For example, if one television detective drives a BMW, another 
in a different series will drive an Opel (see Limmer, 1986, p.21).
Under the current legislative environment it is difficult to know 
when product placement can be justified on the grounds of the public's 
right to know, for example in consumer programmes, and when it is 
used merely to promote goods and services. Furthermore, product 
placement in purchased programmes and events has to be weighed 
against the public interest and the possibility that programmes might 
not be transmitted if rules on separation of advertising and 
programme content were interpreted strictly (see Scheele, 1986, pp.25- 
26). However, there is a growing suspicion that products shown in 
popular drama, for instance, are intrinsic neither to programme plot 
nor to editorial content, and that third parties are gaining too much 
influence over editorial decisions (see Gottschalk/Scheele, 1986, p.25; 
Scheele, 1986, p.24). There are strong indications that programmes are 
being made which give full vent to advertising interests. For 
example, in 1985, Lufthansa, the national airline, provided ZDF with 
thousands of free airmiles for a ZDF drama production, Grenzenloses 
Himmelblau (see Gottschalk/Scheele, 1986, p.25). Publicity for the 
airline was so obvious that ZDF stated that cuts might have to be 
made for the repeat showing (ZDF will Schleichwerbung in Grenzen
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haltent FR 25.7.1986). Examples of this type of cooperation are by no 
means isolated (see Ott, 1987, p.12; Gottschalk/Scheele, 1986, p.25; 
Limmer, 1986, pp.13-15).
Legislation on sponsorship and the transmission of sponsored 
events is equally vague. The inter-Land agreement allows ARD and ZDF 
to make use of sponsorship "in der bisherigen Veise" as long as it 
does not serve the economic interests of the sponsor (Staatsvertrag 
zur Neuordnung des Sundfunkwesens, KuR, 27.3.1987, pp.18-26, Artikel 3). 
According to Andreas Schardt, Justiziar at SAT 1, this would seem to 
imply that ARD and ZDF can show only the sponsored programmes they 
had transmitted prior to the passage of the inter-Land agreement 
(Interview, 5.8.1987). These have all been supported by public 
institutions like the police force. By contrast, the inter-Land 
agreement's rules on sponsorship for private broadcasting are much 
broader (Artikel 7).
ARD and ZDF's involvement in these new forms of advertising has 
attracted publicity, because product placement and sponsorship are 
precisely those areas of advertising which private broadcasters, 
wholly dependent on advertising income, wish to exploit. The most 
publicised clashes between private and public broadcasters have been 
over the transmission of sponsored events. The broadcasters receive 
no direct payment for the broadcasts, because the event, not the 
programme, is sponsored, but there is a financial advantage in 
obtaining cheaper rights to a sponsored event because of the chance of 
national coverage for advertisers (see Scheele, 1986, p.26).
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In April 1987, ARD transmitted an international football matcn 
between Italy and West Germany. The event was sponsored by AGFA for 
a fee of DX100,000. The DFB, the Vest German football association, 
and ARD maintained that the contract was purely a sponsored event; 
others maintain that ARD was sold the rights of transmission at a 
reduced price provided that reference was made to the sponsor at the 
end of the transmission (see Agfa-Signet im ARD-Programm wirkt wie 
ein Signal zum Sturm, FR 24.4.1987; Andreas Scharat, Interview, 
5.8.1987). The insertion of the firm’s insignia at the end of the 
match was a first in the history of public broadcasting.
Hans Beierlein of Montanamedia saw ARD's new stand on the 
transmission of the sponsor's name as a direct outcome of the 
appearance of private competition and changes in the composition of 
the ARD-ZDF Sport-Kommission (1987, p 23). The BKS (Bundesverband 
Kabel und Satellit), the professional body representing private 
broadcasters, demanded that ARD undertake a declaration to cease this 
practice or it would start court proceedings on the grounds of unfair 
competition and a failure to separate advertising and programme 
content (Agfa-Signet im ARD-Programm wirkt wie ein Signal zum Sturm, 
FR 24.4.1987). This protest from private broadcasters must be put in 
context. They are not against reference to sponsors, because they too 
would like to transmit sponsored sporting events. Their primary 
concern was that ARD and ZDF should not monopolise this form of 
sponsorship (FR 24.4.1987).
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ARD refused to comply with BKS's demands, pointing to the public 
interest as justification for transmission (.ARD lehnt die vom BKS 
geforderte Erklarung ab, FR 5.5.1987, p. 16; Sponsor-Send ungen werden 
fur die ARD auch kiinftig Thema bleiben, KuR 1.7.1987; Unlauterer 
Wettbewerb mit einem Firmen-Logo, FR 25.2.1988). The BKS applied for 
a temporary injunction to prevent ARD from repeating the action on The 
grounds that ARD had broken legislation on unfair competition (Gesetz 
gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb) and ARD's own rules on the separation of 
advertising and programme content (ARD-Grundsatze zur Trennung von 
Werbung und Programm; Sponsor-FuB ball Fall fiir Gerichte, FR, 7.5.1987, 
p.10). The first allows the complainant to sue and demand, damages 
from a competitor who has made a business decision in contravention 
of standard practice, for if SAT 1 had shown the same event, it would 
have had to have added the reference to its own advertising quota of 
20%, but ARD had not included the insertion as part of its advertising 
quota (SAT 1 Mews, 20.5.1987, p.8; Unlauterer Wettbewerb mit einem 
Firmen-Logo, FR 25.2.1988). ARD's own rules only permit the 
transmission of a sponsored event if there is an overriding public 
interest and no threat to editorial independence. (Sponsor-FuBball 
Fall fur Gerichte. Einstweilige Verfugung beantragt, FR 7.5.1987).
On 30th March 1988, the Frankfurt Landgericht threatened ARD with 
a DM500,000 fine if it repeated its action (ARD darf keinen Sponsor 
nennen, FR 31.3.1988). The court rejected ARD's argument that it could 
only acquire the rights to the transmission on the condition of 
transmitting the reference to the event's sponsor, arguing that public 
service broadcasting was constitutionally obliged to be protected from
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the outside influence of third parties (FR 31.3.1988). The Court also 
rejected ARD's argument about the transmission being in the public 
interest, because viewers have no right to the transmission of a
football match, since sport does not belong to those type of 
programmes which are overwhelmingly important (FR 31.3.1988).
Concern about recent events has led both ARD and ZDF to draw up
rules on product placement, merchandising, and sponsorship (see ARD 
entschieden gegen "Product Placement", FR 7.10.1986). Both public and 
private broadcasters are expressly required to draw up these rules
under the terms of the inter -Land agreement on the reorganisation of 
broadcasting of 1987. Some commentators feel that the rules have in 
fact broadened the scope for this source of finance and doubt the 
effectiveness of self-regulation by ARD and ZDF (see Gottschalk/ 
Scheele, 1986, p.26; Limmer, 1986, p.20; Ott, 1987, p.12).
The ARD Intendanten approved a set of rules on the separation of 
advertising and programme content in Berlin on 22/23. October 1986 
(.Grundsatze zur Trennung von Verbung und Programm, in KuR 1.11.1986, 
pp.23-24). In March 1988 these were replaced by a new set of rules 
(ARD Richtlinien Uber die Trennung von Verbung und Programm, in MP 
4/1988, pp.259-260). The ARD guidelines mirror similar guidelines 
passed by the ZDF television council on 27th March 1987 (.Vorlaufige 
Richtlinien zur Zusammenarbeit mit Dritten fiir Sendungen des ZDF, MP 
11/1986, pp.187-189).
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Under the ARD and ZDF guidelines proauct placement is expressly 
forbidden in ail types of programmes including independent 
commissions, co-productions, and acquisitions CARD, 1988, p.259; ZDF, 
1987, p.187). However, this is weakened by various exceptions which 
allow product placement if there are overwhelming editorial or 
cultural reasons (ARD p.259; see also ZDF p.187). Exceptions are also 
possible for purchased programmes or sports programming, which could 
not otherwise be transmitted or if there is overwhelming public 
interest in the programming (ARD, p.259; see also ZDF, p.187). Payment 
in kind or cash for the inclusion of products is not allowed (ARD, 
p.259; see also ZDF, p.187), but exceptional acceptance of free or 
cheap production facilities or other services is possible if there is 
no undermining of editorial independence (ARD, p.260; see also ZDF, 
p. 187).
The guidelines allow sponsored programmes if content is not 
directly linked to the economic interests of the sponsor, and if the 
sponsor is mentioned at the beginning or the end of the programme 
(ARD, p.260; ZDF, p.187). The transmission of sponsored events is 
permissible if there is overwhelming public interest in the programme, 
and if editorial independence is not affected (ARD, p.260; see also 
ZDF, p.188). Reference to the sponsor has to be restricted to a 
minimum, but in the ARD guidelines reference to the sponsor can be 
made if this is necessary for editorial reasons (ARD, p.260; see also 
ZDF p.187). Reference to products (books, records etc) associated with 
individual programmes and produced by third parties is only possible
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if there is a special interest in the programme and the products are a 
necessary programme accompaniment (ARD, p.260; see also ZDF, p.IS8).
ARD and ZDF have continued to support the idea of sponsored 
programmes, arguing that sponsorship will became more prevalent 
especially in foreign programmes, sporting and cultural events. An 
ARD statement on 25th June 1987 stated that it was not in the public's 
interest "auf rechtlich jetzt und kiinftig zulassige Xogiichkeiten aer 
Hinnahme von Sponsorhinweisen zu verzichten". ARD argued that the 
inter-Land agreement of 1987 and the ARD guidelines on the separation 
of advertising and programmes do not exclude the naming of sponsors 
(Sponsor-Sen d ungen werden fiir die ARD auch kiinftig- Thema b lei ben, KuR
1.7.1987, pp.10-11). Legally, the problems associated with
sponsorship, product placement, and merchandising have still to be 
fully resolved. There will undoubtedly be further court cases on the 
subject, but until such time as the legal situation is clarified, ARD 
and ZDF will continue to operate on the thin dividing line of what is 
legally permissible and what is not. This will happen as long as they 
see their status threatened by private broadcasters, and as long as 
they see themselves locked in a financial strait jacket of inadequate 
licence-fee income and receding advertising revenues.
6.5 Other alternatives and future outlook
The previous sections of this chapter have described the problems 
associated with the existing mixed method of funding public service 
broadcasting in Vest Germany. The licence fee is vulnerable to
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outside influence, and is no longer growing at a fast enough rate to 
pay for improvements and expansion. Levels of advertising nave 
effectively been frozen, and combined with competition for advertising 
revenue from private broadcasters, advertising income for the public 
service stations may actually fall in future years. Attempts by the 
public broadcasters to avoid existing rules on advertising by 
exploiting merchandising, sponsorship, and product placement are 
hindered by legal barriers, and even if they are allowed to continue, 
it is unlikely that they will ever be more than a useful, but minor 
source of additional income.
Given the limitations of traditional methods of funding, it is 
useful to examine whether there are any other alternatives. Those 
that spring to mind include subscription or pay television, co­
production finance, and the possibility of introducing separate sources 
of funding for the private and public broadcasting systems.
Pay or subscription television allows the viewer to pay directly 
for the reception of a TV channel or individual programmes (usually 
called pay-per-view). This is common in the United States, where the 
widespread use of cable television has enabled electronically metered 
systems of direct payment (see Hollins, 1984, pp.!77pp). The most 
famous pay-TV channel in the United States is Home Box Office (HBO), 
a subscription feature-film service, but subscription has also been 
used for arts, pornography and sports channels. In Europe, the most 
successful pay service is the French feature film channel, Canal Plus. 
This is delivered terrestrially, but access is controlled by a decoding
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system. Subscription already forms the financial basis of several 
European satellite-delivered feature-film services, notably Sky ftovies 
in the United Kingdom, Filmnet in Scandanavia and the Benelux 
countries, and more recently the Vest German version of Teieclub, 
owned by the Taurus Group. Apart from the advantage of charging 
consumers directly for the reception of TV programmes, something 
which is not possible in advertising or licence-fee funded systems, 
pay-TV is also seen as a useful way of avoiding intrusive advertising. 
This is one of the main reasons behind its phenomenal growth in the 
United States. In the United Kingdom, subscription finance is 
currently being envisaged as a means of funding the BBC in place of 
the licence fee.
Co-productions are also becoming an important source of funding 
for feature-film and television projects, helping to spread financial 
risk, particularly of expensive drama productions (see Ungureit, 1987, 
p.53). Some distinction should be made between co-productions and co­
funding. Co-funding, as the name infers, relates to a financial 
contribution towards production costs. In return the co-funder 
receives a share of income from sales, and the right to transmit the 
programme. Pre-buying, a form of co-funding, entails putting money 
"up front" in return for acquisition rights. Co-production proper 
involves cooperation in production at the level of management, 
facilities, and funding. Co-production does, however, have some 
negative consequences. Primary amongst these is the threat to 
national identity and culture, because international co-productions 
tend to appeal to a homogenised international audience (see ftaier,
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1986, p.50; see also Ungureit, 1987, p.53). Co-productions also carry 
a stronger risk of editorial interference. At an economic level, they 
carry the disadvantage of dilution of rights (see Maier, 1986, p.49).
At ZDF, co-productions accounted for 1.6% of all transmissions in 
1987 (ZDF Jahrbuch, 1987, p.144). Most of these were international 
co-productions involving other European broadcasting stations, 
including East European broadcasters (Ungureit, 1986, pp.64-55). One 
of the most interesting projects has been the formation of a co­
production consortium involving European public broadcasters, ORF, 
SRG, RAI, Antenne 2, Channel 4, and the Spanish broadcaster, RTVS, for 
the production of European series (see Ungureit, 1987, p.60). This was 
established in 1985 with a fund of DM156m in order to promote 
European drama and make European broadcasters less dependent on the 
international (mainly US dominated) programme market (see Ungureit,
1987, p.60). Each station donates programmes to the consortium. One, 
the Eurocops series, has already been completed and was shown in 
November 1988. In 1987, other income, of which co-production finance 
is only a small part together with programme sales and income from 
merchandising, accounted for only 1.4% (DM22.4m) of ZDF’s total income 
of DM1,573m (ZDF Jahrbuch, 1988, p.205).
At ARD, a distinction is made between Ko-Praduktion and Ko- 
Eigenproduktion (ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, p.351). The former refers to 
programmes whose funding and/or production is undertaken bath by an 
ARD station and by another partner. The latter refers to programmes 
whose production is undertaken almost exclusively by the ARD station,
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with co-funding by an external partner. In 1987, Ko-Froduktionen 
accounted for 5.9% of all transmissions on the ARD television network, 
with Ko-Eigenproduktionen accounting for a further 2.9% (excluding 
repeats) (ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, p.353). ARD income from co-production 
and co-funding amounted to DM49.5m in 1987, less than one per cent of 
ARD's total income (DM5141m) in 1987 (ARD Jahrbuch, 1988, p.308).
Although co-productions are growing as a source of programming on 
ARD and ZDF (see Maier, 1986, p.50), they are really only suited to 
certain types of programmes, predominantly drama and sometimes 
documentaries. This is primarily because of the logistics of co­
production, involving different partners often with different 
objectives. The financial benefits, although useful for the production 
of top quality drama, are minimal compared to income from the licence 
fee and advertising. It is therefore unlikely that co-production 
finance will ever be more than a peripheral source of income.
The principle of separate sources of funding has its origins in the 
United Kingdom. The idea behind this is that no broadcasting 
organisation should be forced to compete for its funding with an
organisation of the same stature. For example, the BBC is funded by
the licence fee, the ITV network is funded by the sale of advertising 
space, and Channel 4 is funded by a subscription from the ITV
contractors, who in turn are permitted to sell Channel 4's advertising 
space. The advantage of such a system is that broadcasters are 
partially freed from having to worry about their source of' funding and 
can concentrate on the provision of programmes. If they were to
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compete for the same source of funding, it is commonly believed, that 
they would then attempt to show similar types of programming in order 
to maximise their audiences and as a result, their advertising revenue 
(see Broadcasting Research Unit, 1985, pp. 15-18). Although this 
system has its supporters in the United Kingdom, it is slowly being 
dismantled by the emergence of new broadcasting channels, ana by 
government attempts to deregulate the broadcasting market.
Some of these alternative methods of funding, especially pay 
television and separate sources of funding, have been promoted within 
Vest Germany, with the Monopoly Commission (Monopolkommission) 
playing a leading role in the debate. The Commission, whose members 
are drawn from academe, business, and the trade union movement, is 
appointed by central government, and reports every two years on 
monopolistic tendencies in the Vest German economy (see Kiefer, 1981a, 
p.821; Kammann, 1986, p.7). In 1981, it published a special report on 
the competitive implications arising from the introduction of private 
broadcasting. The report was a response to the Constitutional Court's 
1981 ruling, which had relaxed constitutional requirements on private 
broadcasting (Monopolkommission, 1981; see also Kiefer, 1981a,
pp.821pp).
The Monopoly Commission rejected advertising as a source of 
funding for private television, because of the possible negative 
influence which advertisers might exert over the process of opinion 
formation (Monopolkommission, 1981, pp.21-24). Instead it recommended 
pay television, adding that pay television gave programmes a real
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economic value by promoting direct transactions with the viewer, thus 
countering the idea that advertising-funded broadcasting is basically 
free (1981, p.22). Those programmes which were most popular would 
then be offered at a correspondingly low cost (1981, pp.22-23). The 
Commission felt that pay television would benefit minority interests, 
provided that viewers were willing to pay extra for their viewing 
preferences (1981, p.23). Advertising-funded broadcasting, on the 
other hand, was felt to be more likely to encourage ratings battles 
and uniformity in programming content, because of pressures to 
maximise audiences in order to maximise advertising revenue (1981, 
p.23). The Commission added that minorities would probably be ignored 
under such a system, because they are too small to attract advertising 
revenue (1981, p.23).
The Commission also rejected advertising as a source of funding 
for private broadcasting on competitive grounds (1981, p.24). It was 
felt that advertising was not sufficiently informative to allow 
consumers a rational choice from a range of goods and services, and 
that its suggestive character is essentially manipulative (1981, p.2S). 
This tended to favour large firms with large advertising budgets 
rather than new market entrants or smaller companies (1981, p.26). 
For this reason, the Commission stated a preference for limits on 
advertising or even its passible removal from the public service 
stations (1981, p.26).
The Commission's proposals on pay television were too radical to 
gain support amongst broadcasters and politicians, and it drew mixed
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reactions (see Kiefer, 1981a, pp.821pp). For one thing, in 1981 cable 
television, which would have allowed the introduction of pay ■celevision 
on a wide scale, was virtually non-existent in Vest Germany, and is 
still not available to even half of all Vest German households in 
1988. Doubts were raised about the ability of pay television to raise 
levels of diversity in programming content, and the United States was 
used as an example of pay television being used to promote populist 
programming, chiefly feature films (see Kiefer, 1981a, pp.823pp>. It 
was also argued that a system of private television financed solely by 
subscription would promote populist programming, leaving less 
profitable areas like educational, informational, and minority 
programmes to the public service broadcasters, who in turn would be 
forced to become "niche" channels (see Kiefer, 1981a, pp.823-824). The 
argument that pay television would benefit minorities has a basic flaw 
which is even implied by the Commission's findings. Only those 
minorities of taste which are prepared to pay for their programme 
preferences would be given more choice. Those minorities which are 
socially disadvantaged would be financially precluded from greater 
choice, and perhaps forced to become increasingly reliant on a poorer 
quality public service broadcasting system. The arguments in favour 
of pay television would also appear to contradict Constitutional Court 
rulings about not leaving the regulation of broadcasting solely to the 
market or in this case consumer choice. Broadcasters play an 
essential role in the formation of opinion for the benefit of all, not 
just those who are prepared to pay for this privilege (see Kiefer, 
1981a, p.822),
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Given the fact that subscription-funded, channels are more likely to 
rely on popular programmes like feature films and light entertainment, 
pay television might encourage programme inflation which w o u L.g  price 
the public stations out of the market altogether (see Kiefer, 1981a, 
p.824). The viewer would then be forced either to do without these 
programmes or to pay extra for programmes which had previously been 
generally available (Kiefer, 1981a, p.824). The Commission's proposals 
also have to be criticised for ignoring the competitive realities of a 
broadcasting environment which is no longer restricted to national 
markets. If Vest Germany were to ban advertising on its private 
television channels, there is nothing to stop foreign channels beaming 
into Vest Germany via satellite (or even terrestrially) and soaking up 
domestic advertising budgets.
In its sixth and latest report, the Commission recommended that 
separate sources of finance be introduced for private and public 
television with ARD and ZDF supported by the licence fee, and private 
broadcasting by advertising Gtonopolkommission, 1987; Monopol- 
kommlssion: Rundfunkanstalten sollen auf Werbung verzichten, KuR
26.7.1986, p.9; Konopolkommision empfiehlt werbefreien bffentlich- 
rechtlicben Rundfunk, FK 1.8.1986, p.14). This, it was believed, would 
encourage a complementary rather than a competitive relationship 
between private and public broadcasters, because they would then be 
competing in the provision of programmes, rather than for advertising 
revenue (see Monopolkommission, 1987, p.126). The Commission only saw 
a competitive market for advertising not for programmes, because there 
was no direct financial relationship between programme provicers and
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consumers (Monopolkommission, 1987, p/125). It argued that if public 
service broadcasting was free of advertising it would then be bexter 
able to fulfil its "kulturpolitischer Auftrag" without having to worry 
about commercial interests (Monopolkommission, 1987, p.126). If, 
however, ARD and ZDF were forced to compete with the private staxions 
for advertising revenue, the Commission feared that both might be 
forced to neglect their public service obligations to satisfy 
commercial criteria.
The Commission's arguments for the removal of adverxising from ARD 
and ZDF were remarkably similar to those advanced in the United 
Kingdom for the separation of funding sources, and most recenxly 
endorsed by the government-appointed Peacock Committee which rejected 
advertising on the BBC for reasons of programme diversity. The 
Monopoly Commission's recommendation constituted a radical change 
from its earlier report of 1981. In this report, the Commission had 
only rejected advertising on private broadcasting, recommending 
subscription instead as a way of securing programme diversity. The 
Commission had now dropped its earlier proposal in order to reflect 
the realities of a system of private broadcasting, which is largely 
funded by advertising revenues and the economic unlikelihood of pay 
television being introduced (Monopolkommission, 1987, p.126). The 
Commission stated that it would have still preferred a total ban on 
advertising, because it resulted in less programme diversity, but it 
felt that it was unlikely that advertising would ever be dropped.
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Like the 1981 report, the Xonopoly Commission's sixth report met 
with a certain amount of criticism - much of it justified (see 
Karamann, 1986; Veder, 1986). Uwe Kammann recognises some of the 
advantages of separate sources of funding, and he uses the United 
Kingdom as an example, but he feels that the Commission capitulated to 
existing developments (1986, p.7). Separate sources of funding can 
act as a barrier to undue influence by advertisers, because audience 
maximisation is not the principle aim, as is the case at Channel 4 
(Kammann, 1986, p.8). However, it is doubtful whether the British 
model could be successfully imported into Vest Germany, because the 
tradition of mixed funding for public service broadcasting is too 
deeply entrenched (see Kammann, 1986, p.8).
If advertising were removed from ARD and ZDF it would certainly 
render them more vulnerable to the political machinations which 
surround the procedure for fixing the licence fee (Kammann, 1986, 
pp.7-8; Veder, 1986, pp.645-646). At present advertising still gives 
ARD and ZDF a degree of financial flexibility and independence, unlike 
in the United Kingdom, where recent debates about licence-fee funding 
have underlined the vulnerability of the BBC to government pressure 
(see Hearst, 1986, pp.567-581; Kammann, 1986, p.8). It is also
doubtful whether the public would accept a substantial licence-fee 
increase, estimated by some to be 40%, which would follow the removal 
of advertising from the public channels (see Kammann, 1986, p.8; Veder, 
1986, p.645). Furthermore, without advertising, public service
broadcasting might suffer from appearing to be an expensive elitist 
"niche" compared to "free" private broadcasting.
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The removal of advertising from ARD and ZDF is also unlikely to 
find favour with advertisers. First, the private channels, dependent 
as they are on satellite, cable, and an incomplete regional network of 
terrestrial frequencies, do not enjoy the same reach as ARD and ZDF 
(see Kammann, 1986, p.8). Second, competition for advertising budgets 
would be reduced, probably resulting in more expensive advertising 
rates.
In some ways the Commission appears to have treated ARD and ZDF 
as a safety net for the deficiencies of private broadcasting, because 
of the nan-commercial character of their funding. Dietrich-Jorn Veder 
doubts whether the removal of advertising from ARD and ZDF would 
secure programme quality and diversity as the Commission had claimed 
(1986, p.646). If ARD and ZDF were solely dependent on the licence 
fee their programme policies would become more subject to party- 
political and governmental scrutiny (see Veder, p.646). Reliance on 
the licence fee would also restrict involvement in cable or satellite 
television (Veder, 1986, p.646). The Commission’s statement about 
there only being a competitive market for advertising, not programming 
is rejected by Veder because ARD and ZDF are already losing staff to 
the private stations, and the cost of acquiring programmes is going up 
as a result of competition (1986, p.646).
A modification on the separate sources of funding theme has been 
the idea of privatising ZDF, making ARD solely reliant on licence-fee 
revenues in order to establish "wirklich ein System von offentlich- 
rechtlichen und privaten Anbietern. . .das ein Optimum an Xeinungs-
und Informationsfreiheit gewahrleistet und das oen standigen 
Wettbewerb urn das beste Programm garantiert" (.Burda-GescMftsfiihrer 
Todenhofer fur Trennung beim Rundfunksystem, KuR 25.7,1989, pp.8-9). 
This proposal was underlined with reference to the success of Channel 
4, a "Kulturkanal" which in "Europa seinesgieichen such" (pp.8-9). It 
would also have allowed a reduction in the licence fee (p.8 ). This 
proposal is not new, because it was also championed, unsuccessfully, 
by Vest German press interests in 1964 (see Gottberg, 1979, p.303). 
Apart from the objections of both ARD and ZDF to this idea, 
constitutionally, it is unlikely to happen, because the obligation of 
Grundversorgung is inextricably connected to licence-iee funding (see 
Kiefer, 1986, p.693; ZDF und ARD zum Burda-GeschaftsfUhrer: 
"Sommerloch" und ”Unkenntnis", KuR 25.7.1987, p.9). The removal of 
advertising from ARD and ZDF would undoubtedly further the cause of 
the private stations. It might even reinforce the public service 
principles of ARD and ZDF, but at the risk of becoming a niche in the 
broadcasting environment, and more subject to political interference.
In summary, we can conclude that in spite of its undoubted defects, 
the old system of mixed finance for ARD and ZDF, supplemented by 
peripheral commercial activities like merchandising, product placement, 
and sponsorship, is likely to continue for the forseeabie future. This 
has been reinforced by the passage of the 1987 inter-Land agreement 
on the reorganisation of broadcasting, which reaffirms the licence fee 
as the main source of public service broadcasting’s finance, and 
virtually freezes advertising as a supplementary source of income. 
Slower growth in licence fee revenues, restrictions on advertising,
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party-political interference in the way the licence fee is set, and the 
new factor of competition from commercial broadcasters, means that 
funding will continue to be the Achilles1 heel of Vest Germany's public 
service broadcasting stations, inhibiting their plans for both 




After almost forty years the public service monopoly in Vest 
Germany has been breached with the introduction of private 
broadcasting channels. Commercial broadcasting is now a permanent 
feature in most Vest European countries, and the proliferation of new 
channels is forcing a reappraisal of both broadcasting policy and the 
role of the older broadcasting institutions, most of which have 
followed the public service tradition.
In West Germany, as in many other Vest European countries, the 
motives behind the opening of the broadcasting market to commercial 
players are partly economic, but also political. The introduction of 
new broadcasting services is seen as a means of boosting local 
industries involved in consumer and industrial electronics. 
Commercial broadcasting also offers a means of retaining domestic 
advertising budgets in an increasingly international media 
environment. Politically, competitive commercial broadcasting is 
viewed as one way of weakening public service broadcasting's hold over 
public opinion by giving the public a choice of broadcasting outlets. 
This potent combination of political and economic logic has proved to 
be a force which few public service broadcasters in Vestern Europe 
can withstand.
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In Vest Germany, the history of attempts to break the public 
service monopoly is almost as long as the existence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany itself. Private broadcasting was never
prohibited, but technological restraints (lack of frequencies) and 
constitutional rulings on the independence of broadcasting and on the 
fulfilment of the same programming obligations as those applied to 
public service broadcasting, proved too high a barrier for commercial 
broadcasting initiatives. The technological problem was partly 
resolved with central government's decision in 1982 to promote and 
install cable and satellite technology. The passage of legislation by 
the Lander allowing private broadcasting and a lessening of
constitutional demands on private broadcasting, starting with the 
Constitutional Court's decision in 1981, finally produced the right
conditions for the introduction of commercial broadcasting in 1984.
Commercial television and radio represent a radical departure from 
the tightly regulated broadcasting environment of the past. The
implications of competition for ARD and ZDF are far-reaching as they 
begin to come to terms with a smaller share of the audience and with 
a rate of change occuring faster than at any previous stage in Vest 
Germany's broadcasting history. My research has outlined the initial 
effects of commercial broadcasting an public service broadcasting. It 
has also attempted to ascertain the extent to which ARD and ZDF can 
stand up to commercial competition by drawing on their own resources, 
and the extent to which their response is governed by factors outside 
their immediate control.
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The prospect and eventual introduction of private broadcasting has 
inevitably led to a review of programming policy at ARD and ZDF in 
order to meet the commercial challenge. Private TV channels SAT I and 
RTL Plus are already beginning to make inroads into ARD and ZDF's 
audience share in cabled households. If terrestrial frequencies become 
more widely available, ARD and ZDF will have to endure dents in their 
national audience share too. This seems likely, because private 
broadcasters have fewer programming obligations than either ARD or 
ZDF, and can concentrate their efforts on reaching a mass audience 
with popular programming. In cabled homes, research has shown that 
it is ARD and ZDF's serious peaktime information programmes which 
suffer from this competition. A loss of audience share for ARD and 
ZDF is therefore inevitable, but whether this becomes a rout or a 
sustainable loss depends very much on the type of programming policy 
adopted now.
In contemplating changes in programme policy, ARD and ZDF have had 
to weigh up several factors. Above all they need to convince their 
political paymasters that they deserve a decent licence fee increase, 
and the extent to which they manage this is governed by their ability 
to offer the right sort of programming. This is not easy because it 
involves a balancing out of the society-led goals of public service 
and the commercially-led goals of mass audience satisfaction. If ARD 
and ZDF diverge too far from their public service obligations and 
adopt an overtly commercial approach in their programming policies, 
they run the risk of losing legitimacy for the licence fee. For in 
November 1986, the Constitutional Court justified licence-fee support
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for ARD and ZDF, precisely because they provide programming (minorixy 
and cultural programmes) which commercial broadcasters are unwilling 
or unable to provide. For this reason ratings should not become the 
sole criterion of success for public service broadcasting. 
Alternatively, however, if ARD and ZDF fail to attract a significant 
proportion of the audience with popular programming, they still run 
the risk of losing political support for a suitable licence-fee 
increase.
The most visible forms of programme policy reform, not 
surprisingly, have been felt in television. Emphasis has been placed 
on maintaining and developing an identity which makes public service 
broadcasting stand out from its competitors, while still appealing to 
all sections of the community. The chief elements of this identity 
are seen to lie in the maintenance of domestic production, high 
quality news, information and current affairs, and live programming 
such as sport and cultural events. In this sense, ARD and ZDF have an 
advantage over private broadcasters, because licence-fee funding 
allows them to support those types of programming which cannot 
always be supported in an advertising-funded environment. Both ARD 
and ZDF have declared that they are not tampering with the proportion 
of transmission time devoted to information and entertainment, but 
they are certainly devoting more attention to scheduling, placing more 
populist forms of programming, particularly domestic drama series, at 
peaktime. For example, at ARD regional information programmes have 
been placed on the third channels to make way for popular drama and 
entertainment on the mainstream service.
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However, within ARD and ZDF, there are certainly differences about 
this policy. Two strands of thought seem to be emerging within the 
public stations. The old school, which fostered the news- and- 
documentary approach to public service broadcasting, is coming into 
conflict with those who feel that the past approach was elitist and 
might prove to be the rock on which the system perishes. The new 
school views the introduction of commercial television as a challenge 
to be met by good, popular indigenous programming rather than as 
something which has to be strangled because of its commercialism. A 
retreat to the role of a niche broadcasting system, catering solely 
for those sections of the audience not adequately catered for in the 
commercial system, is rejected. However, even here there seems to be 
an element of elitism which patronises the audience by ignoring the 
fact that "highbrow” programmes can be popular. This seems 
particularly evident in the ascendency of the populist series over the 
one-off play on both national TV channels.
In spite of changes which are undoubtedly taking place, there are 
still problem areas in programming supply. ARD and ZDF may well be 
priced out of two of their most popular schedule components, feature 
films and sport. Commercial competition has already led to inflation 
in the market for programme rights, and ARD and ZDF’s attempts to mop 
up the market for feature films not only brings bad publicity, but 
involves money which could perhaps be better spent on domestic 
production. Popular sports, such as football and tennis, continue to 
be a rights battleground, and here ARD and ZDF may well have to come 
to terms with paying more for less coverage. Information programmes,
while still an important anchor in the schedules, have in the past
frequently been sullied by rumours of political interference. low, 
with the exception of news, they are most at risk of losing their 
audiences to more . popular alternatives offered by the commercial 
channels. ARD and ZDF's genuine commitment to their public service 
obligations may well be tested by their steadfastness in keeping this 
type of programme in prime-time slots. If ARD and ZDF were prepared 
to cooperate in preparing schedules which benefited the public service 
system as a whole, the commercial challenge could be better met.
However, their own rivalry, as exemplified by recent squabbles about 
the coordination of schedules, the use of ARD's third channels as a 
scheduling weapon, and outright competition at those times when both 
are permitted to transmit advertising, all seem to indicate that this 
level of cooperation has not yet been adequately contemplated.
Beyond mainstream television, ARD and ZDF's policy of expansion 
into new areas of activity - satellite broadcasting, sub-regional 
broadcasting, breakfast TV - is not without flaws. On a practical
level, there is a danger that both organisations may be spreading 
their already diminishing resources too thinly on ventures which will 
never earn them revenue. Sew ventures also encourage accusations of 
empire-building. However, ARD's insistence on being allowed to 
continue with its satellite channel, Eins Plus, and SDR and SWF's legal 
battle with Baden-Wiirttemberg for the right of public service
broadcasters to embark on sub-regional radio, also constituted the 
defence of the broadcasting stations' right to determine their own 
policies independently of government. If ARD and ZDF can demonstrate
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that they are not just offering more of the same, these ventures may 
be justifiable, particularly where they meet recognisable audience 
needs which are not adequately catered for by either the public or -che 
private system. The cultural emphasis of 3SAT and Bins Plus and the 
regional/local emphasis of sub-regional radio and the Dortmund cable 
pilot project certainly fulfil this objective.
Even though ARD and ZDF are making strenuous efforts to meet xhe 
challenge posed by private broadcasting, their destiny is undoubtedly 
determined by other factors over which they have only limited
influence. The structure of West German broadcasting is greatly
influenced by federalism and by the determination of media policy by 
the Lander. This was amply demonstrated in the complicated, drawn 
out, and controversial negotiations over the inter-Land agreement on 
the reorganisation of broadcasting. Compromise was notoriously 
difficult to achieve because the Lander are split between two
ideologically opposed camps: the CDU/CSU, the traditional supporters of
commercial broadcasting, and the SPD, the traditional supporters of 
public service broadcasting. Throughout the three-year negotiations, 
concluded only in March 1987, threats of separate Lander initiatives 
on satellite broadcasting and the licence fee undermined the security 
of ARD and ZDF, and at times threatened to lead to the disintegration 
of the whole federal system of broadcasting. In fact, the threat of 
separate Land initiatives on satellite broadcasting was only prevented 
by the intervention of the Constitutional Court in November 1986, 
which reaffirmed the principle of cordial behaviour between individual
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Lander, and the necessity of unanimous agreement on satellite 
broadcasting, which affects ail Lander.
Closely allied to the complexities of Lander policy-making, the 
funding of public service broadcasting represents the weakest 
component in ARD and ZDF's defences. For any reforms of TV 
programming policy or expansion into new areas of activity require a 
secure and growing source of revenue. The procedure for fixing the 
licence fee, which is decided by a unanimous decision of the Landert 
remains deeply politicised, and the situation is unlikely to improve in 
spite of assurances in the 1987 inter- Land agreement that the level of 
the licence fee would be determined objectively, taking ARD and ZDF's 
financial requirements adequately into account. Moreover, as most 
homes now have a TV or radio set, licence-fee revenues cannot be 
expected to increase as much as they did in the past. The inadequacy 
of licence-fee funding is likely to grow as commercial broadcasters 
begin to compete for programming and staff, driving costs up still 
further, but they, unlike ARD and ZDF, are not saddled with the high 
costs of domestic production, and minority and cultural programming 
which are part of ARD and ZDF's constitutionally defined programme 
obligations of Grundversorgung.
Advertising revenue, an important supplement to the licence fee, 
particularly for ZDF, is unlikely to grow significantly because of the 
freeze on advertising levels imposed by the 1987 inter-Land agreement 
and because of increasing competition from commercial broadcasters, 
who are subject to less stringent advertising regulations. As a
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result of competition, ARD and ZDF may well have to price their 
advertising slots more competitively. If they suffer any substantial
decrease in advertising revenues, the independence which advertising 
offered as a remedy to the politicisation of the licence fee may 
diminish. As ARD and ZDF begin to compete with commercial stations 
for the attention of advertisers, their programming may also suffer.
There are only a few sources of new, alternative funding for public 
service broadcasting, and these are unlikely ever fully to replace the 
mixed method of advertising and licence-fee finance. There are also 
strong doubts about the legality of sponsorship, product placement, 
and merchandising at ARD and ZDF and about their compatibility with 
the public service ethos. Indexation of the licence fee would 
undoubtedly remove the issue of funding from the political arena, but 
is unlikely to be introduced in the foreseeable future, because 
politicians are fully aware of the political leverage which the present 
licence-fee procedure gives them. Similar barriers face subscription 
finance, which the public would no doubt resent if subscription 
(following the eventual removal of advertising from ARD and ZDF) 
proved more expensive than the present licence fee.
Throughout, the Constitutional Court has proved to be the saviour 
of public service broadcasting, reinforcing the principles of 
diversity, pluralism, independence, and equality of access, and 
acknowledging broadcasting's important role in shaping and informing 
public opinion. The Court has not ignored the changes taking place in 
broadcasting, and has adapted its interpretation of the Basic Law
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accordingly, but it has always maintained that the core of basic
rights and broadcasting independence are more important than any
commercial considerations or the interests of the state.
The Court's chief concession to public service broadcasting has 
been to acknowledge the deficiencies of commercial broadcasting, which 
make it unable to meet fully broadcasting's classical role of 
informing and shaping public opinion. In doing so the Court has
recognised public service broadcasting's traditional role in providing 
balanced programming, not just minority programming, and in 
contributing to the formation of public opinion, by giving it the duty 
of Grundversorgung. This has been backed up by an obligation placed 
on the legislator to guarantee ARD and ZDF sufficient financial, 
technical, and organisational resources to meet the requirements of 
Grundversorgung. However, within such a dual system of private and 
public broadcasting, private broadcasters have been given fewer 
obligations on broadcasting balanced programming in recognition of 
the fact that their commercial structure makes it more difficult for 
them to provide programmes which do not attract the type of audiences 
that underpins funding by advertising. In the interest of 
safeguarding the process of public opinion formation, the Court has
also guaranteed ARD and ZDF's participation in those broadcasting 
areas which cannot be considered part of Grundversorgung, such as 
sub-regional broadcasting. The Court has further safeguarded these 
activities by requiring that the legislator secure some means of 
funding these activities, even if advertising funding is prohibited.
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In theory the Court's pronouncements in 1986 and 1987 have greatly 
enhanced the position of public service broadcasting by rejecting 
protected areas of activity for private broadcasters and underlining 
public service broadcasting's special role of Grundversorgung. 
However, the reality is far more complex. In spite of Grundversorgung 
and ARD and ZDF's theoretical access to all areas of broadcasting, 
there is no guarantee that they will be awarded sufficient funding to 
finance all their programming aspirations, let alone their basic 
services. For the dual system put forward by the Constitutional Court 
will only work if the party-political players remain committed to 
supporting the maintenance of a public service broadcasting system. 
The advance of commercial broadcasting and a succession of low 
licence fee increases may well lead to the gradual impoverishment of 
the public system to a point where it is no longer even protected by 
the Constitutional Court. For the Court's rulings are not hewn in 
tablets of stone. The Court's composition changes, and future members 
may well interpret the Basic Law in a way more conducive to private 
broadcasting. It should be remembered that public service 
broadcasting, per se, has no constitutionally guaranteed status in the 
Basic Law.
The clearest lesson which emerges from recent developments in West 
Germany, is that no matter how sophisticated the checks and balances 
in the formal structure of broadcasting, a lack of political consensus 
about the role of broadcasting can undermine broadcasting structures, 
making them more open to political pressure and the threat of gradual 
decline (it could be argued that this political consensus has been
missing from the very beginning, because public service broadcasting 
is still regarded by many as a relic of the Allied occupation). The 
continuing and worsening problems of public service broadcasting's 
funding demonstrate conclusively the inadequacy of formal 
constitutional and organisational structures, and the introduction of 
commercial broadcasting can only aggravate the situation. The 
Constitutional Court's pronouncements and the stipulations of the 
inter-Land agreement on the reorganisation of broadcasting offer only 
a partial resolution of this problem.
In the meantime, ARD and ZDF must demonstrate that they are nor 
only able to equal the achievements of private broadcasting in the 
sphere of popular programming, but also capable of providing their 
public with some added value which commercial broadcasting cannot or 
is unwilling to provide. This will not be easy, because there is a 
strong argument against the continuation of a service which caters for 
all audience needs, particularly if the audience fragments and ARD and 
ZDF have to compete with many other alternative offerings. However, 
even if ARD and ZDF have to admit that they will not become involved 
in all new areas of broadcasting, there is still a strong argument for 
a well-balanced mainstream service. For if ARD and ZDF can maintain 
and increase the loyalty of their public, this surely constitutes their 
best guarantee of survival and the best way of convincing their 
political paymasters that they need financial support. The added 
value which would help to underpin this loyalty would certainly 
include continued involvement in domestic production, information, and 
cultural and minority programming. Yet the real key to success, in my
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□pillion, is improved high quality entertainment and drama, 
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